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CHILD SOLDIERSGlobal Report 2008COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Girl soldiers and others gathered at aCommunist Party of Nepal (Maoist) eventin Tila, Rolpa district, Nepal.Cover photo © Marcus Bleasdale 2005The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers was formed in May 1998 by leading nongovernmentalorganizations to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers, both boysand girls, to secure their demobilization, and to promote their reintegration into theircommunities. It works to achieve this through advocacy and public education, researchand monitoring, and network development and capacity building.The Coalition’s Steering Committee members are: Amnesty International, Defence forChildren International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes,International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Quaker UnitedNations Office – Geneva. The Coalition has regional representatives in Africa, theAmericas, Asia and the Middle East and national networks in about 30 countries. TheCoalition unites local, national and international organizations, as well as youth, expertsand concerned individuals from every region of the world.COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERSwww.child-soldiers.org

ChildSoldiersGlobalReport2008This report covers the period fromApril 2004 to October 2007.

Countries/situations where children were recruited

or used in hostilities – April 2004 to October 2007

First published in 2008 byCoalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers9 Marshalsea Road (4th floor)London SE1 1EPUnited Kingdomwww.child-soldiers.org© Coalition to Stop the Use of Child SoldiersISBN 978-0-9541624-5-0Original language: EnglishText and cover design: www.intertype.comPrinted in the United Kingdom by Bell and Bain

ContentsWorld Map 2Acknowledgements 7Preface 9Introduction 12Afghanistan 40Albania 43Algeria 44Andorra 45Angola 46Antigua and Barbuda 48Argentina 49Armenia 51Australia 52Austria 54Azerbaijan 56Bahamas 57Bahrain 58Bangladesh 58Barbados 61Belarus 62Belgium 63Belize 64Benin 65Bhutan 66Bolivia 67Bosnia-Herzegovina 70Botswana 71Brazil 72Brunei Darussalam 74Bulgaria 75Burkina faso 76Burundi 77Cambodia 81Cameroon 84Canada 84Cape Verde 86Caribbean (Dominica,Grenada, St Vincent &the Grenadines, St Kitts& Nevis, St Lucia 86Central AfricanRepublic 88Chad 91Chile 95China 97Colombia 99Comoros 106Congo, DemocraticRepublic of the 106Congo, Republic of 113Costa Rica 115Côte d’Ivoire 116Croatia 122Cuba 124Cyprus 125Czech Republic 127Denmark 128Djibouti 129Dominican Republic 130Ecuador 131Egypt 134El Salvador 135Equatorial Guinea 136Eritrea 137Estonia 140Ethiopia 141Fiji 144Finland 145France 146Gabon 147Gambia 148Georgia 149Germany 151Ghana 152Greece 153Guatemala 154Guinea 156Guinea-Bissau 159Guyana 161Haiti 162Holy See 165Honduras 166Hungary 167Iceland 168India 169Indonesia 173Iran 176Iraq 178Ireland 181Israel 184Italy 188Jamaica 189Japan 191Jordan 192Kazakhstan 194Kenya 196Korea, Democratic People’sRepublic of 198Korea, Republic of 200Kuwait 201Kyrgyzstan 202Laos 204Latvia 206Lebanon 207Lesotho 210Liberia 211Libya 217Liechtenstein 218Lithuania 219Luxembourg 221Macedonia 222Madagascar 223Malawi 224Malaysia 225C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Maldives 226Mali 227Malta 228Mauritania 229Mauritius 230Mexico 231Moldova 233Monaco 235Mongolia 236Montenegro 237Morocco and WesternSahara 238Mozambique 239Myanmar 240Namibia 245Nepal 246Netherlands 250New Zealand 251Nicaragua 252Niger 253Nigeria 255Norway 257Occupied PalestinianTerritory 258Oman 262Pacific Islands (Cook Is,Kiribati, Marchall Is,Micronesia, Nauru,Niue, Palau, Samoa,Tuvalu, Vanuatu) 263Pakistan 266Panama 268Papua New Guinea 269Paraguay 271Peru 274Philippines 276Poland 280Portugal 281Qatar 282Romania 283Russian Federation 284Rwanda 288San Marino 290Sao Tome andPrincipe 291Saudi Arabia 292Senegal 293Serbia 294Seychelles 295Sierra Leone 297Singapore 302Slovakia 303Slovenia 303Solomon Islands 304Somalia 305South Africa 308Spain 310Sri Lanka 311Sudan 315Suriname 321Swaziland 322Sweden 323Switzerland 324Syria 326Taiwan 328Tajikistan 329Tanzania 331Thailand 333Timor-Leste 335Togo 337Tonga 339Trinidad and Tobago 340Tunisia 341Turkey 342Turkmenistan 344Uganda 345Ukraine 351United Arab Emirates 353United Kingdom 354United States ofAmerica 358Uruguay 362Uzbekistan 363Venezuela 366Viet Nam 368Yemen 370Zambia 371Zimbabwe 372Summary of selectedinternationaltreaties 375Optional Protocol 378UN Resolution 1612 383Child soldiers 2008:data summary 389Methodology, termsand definitions 410Glossary and explanatorynotes 413

AcknowledgementsThis report covers the period from April2004 to October 2007. It contains detailedinformation on child soldier recruitmentand use in 197 countries. Where relevant,information is provided on disarmament,demobilization and reintegration programs,and on justice and accountability measuresto address the problem.The project and the research were coordinatedby consultant Donna Guest. Theintroduction was written by Coalition staffmember Lucia Withers, with contributionsfrom Victoria Forbes Adam and BrianPhillips. Coalition staff members EnriqueRestoy, Lucia Withers and Heloise Ruaudeland consultant Laura Fine reviewed andrevised draft entries for Africa, Asia andthe Middle East; Martin Nagler and internChantal Scholten compiled large quantitiesof data to support the process. Regionalstaff Dee Brillenburg Wurth, Emma De Viseand Ryan Silverio provided information,comments and reviews on entries forwest Africa, the Great Lakes and southeastAsia respectively. Ryan Silverio alsoresearched and drafted a number of entries.Carissa Lopez and Heloise Ruaudel wereresponsible for the cover design andphotographs respectively, and EnriqueRestoy co-ordinated the translations.Invaluable administrative support,fundraising and financial managementwere provided throughout by Coalition staffmembers Andrew Lowton, Carissa Lopezand Carol Steel. A special debt of gratitudeis owed to Ratna Jhaveri, who spent manyhours revising and updating numerouscomplex entries as well as compiling thedata summary chart which appears at theend of the report.I would also like to thank editorsMaggie Maloney, Sarah Pennington andPhilippa Youngman; and Maggie Maloneyand Philippa Youngman for copy-editingthe report. Country entries were researchedand drafted by a team of consultants. Theywere Daniel Alberman, Lana Baydas, EmmaBlower, Marisé Castro, Alison Dilworth,Mary Durran, Marjorie Farquharson,Sara Hamood, Catherine Hunter, SteveKibble, Don Lieber, Sarah Maguire,Anoushka Marashilian, Roland Marchal,Ingrid Massagé, Matthew Naumann, JoshOunsted, Sandrine Perrot, Brian Phillips,Hugh Poulton, Claudia Ricca, Kerry Smith-Jeffreys and Lars Waldorf.Coalition members in Colombia,France, Italy, Philippines, Spain and theUnited States researched and drafted theircountry entries. Information was providedby national coalition members and partnersin Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia,Israel, Lebanon, Occupied PalestinianTerritory, Thailand, Uganda, the UnitedStates and Venezuela.I am grateful to staff at the Office ofthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, toUN staff in relevant peacekeeping missions,and to UNICEF in New York and in fieldoffices around the world. They providedinvaluable information, commentary andsupport throughout the duration of thisproject. Thanks are due in particular tostaff working on Central African Republic,Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti,

