Chapter 51 IntroductionColorado’s move toward green growth policy is relativelynew. Colorado does not have the iterative history of multiple,mutually reinforcing phases of green growth seenin California. Rather, its movement toward green growthpolicy has developed recently through the relatively rapidcreation of a supportive coalition behind it. Colorado’sstory, which effectively begins around 2000, is a short butexciting one. So here, we analyze the Colorado case bylaying out the fascinating question of what has begun tohappen in Colorado, and why it has happened.Despite its vast reserves of fossil fuel,1 the state ofColorado has recently embarked on a surprising greengrowth path. In 2004, a grassroots advocacy movementin support of renewable energy put a renewable portfoliostandard (RPS) on the ballot. Despite oppositionfrom major stakeholders like the utility company Xcel,the measure passed by slightly more than fifty percent(Broehl 2004). In this citizen-led Amendment 37, Coloradopledged to increase the share of electricity generatedby major utilities2 from renewable sources3 to 10% byyear 2015. Colorado has met this goal ahead of schedule,and has since raised the standard twice, to 30% renewableenergy4 by 2020. Among US states, this is second onlyto the 33% renewable energy by 2020 goal in Californiapassed in 2011 (Minard 2010).The government of Colorado has subsequently unveileda series of other progressive environmental legislationsenabling the transition to a low-carbon economy.The latest Clean Air Clean Jobs Act, which led to the earlyretirement of two urban coal plants that will be closed orrefueled to natural gas, is an example of such progressivelegislation (2010). Colorado's green industries have beenbooming in the past few years; the state has attracted globalgreen technology leaders like the wind turbine makerVestas, who already has 1,600 workers in the state andexpect to reach 2,200 (Ritter 2010).Colorado seems to be turning its fossil fuel-basedeconomy toward a path of slow but steady emissionsreduction, while growing green industries and creatingjobs. Although the full economic effects of legislationslike the RPS or the Clean Air Clean Jobs Act arenot yet clear, one can still conclude that the governmentof Colorado is trying to drive employment and economicgrowth through emissions reduction measures.Of course, this green growth strategy is a very recentdevelopment. Before Amd 37 passed, Colorado's legislaturerejected RPS bills four times; but in the six yearssince Amd 37, Colorado has embraced emissions reduction.Understanding the reasons behind this turnaboutis not only important for ensuring a low-carbon futurein Colorado, but may also hold answers for other states.2 Colorado timelineTimelinePrior to 2004: Multiple attempts to pass clean energyand RPS legislation through Colorado’s RepublicancontrolledGeneral Assembly; all are defeated in eitherthe state House or Senate, and would likely have beenvetoed by then-Governor Owens if not.2004: Amd 37, a citizen ballot measure calling for renewableenergy standards as well as several relatedmeasures, passes in the general election. This sameelection gives Democrats a majority in both the stateHouse and Senate.2004 – 2006: Attempts at additional green legislationare passed but vetoed by Governor Owens.2006: Governor Bill Ritter is elected after making greenenergy a primary issue in his campaign.2007 – 2010: Colorado passes over 50 pieces of legislationintended to advance the “New Energy Economy.” InMarch 2007, the legislature increases the RPS to 20%by 2020.2010: The legislature increases the RPS again to 30%by 2020.2011: Shrinking federal funding and cuts to state fundingbegin to create future challenges for green policy.3 Explaining Colorado's green growthThe critical questions in the Colorado story are: First,what allowed Colorado to pass a citizen-supportedmeasure like Amd 37 – making it the first US state todo so, and a particularly startling achievement giventhat similar legislation had repeatedly died in the state’sGeneral Assembly? And second, once Amd 37 passed,what drove Colorado on the relatively fast track of greenpolicy that it has seen, from a 10% RPS to 20% to 30%,with accompanying growth in installed energy base andlocal green business? Below, we argue that the answerlies in a combination of 1) a public advocacy programthat successfully showed several very different constituenciesin Colorado how clean energy could meet theirdifferent needs, thus building support among severalcommunities; 2) a fertile environment provided by localcenters of research and business innovation in cleantech;3) coincidental funding assistance from the federal government,and 4) immediate reinforcement generated byearly successes.1 Colorado has 8% of Americandry natural gas reserves, androughly one third of US coal-bedmethane reserves, as well as oilshalereserves equivalent to theworld’s proven oil reserves, thoughit is currently uneconomic to exploit(Burnell, Carroll and Young2008).2 Those serving more than 40,000customers.3 In Amendment 37, renewableenergy was defined as wind, solar,geothermal, biomass, hydrogenfuel cells, and small hydro power.4 The latest RPS legislation addsrecycled energy, which is powergenerated from waste heat of industrialplans, as a renewable energyon top of those defined in Amendment37.62
