Chapter 4concept became a central theme of his successful 2005and 2007 re-election campaigns (Andersen 2008:19).Part of understanding the sudden shift in policy isalso to understand the very coalitional nature of the Danishmulti-party system of politics. In a parliament wheregovernments have historically depended on centre partiesfor parliamentary backing, the 2001 election markedthe first time since 1929 that parties right of the middleheld a majority in the parliament on their own (Bille2002). In other words, the government did not dependon a centre party for parliamentary majority, which likelywould have limited the subsequent deregulation and liberalizationdrive.The following five years thus marked a period of Danishenergy policy in which the political objective of liberalizationwas the main driver of policy. The change cameabout as a result of EU pressure that began the process ofderegulating energy markets in the late 1990s, but withthe election of 2001 the process received strong backingfrom the Danish parliament and government as well. Theprimary goal of energy policy was still to ensure stableeconomic growth, but in the eyes of the new government,liberalization of energy markets was crucial to ensuringthis. (Mendonca, Lacey, and Hvelplund, 2009; Karnøe &Buchhorn, 2008; Jakobsen, 2010; Nørgaard and Tornbjerg2002).The following five years thus marked a period of Danishenergy policy in which the political objective of liberalizationwas the main driver of policy.Despite the significant change in policies away fromalternative energy support and environmental prioritiesduring this period, the foundation for another criticalchange in policy had been laid. The changes to the energymix and the investment in industry and infrastructurehad created a context in which the goal of the fossil-freeeconomy could emerge.Energy consumption, GDP, and energy intensityIndex 1980=1001801601401201008060401980 '85 '90 '95 '00 '05GDPGDP, adjustedEnergy intensity, energy consumption / GDPFigure 8: While GDP has grown substantially, the energyintensity of the Danish economy, i.e. energy used per unit ofGDP, has decreased since 1980.Source: DEA 20093.2 Summary – results of the first three phases of Danishgreen growth“Green growth” was never an explicit goal of Danish energypolicy during these first three parts of the story, butthe combination of policy tools used to achieve the primaryobjectives of supply security and economic growthhad the derivative effect of decoupling emissions andeconomic growth (Danish Government 1996; Grohnheit2001). Thus, although emissions reductions did not attractsubstantial focus as a political objective until the1990s, the decoupling of growth and emissions began inthe 1970s. In the clarity of hindsight we can thus describethese first three phases as a form of green growth compatiblewith emissions reductions. (See Figure 8 below for anillustration of this decoupling.)“Green growth” was never an explicit goal of Danishenergy policy during these first three parts of the story,but the combination of policy tools used to achieve theprimary objectives of supply security and economicgrowth had the derivative effect of decoupling emissionsand economic growth4 Green growth part IV: the fossil freeeconomy8 (2006 – 2050)In 2006, a combination of international developmentsand the policies pursued during the first phases of greengrowth had created the industry, infrastructure, energymix and global market conditions that enabled Denmarkto commit to pursuing the goal of a fossil-free economy.This commitment occurred in spite of the fact that Denmarkwas still governed by the conservative administrationthat had initially slashed green policy support. Howdid this reorientation occur?4.1 The politics of reorientationThe change can be traced to back to September 2006,when Fogh reversed the previous five years of liberalizingenergy policy priorities by announcing the goal of afossil-free society. (Vestergaard 2006)Understanding how this policy shift came aboutmeans understanding the political climate and emergingindustrial structure of 2006. We divide this story intotwo sets of factors: first, a set of specific, circumstantialpolitical events and conditions that impacted Fogh’s decision-makingat the time. Second, the playing out of theon-going structural reorientation of the domestic and internationalmarket that began in the first three periods ofDanish green growth.4.1.1 Circumstantial political factorsDuring the government’s attempt to liberalize energymarkets it sought to adhere to environmental obligationsvia the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and joint implementationprojects under the Kyoto Protocol. Meilstrup(2010), based on interviews with ministers and high level8 This part of the story is stillbeing written, and for obvious reasonstelling it is associated with acertain amount of uncertainty. Itshould be noted that the strategiesdescribed in this section are justthat – strategies. How they will actuallyplay out remains to be seen.There are however, clear signs ofa shift in direction of policies andindustry onto a new and more‘green’ path.38