Iceland, Indonesia, Mongolia, Myanmar,Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, SriLanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe.I would like to thank Salvatore Saguesand Sara Dezaley for French translations,the Permanent Peace Movement for Arabictranslations and Blue Box for Spanishtranslations. I thank Martyn Partridge andFrancis McInally at Intertype for their invaluablesupport during the production process,and Beatriz Bellorin and Ian Wren for theirphotographic expertise.We are grateful for the long-standingsupport of Coalition Steering Committeemembers Jo Becker, Rachel and DerekBrett and Martin Macpherson. Thanks areadditionally owed to Robert Freer, DavidBuchbinder, Linda Dowdney, FrancescaPizzutelli, Halya Senyk and MaisyWeicherding, who generously donatedtime and expertise to the project, toJames and Sonia Nesbitt and to numerousother organizations and individuals whosupported the research and productionprocess.The governments of Canada, France,Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,Sweden and Switzerland provided financialsupport. Oakdale Trust, the Allan and NestaFerguson Charitable Trust and the TidesFoundation also supported this project.Their continued support for the work ofthe Child Soldiers Coalition is greatlyappreciated.This report is dedicated to childsoldiers and their children.Dr Victoria Forbes AdamDirectorLondon April 2008 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

PrefaceChild soldiers. Two simple words. But theydescribe a world of atrocities committedagainst children and sometimes by children.Committed in many different countriesand often hidden from the public eye. Weknow how devastating these experiencesare for children – thanks to the courageand determination of those who havespoken out and called on the internationalcommunity to take action on their behalf.This Global Report, the third producedby the Coalition to Stop the Use of ChildSoldiers, elaborates on progress over thepast four years, confirming for example,that tens of thousands of child soldiershave been demobilized during this period.But as this meticulously documentedreport shows, tens of thousands morehave remained in or been newly recruitedand used in armed conflicts – primarily bynon-state armed groups, but also by somenational armies. Governments have failed toprevent the use of children by proxy forcesand child soldiers who have escaped orbeen captured have been used as spies orsources of intelligence rather than providedwith rehabilitation and reintegrationsupport. Numerous governments persist inrecruiting under-18 year olds into nationalarmies, exposing them to military discipline,hazardous activity, bullying, abuse andpossible deployment to war zones.There is an urgent need to increaseall our efforts to prevent and eradicate therecruitment and use of children in armedconflict.The Global Report 2008 showsthat achieving this goal is far from easy.Nevertheless, there is reason for hope. Animpressive and unprecedented number ofinternational instruments are in place tosupport efforts to “stop the use of childsoldiers”. They testify to an emerging globalconsensus on this damaging practice. TheOptional Protocol on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflict has been ratifiedby 120 states; special war crime tribunalsand the International Criminal Court arebecoming a more important means forbringing the perpetrators of crimes againstchildren to justice. The Security Councilhas established a working group to closelymonitor developments in states where childsoldiers are used and the UN has devotedsubstantial resources to this problem.Most recently, the Paris Principles andGuidelines on children associated witharmed forces and armed groups have beenendorsed by 66 governments – they havepledged to work for the release of all childsoldiers from fighting forces, and to supportprograms which genuinely address thecomplex needs of returning child soldiers.In short, a rich body of internationalinstruments exists. Our challenge is toensure they are used to maximum effect.This will involve well-coordinated and multifacetedactions by a wide range of actors,the exertion of pressure where it is needed,and sustained funding for programs toassist returning child soldiers and otherwar-affected children. Ultimately, successwill depend on addressing root causes andbuilding societies where the rights anddignity of all children are upheld.Last but not least, organizationslike the Coalition to Stop the Use of ChildSoldiers have played a vital role in theC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

global movement to definitively end childsoldiering. For ten years the Coalition hasserved as an independent global monitorfor child soldiers; they have tirelesslyadvocated for the right of all children toprotection from military exploitation; andthey have substantially contributed to thepolicy and human rights agenda regardingchild soldiers. Their partnerships withgrassroots organizations working with andfor children in conflict zones have greatlyenriched all our knowledge of the realitieson the ground, and the challenges to be metif we are to achieve our goals.This Global Report is an importantrecord of progress made and the manyobstacles yet to be overcome. May it inspireus all to renew our efforts so that one day inthe near future we can shout: “Children arefree from involvement in war at last!”Professor Jaap E. DoekChairpersonCommittee on the Rights of the Child2001 to 20071 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

© Private source 2004Ethnic Wa child soldier in the ceasefire group, the United Wa State Army, at a Wa regioncheckpoint, Shan State, northern MyanmarC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1

I N T R O D U C T I O NChild soldiers: progress,but too littleWe feel different because of the way other children look at us; it seemsas if we are not children born from this land. They view us as though wecome from a different place.You cannot be completely happy with all these wounds – both in yourbody and in your mind. 1Four years is a long time in a child’s life.Much can happen that will touch the rest oftheir lives for good or for ill. Some childrenmay live their lives in situations of peaceand security. For countless others warcontinues to be all too real. Over this aspectof the adult world they have little say andno control.Four years is sufficient for substantialdevelopments in the life of a globalmovement. The last Global Report waspublished by the Coalition to Stop the Useof Child Soldiers (Coalition) in November2004; since then the movement to end theuse of child soldiers has seen continuedprogress towards a universal consensusagainst their use in hostilities, witnessed bythe fact that over three-quarters of stateshave now signed, ratified or acceded to theOptional Protocol to the Convention on theRights of the Child on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflict.On the ground, the consensus wouldappear to be reflected most clearly bya decrease in the number of conflicts inwhich children are directly involved – from27 in 2004 to 17 by the end of 2007. TheCoalition’s research for this Global Reportshows, however, that that this downwardtrend is more the result of conflicts endingthan the impact of initiatives to end childsoldier recruitment and use. Indeed, wherearmed conflict does exist, child soldierswill almost certainly be involved. Themajority of these children are in non-statearmed groups, but the record of somegovernments is also little improved.The figures for conflict do notreveal the whole picture. The militaryrecruitment of children (under-18s) andtheir use in hostilities is a much largerphenomenon, that still takes place in oneform or another in at least 86 countriesand territories worldwide. This includesunlawful recruitment by armed groups,forcible recruitment by government forces,recruitment or use of children into militiasor other groups associated with armedforces, their use as spies, as well as legalrecruitment into peacetime armies.The findings make it clear that, despitethe high level of international attention onthe issue, the impact of that attention isyet to be felt by many children who are, orare at risk of becoming, child soldiers. Theyhave reinforced the fact that a complexrange of co-ordinated responses by multipleactors are required to achieve the goal1 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

