GREEN GROWTH: FROM RELIGION TO REALITY - Sustainia

GREEN GROWTH: FROM RELIGION TO REALITY - Sustainia GREEN GROWTH: FROM RELIGION TO REALITY - Sustainia

12.07.2015 Views

Chapter 5for other fuel sources. Nuclear was not a generally attractiveoption due to numerous fault lines, limited accessto cooling water, and political opposition. The statepursued renewable and cogeneration options instead. Topromote alternative forms of energy, regulators set highprices on traditional fossil fuel based energy. The statedid also embark on several nuclear projects that laterproved to be significantly more expensive than expected.By the early 1990s the state could boast both the highestrenewable generation capacity and the highest energyprices in the nation.In the 1990s electricity supplies in the entire Westernregion of the United States became tight as per-capitaconsumption outpaced growing generation capacity. InCalifornia an unusually lengthy application process tosituate plants further exacerbated the issue. Given thesources of the problems California faced, deregulationwas from the start unlikely to address high rates and capacityissues. These problems resulted from previouslyincurred high costs and long application processes ratherthan a lack of market forces. In 1996, however, thestate nonetheless passed aggressive deregulation policies.These new policies separated generation and distributionwithin utilities, required all electricity produced fromfossil fuel-fired plants to be sold on the power exchange,and promoted more open access to transmission. TheCalifornia Power Exchange only provided for spot-marketand day-ahead transactions, preventing utilities fromsigning more long-term supply contracts. While wholesalemarkets were deregulated, retail rates remained regulatedin a policy attempt to both safe-guard consumersand address “stranded costs” if prices fell too quickly.Moreover, the isolation between the different electricitysupply networks in the nation meant that even withthe incentive of high prices electricity could not movefrom the Midwest or other regional networks.While the policy did initially boost the number of applicationssubmitted for new plants it did not address theslow application process at the root of the problem and sohad little effect. Moreover, policy uncertainty followingthe legislation began to discourage private companiesfrom investing in new electricity generating facilitates.Amid this tight market, utilities were forced to bid oneven the electricity produced from their own generatorsand prices began to rise. Prices were further exacerbatedby flaws in the market structure that allowed traders withmultiple interests in the transaction to engage in marketmanipulation to drive up prices for their own gain. In essence,deregulation policies combined with market manipulationand political incapacity greatly exacerbatedCalifornia’s electricity concerns and plunged the stateinto crisis.California politicians proved unwilling to make thedifficult and unpopular choices needed to avoid deepeningthe crisis. As deregulated wholesale prices reachedrecord highs retail prices remained regulated forcing utilitiesto take substantial losses in the transaction. Despitepleas from the utilities, the Governor and Legislature refusedto deregulate retail prices, fearing consumer backlash.This culminated in one of the state’s largest utilities,Pacific Gas and Electric, filing for bankruptcy. Then asprices spiked the state choose to reverse course and negotiatelong-term electricity contracts, thereby locking inunfavorable rates for several decades."Moreover, the isolation between the different electricitysupply networks in the nation meant that even withthe incentive of high prices electricity could not movefrom the Midwest or other regional networks"California’s electricity deregulation further tightenedalready tight electricity supplies in the West. Growth indemand had begun outpacing growth in supply throughoutthe Pacific region over the decade leading up tothe electricity crisis. While most states responded byensuring electricity supply through generation facilitiesor medium-to long-term contacts, California utilitieswere mandated to use spot markets. Deregulationpolicies specifically disallowed use of long-term supplycontracts by Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs). IOUs hadpreviously used such contracts as a hedging method tobuffer against price and supply volatility. This was compoundedby the fact that unlike many of the other statesin the region, which were either self-sufficient or net exporters,California imported about 25% of its electricity.When electricity supply fell considerably in 2000 due todrought in the hydro-powered Pacific North West, a lackof capacity, and political uncertainty, California was leftparticularly vulnerable."Local deregulation can go very badly if it is not supportedby policy at the regional and/or national level."Two implications relevant to green growth policy canbe drawn out from this story. First, restructuring energymarkets, necessary for many states’ green growth plans, isa difficult process fraught with the potential for unintendedconsequences. Second, and related - one particulardifficulty is that trying to transform one part of a systemwithout a full assessment of how that part will interactwith the rest of the system can create problems. Californiais part of a national and regional energy system, andthis link provided a troublesome conflict between localand regional practices. Local deregulation can go verybadly if it is not supported by policy at the regional and/or national level.2.3 The next generation: venture capital, green policy,and green energy marketsCalifornia arrives at the present day with two major legaciesfrom its past. The first is the result of the narrativethat has occupied the previous two sections: California’shistory of successful leadership, within the context of theUS, in pollution and energy efficiency policy and resul-54

