Chapter 8biodiesel in Brazil jumped from 69 million to 1.167 billionliters, placing Brazil fourth in world production, behindonly Germany (3.193 billion liters), the U.S. (2.644billion liters), and France (2.063 billion liters) (ibid., 27).Growth in biodiesel is good news for Brazil’s energyrelatedGHG emissions profile, but its effects on land useand its consequent potential to contribute to GHG emissionsfrom deforestation means that enthusiasm over biodiesel’soverall greenness must be tempered. Indeed, ifbiodiesel production grows considerably in the long run,the potential for an increase in deforestation in the Amazonis alarming. Area devoted to the planting of soybeansin Brazil has increased from 6.9 million hectares in 1976to an estimated 24.2 million hectares today, of which 6.4million hectares are in Mato Grosso state, one of the twoleading Amazon deforesters after Pará (to put this in perspective,in 1976 Mato Grosso had only 310,000 hectaresunder soybean cultivation) (CONAB 2011 data).As the world market for ethanol grows, and as newtechnologies to extract biodiesel from soybeans and bovinefat are developed and implemented, agroenergy islikely to contribute more directly to deforestation thanit currently does. This, in turn, will partially offset ethanolbiodiesel’s potential contribution to reducing Brazil’sGHG emissions.4.4 HydropowerFinally, hydropower presents another paradox in Brazil’squest for green growth: Hydropower has the third largestshare in Brazil’s domestic energy supply (Table 1 above),and is essential if domestic electricity generation is tomeet growing demand over the coming decades (OECD/IEA 2006, 9-10). However, large hydropower projects inthe water-rich Amazon require that massive tracts of landbe deforested – with the corresponding release of massiveamounts of GHGs – and dams may damage ecosystemsupstream and downstream by altering river flows.Brazil’s 852 hydroelectric plants produce 72.5%(79,182.3 MW) of Brazil’s domestic electricity supply,and 311 new plants are under construction (potentiallyadding another 15,336.7 MW) (IPEA 2010, 137). TheBi-National Itaipú Dam, whose management is sharedbetween Brazil and Paraguay, alone “accounts for 20 percentof the Brazilian energy supply, providing most of theenergy consumed in the country’s Southeastern region,”Brazil’s industrial hub (Sennes and Narciso 2009, 47-48).Hydropower is key to the Brazilian government’s renewableenergy strategy, but it is one that in some casesgenerates opposition from the domestic and internationalenvironmental movements. This is the case of a proposedmega-dam on the Xingú River in eastern Pará. Ifconstructed, the Belo Monte dam will be the world’s thirdlargest, and the Brazilian government estimates that itwill produce 11,200 MW of electricity (Inter-AmericanDialogue 2011). However, to build the dam will requirethe displacing of local indigenous communities, and thelogging and flooding of 400 km2 of currently standingforest – a process that is expected to generate “enormousquantities of methane” (Amazon Watch 2011). Finally,dam construction will attract an estimated 100,000 migrantsto the region, which will exacerbate deforestationproblems there, as dam construction is only expected tocreate 40,000 new jobs – the rest of the migrants will likelybecome loggers and cattle ranchers (Amazon Watch2011). Worse, critics argue that the Belo Monte dam willonly produce 10% of its expected annual mega-wattageduring the 3-5 month long dry season – or only 39%of its nominal annual capacity (Amazon Watch 2011).Thus, Belo Monte’s long-run clean energy generating potentialmay be canceled out by its up-front environmentalimpacts.It is still unclear if the dam will be built, but whatbecomes clear in the debate over Belo Monte is that thegreen benefits of hydropower are contingent on the ecologicalvulnerability of surrounding areas.5 ConclusionThis study has demonstrated that deforestation presentsa challenge to prospects for truly green growth in Brazil.Cattle ranching and soybean farming contributed to 25%of Brazil’s GDP in 2008, and must continue to grow ifBrazil overall is to grow economically (absent major restructuringof its economy). However, agribusiness producesapproximately 25% of Brazil’s annual GHG emissions,and the industry is a direct driver of deforestation,which produces another 55% of annual GHG emissions.Finally, as stated in the introduction, each option forrenewable energy in Brazil may directly or indirectlyworsen deforestation rates in the Amazon and Atlanticforests: Soy- and bovine fat-derived biofuels directly affectdeforestation rates in the Amazon by making cattleranching and soybean farming more lucrative; sugarcane-derived ethanol may directly contribute to deforestationin the Atlantic, and indirectly to deforestationin the Amazon by displacing other farming and ranchingactivities; and the construction of large dams to produceelectricity requires deforestation and the flooding offragile ecosystems. Thus, Brazil faces contradictory imperativeswith respect to green growth, and responsiblegovernance by federal and subnational states is necessaryto ensure that agro-industrial growth has a minimal impacton the environment.This study has demonstrated that deforestationpresents a challenge to prospects for truly green growthin Brazil.Brazil will continue to invest in renewable energy andagricultural exports, but to reduce its overall emissions, itmust do so in a way that minimizes GHG emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation. More consistentenvironmental law enforcement on the Amazon frontierand other rural areas, and the effective application ofpunishments for transgressors are necessary to raise the94