of preventing children’s involvement inarmed conflict, obtaining their release andsupporting successful reintegration. Thiswill involve a more explicit recognitionof child soldiers on the agendas of thoseinvolved in a whole range of initiatives,from conflict prevention, peacemaking andmediation through to peace-building andlonger-term development.Ultimately, if, over the next four years,the international community is to makegood its promise to protect children frommilitary exploitation, the level of politicalwill, the amount of human and financialresources, the adherence to establishedbest practice and the quantity as wellas the quality of collaborative effortand imaginative endeavour must all bemultiplied.OverviewInternational efforts continueThe international framework to protectchildren from involvement in armed forcesand groups has been reinforced and effortshave focused increasingly on field-levelimplementation.The first important steps towardsestablishing individual criminalresponsibility for those who recruit and usechildren in hostilities have been taken. Warcrimes charges relating to the conscription,enlistment and active participation inhostilities of children under 15 years oldhave been issued by the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) against members ofarmed groups in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (DRC) and Uganda. A landmarkin international justice was forged by theconviction in 2007 by the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone of four people on chargesthat included the recruitment and use ofchildren during the civil war. The pursuit ofjustice has also been furthered by the workof truth commissions in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and recently Liberia, all of which haveaddressed the issue of child soldiers.The Optional Protocol to theConvention on the Rights of the Childon the involvement of children in armedconflict (Optional Protocol) – the mostspecific prohibition of child soldiers underinternational law – has now been ratifiedby 120 states, up from 77 in mid-2004.The United Nations (UN) Committee onthe Rights of the Child began to examinestate party reports on the Optional Protocolimplementation in January 2005. Theirconcluding observations are generating anincreased momentum towards developingmodalities for protecting children frommilitary recruitment and use, as well asproviding an insight into further measuresC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3

that many governments must take if theyare to achieve this goal.Building on previous actions, the UNSecurity Council adopted resolutions 1539(2004) and 1612 (2005) calling for theestablishment of a monitoring and reportingmechanism on children and armed conflict.Now set up in around a dozen countries,the mechanism is tasked with documentingsix categories of grave abuse againstchildren, including recruitment and use ofchild soldiers, in the situations of armedconflict listed in the annexes of the UNSecretary-General’s regular reports on thetopic. A Security Council working group onchildren and armed conflict was set up in2005 to review reports submitted underthe mechanism and to monitor progressin the development and implementationof time-bound action plans by warringparties to end their recruitment and useof child soldiers. The working group hasissued conclusions based on the reports,transmitted letters and appeals to partiesengaged in violations, and taken a range ofother actions on situations where abusesagainst children have been committed.The first actions by the SecurityCouncil to apply targeted measures againstindividuals specifically for recruiting andusing children were taken in 2006, when atravel ban was imposed on an armed groupleader in Côte d’Ivoire. A Security Councilresolution the same year sought to subjectto travel bans and asset freezing leadersin the DRC who recruited or used childsoldiers. 2Regional bodies have also continued tofocus attention on this issue. The EuropeanUnion’s (EU) 2003 Guidelines on childrenand armed conflict were given practicaldirection by an implementation strategyissued in 2006. The same year a checkliston integration and protection of childrenwas adopted to ensure that child rightsand protection concerns are systematicallyaddressed in European Security andDefence Policy (ESDP) operations andmission planning. The African Union (AU)renewed its calls for its member states toratify the African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child by the end of 2008 andto enact relevant implementing legislationby 2010. The Charter requires state partiesinter alia to refrain from recruiting childrenand to ensure that they do not take directpart in hostilities. 3On the ground, tens of thousands ofchild soldiers have been released fromarmies and armed groups since 2004 aslong-running conflicts in sub-Saharan Africahave ended. A major initiative to gatherand compile accumulated experiencefrom the demobilization, disarmamentand reintegration (DDR) of child soldiersaround the world culminated in the ParisPrinciples and Guidelines on childrenassociated with armed forces or armedgroups (Paris Principles). Endorsed by 66governments at ministerial meetings inFebruary and October in 2007, includingmany from conflict-affected countries, theParis Principles offer guidance on protectingchildren from recruitment and on providingeffective assistance to those alreadyinvolved with armed groups or forces.The large-scale recruitment anddeployment of children by governmentforces in countries such as Burundi, Côted’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia ceased with theend of conflicts. More than half of countriesworldwide have set the minimum age atwhich an individual can enter the military,including for training, at 18.In response to international pressureand local initiatives, several armed groupshave committed themselves to ending therecruitment and use of children. Groupsin Côte d’Ivoire and Sri Lanka are workingwith the UN to develop and implementtime-bound action plans to release childrenand prevent their recruitment. Ethnic armedgroups in Myanmar have agreed to dolikewise.1 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Real protection requires redoublingof effortWhile the general direction is positive, thepace of progress is slow and its impactis not yet felt by the tens of thousands ofchildren in the ranks of fighting forces. Theinternational framework offers little realprotection for countless others who are atrisk of recruitment and use in conflict.The Coalition has documentedinformation on 21 countries or territorieswhere children were deployed to areas ofconflict between April 2004 and October2007. Within this period conflicts ended intwo of the 21 – Indonesia and Nepal – andso too did child soldier use there. Althoughthis is fewer than the preceding four years,the Coalition’s research reveals a number ofdisturbing findings that make it clear thatthe efforts to date have been insufficient.The first of these findings is perhapsthe most stark. It is this: when armedconflict breaks out, reignites or intensifies,children will almost inevitably becomeinvolved as soldiers. The Central AfricanRepublic, Chad, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan(Darfur) are all cases in point.Next, efforts to demobilize childrenduring conflict have met with only limitedsuccess. Peace remains the main hopefor securing the release of child soldiersfrom armed forces and groups, a factthat further reinforces the importance ofchild protection being integral to peacenegotiations, as well as the need for explicitprovisions relating to child soldiers inceasefire and peace agreements.The impact of efforts to end childsoldier recruitment and use by armedgroups has been similarly limited. Armedgroups in at least 24 countries located inevery region of the world were known tohave recruited under-18s and many haveused them in hostilities. Many have provedresistant to pressure and persuasion.Their widely diverse characters, aims andmethods, and the varied environmentsin which they operate militate againstgeneric solutions. Effective strategiesmust be multifaceted and context-specific.Above all, they must address root causes.Poor governance and its effects, includingimpoverishment, inequality, discriminationand human rights abuses, are all knownto contribute to the risk that children willbe recruited by armed groups. While suchconditions persist, children will remainvulnerable to involvement in armed forcesand groups.The number of governments thatdeployed children in combat or otherfrontline duties in their armed forces hasnot significantly decreased since 2004.Children have been used in armed conflictby government forces in nine situationscompared with 10 in the previous four-yearperiod. The most notable offender remainsMyanmar, whose armed forces, engaged inlong-running counter-insurgency operationsagainst a range of ethnic armed groups, arebelieved to contain thousands of children.Children were also reported to havebeen used in hostilities in Chad, the DRC,Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Additionally,Palestinian children were used on severaloccasions by defence forces in Israel ashuman shields. There were reports of childsoldier use by Yemeni armed forces infighting in 2007. A few under-18s in the UKarmed forces were sent to Iraq.The flouting of international standardsby governments extends beyond officialarmed forces. Children in at least 14countries have been recruited into auxiliaryforces linked to national armies; into locallevelcivilian defence groups establishedto support counter-insurgency operations;or into militias and armed groups actingas proxies for government forces. In atleast eight countries children were used asspies and for other intelligence-gatheringpurposes, placing them at risk of reprisalsand ignoring government responsibilitiesC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5