Chapter 5ting regulatory infrastructure. This experience has madeit more willing and able to enact green policy that will loweremissions and build green markets. This enables thepassage of market-creating green policy such as AB32,discussed below.The second derives from California’s general economichistory of successful innovation and new businesscreation. This background and its commercial infrastructurelegacy prepares California to undertake a newwave of business creation in a highly technical field suchas clean tech, embarking on a new stage of growth whereemissions reductions drive growth. Below, we discussCalifornia’s business legacy – the venture capital communityand associated resources. We then review AB32 andthe green policy that this environment makes possible.We next discuss how the clean tech venture capital industryhas grown over the last few years in tandem withgreen policy. We conclude by discussing some challengesfacing California.2.3.1 Finding a new home for venture capitalCalifornia’s venture capital (VC) community is a prominentpart of its economic landscape. The state’s traditionof tech-based entrepreneurship, venture capital investment,and innovation means California has in place thefinancial expertise, related services, and intellectual infrastructureto support a thriving high-tech VC community,and constituencies in place who stand to profit fromVC activities (Randolph 2011; Lecar 2011). This VCcommunity has a strong backing in technical know-howlocal to the state: in the last half century production inthe state has increasingly shifted away from heavy manufacturingand increased emphasis on innovation andhigh-tech light manufacturing (Sudarshan and Sweeney2008). In addition, California’s strong network of researchand innovation centers, such as the national labsand the University of California system, support researchand discovery at a basic level and help nurture a communityof scientists and engineers.This existing VC community was a critical and fullyinvolved participant in the information technology industryboom in California. As that wave of new industrygrowth drew to a close, however, the VC machinerywas in a sense left idling. With the community and itseconomic infrastructure ready and waiting, VC participantsbegan searching for the next major investmentwave (Lecar 2011). This search has led business intereststo focus on green technology as a possible new engineof growth in the state. The potential to capture even asmall portion of the $5 trillion global energy market withthe rising demand for clean tech has proved seductive tomany venture capital firms. Firms hope to earn high returnsby being able to provide the most advanced cleantech technologies to a rapidly growing, policy driven,market (Huberty et al. 2011). California’s existing VCcommunity thus provides a driving force for California’sinvolvement in clean tech, as well as a fertile environmentin which to begin new high-tech businesses (withsome caveats, discussed below).AB32 and associated green policyAssembly Bill 32 orders the reduction of California GHGemissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a 30 percent reductionfrom projected business-as-usual levels. The bill furtherrequires an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissionsby 2050. It intends to meet these goals through the oversightand implementation of a suite of new and existingstate laws and policy (CARB 2008).Key policy initiatives under or further supportive to AB 32:• Development of California cap-and-trade program tointeract with regional market system the Western ClimateInitiative• Increase of Renewable Portfolio Standard to 33 percent• California Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan• High Global Warming potential gas reductions• Implementation of Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Standards• Implementation of Low Carbon Fuel StandardRegional efforts:The Western Climate InitiativeFormed in 2007 Western Climate Initiative (WCI) soughtto set regional green house gas emission targets andimplement a multi-state cap-and-trade program. Theinitiative would regulate the electricity sector, most largeindustrial plants, and transportation in the region (WesternClimateInitiative2010). Political opposition to theprogram, however, has halted ratification of the initiativein many of the key U.S. states. Of the original sevenstates: California, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington,Utah, Montana, and Arizona, only California and NewMexico have passed legislation to move forward with theinitiative. Elected officials in the states that have pulledaway indicate concerns over budget costs and politicalopposition. New Mexico may yet reverse its support ofthe initiative, as “anti-business” (Roosevelt 2010; LATimes 2011).Regional initiatives such as the WCI can aid in the transitionto a low-carbon economy in the U.S. by providing thescale, coordination, resources, and knowledge, absentin individual state initiatives, while bypassing the politicalgridlock on the national level. They can help overcomecross-jurisdictional issues, eliminate duplicationof work, and provide greater levels of policy expertise(Lutsey and Sperling 2008). As the WCI demonstrates,however, in the current polarized political climate of theU.S. even regional initiatives may prove challenging.2.3.2 Creating a clean tech market: green policy andAB 32As noted above, California’s history has created a dynamicin which its business community has come to seeeconomic opportunity in green policy and has thus chosento back such policy. The narrative of successful pollutionand energy efficiency policy discussed in section2.1 above means there is a broader array of players thatfeel comfortable with, in favor of, and equipped with theinnovative skills necessary to handle future green policyGreen Growth: From religion to reality 55