Chapter 53.1 Public advocacyPublic awareness and support for renewable energy, aswell as advocacy efforts from various NGOs, were indispensableto the formation of Colorado's green growthstrategy. It was, after all, a citizens' initiative that producedColorado's first RPS. The widespread popular supportfor renewable energy (compounded by early successes)is also evident in the fact that Governor Bill Ritter's successfulcampaign in 2006 emphasized what he called "anew energy economy", a green growth strategy aiming tocreate jobs by promoting renewable energy (Ritter 2010).Popular support for renewable energy in Colorado spansgeographical regions and political spectrum, and thisbreakdown is considered in finer detail below. Supportstems from a variety of sources; background characteristicsinclude the obvious ready availability of renewableenergy resources; citizen pride in Colorado’s natural resources;an independent political streak that favors energyindependence; and more specific reasons discussedbelow. This emerging state-wide popular pressure pavedthe way for the recent green movement."Public awareness and support for renewable energy,as well as advocacy efforts from various NGOs, wereindispensable to the formation of Colorado's greengrowth strategy"Colorado’s population can be divided into three majorgeographic groups, each of which has its own economicand ideological make-up regarding renewable energy. Thefront range area in central Colorado, which includes majorurban centers like Boulder, Denver, and Fort Collins,tends to be more progressive and Democratic-leaningthan the rest of the state. A survey of county commissionersacross Colorado shows that urban, Democraticadministrators are more likely to implement renewableenergy projects (Davis and Hoffer 2010), which may reflectthe stronger public concern for the environment inthese areas (and, if successful, may also tend to build support).Eight out of the thirteen coal-fired power plants inColorado are also near these more progressive cities in thefront-range area. Aside from greenhouse gas emissionsconcern, many people are affected by pollutants, like nitrogenoxides and mercury, that these power plants emit.This may stir public opinion against coal; there have beenmany protests in Coloradan cities against coal-fired powerplants in the past two years (Finley 2009; Espinoza 2010).The counties in the rural plains of eastern Coloradotend to be more conservative and Republican, but farmersand ranchers could still find reasons to support theRPS. Agricultural communities have a history of utilizingwind as an important power source (Davis and Hoffer2010). With an RPS, they can increase their income byselling homegrown renewable energy back to utilities orby leasing land to wind farms. According to one Democraticlegislative leader – Alice Madden, who participatedin the advocacy movement – RRepublican support forrenewable energy remains relatively narrow. However,the support of Republican former Speaker Lola Spradley,who represented a rural constituency in eastern Colorado,during 2003-2004 was indispensable to the eventualcreation and passage of Amd 37, and provided significantrhetorical support for the effort (Plant 2011).Finally, the western mountain counties are rural andrelatively independent politically. Tourism is a major industryin these areas, meaning that protecting the naturallandscape is important. However, these areas tend tohave less in the way of exploitable wind energy.As can be seen from these descriptions, advocates ofAmd 37 had plausible arguments to offer voters in eachof these areas. Precisely how critical arguments made toeach constituency were to the success of Amd 37 is difficultto determine definitively. It is clear that supportfrom urban Front Range and western mountain countiesformed a core part of the vote. Voting returns show thatall of the Colorado counties in which Amendment 37 receivedmore than 50% of the vote were Front Range orwestern mountains counties.In the rural eastern plains counties, the amendmentfaced not only general ideological opposition from conservatives,but direct, specific opposition from rural powergeneration coops that felt threatened by the measure(Baker 2011). A poll roughly a month before election didshow that a plurality of Republicans in the state supportedthe measure (45% favoring and 33% opposed (Fratesand Cox 2004)) and Speaker Lola Spradley in particularmade a concerted effort to reach these voters based on aneconomic message about the potential monetary benefitsthey could accrue from local wind installations (Olinger2004; Paulson 2004; Purdy 2004). However, ultimately,the measure failed to win any of the eastern plains counties,outright; and in fact, eight of the eleven counties, inwhich 37 polled at less than 1/3 of the electorate were inthe eastern plains. Nonetheless, selling 37 to these voterswas inherently an uphill battle, ideologically. It is difficultto tell whether, without efforts to court these voters, 37might have done even worse in these areas, potentiallyresulting in a statewide loss. These efforts may also havepaved the way for a subsequent quick turnaround to acceptanceof the benefits of RPS in following years (discussedbelow).Finally, a factor potentially affecting all constituencieswas the fact that rate payers in general could look to gainfrom the RPS. Amd 37 mandates a $2 per watt rebate toconsumers for solar installation. It also dictated that Xceland Black Hills, the state’s two investor-owned utilities,must produce half of their solar standards by buying backpower produced at customers' facilities. Amd 37 alsocapped the rate increase for a customer per month at 50cents, forcing the utilities to shoulder any additional costincrease. The legislation thus offered consumers rebates,potential buy-backs of homegrown renewable energy,and guaranteed low impact on rates. Later renewableenergy legislation, like Net Metering HB08-1160 (2008)and Renewable Energy Financing Act SB09-051 (2009),expanded rebates to consumers for solar installation andGreen Growth: From religion to reality 63
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