to provide protection and reintegrationassistance.Governments which used child soldiersin armed conflict between April 2004and October 2007.ChadDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)IsraelMyanmarSomaliaSudan & Southern SudanUgandaYemenAdditionally, the United Kingdomdeployed under-18s to Iraq where theywere exposed to risk of hostilitiesDespite growing knowledge of bestpractices for the disarmament,demobilization and reintegration (DDR) ofchild soldiers, lessons learned from pastefforts have continued to be overlooked inthe implementation of official programs.In many DDR processes the needs of childsoldiers were not prioritized and in somewere entirely overlooked. Reintegrationprograms were frequently not tailored totheir specific needs and have suffered fromchronic under-funding.The repetition of mistakes has beenacute in relation to girls. The special needsand vulnerabilities of girls affected byarmed conflict have long been recognized,yet they are not well served by DDRprocesses. The vast majority of girlsassociated with fighting forces do notparticipate in official DDR programs andare not catered for in post-demobilizationsupport. Specialized medical care forphysical injury resulting from rape orsexually transmitted diseases is rarelyavailable. Girl mothers and their children,often born of rape, are known to beparticularly vulnerable, but continue tosuffer stigmatization and rejection by theirfamilies and communities.Universal responsibilities underthe Optional Protocol to protect childrenagainst recruitment and to promote therecovery and reintegration of former childsoldiers have yet to be fully realized. Whenformer child soldiers flee their countryof origin, asylum processes and specialmeasures facilitating their recognitionas refugees are frequently lacking indestination countries, as is the provisionof adequate services for their recovery andsocial reintegration. The legal framework tocriminalize the recruitment and use of childsoldiers and to establish extraterritorialjurisdiction over such crimes is also far fromcomplete.Finally, many state parties haveundermined the spirit, if not the letter,of the Optional Protocol by continuing totarget under-18s for military recruitment.While a number of states have raised theage of voluntary military recruitment withinthe past four years, at least 63 countriespermitted the voluntary recruitment ofchildren by their armed forces; 26 wereknown to have under-18s in the ranks.Others introduced children, often at a veryyoung age, to military culture throughmilitary training in schools, cadet corps andvarious other youth initiatives.Placing children’s rights ahead ofmilitary needs requires far-reaching shiftsin values and attitudes. Until it is acceptedthat childhood extends to 18, and that thespirit of the Protocol expects more of statesthan just amending the age of conscription,children will continue to be at risk ofbecoming soldiers, especially in times ofcrisis.1 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Governmentsandinternationallaw: a measureof progressAlmost two-thirds of the world’s stateshave ratified the Optional Protocol, andothers have prohibited the recruitmentand use of child soldiers in domestic lawor regulations. However, the gap betweenwhat governments say and what they doremains wide.Children sent to warA small number of states persist not onlyin recruiting children but also in exposingthem to the physical and psychologicaldangers of combat. Despite repeateddenials by the government, there isevidence that Myanmar continues to recruitlarge numbers of children into its armedforces – often forcibly through intimidation,coercion and violence – and to use them ina range of combat and non-combat roles. InChad, children were among those roundedup in hasty manpower drives in 2006 anddeployed to defend the capital againstarmed groups; in Somalia, the TransitionalFederal Government allegedly recruitedand used children during intense fightingfor control of Mogadishu in late 2006; inSudan, children have been used in Darfurby the Sudan Armed Forces and in thesouth of the country by the Sudan People’sLiberation Army (SPLA); and in Uganda,children who escaped from the Lord’sResistance Army (LRA), or were captured orreleased from it, were pressured to join thegovernment defence forces to fight the LRA.Additionally, there were reports thatPalestinian children have been used onseveral occasions by the Israeli DefenseForces as human shields. In the Philippineschildren were reported to be in paramilitaryunits used to support counter-insurgencyefforts. In Yemen, there are unconfirmedreports that untrained children as youngas 15 were given weapons and sent tothe front against an armed group in early2007. Additionally, a few British under-18swere sent to Iraq as recently as mid-2005.Although most were swiftly removed, theywere, in the meantime, exposed to risk ofhostilities.State responsibility at arm’s lengthThe responsibility of governments extendsbeyond their official armed forces to militiasand armed groups which they support orwhich act as proxy forces.In Sudan, for example, responsibilityfor ending the widespread use in hostilitiesof children by the government-backedJanjaweed militias rests squarely withthe Sudanese authorities. The Sudanesegovernment’s support for armed groupsin Chad and the Chadian government’sbacking for armed groups in Sudan alsorender these governments responsible forthe recruitment and use of child soldiersby these groups. The government in SriLanka cannot escape responsibility for theabduction of children by the Karuna Group,a breakaway group of the Liberation Tigersof Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that was linked togovernment armed forces. Likewise, thegovernment of Côte d’Ivoire is accountablefor recruitment of children in 2004 and 2005by pro-government militias, many of themformer child soldiers from Liberia.Local-level civilian defence groupsestablished to support counter-insurgencyefforts also demand attention. Informallystructured and in some cases unregulatedby law, such groups include village-levelC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7

