Chapter 7I. IntroductionAs international concern over climate change grows,many countries including China are pursuing "greengrowth" strategies that aim to both stimulate economicgrowth and reduce carbon emissions.1 The recently announced12th Five-Year Guideline (FYG) dedicates anentire section to “green development”. China’s green initiatives,such as conserving scarce resources and investingin renewable energy, are important and necessarysteps toward creating a more environmentally sustainableeconomy. Yet in order to assess the impact theseinitiatives are likely to have on China’s carbon emissions,it is imperative to place China’s green policies in thebroader context of its manufacturing-driven economyand national energy system. The analysis presented heresuggests that, given the rapid rate at which China’s overallenergy demand is growing, the government’s green initiativeswill not displace the country’s heavy reliance oncoal, and hence will have limited effects on its total carbonemissions in the near term. China’s carbon emissionsare not likely to plateau until 2030 when urbanizationand population growth begin to slow, and when Chinamakes more progress in its transition from an energyintensiveindustrial economy to a service economy.At the highest level, the primary concern of the Chineseleadership is to secure enough energy to fuel the country’shungry economic growth engine, and thereby keepa lid on social and political unrest.At the highest level, the primary concern of the Chineseleadership is to secure enough energy to fuel thecountry’s hungry economic growth engine, and therebykeep a lid on social and political unrest. In China, “energysecurity” – ensuring continued and expanding accessto energy at relatively low prices – is a matter of politicalsurvival. The legitimacy of the party and governmentcomes through the ability to create tens of millions ofjobs each year and raise the living standards of more thana billion people. From 1990 to 2007, 380 million peoplemoved to Chinese cities; between 2007 and 2030, another380 million are expected to move to urban areas (Zhouet al. 2011, 4). As it turns out, this task requires an enormousamount of energy. To that end, the government isinvesting heavily not only in energy efficiency programsand non-fossil fuel energy sources, but also in new coalfiredpower plants and high voltage transmission lines toconnect both new coal and new renewable sources to thestate grid. Despite this massive investment, China is stillrationing electricity and dealing with power outages in2011. The core challenge the government faces, therefore,is not how to supplant coal with renewables, butrather how to supplement existing energy sources withnew sources and generate enough electricity to keep thelights on and the factories running.The core challenge the government faces, therefore, isnot how to supplant coal with renewables, but ratherhow to supplement existing energy sources with newsources and generate enough electricity to keep thelights on and the factories running.The purpose of this report is to illuminate the opportunitiesand implications of China’s current green initiativesfor both energy security and carbon emissions. Ourkey findings are as follows: First, because of China’s needfor a cheap and abundant energy source, coal will remainthe dominant energy source in the foreseeable future,even under the most optimistic scenarios. As such, carbonemissions as a policy issue will continue to take abackseat to energy security. Second, although renewableenergy will barely make a dent in China’s overall energyneeds, the country’s burgeoning green industries are likelyto significantly impact global energy markets throughlearning and scale effects. Third and finally, the greatestcontribution the international community can make towardreducing global carbon emissions is to help Chinadevise methods to burn coal more efficiently and cleanly.Foreign criticism of – and energy proposals which ignore– China’s reliance on coal is unproductive.The rest of this report is organized as follows. First,we investigate the broader political and economic contextof China's energy strategy. The legitimacy of China’sauthoritarian, single-party government is contingent onits ability to create jobs for and improve the living standardsof average Chinese citizens. Therefore, the government’spriority is on securing enough energy to feed thecountry’s economic growth engine. Second, we examineChina’s current energy-related initiatives – includingenergy efficiency, economic restructuring, expansion ofrenewable sources, and electricity transmission – and assessthe implications for both energy security and carbonemissions. Third, we reiterate China’s continued relianceon coal as its primary energy source. China's present en-1 Given the limited scope of thiscross-country report, we confineour analysis to a narrower area ofinterest, defining green growth asjob creation or economic growthcompatible with or driven byactions to reduce greenhousegas emissions. These summarizethe types of growth that must beachieved in order to successfullysupport growth while simultaneouslyavoiding climate catastrophe.As such, we focus our attentionon those Chinese policiesthat affect carbon76
