Chapter 6from 2012 to 2016 (MKE, 2010b). The current goal is toincrease renewable energy usage to 11% of total energyconsumption by 2030 (PCGG 2010a, 8) (See Figure 1).In absolute terms, Korea’s renewables goal appearsmodest compared to those of renewables powerhouseslike Denmark. This apparent modesty reflects in part thelow installed base from which Korea must start (Korea’sgoal of 10.7% is a 4-fold increase from 2009’s 2.7%). It isalso a reflection of the relative dearth of strong renewableresources (Korea’s renewable plans are constrained by thefact that Korea’s wind and solar potential is limited comparedto many nations.) Korea believes that, given theselimitations, it has set quite challenging goals.The third method is to produce more energy fromnuclear power plants, a carbon-free but not renewablesource. Korea is already the fifth largest nuclear energyproducer (151TWh), generating 5.5% of the world’s totalnuclear energy (International Energy Agency 2010,17). By 2030, Korea aims to produce 59% of its domesticelectricity from nuclear energy, according to the KoreaHerald (Cho 2010) The Basic Energy Plan of 2008 furthershows that nuclear energy will take up to 27.8% in thecountry’s overall energy mix. In addition to the potentialto reduce carbon emissions, Korea hopes to emerge as amajor exporter of nuclear power technologies and plantsin the global market.2.1.1 Challenges - nuclear developmentThere are some significant questions surrounding the developmentof nuclear power in Korea. Whether nuclearpower constitutes green energy has been as controversialan issue in Korea as it has been elsewhere. The PresidentialCommittee had attempted to include provisions fordevelopment of nuclear power in the Framework Act onLow Carbon Green Growth enacted at the end of 2009,but had to abandon this because of objections regardingthe safety and cleanliness of nuclear power. Still, nuclearpower is included in Korea’s blueprint for future energiesas a major alternative energy to fossil fuels.3However, nuclear energy’s safety concerns have gainedfurther saliency recently. When Korea won the bid in2010 to construct nuclear power plants in the UnitedArab Emirates, with expected profits of four million dollars,the country was excited about becoming the nextmajor nuclear power exporter. Yet, despite such majoraccomplishments, safety issues regarding nuclear energygeneration, including proper disposal methods of the nuclearwastes, continue to be debated. The fear of nuclearexplosion and radiation exposure in Fukushima, Japan,has raised new nuclear safety issues, prompting the Koreangovernment to undertake the “Domestic NuclearEnergy Security Check Plan” to ease safety concerns, andit expects continuing discussion about this issue in Korea.Finally, it is worth noting that the effect of nuclearpower on energy security is unclear. Despite KEPCO’srecent discovery of uranium in Waterbury Lake, Canada,Korea would have to import a major portion of its uraniumfrom Russia, Kazakhstan, and/or Australia. While itis potentially simply trading one dependency for another,expanding nuclear power in the country’s energy portfoliowill reduce its high dependency on oil coming fromthe Middle East. At the moment, Korea is more concentratedon tackling the potential safety issues of nuclearpower plants; potential dependency issues related to uraniumare not considered a major concern2.2 Second objective: provide an engine for economicgrowthThe second major objective of Korea’s National GreenGrowth Strategy and Five Year Plan for Green Growthis to create new growth engines from green technologies,promoting green industries."The Korean government’s choice of the next generation’sgrowth-driving green industries such solar panels,fuel cells, LED, and green cars industries, reflectwell on the strengths of its current industrial sector"Korea has the market clout and technical skills to capitalizeon green markets like those Objective One (with itsgoals of increasing national efficiency, renewables, andnuclear power) would create domestically. The Koreangovernment’s choice of the next generation’s growthdrivinggreen industries such solar panels, fuel cells, LED,and green cars industries, reflect well on the strengths ofits current industrial sector. The country is home to someof the top global corporations in many high-tech industriessuch as the electronics, semi-conductor, IT, automobile,and ship-building industries. Korea also ownssome of the most advanced technologies in related areas,and since 2005, the government has been spending 253.2billion won (230 million USD) on research and developmentin heavy electric equipment and semiconductors(MKE 2010d, 14). Technological capabilities, experience,and knowledge on market trends and consumer taste inthose industries could help the Korean firms make a faststart in some of the new green industries."Korean companies are in fact making major moves intarget industries"Korean companies are in fact making major moves intarget industries. Hyundai Heavy Industries is building a175MW (7 trillion USD) generator in what is to becomeAmerica’s largest solar energy generation project (total of900MW) in California and Arizona (Park and Lee 2010).Samsung will invest 23 trillion won (20.9 billion USD)on solar panels, fuel cells, LED, and medical devices by2020. It will also start building a green industrial complexby 2021 with 7 trillion won (6.3 billion USD) initial investments(Ryu 2011). Hyundai-Kia Automobile has developedthe Sonata Hybrid and K5 Hybrid using its ownindependent technologies, acquiring 1000 new patents.Hyundai will also release a new plug-in hybrid electric3 Private communication withKorean government official, 2011.70
