please do not cite without permission from the authors

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Figure 1. Shares of various groups of countries in the imports of the EU(27), 1990–2008Million Euros and percentage of total EU imports300.00020,018,0250.00016,0Million Euros200.000150.000100.00014,012,010,08,06,0Percentage of total EU imports50.0004,02,001999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20090,0Source: EUROSTATSADC total ACP total Lat_Am total DAE total CN excl. HK totalSADC % ACP % Lat_Am % DAE % CN excl. HK %During the Lomé era, Asian and Latin American countries generally increasedtheir volume of exports to the European market more than the ACP countries.Nonetheless, it is important to note that when there was a higher margin ofpreference compared with other developing countries the increase in exportsfrom the ACP countries was substantially greater. 6 Also, the results are betterfor certain countries which received more trade advantages than those offeredby the basic Lomé non-reciprocal preference scheme (in the form of quotas,6 In other words, although the volume of exports of ACP countries to the EU grew only 3.6percent between 1988 and 1997, the number of products receiving preference of more than3% above the GSP level grew by 61.9 percent (17 times as fast). In the case of SADC, thisdisaggregation of the data shows an even more marked contrast: during the same period theoverall volume of exports fell by 5.4 percent, whereas the products receiving more than 3percent preference above the GSP level grew by 83.6 percent (Goodison and Stoneman,2005; Davies and Mbuende, 2002; Goodison, 2000).6
for instance). 7 For this reason some writers have questioned the honesty ofthe EU when it declares the Lomé system to have been a failure, given thatthe EU fails to mention other problems of a structural, supply-side nature inSSA countries, such as their specialisation in a limited range of primaryproducts which were facing over-supply and falling prices in the world market.The erosion of the level of preference due to the advance of the GATTliberalization programme was another reason why the argument that Loméfailed is an exaggeration. These points suggest that the verdict on theprevious preferential system is a good deal more complex than the EU hasadmitted (Mold, 2007, Goodison and Stoneman, 2005; Hurt, 2003).Moreover, if the preferences had been such a failure it would be hard tounderstand why African governments insist that the old model should beretained, as well as the fact that the EU itself proposed to continue nonreciprocalpreferences for the worst-off economies (the LDCs) rather thansubmit them to the reciprocal trade rules of the EPAs (Faber and Orbie, 2009).The EU’s arguments highlight the incompatibility between the Lomé model andthe WTO principles in relation to reciprocity and non-discrimination. 8 Also theimportance of differentiating between different ACP countries on the basis oftheir level of development, by giving more favourable conditions to the LCDs,led the European Commission to stress the need for changing the Lomémodel. In spite of these incompatibilities, it has been possible in recent yearsto continue to apply the Lomé model thanks to the acceptance of two requestsby the EU for temporary exemptions from the WTO multilateral norms, the lastof these expiring on the 31 December 2007. The possibility that the EU couldcontinue to press for temporary exemptions has also been mentioned by7 Countries such as Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe had significantlyincreased their income in the SADC thanks to the advantages offered by special protocols forsugar and beef. These facts, in contrast to the general opinion about the effectiveness of theLomé Agreements, show that for the favoured nations preferential trade has played animportant role in ensuring that the SACD countries are not marginalised from internationaltrade flows (Goodison, 2000; Matambalya, 1998).8 The exception to the principle of reciprocity, using the controversial Article XXIV on regionalintegration agreements, was not applicable. And in relation to the Most Favoured Nationclause, which signified the absence of discrimination, the Lomé non-reciprocal preferencesystem was authorized in the form of an exception using the Habilitation Clause. Thispermitted Lomé, as long as such advantages were given to all developing economies and notmerely some of them (Solignac-Lecomte, 2001; Gibb, 2000; McQueen, 1998).7
Page 2 and 3: opportunities and improve their com
Page 4 and 5: This kind of pattern has come to be
Page 8: several writers as evidence of the
Page 11 and 12: the rest of the world, regardless o
Page 14 and 15: of them except Namibia. Namibia’s
Page 16 and 17: Among the questions which most worr
Page 18 and 19: Figure 5. Index of export concentra
Page 20 and 21: 5.2 Related issuesInvestment, intel
Page 22 and 23: separate agreement with the EAC cus
Page 24: multilateral negotiating frameworks
Page 28 and 29: Hurt, S. (2009): ‘Economic Partne
Page 31 and 32: Annexe 1. The three main exports of
Page 33: Annexe 2. Global Competitiveness In

please do not cite without permission from the authors

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?