Chapter 72 In his investigation of the Chinesepolitical system, Guo (2003)suggests that this form of ‘utilitarianlegitimacy’ is a powerful legacyfrom China’s imperial era. Perry(2010) argues that this concept ofutilitarian legitimacy justifies antigovernmentsentiments stemmingfrom food, housing and othermaterial necessities, which mayin part explain why the CCP ismore tolerant of protests over landand energy prices than those overreligious and political freedoms.Utilitarian legitimacy also explainswhy the CCP places so muchemphasis on sustaining high levelsof economic growth, enhancingenergy security, creating jobs, andcontrolling inflation.3 Export industries and investmentwere largely responsible forthe trend-breaking increase inenergy intensity during the few yearsafter China first entered W<strong>TO</strong>.According to Kharl and Roland-Hoslt’s research, export and investmentaccounted for more than70% of the growth of energy consumptionbetween 2002 and 2004(2009, 9).4 These statistics only account forcommercial fuel consumption; ruralresidents in China still rely heavilyon biomass and waste fuels,which account for roughly 10% oftotal energy consumption accordingto the IEA (2010c).ergy goals represent an optimization of the current coalbasedenergy system, with non-fossil fuel energy sourceslargely acting as supplements, not substitutes, for coal.2. Political and economic context ofenergy policy in China“Green development” is an important theme in China's12th Five Year Guidelines (FYG) for 2011-2015, thepolicy document which reveals the government’s topeconomic and social objectives for the coming years.Responding to global climate change via mitigationand adaptation measures is a clearly stated goal in thegreen development plan. Yet China’s targets for energyconsumption reduction and carbon emission reductionare per unit of GDP, rather than absolute caps. Thus asthe Chinese economy expands, the country’s total energyconsumption and carbon emissions will also grow,though the rate of that growth will be modestly slower.Understanding the particular configuration of theChina’s political and economic system can help explainwhy there is little political will to either reduce China’sreliance on fossil fuels such as coal or cap total emissions.During the reign of Mao Zedong, the Chinese CommunistParty (CCP) derived its legitimacy through the bannerof communism. With the winding down of communistideology in China’s reform period (1978-present),many argue that the ability to create jobs and continuouslyimprove living standards has become the newsource of legitimacy for the CCP. 2In recent years, public awareness and concern overenvironmental degradation and poor natural resourcemanagement have increased. But carbon emissions area unique breed of environmental problem. Unlike deforestation,air pollution, and water pollution, carbonemissions have had little immediate and tangible effecton economic productivity or people's daily lives. In addition,while many scientists would argue that China’sendemic problems of water shortage or desertificationare the results of climate change, such claims are hard to“prove” to ordinary citizens. As a result, climate changehas little obvious, immediate impact on Chinese livingstandards, and there has been little if any domestic pressureon the Chinese government to reduce carbon.Energy security, however, has been a top governmentpriority, because it is critical to driving the economy andcreating jobs. The Chinese economic model has reliedheavily on manufacturing-intensive industries which requirean enormous amount of energy. The industrial sectoris estimated to contribute to 46.8% of China’s economyin 2010 (CIA 2011b), much higher than in other prominentindustrializing and developing economies, such as28.6% in India or 26.4% in Brazil (CIA 2011a; CIA 2011c).The dominance of steel, cement, electronics and otherenergy-intensive industries, coupled with double-digitGDP growth, has led to soaring energy demand in China.3China is currently the world’s largest energy consumer.Meanwhile, due to rising incomes and increasing urbanization,the Chinese are buying more homes, cars, andChina's Primary Energy Consumption, 200870,3%18,3%3,7%7,7%Figure 1: China’s reliance on coalSource: National Bureau of Statistics (2010, 2-7)OilNatural gasCoalNon-fossil fuels (hydro,nuclear, other renewables)home appliances, all of which require energy to produceas well as to use. In its World Energy Outlook 2010, theInternational Energy Agency predicts that between 2010and 2035, China’s energy demand will increase by 75%(2010, 5). Equally alarming is the US Energy InformationAdministration’s prediction that China’s electricity generationalone will triple between 2009 and 2035, producing10,555 billion kWh of electricity in 2035 (2010, 16).Though China has had a remarkable track record whenit comes to improving energy efficiency, the 12th FYG’sstated goal of reducing the energy intensity of GDP by16% over the next five years is simply not enough to leveloff energy consumption.As figure 1 below shows, China’s energy consumptionrelies heavily on low-cost and domestically abundantcoal. According to the latest official data from itsNational Bureau of Statistics, China's total primary energyconsumption measured 2.91 billion tons of standardcoal equivalent in 2008, of which 70.3% came fromcoal.4 Similarly, China's electricity production is alsooverwhelmingly reliant on coal. In 2008, 83.3% of China’selectricity was generated by thermal power plants, whichare mostly coal-fired with only a few natural-gas powerplants. Hydroelectric power generated 13.8% of electricity.Nuclear power contributed 2.0% to the total generation,wind 0.8%, and all others such garbage incinerationplants, solar energy, and geothermal power contributed0.1% (State Electricity Regulatory Commission 2009, 10).Despite massive infrastructure investments in recentyears, renewable sources not including hydroelectriccurrently comprise only a tiny fraction of China’s totalenergy consumption. Even if the Chinese governmentcontinues to commit billions of dollars of investment tothe development of renewables and other non-fossil fuelenergy sources, such installations are unlikely to significantlyshift the composition of China’s overwhelminglycoal-based energy system. In Section IV, we will furtherexplain why, from the Chinese government’s perspective,coal remains the only plausible candidate to satisfyChina’s energy demand.To sum up, the legitimacy of China's single-party governmentrests largely on its ability to sustain economicGreen Growth: From religion to reality 77
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