Chapter 49 Translated by author.civil servants, argues that Fogh decided he needed to‘green’ the government in response to public pressure. Hedid this by appointing Connie Hedegaard as the Danishminister for energy and the Environment in 2004. In theheat of the cartoon crisis of 2006, she suggested to Foghthat pursuing the presidency of COP15, which was expectedto deliver the next global climate change treaty,was a unique opportunity for Denmark to shift internationalfocus away from the cartoon crisis. (Meilstrup,2010) The change in policy then is seen as a way for thegovernment to position itself in the race for the presidencyof COP15, and later to bolster diplomatic effortsto achieve an ambitious treaty.Secondly, the increasing scientific consensus on theadverse impacts of climate change clearly also had animpact on the change in policy – though whether it wasdirect or through increasing public awareness and pressureis unclear. As figure 7 above shows, by the late 2000sthe environment was again becoming an increasingly importantissue on the Danish political agenda. Moreover,according to public opinion polls, “already in May 2002,the environmental cuts were the most unpopular of thegovernment’s new measures (50 % against, 35 % for)”9.(Andersen 2008:17)Thirdly, the Danish public service does not changewith elections. That is, aside from natural turnover, ministerialemployees largely remained the same as duringthe Auken years, except for people let go as a result offunding cuts after the 2001 election. This implies that thepolicy ideas created during Auken’s tenure remained nascentin the ministries.As it became apparent that COP15 would not producethe desired result, the government decided to link its environmentalpriorities to growth policies directly, whichmost recently has created the green growth strategy “Energy2050”, as described below in section 4.2."The best way to understand this shift is to see it as representinga structural shift in the expectations createdby regulation and the market for energy companies"4.1.2 Structural reorientation of the marketSimultaneously with the political reorientations, a seachange was occurring more broadly in the general economy.Structural changes were playing out in industry atinternational, domestic, and local levels. This is best exemplifiedby the decision of the major energy company,DONG Energy, to pursue a ‘green’ strategy in 2008. Themain tenets of the strategy are to stop new investment incoal-fired power plants and increase the amount of windand natural gas-fired power plants in its portfolio. Thegoal is to increase the ratio of renewables to fossil fuels inthe portfolio to 85/15, to cut CO2 emissions per energyunit in half over ten years, and to reduce it to 15 % of currentlevels by 2040 (Bøss 2011).In addition to this, DONG has also pulled back fromcoal-power activities generally, making the decision notto pursue any more coal-fired power plants in the future.Indeed, as of 2009 it has pulled out of all new coal firedprojects – including projects to build coal power plantsin Scotland and Germany – in spite of the fact that it hasexpertise in this area, had won these contracts, could potentiallymake money from them, and had already sunksome investment into them. This seems to us to indicate auniquely strong commitment to pulling back from carbonheavypower sources like coal. Why would DONG cancelprojects it had already signed, secured, and invested in?The best way to understand this shift is to see it asrepresenting a structural shift in the expectations createdby regulation and the market for energy companies.DONG’s current strategy reflects a belief that coal is nolonger a good investment – in any form. Pulling backfrom coal-fired plant projects that have already beenwon is a reflection of DONG’s growing expectation thatconditions in the market – ranging from increasinglystringent projected carbon regulation to public opiniontrends – will make it increasingly difficult to bring coalprojects to completion as countries shift away from coalas a desirable power source, and that (even if completed)such projects will have increasingly uncertain returnson investment. In part, this is because of the surroundingregulatory environment, which places a growingcost on CO2; free CO2 quotas will disappear as of 2013,meaning that full CO2 costs will be incurred from thatpoint on. Pursuing a coal project – even one that is alreadyin process – no longer makes good business senseto DONG because it could lead to an expensive wasteof effort and uncertain profitability over the long lifetimeof these projects. Given that funds for investmentare limited, and that the alternative investment – renewableenergy – is desired and stimulated from a societalperspective, DONG sees this situation as prompting astrategic re-orientation toward low-carbon investment(Bøss 2011). Once expectations within the market havealtered to this extent, green growth policy becomes in asense self-sustaining, as perceived incentives lead to thegrowth of constituencies with a vested interest in greenenergy, and shrinkage of constituencies with a vestedinterest in fossil fuels. Indeed, DONG itself has adaptedto the transformed market structure, and now supportsCO2 taxes and increasing emissions reductions goals, asthese regulations incentivize the continuing transition tothe renewable energy world DONG is structuring itselffor (Bøss 2011).Once expectations within the market have altered tothis extent, green growth policy becomes in a senseself-sustaining, as perceived incentives lead to thegrowth of constituencies with a vested interest in greenenergy, and shrinkage of constituencies with a vestedinterest in fossil fuels.4.2 The new toolkit: policy tools for a fossil-free economyThe policy suite used today to pursue Denmark’s fossil-Green Growth: From religion to reality 39
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