self-defence forces in Chad; anti-Maoistvillage defence forces in India; self-defencecommittees in Peru; civilian volunteerorganizations and village defence groupsin the Philippines; and local defenceunits in Uganda. Often located in remoteareas, such groups may escape scrutinyand accountability for crimes committed,including the recruitment and use ofchildren.Countries where children were recruitedand used by paramilitaries, militias,civilian defence forces or armed groupslinked to, supported by, or acting asproxies for governments.ChadColombiaCôte d’IvoireDRCIndiaIranLibyaMyanmarPeruPhilippinesSri LankaSudanUgandaIn addition, several thousand childrenand youth received training inparamilitary skills in Zimbabwe’s youthmilitias.Child soldiers in detentionIn many situations child soldiers associatedwith armed groups and captured bygovernment forces have been treatedsolely as adversaries rather than aschildren. Contrary to the principle thatchild soldiers should be treated first andforemost as victims in need of support andassistance for reintegration, some havebeen detained solely on the basis of theiralleged association with armed groups, or fordesertion and other military offences whilein armed forces. International standardsof juvenile justice and the right to fair trialhave been violated in situations where childsoldiers have been detained for prolongedperiods and subjected to torture or illtreatment.Scores of children, some as youngas nine, have been detained in Burundion suspicion of collaboration with theNational Liberation Forces (FNL). Somewere reportedly severely beaten – one16-year-old alleged to have been a memberof the FNL youth wing was believed to havebeen unlawfully killed while in custody.In Israel hundreds of Palestinian childrenhave been held under military provisions;incidents of ill-treatment and torture werereportedly common. In one case, a 16-yearoldboy was held in solitary confinement for35 days in 2007 and pressured to becomean informant. In the Philippines, detailedpolicies on the treatment of rescued,captured or surrendered child soldiersby the security forces are not alwaysimplemented, and children have beendetained beyond the officially sanctionedtime-limits and in some cases ill-treated. Inboth Myanmar and the DRC, child soldierswho have escaped from armed forces havebeen charged with desertion and sentencedto terms of imprisonment. In the DRC afew children convicted of military offencesremained in prison under sentence of death,in contravention of international law.In Iraq hundreds of children accused ofsecurity violations were detained in Multi-National Force – Iraq facilities – where therewere reports of abuse – as well as in Iraqi-runfacilities. In its “war on terror”, the UnitedStates of America (USA) has designateda number of children, some as young as13, as “enemy combatants” – a status, asused by the USA, that is unrecognized ininternational law. Several under-18-yearoldswere transferred from US custody inAfghanistan to indefinite military detentionin the US Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay inCuba. One such individual is Omar Khadr,a Canadian national shot and captured ina firefight with US forces in Afghanistanin 2002. He has alleged that he was ill-1 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

treated in US custody in Afghanistan andGuantánamo. Six years on he is facing trialbefore a military commission for offencesallegedly committed in 2002 when he was15. In its case against him, the prosecutionsuggested that Khadr had become involvedwith al-Qaeda when he was just 10 years old.From the start, Omar Khadr andothers like him should have been treatedprimarily as children and as victims. Theirtreatment should focus on maximizing thepotential of the individual for successfulsocial reintegration. Accountability for anycriminal acts that may have been committedcan be a part of this, but any process tothis end must take full account of the ageof the child at the time of involvement withan armed group, and not allow the pursuitof punishment to blind the prosecutingauthorities to the responsibility of others inhis or her predicament.The use of children – often capturedor escaped from armed forces – as spies orinformants similarly violates basic humanrights principles for the protection ofchildren. It also contravenes governmentobligations to assist in the recovery of childsoldiers and, moreover, exposes childrento risks of reprisals. Yet this practice isknown to have been carried out by armedforces in Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, India,Indonesia, Israel, Nepal and Uganda duringthe reporting period.Recruitment ageWhile ensuring that under-18s do not takea direct part in hostilities is an essentialcomponent of the pledge to prevent childsoldiering, the Optional Protocol demandsmore. As its Preamble spells out, its goalis the “continuous improvement of thesituation of children without distinction”.This suggests the need for serious reflectionon whether the inclusion of under-18s inmilitary forces satisfies the ultimate goalof the Convention and its Optional Protocol– to promote the development and wellbeingof the child.Of the 120 states that have ratified theProtocol, almost two thirds have committedthemselves in their declarations to setthe compulsory and minimum voluntaryrecruitment ages at 18 or higher. In the pastfour years the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment into the armed forces hasbeen raised to 18 in Chile, Italy, Jordan,the Maldives, Sierra Leone, Slovenia andSouth Korea. In Nepal, a law that permittedrecruitment of under-18s was declared nulland void by the Supreme Court.However, a number of states whosecommitment to stopping the use of childsoldiers is otherwise not in doubt continueto assert their need to target 16- and17-year-olds for voluntary recruitmentinto their own forces. Some openly insiston placing the manpower requirementsof their armed forces ahead of children’srights. Calls to raise the minimum age ofvoluntary recruitment to 18 have beenresisted by armed forces in Australia, NewZealand and the United Kingdom, on thegrounds that it would adversely affect theavailability of recruits. In the USA, followinga dramatic fall in the number of under-18sjoining the military and general recruitmentshortfalls, increased enlistment bonuseswere introduced and minimum educationalstandards for recruits lowered.Government armed forces whichused children as spies, informants ormessengers.BurundiColombiaDRCIndiaIndonesiaIsraelNepalUgandaResistance to the spirit of the OptionalProtocol in the interests of filling the ranksraises questions about the value assignedto child protection. Active targeting ofC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9

children – often from deprived backgroundswith fewer educational or vocationaloptions – undermines official claims thatsuch recruitment is genuinely voluntary.Elsewhere, a stated intention torecruit only those above the age of 18 isundermined by the absence of measures todetermine the age of recruits. Registrationat birth is the right of every child and isthe first of many essential measures thata state must take to build a frameworkof protection around children. Lowbirth registration is most prevalent inwar-affected and heavily indebted poorcountries – precisely those countries wherechildren are most at risk of recruitment anduse by armed forces.The risk of inadvertent under-agerecruitment of children because of lowbirth registration rates was noted incountries such as Bangladesh, Botswana,Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Kenyaand Zambia. In Paraguay the lack of birthregistration procedures has facilitated theforced conscription of children as youngas 12 years old. Elsewhere, for examplein Afghanistan and Yemen, inadequateverification procedures to determine theage of new recruits has meant that underagesoldiers were likely to be serving insecurity forces.A shift in culture is called forBy late 2007 the UN Committee on theRights of the Child had examined initialreports from 28 state parties to theOptional Protocol. The examinations haverevealed much about the attitudes of thesecountries to childhood and how far a stateis willing to go to protect children fromunder-age recruitment and involvement inconflict. The Committee’s work shows thatthe implementation of the Protocol requiresmore than changes to legislation. Valueshave to be entrenched if legislative progressis to prove durable when put to the test byconflict, crisis or emergency.Military values are often inculcated inthe educational and recreational settingswhere children’s physical and intellectualformation takes place. At one extreme,a “military first” policy is reported totranslate into the equivalent of some 12weeks annually of drills and other militarytraining for North Korean secondary-schoolstudents. But military culture and trainingpermeate school life elsewhere. Militarytraining is compulsory for school children incountries including China, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan,the Russian Federation, United ArabEmirates and Venezuela. The presence ofcadet corps within schools, for example inAntigua and Barbuda, the United Kingdomand the USA, may also introduce militarisminto places of development and learning.The Optional Protocol permits theadmission of under-18s into schoolsoperated by or under the control of themilitary, but requires them to operate inaccordance with Articles 28 and 29 of theConvention on the Rights of the Child.Primary or secondary education is providedin military-run schools in countries such asArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Honduras,Israel, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Peru, theRussian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraineand Viet Nam. In some military schoolschildren wear military uniforms, live inmilitary-style barracks and are subject tomilitary discipline. Some offer a standardschool curriculum, while others provide anarrow education involving hard physicaldrill and weapons handling. It is true that inmany cases these schools fill gaps in stateeducation and children from poor familiesparticularly can stand to benefit. However,states must not be allowed to sidesteptheir obligation to provide every child withan education consistent with the aimsenshrined in the Convention.There is also a variety of youthinitiatives which may not sit comfortably2 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