Chapter 6vehicle (PHEV) model next year and a fuel cell car modelin 2013, strengthening its environmentally friendly automobilesline up (Cho 2011).The electricity and smart grid businesses also representa major business opportunity for Korea. Accordingto the International Energy Agency (IEA), 13.6 trilliondollars are expected to be spent worldwide on the electricityindustry by the year 2020. In addition to leveraginga significant domestic market, Korea can also hopeto export to developed countries, as well as to Chinaand Asia, where the markets for smart grid are expectedto grow exponentially in the near future (qtd. in MKE2010a, 96). In the best-case scenario, Korea would see anannual increase of 50,000 jobs, 74 trillion won (67 billionUSD) increase in domestic demand, and 49 trillion won(44.5 billion USD) in exports of smart grid related productsby the year 2030 (MKE 2010c, 33).With an industrial sector that is prepared and eagerto take advantage of the market opportunities inherentin capturing this new industry, Korea appears tohave the commercial drive necessary to achieve themajor transformations in energy systems, industrialstructure, and life-style changes that the governmenthas promised.With an industrial sector that is prepared and eagerto take advantage of the market opportunities inherentin capturing this new industry, Korea appears to have thecommercial drive necessary to achieve the major transformationsin energy systems, industrial structure, andlife-style changes that the government has promised.2.2.1 Challenges – restructuring the marketHowever, significant challenges must be overcome to realizeKorea’s vision of a green economic engine. Some ofthese center around providing the right set of incentivesin the domestic market and energy system. One majorchallenge is introducing the carbon pricing system suchas the ETS and carbon taxes. In 2009, the governmentannounced its plans to implement cap and trade policiesstarting 2013. Last year, the Federation of Korean Industries(FKI), representing Korea’s top conglomerate firms,strongly advised the government against the implementation,and implementation was delayed until 2015. ThisApril, the bill was submitted to the National Assembly.The government hopes to see its passage before the endof the year. Carbon tax is currently under study.Delays in implementation have to do with concernsabout the potential economic effects. According to theFKI, the proposed carbon trading schemes will raiseproduction costs for Korean firms and erode their pricecompetitiveness in global markets, especially becauseKorea’s major trading partners like America, China, andJapan are also delaying the implementation of similarcarbon pricing systems. Also, the FKI argued that Koreanfirms, except for a few conglomerate ones, are lacking theappropriate tools to measure their own greenhouse gasemissions, and the government should first construct anational carbon measurement, report, and managementsystem. It acknowledged that introducing the greenhousegas target management system (starting 2012) which allowedthe collection of data on carbon emissions wasthe right step towards national carbon emissions management,and a sufficient one. On the other hand, theproposed ETS bill visualizes the parallel running of thesystems, with graduation clauses for the emitters in thetarget management system with emission above a certainamount required to move into ETS while to the othersthis would be optional.Yet another change that the government must superviseis the restructuring of the electricity market. Whilethe restructuring of electricity markets is a complex andoften controversial challenge in most settings (see for instanceour discussion of the deeply troubled and largelyfailed deregulation attempt in the California system inour California State Case report (Green Growth Leaders2011a), some rearrangement of the market dynamicsmay be necessary for two reasons. First, better priceincentives could drive domestic efficiency, reducing consumptionand emissions. Second, it would make Korea amore suitable nursery for refining and commercializingeffective new products in these areas, by providing theappropriate structure and market incentives for the developmentand use of energy efficiency and smart gridproducts. Responsiveness within the energy system islikely necessary to support the kind of green transformationof the economy and society that Korea seeks.In 1999, the government recognized the need for amore open and competitive market for electricity. Consequently,KEPCO’s generation has been divided intofive separate power generation firms (excluding nuclear).However, while the government guarantees certainamounts of profits to independent power with PowerPurchase Agreements (PPA), generation capacity of theprivate sector has not been increasing since 2001 (Kimand Kim 2010, 13). Also, further restructuring of themarket has stopped since 2004, and significant improvementsin efficiency have not been observed. Accordingto Kyung Hoon Kim and Hye Soon Kim, the Koreanelectricity market is currently structured so that KEPCOmonopolizes transmission and distribution of electricity,while 93.3% of generation is also produced by KEPCOand its six subsidiary firms. Transactions of electricityover 20MW are required to go through the Korea PowerExchange (KPX), where wholesale price is determined bythe actual variable costs of the generators and not by amarket mechanism (Kim and Kim 2010, 13)."In Korea, electricity usage is classified into six types—residential, general, educational, agricultural, industrial,and streetlight—and each type pays differentrates."Green Growth: From religion to reality 71
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