Chapter 3growth via investment in new high-technology sectors.Politically, they create new constituencies of firms andworkers supportive of emissions reduction, offsetting theacute costs of emissions mitigation with the acute benefitsof industrial competitiveness.5 Green growth and the European UnionThis study has so far demonstrated that European Unionclimate policy cannot be understood in reference toemissions reductions alone. Were that the case, a rangeof simpler, and potentially even cheaper, alternatives forclimate change mitigation might have emerged as preferredpolicy options. Instead, the European Union has,whether by design or not, embarked on a policy suite thatcouples progress on emissions reduction to action on energysecurity and economic competitiveness. Doing sohas allowed the cross-subsidization of different policygoals between the member states, keeping political coalitionsfor action together where action on only one goalmight have generated defection.In doing so, the EU has embarked on a strategy thatknits together many of the “green growth” proposals discussedin Huberty et al. (2011). Improved competitivenessfrom reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels, export-ledgrowth in renewable energy industries via market promotionat home, and revenue recycling from emissions pricingto research and development all represent prominentgreen growth strategies. That the EU understands this isclear from statements by the Commissioners themselves.Commissioner for Energy Günther Öttinger argued forincreased European spending on low-emissions energytechnologies by stating that “in global competition weneed to avoid that we start lagging behind China and theUSA.”20 EU Commissioner for Climate Action, ConnieHedegaard, has also endorsed the growth potential of climatechange mitigation. (Hedegaard, 2010)Many of these strategies have worked well for individualmember states. Denmark has profited from bothexport-led growth in the wind turbine industry andincreased global competitiveness through insulationfrom fluctuating fossil fuel costs. Germany has donewell through promotion of renewable energy firms likeSiemens at home (though as Frondel et al. (2009) show,that has come at a very high cost, particularly for solarenergy technologies). Portugal and Spain both sought touse domestic market expansion to drive export competitivenessabroad and industrial redevelopment at home.(Rosenthal, 2010) Finally, a range of countries, from theUnited Kingdom to Poland, view offshore wind energyas new source of demand for skilled labor displaced fromdeclining sectors such as offshore gas and oil exploration(in Scotland) and ship building (in Poland). As Hubertyet al. (2011) noted, though, each of these strategiesremain limited in scope and potential duration. In thecase of the European Union, two threats in particularstand out. First, the process of market integration, criticalto cost containment, has run into various regulatoryRenewable power potentialPhotovoltaic (PV) Potential in the EU RegionsPV PotentialPV output for a 1 kWp system mounted at optimum angle (kWh/y)LisboaAr Ribat676,1 - 845,0845,1 - 951,0951,1 - 1.113,11.113,2 - 1.291,31.291,4 - 1.506,2No DataReykjavikMadridDublinTounisOsloHelsinkiStockholmTallinnWind Power Potential in the EU RegionsFigure 3: Wind and solar photovoltaic power generationpotential maps for the European Union. Source: ESPON Regionsat Risk of Energy Poverty (ReRisk) project.Source: ESPON Regions at Risk of Energy Poverty (ReRisk) project.RigaVilniusMinskLondonAmsterdamAcoresBerlinWarszawaBruxelles/BrusselKyivLuxembourg PrahaParisWien BratislavaVaduzBudapest KishinevBernLjubljanaZagrebBeograd BucurestiSarajevoPodgorica SofiyaRomaSkopjeTiranaAnkaraEl-JazairWind Power Potential (m/s*km 2 )0 - 7918079.181 - 204.546204.547 - 487.852487.853 - 1.031.0761.031.077 - 1.795.408No DataKøbenhavnVallettaGuadeloupe Martinique RéunionAthinaCanariasGuyaneMadeiraNicosia0 250 500km0 250 500Km20 Speech of Commissioner Öttingerat ENERI 2010, Belgian PresidencyConference on Infrastructureof Energy research. Brussels,29 November 201028
Chapter 321 This problem is unique to alternating-currenttransmission. Theinterface between the cable andthe surrounding earth functionsas a capacitor. Polarity-switchingalternating current thus dumpsmost of its energy into chargingand discharging that capacitor, tothe point where line losses becomevery large. Solutions include use ofdirect current transmission (oververy long distances) or shorteningof the effective undergound cablelength through periodic abovegroundstations.22 See, for instance, the 2008-2009agreements among the Danish politicalparties and with the Danishnetwork operator, Energinet.dk,on future construction of interconnectorsin western Denmark. Theagreement approved the constructionof what will be Denmark’s lastnew above-ground transmissionline. It also set a framework formoving most of the high-voltagetransmission infrastructure underground,albeit at significantlyhigher cost. See “Undergroundingof 132-150kV grids”, at http://energinet.dk/EN/ANLAEG-OG-PROJEKTER/Infrastructureprojects-electricity/Sider/Cablelaying-of-132-150kV-grid.aspx.Accessed 5 April 2011.problems on the ground. This is principally true in thecase of power grid integration. Integration of renewableenergy in the European power grid will be cheaper andless complex if accompanied by integration of the currentregional