with the Optional Protocol. The Committeeon the Rights of the Child suggested thatNorway’s voluntary youth program, theHome Guard, could not be regarded asgenuinely conforming to the spirit of theProtocol, despite a range of safeguardsprohibiting practical military training forunder-18s. Youth initiatives elsewhere donot even incorporate such safeguards.In Australia, Georgia, Sweden, the USAand Uzbekistan, for example, a variety ofpatriot camps, cadet corps and military andsporting competitions and the like involvemilitary drills, weapons handling and, insome cases, the use of weapons. Suchactivities cast doubt on claims that theseprograms motivate young people to bebetter citizens and make a wholly positivecontribution to youth development.Children attending military schoolsor participating in such initiatives are, forthe most part, under no formal obligationto enlist. It is nonetheless apparent thatearly exposure to military life can beused to facilitate military recruitment.In Kazakhstan, for example, of theapproximately 4,000 children studying inmilitary schools in 2005–6, some 65 percent went on to join the army. In the USAan estimated 40 per cent of students whograduate from high school with two or moreyears in the Junior Reserve Officer TrainingCorp, open to children from 14 upwards,eventually enlist in the military. Childrenfrom 12 to 15 years old, many of themorphans, who enter cadet schools in theRussian Federation have no legal means ofreversing either their decision to attend theschool or the undertaking to do vocationalmilitary work on graduation.A global responsibilityThe Optional Protocol embraces valuesof global responsibility that promote theuniversality of human rights. Neithervictim nor perpetrator of serious abuses ofhuman rights should be considered outsidethe sphere of moral and legal concern– regardless of where those abuses havetaken place. Building on other humanrights treaties, the Optional Protocolrequires state parties to commit resources,energies and political will to a recoveryand rehabilitation agenda for former childsoldiers and to ensure accountabilityfor those who recruit and use childrenin hostilities. That agenda encompassesresponsive and responsible asylumprocedures, international assistance to andco-operation with countries where childrenhave been active participants in armedconflict, and the establishment of robustlegal protections against the recruitment ofchildren and their use in hostilities.When former child soldiers seekasylum, the values of global responsibilityare put to the test and many states theworld over are found lacking. Problemsidentified by the Committee on the Rightsof the Child include failure to identifychildren who may have been recruited orused in hostilities, failure to recognize thisform of persecution as a basis for grantingrefugee status, absence of systematic datacollection, deficient training of immigrationofficials and other relevant professionals,and inadequate services. In thesecircumstances former child soldiers can beleft without support in a strange country.They are also at risk of forcible return and,in countries where children seeking asylumare detained, such as Italy and Australia,of detention. State parties, many of themin Europe, have been put on notice bythe Committee that progress is expectedtowards developing asylum procedures thatare sensitive to former child soldiers andputting in place special measures to assistthem.The Committee has also closelyscrutinized domestic laws that explicitlyprohibit the involvement of under-18s inhostilities and under-age recruitment,C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1

including third-party recruitment of under-18s for military activity. It has given similarscrutiny to laws to establish extraterritorialjurisdiction for crimes of under-agerecruitment and use of child soldiers,including the incorporation into domesticlaw of the relevant provisions of the RomeStatute of the ICC.While many governments have policiesprohibiting the recruitment and use ofchildren, very few have explicitly prohibitedby law the violation of these provisions ofthe Optional Protocol. Australia, Belgiumand Germany are among a small numberof countries that have introduced criminalpenalties for individuals who conscript,enlist or use children under the age of 15 athome and abroad. In Norway, Sweden andthe USA, such legislation was pending. Inthe case of Norway it was proposed thatconscripting or enlisting children underthe age of 18 could be prosecuted as a warcrime – a standard higher than the age limitof 15 contained in the Rome Statute. Wherelegislation exists some states have limitedits application, for example to times ofwar and armed conflict, or to apply only tocrimes committed within the borders of thestate against or by its own nationals. Theenactment of legislation that criminalizeschild recruitment and use both nationallyand extraterritorially is essential inestablishing the legal framework necessaryto end impunity for this crime.Even in states which have yet tobecome parties to the Optional Protocol thisprogressive standard can be a useful basisfor dialogue about conceptions of childhoodand why children should not be seen asacceptable participants in armed conflictby either governments or non-state actors.In countries where governments seek tojustify inaction on grounds of inadequateresources, those measures in the Protocolmore dependent on political will than cashfor their realization can be emphasized.Armed groups:confronting thechallengeWhile fewer states are recruiting and usingchild soldiers, when it comes to non-statearmed groups the news is far less positive.Despite some examples of progress,the bigger picture remains essentiallyunaltered: the recruitment and use ofboys and girls by armed groups remainswidespread.The uses to which children are put byarmed groups remained largely unchanged.In Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central AfricanRepublic and Colombia, for example,under-18s have been used as combatantsand in other front-line duties. Here andelsewhere armed groups also employedchildren in a range of support roles fromcooking and portering to carrying messagesand acting as lookouts and spies. Girls arereported to have been raped and subjectedto other forms of sexual violence andexploitation including by the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Columbia (FARC), theArmed Forces of the New Forces (FAFN)in Côte d’Ivoire, various armed groups inthe DRC, and the LRA in northern Uganda.On occasion, children have been used bymilitant groups in suicide attacks in Iraq, aswell as in the Occupied Palestinian Territoryuntil late 2004. This phenomenon has alsorecently emerged in both Afghanistan andPakistan. In situations such as those inHaiti, Kenya and Nigeria, children have beenactive players in political violence throughtheir membership of criminal gangs whoseservices are intermittently employed bypoliticians and other actors for politicalends.2 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Positive developmentsAn end to conflicts in Angola, Liberia andSierra Leone in the last decade brought ahalt to the massive recruitment and useof children by armed groups there. Peaceagreements in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, theDRC, Nepal and Southern Sudan have alsodelivered significant reductions in suchrecruitment, if not in all cases a total end tothe practice.Peace processes aside, the impact ofmeasures aimed at preventing and endingthe recruitment and use of children byarmed groups has been limited, reachingonly a few groups and benefiting relativelysmall numbers of children. While the valueof such measures is undeniable, it mustbe recognized that more needs to be doneto bring about demonstrable change inconflict-affected countries.The UN-led monitoring and reportingmechanism has significantly increasedavailable data on abuses against childrencommitted by armed groups, as well asarmed forces, in selected situations. 4 Theprinciple of engagement with armed groupsfor child protection purposes is now widelyaccepted and has yielded some positiveresults. Armed groups in Côte d’Ivoire andSri Lanka have agreed to UN-sponsoredaction plans to end their recruitment ofchild soldiers and to demobilize the childrenalready in their ranks. Two armed groups inMyanmar have committed to end the use ofchild soldiers and another has expressedwillingness to enter into discussions withUNICEF.At grass-roots level, initiativesaimed at building awareness of children’srights among armed groups and thecommunities that surround them havedemonstrated potential to impact on thepolicy and practices of some groups. Acase in point is in relation to ethnic armedgroups in Myanmar, where, althoughthe work of the UN was impeded by thegovernment, workshops and advocacywith armed groups conducted by a localnon-governmental organization (NGO) hascontributed to changing attitudes.Armed groups continue to recruitchildrenDespite progress, the overall picture isone of armed groups that have ignoredinternational law and standards, thatrenege on commitments, are resistant topressure and persuasion, or have so farproved to be beyond the reach of efforts toend the involvement of children in conflictand political violence.The examples are many. The LTTEhas repeatedly been condemned for itsrecruitment and use of children. Yet as SriLanka descends once again into all-outwar, the LTTE is reported to be recruitingand re-recruiting children, albeit in fewernumbers than previously, despite itsrepeated commitments to end the practice.The LRA, notorious for abducting andbrutalizing thousands of boys and girlsduring the 22-year-long conflict in northernUganda, has steadfastly ignored appeals torelease children even though peace talksare taking place. In the DRC, groups loyalto Laurent Nkunda, a former commanderof the Rwanda-backed Congolese Rally forDemocracy (RCD-Goma), have continued todeploy children in hostilities against variousother armed groups. Some of the childrenhad been recruited from refugee camps inRwanda. In Colombia, where peace effortshave stalled, several thousand childrenremain within the ranks of FARC and theNational Liberation Army (ELN) with littleapparent prospect of release.Other groups operating in little-knownconflicts have largely escaped internationalscrutiny and action. In Thailand, forexample, the separatist group NationalRevolution Front-Coordinate (BRN-C),responsible for much of the spirallingC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3

