GREEN GROWTH: FROM RELIGION TO REALITY - Sustainia

Chapter 134 Ibid.35 Information based on interviewsand correspondence withexecutives and staff at DONGEnergy and Vattenfall, Inc. Denmark,February-April 2011.36 California’s energy efficiencyprograms are generally creditedto have contributed about 25% ofthe state’s reduced energy inputto a unit of GDP. The rest of thegains are attributed to other factorsincluding shifts in industrycomposition and away from heavymanufacturing, mild climate, andother particular demographic statistics.For a more complete analysisof these policies see Sudarshanand Sweeney (2008).rooted growth strategy intended to reorient the Koreaneconomy around green technology, public transport innovation,and efficiency-improving uses of informationand communications technology. Despite the broaderAmerican inertia, California and Colorado have bothembarked on economic growth strategies that emphasizethe link between action on climate change mitigation andnew economic opportunities.This variation in both openness to and action on greengrowth as an economic strategy cannot be viewed onlyas an outcome of enthusiasm for environmental protection.Rather, it reflects important differences in nationalprerogatives for domestic energy systems. In cases where“green growth” has received significant attention, that attentionis in every case motivated by significant non-environmentaldomestic interests—whether economic development,energy security, or competitiveness. Becausethose interests can provide immediate counterweights toresistance from those who benefit from today’s system,they help overcome the policy inertia generated by thepre-existing structure of domestic energy production,distribution, and use.Two dimensions appear particularly critical in shapingnational positions on energy systems transformation.First, a country’s choices on energy policy in particularderive from a set of idiosyncratic national goals—whetherfor energy security and independence, reliability, affordability,emissions reduction, or other goals. Second,those goals are viewed through the lens of a country’sdomestic resources, natural or otherwise. For example, asKelsey et al (2011) make clear, the sharp contrast betweenChina and Denmark reflects different priorities.“Denmark’s core problems and objectives have to dowith: (1) ensuring predictable availability of energy at anacceptable long-term cost, ideally by achieving energyindependence; (2) driving economic growth; and (3)lowering emissions. Choosing to make green industry acore of Denmark’s economy – and choosing to structureits economy and infrastructure to take full advantage ofthis industry – creates a unified solution to all of Denmark’sproblems.China, by contrast, needs to do the following: (1)achieve massive, near-future increases in energy availability;(2) continue growing economically at a rapidrate; and (3) very much secondarily, deal with a growingparticulate emissions problem. Moreover, it is well-endowedwith coal, a cheap-but-dirty energy source. Giventhe current state of technology, these objectives mandateboth green technology and brown growth. Denmark’s solutionwould not solve China’s problems.”34We observe a diverse set of “green growth” strategies,and a variety of instruments employed to accomplishthe distinct goals. Amidst the diversity, we propose, thatthere is a common political foundation. That foundationrequires a deal between industry and those who wouldadvocate for significant transformation of the energy system.Sometimes those advocates will be environmental orenergy consumer groups, as in California or Colorado.In others, as in the case of Korea, the advocates will includeor be led by government strategists concerned withsecurity—either energy security in a narrow sense, or nationalsecurity more broadly—or with finding the basis ofa new trajectory of economic growth. No matter wherethe initial impetus comes from, however, the energy systemtransformation cannot be sustained by environmentalconsciousness alone. Rather, it requires a broader dealthat brings economic interests inside the coalition in favorof a low-carbon energy systems transformation."We propose, that there is a common political foundation....... a deal between industry and those whowould advocate for significant transformation of theenergy system.The origins of those deals have, in the past, varied significantly.In some cases, as in Denmark and California,the deals grew from the synthesis of historic concernsabout energy security and modern priorities for economicdevelopment and environmental protection. Forthe Danes, the initial problem was one of energy security,when following the oil crisis of the 70s the country’s politicalelite recognized their vulnerability to dependenceon imported energy. Policies at that time gave rise to awind industry that has been a global leader and generatesnearly 10% of Danish exports. Those policies also set aframework in which the major energy producers foundadvantages in moving both to renewable energy sourcesand more efficient energy generation technologies.35 Incontrast, for California the initial problem was urbansmog, particularly in the Los Angeles basin, that contributedto a strong environmental movement in the state.Resistance to nuclear power when Jerry Brown was firstgovernor gave rise to the energy efficiency programs.36In contrast, political realignment enabled change inColorado and policy realignment underpins South Koreanstrategies. In Colorado, an initial grass-roots push forclean energy quickly garnered support from major energycompanies who stood to benefit from the shift fromhigh-emissions coal electricity generation to lower-emissionsgas and a renewable energy-based generation. InKorea, the need to respond to both increased competitivepressure from developing countries and a stagnant globaleconomy promoted a drive toward a broad reorientationof the economy in the direction of “green” goods.That reorientation was secured by positioning policymeasures as a solution to energy security, unsustainablecongestion and transport-related pollution, and the possibilitiesfor capturing global markets in green goods. Inboth the Californian and Korean cases, then, the initialpush for environmental policy was secured through a setof bargains that brought industry inside the coalition andcreated near-term and acute incentives for policies thatotherwise generated only long-term, diffuse benefits.Thus the real policy challenge at the heart of greengrowth lies in securing effective, stable alliances for industrialredevelopment. Those alliances must support aGreen Growth: From religion to reality 15