energy markets. By averaging intermittencyand resources over a wider geographic range, marketintegration can improve the stability of the power gridand lower the price of renewable electricity. As figure 3shows, a European grid capable of drawing wind energyfrom northern Europe and solar energy from southernEurope would allow averaging of renewable power productionacross the entire European continent.But actually building the power grid interconnectorsrequired to make this a reality has encountered two significantproblems. First, local resistance to new powerlines has delayed new interconnector construction. Discussionswith several European energy firms in late 2010suggested that the time from project announcement tothe start of operations could be as long as a decade. Second,potential solutions to local resistance–chiefly buryingcables to minimize their aesthetic impacts–face signficanttechnical hurdles21 and raise construction costsdramatically.22 Thus despite ambitious goals for EU-leveladoption of renewable energy and reform of power markets,the disconnect between EU-level goals and localregulatory and political reality may slow progress andincrease costs.The second potential problem comes from the politicaleconomy of the Common Market itself. Presently,significant disparities in competitiveness in renewableenergy technology exist among different EU memberstates. Given the lack of tariff barriers inside the EU,Timeline of EU Energy and Climate Policy2000● March, 2001 Commission proposes completion of the internalenergy market via the 2nd Energy Market Directive● September, 2001 Adoption of the Directive on the Promotion ofElectricity from Renewable Sources● August, 2003 Second Gas and Electricity Directive endorsed bythe Parliament● October, 2003 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) adopted● May, 2004 “Big bang” enlargement creates EU-25● January, 2005 First trading period of the ETS begins● October, 2005 Climate and Energy prioritized at Hampton CourtPalace summit under British Presidency● January, 2007 Commission White Paper on EU Energy Strategy● January, 2007 Romania and Bulgaria succession creates EU-27● March, 2007 European Council adopts 20/20/20 targets● January, 2008 Second trading period of the ETS begins;Commissions proposes legislation for 20/20/20 targets● June, 2008 ENTSO-E establishes operations● December, 2008 Climate and Energy Package endorsed by theParliament● July, 2009 3rd Energy Package endorsed by the Parliament● November, 2010 ACER, the European coordinating body forenergy regulators, established2015mandates to adopt renewable energy technology mayexacerbate, rather than even out, these disparities. Thisharkens back to earlier debates about the impact of theEuro and a common monetary policy on member stateheterogeneity. Then, the debate over optimum currencyareas turned on whether a common monetary policywould generate convergence of business cycles amongthe member states; or, alternatively, reduce transactioncosts, and so increase the specialization and heterogeneityof the EU economies. Now, the question is whetherrenewable energy standards will provide new industrialopportunities to all member states, or instead generatesubstantial windfall profits for already-competitive firmsin specific member states.6 Conclusions: risks and opportunitiesfor green growth in the European UnionThe European Union, intent on climate change mitigation,has yoked emissions reductions to the cause ofenergy security on the one hand, and the promise of innovation-drivenjobs and growth creation on the other.In doing so, it has created significant incentives for otherwisereluctant actors to maintain their commitmentsto emissions reduction in the face of the costs. EasternEuropean member states concerned about the price ofrenewable energy nevertheless benefit from reduceddependence on uncertain foreign suppliers, and receivesubsidies to offset the costs. Northwestern Europeancountries offset the costs of those subsidies with the expandedmarkets for the products of their high-technologyindustries. Emissions prices provide near-term signalsfor energy market evolution and efficiency, but not atlevels that would generate significant political backlash.In contrast to recommendations for “price fundamentalism”,this analysis would suggest that, given the interactionof the EU climate and energy policy suite with thepolitical interests at stake, the superficial inefficiency ofEU climate policy is a feature, not a bug."The European Union, intent on climate change mitigation,has yoked emissions reductions to the cause of energysecurity on the one hand, and the promise of innovation-drivenjobs and growth creation on the other. "Whether that translates into “green growth” is, ofcourse, a different matter. As we have seen, EU policyfaces obstacles to policy implementation and economicsolidarity stemming from the dynamics of renewable energyadoption. Hopefully, the gains from “green growth”will remain large enough to help offset the costs implicitin these obstacles. If so, then the strategy of cross-subsidizationof interests can remain viable and help sustainemissions reduction in the future. If not, however, EUpolicy will face significant challenges in sustaining thetransition to a low-emissions economy.Green Growth: From religion to reality 29
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TAKE LEAD, OCTOBER 12-13 TH ,2011 C