violence in the southern provinces sinceearly 2004, is reported to use under-18sin various roles including propagandaand support for military operations. InIndia, despite a reported increase in childrecruitment by Maoist groups since 2005,and persistent reports of child soldier useby armed groups in Jammu and Kashmir andnortheastern states, the issue has to datelargely escaped national or internationalscrutiny.Countries where there were childsoldiers in non-state armed groups.AfghanistanBhutanBurundiCentral AfricanRepublicChadColombiaCôte d’IvoireDRCIndiaIndonesiaIraqIsrael/OccupiedPalestinianTerritoryLebanonLiberiaMyanmarNepalNigeriaPakistanPhilippinesSomaliaSri LankaSudanThailandUgandaSolutions have proved elusive in relationto groups involved in protracted low-levelconflicts, where child soldiers have beenrecruited and used over many years. Suchgroups include the New People’s Army(NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) in the Philippines. More challengingstill are numerous irregular groups – oftenwith obscure goals and opaque commandstructures – that fragment, fracture andshift alliances and whose activities areoften as criminal as they are political. Suchgroups are characteristic of the conflicts inthe Central African Republic and Chad andare appearing in Colombia.The limits of existing approachesExisting strategies have been remarkablyeffective in establishing a broad consensusthat armed forces are unsuitable places forchildren. But it is clear that many armedgroups have not joined this consensus. Tensof thousands of children have continuedto be recruited and used by such groups,and to be put at risk of death, injury andsexual violence. Thousands more remainat risk of recruitment. Changing this realityrequires a critical analysis of the limits ofexisting approaches and the developmentof strategies to address underlying causesas well as symptoms.The international legal frameworkprohibits the recruitment and use ofunder-18s by non-state armed groups andcriminalizes the recruitment and use ofunder-15s by state and non-state forcesalike. This framework should underpin anystrategy. Indeed, some armed groups haveproved willing to commit to internationalstandards and a few have acted on suchcommitments by releasing under-18s andending further recruitment. The threat ofprosecution of individuals who recruit anduse children – far more of a reality in 2008than it was in 2004 – should contributeto awareness among members of armedgroups of the potential consequences oftheir criminal conduct.However, some armed groups andtheir leaders appear to attach little valueto international law and display littleinclination to adhere to it. The militaryimperatives of the group and the political,economic and social factors that driveconflicts and cause children to enlist – oftenunderpinned by local cultural attitudestowards the age of majority – can outweighlegal and moral arguments. And, while it ispremature to assess the future deterrenteffect of prosecutions by internationalcourts, members of many armed groupswill, in all likelihood, continue to regard2 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

themselves as beyond the reach ofinternational justice and remain confidentthat national-level prosecutions areunlikely.The public naming of certain armedgroups in the UN Secretary-General’sregular reports to the Security Council onchildren and armed conflict has encouragedseveral groups to renounce the practice andco-operate with the UN to prevent it. Themonitoring and reporting mechanism hasprompted more systematic data collection,focused attention and resources onselected situations and created entry pointsfor dialogue by humanitarian actors.Undoubtedly more could be achieved.For example, the Security Council could,through its working group, apply morepressure on parties listed in the annexes tothe Secretary-General’s report to developand implement action plans. It could alsobe bolder in its application of measures,including, when appropriate, targetedmeasures, in particular in relation tothose parties, the majority of which arearmed groups, identified in each of the fiveannexes so far published. Internationalcondemnation can have a powerful effectand the threat of sanctions or othertargeted measures may at least limit theextent of child recruitment. However,the full effect of such measures can onlybe achieved when combined with theconcerted efforts of a whole range ofnational and international governmentand non-government actors working in aco-ordinated fashion to persuade partiesto conflict to end the practice, to monitorand support their implementation ofcommitments and to design and implementpolicies to prevent future recruitment.Expectations of the role ofcommunities must be similarly qualified.Communities are essential to understandingwhy children are recruited and how theycan be protected. Engagement withcommunities can help build resistance tochild recruitment. Community interventionswith armed groups have in some casessucceeded in obtaining the release ofchildren or reducing levels of recruitment.Wherever possible community involvementshould be actively encouraged andsupported. However, in situations suchas Iraq, Sri Lanka and southern Thailand,civil society organization and actionare rendered ineffective by insecurityand violence. Moreover, where boys areconsidered adults at puberty or whereIslamist doctrine is strong, communitymembers may not oppose children’sassociation with armed groups.There are no quick or easy solutions.Armed groups have widely varyingcharacters, ideologies, aims, capacities andconstituencies, and they operate in diverse,often rapidly changing and frequentlyinsecure environments. Strategies musttake into account that what may beeffective in influencing one group may havelittle impact on another. Strategies mustalso reflect the complex web of relations,including regional and international links,surrounding such groups. Armed groupsin Chad, the DRC and Sudan, for example,enjoy the material or political support ofneighbouring governments, some of whichare in turn recipients of economic anddevelopment aid from second governmentsor donor bodies. Pressure can be exertedon such governments and donors to usewhat influence they have to encouragecompliance with human rights standardsand international humanitarian law.Addressing the root causesEfforts to influence the policies andbehaviour of armed groups should continuewherever possible and appropriate. Directand indirect engagement, advocacy,targeted measures and prosecutions canall have an effect. Greater attention mustbe paid, however, to questions of whereC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5