Chapter 5ting regulatory infrastructure. This experience has madeit more willing and able to enact green policy that will loweremissions and build green markets. This enables thepassage of market-creating green policy such as AB32,discussed below.The second derives from California’s general economichistory of successful innovation and new businesscreation. This background and its commercial infrastructurelegacy prepares California to undertake a newwave of business creation in a highly technical field suchas clean tech, embarking on a new stage of growth whereemissions reductions drive growth. Below, we discussCalifornia’s business legacy – the venture capital communityand associated resources. We then review AB32 andthe green policy that this environment makes possible.We next discuss how the clean tech venture capital industryhas grown over the last few years in tandem withgreen policy. We conclude by discussing some challengesfacing California.2.3.1 Finding a new home for venture capitalCalifornia’s venture capital (VC) community is a prominentpart of its economic landscape. The state’s traditionof tech-based entrepreneurship, venture capital investment,and innovation means California has in place thefinancial expertise, related services, and intellectual infrastructureto support a thriving high-tech VC community,and constituencies in place who stand to profit fromVC activities (Randolph 2011; Lecar 2011). This VCcommunity has a strong backing in technical know-howlocal to the state: in the last half century production inthe state has increasingly shifted away from heavy manufacturingand increased emphasis on innovation andhigh-tech light manufacturing (Sudarshan and Sweeney2008). In addition, California’s strong network of researchand innovation centers, such as the national labsand the University of California system, support researchand discovery at a basic level and help nurture a communityof scientists and engineers.This existing VC community was a critical and fullyinvolved participant in the information technology industryboom in California. As that wave of new industrygrowth drew to a close, however, the VC machinerywas in a sense left idling. With the community and itseconomic infrastructure ready and waiting, VC participantsbegan searching for the next major investmentwave (Lecar 2011). This search has led business intereststo focus on green technology as a possible new engineof growth in the state. The potential to capture even asmall portion of the $5 trillion global energy market withthe rising demand for clean tech has proved seductive tomany venture capital firms. Firms hope to earn high returnsby being able to provide the most advanced cleantech technologies to a rapidly growing, policy driven,market (Huberty et al. 2011). California’s existing VCcommunity thus provides a driving force for California’sinvolvement in clean tech, as well as a fertile environmentin which to begin new high-tech businesses (withsome caveats, discussed below).AB32 and associated green policyAssembly Bill 32 orders the reduction of California GHGemissions to 1990 levels by 2020, a 30 percent reductionfrom projected business-as-usual levels. The bill furtherrequires an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissionsby 2050. It intends to meet these goals through the oversightand implementation of a suite of new and existingstate laws and policy (CARB 2008).Key policy initiatives under or further supportive to AB 32:• Development of California cap-and-trade program tointeract with regional market system the Western ClimateInitiative• Increase of Renewable Portfolio Standard to 33 percent• California Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan• High Global Warming potential gas reductions• Implementation of Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Standards• Implementation of Low Carbon Fuel StandardRegional efforts:The Western Climate InitiativeFormed in 2007 Western Climate Initiative (WCI) soughtto set regional green house gas emission targets andimplement a multi-state cap-and-trade program. Theinitiative would regulate the electricity sector, most largeindustrial plants, and transportation in the region (WesternClimateInitiative2010). Political opposition to theprogram, however, has halted ratification of the initiativein many of the key U.S. states. Of the original sevenstates: California, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington,Utah, Montana, and Arizona, only California and NewMexico have passed legislation to move forward with theinitiative. Elected officials in the states that have pulledaway indicate concerns over budget costs and politicalopposition. New Mexico may yet reverse its support ofthe initiative, as “anti-business” (Roosevelt 2010; LATimes 2011).Regional initiatives such as the WCI can aid in the transitionto a low-carbon economy in the U.S. by providing thescale, coordination, resources, and knowledge, absentin individual state initiatives, while bypassing the politicalgridlock on the national level. They can help overcomecross-jurisdictional issues, eliminate duplicationof work, and provide greater levels of policy expertise(Lutsey and Sperling 2008). As the WCI demonstrates,however, in the current polarized political climate of theU.S. even regional initiatives may prove challenging.2.3.2 Creating a clean tech market: green policy andAB 32As noted above, California’s history has created a dynamicin which its business community has come to seeeconomic opportunity in green policy and has thus chosento back such policy. The narrative of successful pollutionand energy efficiency policy discussed in section2.1 above means there is a broader array of players thatfeel comfortable with, in favor of, and equipped with theinnovative skills necessary to handle future green policyGreen Growth: From religion to reality 55

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