International Center for Advanced and Comparative EU-Russia

DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYAndrey RYABOVFro m Modest y to Globa l Leadership: The Evolving Mindset o f the Russian ElitesThe leading elites i n post-Soviet Ru ssia were socializ ed int o their internationa l environme nt during the 90s of th epa st century. At the same time, a new foreign policy community came into being. An important element of thisprocess was the formation and the articulation o f relevant interests, which took place both on the national level –where th ey served as commo n reference for the settlemen t of disputes – as well as o n the group level.Nevertheless, conflicts be tween various groups and corporate interests could frequently no t be solved b ycompromises o n the national l evel. In a number of c ases, this resu lted in contradictions in the foreign poli cy lineand illo gical and inconsequential actions of the government an d other foreign poli cy agencies.To tal k about foreign policy interests of society at large and of public opinion hardl y makes sens e. Thisphenomenon winds dow n t o a har d core interest, namely the wish to keep t he country out of ex pensive and longconflicts whi ch go with losses in human life, a reduction of livin g standards and other negative consequences. Asth e Chechen wars have demonstr ated, societ y wo uld risk such a conflict exclusivel y i f theonly crediblealternative t o w ar were the threat o f a whol esale destruction of the familiar life, worl d and public order byterrorism, regardless of whether t he citizens arri ve at this conclusio n themselves or whether it results from aconscious policy of (dis-) information engineered by the governmen t.This mindset reflects on e of the most importan t characteristic s of Russian post-Communist society. Society isimmo bile, even petrified, and it is no t ready to jeopardise the consumptio n level attained or accept cutbacks, noteven for the sake of the mo st nob le national ideals. Considering this facto r, one can say that if public opinio n hasany influen ce at all on foreign policy, its impact is never dire ct. Voters and society in gen eral represent a milieuwit h a certain ord er o f values whic h is, i n theor y , taken int o acc ount by the governmen t in its foreign policy.Beginning at the tur n o f the millenniu m, these value s have been based on the idea of Russia as a civilizatio n in itsown right, whi ch takes an independent pat h ; o f a country which has almost no genuine friends i n the modernworld and is surrounde d by enviers who cov et its riches and are afra id of Russia' s growing influence i n th e worl d .Howeve r, the attitude towards other countries is shaped primarily by national television. This fa ct is corroboratedb y all sociolo gical investigations. Tel evision , whic h is under tota l governmental contro l, is capable of generatinga hostile attitude towards a specific country overnigh t , even if it had been regarded as a friendly country before(the change of attitudes towards Ukraine as a consequence of the policies of the Russi an governmen t is a strikin gexample).I n this context, public opinion wit h its fixe d ideas about Russia' s environment and its gullibility plays the role of atool t o provide legitima cy for th e elites i n powe r. By highlighting the h armony of government policies with thesebasi c attitudes i n thei r official propag anda and information campaigns, th e elites demonstrate thei r dedication toth e popular cause and thei r resolve to act in t he national interest as perceived by the populace. In other words,public opinion performs tw o functions in foreign poli tics: societal attitudes play the role o f a passive soundingboard; they determ ine general directions and th ey are manipulated in order to generate mass loyalties and supportfo r the power elites, if political mobilization becomes necessar y. Such campaigns, however, have a short-termcharacter an d do no t af fect the everyday interests of the cit izens. Mass consciousness is neither capable o finfluencing foreign policy decision-making, if it is at varian ce with the latter, nor can it prod the leaders to takecerta in actions i n the international arena, whi ch are rational and make sense in th e eyes of the citizens, butcontradict the perception and the interests of the elites.One must therefore look at the positions of the leading elites if one asks for the interests whi ch drive Russianforeign politics. Two distin ct sets of interests of the new leading elites can be identifi ed in Russia's post-Sovietforeign politics: one that continues t he geopolitical superpower tradition, which was important for domesti cdevelopment and con sisted o f economic and militar y presence in order to influen ce the situation in certain worldregion s. The other materialized already during the post-Communi st period. I t is to realize th e economic interestso f the new elite s. It goes withou t saying that both sets are linked to specific interests of one or the other lobby.Nevertheless, bot h sets appe ar as the common denominator of all partia l elite intere sts on the nation al level. O ntop o f that, they ar e not voiced individuall y, bu t frequently are galvanized into large r units. Thei r relationshipdepends on a multi tude of factors, suc h as the economic situation and the support for for eign politics withmonetar y and manpower resources.– 3 –