Chapter 829 For a detailed historical discussionof the development of publicenvironmental institutions in Brazilsince the 1970s, see Hochstetlerand Keck (2007) and McAllister(2008).30 Nevertheless, challenges remain:many protected areas inBrazil lack effective management,most are under ecological pressurefrom nearby populations, andfew states have implemented theirecological-economic zoning plans(IMAZON 2011).31 At the time, Brazil importedover 80% of its crude petroleum,and the cost was causing economicgrowth to slow (Hofstrand 2008).perceived costs of deforestation relative to investmentsin enhancing agricultural productivity. Compensationmechanisms for avoided deforestation must also be implemented– the federal government, and state governments,may look to Amazonas’ Bolsa Floresta as a model.Finally, credits for farmers and ranchers must be strictlyconditioned on environmental sustainability.Appendix 1: details of Brazilian anti-deforestationpolicyBrazil’s environmental laws date back to the 1934 ForestCode. This was Brazil’s first attempt to regulate loggingand land occupation practices, and was revised in 1965(Drummond and Barros 2006, 87-89). In 1981, Brazilenacted a National Environmental Policy (ibid., 92), andenvironmental concerns were later codified in the 1988Constitution (ibid., 96) and in the Environmental CrimesAct of 1998 (ibid., 90). Nevertheless, these laws have oftengenerally been only weakly enforced, and have noteffectively prevented illegal deforestation.29In recent years, progress has been made by both thefederal and state governments to enhance conservationby gathering information about deforestation from satelliteimages, increasing the land area under legal environmentalprotection, and enforcing environmental laws.Federal programs such as Action Plan to Prevent andControl Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAM)and the Amazon Protected Areas Program (ARPA) havebeen implemented in coordination with Amazonianstates, and benefit from financial and technical supportfrom federal and state agencies, as well as the WorldBank, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the GermanCooperation Fund (KfW), the German TechnicalCooperation Agency (GTZ), and others (Soares-Filho etal. 2009, 11 fn. 11). These initiatives involve collectingand analyzing satellite data, promoting environmentallysustainable economic activities, and undertaking institutionalreforms and ecological-economic zoning (todetermine what lands need to be protected, and whatlands can be cultivated); and, in the case of ARPA, creating340,000 km2 of new environmentally protected areasin the Amazon from 2003 to 2009 (IMAZON 2011,23).30 Finally, in 2008 Brazil enacted a National ClimateChange Plan, which includes the ambitious goal of eliminatingdeforestation by 2040. The plan is currently in theearly stages of implementation (Governo Federal 2008).In conjunction with the aforementioned federal programs,some states have implemented their own plans topromote green growth by reducing deforestation: Acreand Amazonas have both sought to create or expandmarkets for sustainably produced forest products, in anattempt to offset smallholders’ incentives to deforest.Acre’s program began in the 1990s, and has focused onimplementing extractive reserves and creating marketsfor forest products (Kainer et al. 2003); Amazonas’ beganin 2003, and builds on the state’s longstanding Free TradeZone of Manaus to create a “Green Free Trade Zone,”in which producers of sustainable forest products havegreater market access and can fetch better prices than before.As of 2008, Amazonas has also enacted a programto pay poor families for not deforesting their lands – aprogram based on Reduction of Emissions from Deforestationand Forest Degradation (REDD) principles andcalled Bolsa Floresta (Forest Basket) (Viana 2009). BolsaFloresta supports families with US$25/month direct paymentsvia debit cards, and benefited 6,325 families in2009 (Viana 2010, 38). Bolsa Floresta also provides fundingfor various social programs and sustainable incomegenerating programs (Viana 2009; 2010, 38-42). In conjunctionwith green free trade and income support, since2003 the government of Amazonas has greatly expandedthe state’s network of environmentally protected areas(CEPAL 2007, Viana 2010), which now covers 23.5% ofthe state’s territory (IMAZON 2011, 21).There are limitations, however, to the contributionsto deforestation reduction in Acre and Amazonas: theworst deforestation rates occur in Mato Grosso, Pará,and Rondônia, while Acre and Amazonas already haverelatively low rates of forest clearing – 2,636 km2 in Amazonasand Acre in 2003 (the year Amazonas began itssustainable development program), versus 21,147 km2 inMato Gross, Pará, and Rondônia that same year (INPE2011). In contrast to Acre and Amazonas, whose ruralareas are largely populated by traditional populations(including rubber tappers, fishing communities, and indigenoustribes) and a comparatively small cattle ranchingsector, Mato Grosso, Pará, and Rondônia have large,organized beef and soy industries in their countrysides,with an interest in expanding the territory available forproduction. These states have unsurprisingly been slowerto enact policies to reduce deforestation, though recentlyPará passed a state plan (Governo do Estado doPará 2009), and the former governor of Mato Grosso,Blairo Maggi – a soy mogul and longtime enemy of conservation– recently embraced the environmental cause(Patury and Edward, 16 September 2009).Appendix 2: A brief history of Brazil’sethanol industryBrazil has been producing sugar cane-based ethanol sincethe 1920s (IPEA 26 May 2010, 3), but the development ofthe modern ethanol industry began with the Pro-Álcoolprogram in 1975, as the Brazilian government sought tosecure energy independence by creating alternatives toexpensive petroleum imports to power Brazil’s industrializationprocess (IPEA 26 May 2010; Sennes and Ubiraci2009).31 Pro-Álcool involved four policies to stimulateethanol production: A minimum required ethanolpurchase by the state-owned oil company, Petrobrás, tocreate demand; US$4.9 billion in low-interest loans tostimulate ethanol production; subsidies to ensure thatethanol’s retail price was 41% lower than gasoline; anda requirement that all fuels be blended with a minimum22% ethanol (Hofstrand 2008).Green Growth: From religion to reality 95
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