children are recruited by armed groups and,critically, why.While the conditions facilitating childrecruitment persist, as they do in countlesscountries worldwide, it will remain easyfor armed groups to exploit children.Many children have few alternatives to, ordefences against, joining armed groups.When hostilities are ongoing, poverty,social dislocation and other environmentalfactors create conditions of extremevulnerability to recruitment. Children inrefugee camps, the internally displaced,children separated from their families andchildren among the rural poor and in urbanslums are at higher risk. Changing conflictdynamics may exacerbate the risks. Forexample, intensified recruitment drivesby armed groups have taken place inBurundi, Nepal and Southern Sudan priorto ceasefire and disarmament agreements.Protection strategies should, as a matterof course, target identifiably vulnerablechildren and respond to changes which mayimpact on child recruitment patterns.Action to prevent recruitment shouldnot only be triggered by conflict. TheOptional Protocol requires states to takeall feasible measures to prevent armedgroups recruiting and using under-18s. Thefirst step is to criminalize such practicesin domestic law. Beyond this, durableprotection means changing the conditionsthat make recruitment possible or virtuallyinevitable, as is the case in situationssuch as the Central African Republic, Chadand Somalia. Ineffective government, theabsence of legal protections for childrenand lack of effective institutions to enforcethem, poverty, discrimination, political andsocial exclusion, lack of access to educationand vocational training and limitedlivelihood prospects set the conditions forrecruitment. Children are also more likely tobe drawn to armed groups by experiencesof human rights violations or other formsof violence, including domestic violence.Governments and societies that fail toprioritize the promotion and protection ofchildren’s rights – economic, social andcultural, as well as civil and political – shareresponsibility for driving children into theranks of armed groups.As with recruitment into armed forces,education merits particular attention– schools can be part of the problem as wellas part of the solution. Denied an adequateeducation, school leavers are unequippedfor employment in the modern world andmore vulnerable to recruitment by armedgroups.Schools are convenient sites forrecruitment of children, often forced and enmasse – a deplorable abuse. There is alsoincreasing evidence that schools are usedby armed groups to indoctrinate children,encourage volunteers and identify suitablecandidates for training and recruitment. Inboth Bangladesh and Pakistan there arereports that children have been recruitedby armed groups from madrasas (Islamicreligious schools). In the case of Pakistan,such children have been involved in suicideattacks both at home and across the borderin Afghanistan. In southern Thailand,schools and mosques are thought to beused to indoctrinate children from the ageof six in a version of history and Islam thatsupports BRN-C’s political and military aimsand encourages teenage “volunteerism”.Youth summer camps and other out-ofschoolactivities are reportedly organized byarmed groups in Lebanon and the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, which, while notnecessarily overtly military, can generatelinks and loyalties to the armed groups.The risk of education becoming arecruitment tool in the hands of armedgroups is heightened in situations wherethe public schooling system is inadequate.In these circumstances, unregulatedalternatives offering narrow curricula canflourish, with, in some cases, sectarian orIslamist content. In Indonesia, an innovative2 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

approach is being taken to tackle theproblem in Central Sulawesi where thearmed Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)had significant influence in certain religiousboarding schools. The authorities areembarking on an experiment to establisha model religious school to encouragestudents away from radical schools andreduce their vulnerability to recruitmentby militant groups. 5 While it is too early tojudge its success, and despite questionsover the transparency and equity of theprogram, this type of approach meritsconsideration.While governments have primaryresponsibility for ensuring child protectionand preventing their recruitment intoarmed groups, it should be a priority for allthose engaged in human rights protection,humanitarian work, development, conflictprevention and post-conflict peace-building.It should feature explicitly in the mandatesof all involved. It is only through collectiveendeavour that robust and durable barrierswill be erected that effectively protectchildren from being recruited into armedgroups.Disarmament,demobilizationandreintegrationSeveral major disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) programs for adultsand children have drawn to a close in the pastfour years, resulting in the release of tens ofthousands of children. Many thousands morehave escaped, been captured or have foundtheir own way home. Efforts have continuedto release children from fighting forces andto support their reintegration in countriessuch as Afghanistan, Colombia and Sri Lanka,where hostilities are ongoing. New DDRinitiatives for children have been established,including in the Central African Republicand Chad. Overall, however, DDR efforts areinadequate, and many children have failed toreceive the assistance needed to successfullyreturn to their families and communities.The majority of DDR programs inthe last decade have been carried outin sub-Saharan Africa with support frompeacekeeping operations. From these andother experiences, a wealth of knowledgeexists on the identity of girls and boys infighting forces, and their needs and prioritieswhen returning to civilian life. While theParis Principles encapsulate much that hasbeen learned over recent years about howto achieve successful DDR for children, thisknowledge has yet to be fully applied.Demobilization during conflictDemobilization of child soldiers duringconflict presents the greatest of challenges.Despite the best efforts of UN agencies,NGOs and others, large-scale releases ofC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7

children from armed forces or groups haverarely taken place before hostilities end.Difficulties in gaining access andlack of security pose major obstacles toreleasing child soldiers during conflict. Themurder in July 2006 of an NGO worker inthe DRC – killed while seeking the releaseof child soldiers in North Kivu – highlightedthe risks for human rights defenders. InChad and Colombia continued fighting hasprevented children from returning to theirfamilies. Many have been forced to remainin transit centres or institutional care formonths after being released.The record suggests that when armedconflict persists, political and militaryimperatives are likely to dictate the ebband flow of recruitment, but consistentlyapplied pressure can bring about someimprovement. In Sri Lanka, an action planin 2003, the threat of targeted measuresand ongoing dialogue with the LTTE haveresulted in reduced rates of recruitmentand release of under-18s. Nevertheless,recruitment patterns were at least in partdetermined by conflict dynamics and theLTTE’s own training cycles. Difficulties inverifying the situation of those releasedhave also persisted. In Chad, wherean estimated 7,000 to 10,000 childrenremained in armed forces and groups byOctober 2007, an agreement by the Chadiangovernment to release children from thenational army resulted in the releaseof several hundred children. However,further releases have been hampered byobstructions to UNICEF’s access to mostmilitary installations. Recruitment by allfighting forces has continued, fluctuatingaccording to military needs.In other situations armed groupshave placed unacceptable conditions onthe release of children. In the DRC, forexample, Ituri-based armed groups haverefused to release children unless demandsfor amnesties are met by the government.Militias associated with the SPLA increasedchild recruitment in 2005 to bolster fightingstrength and negotiating power prior to theirintegration into the army of Southern Sudan.These and other difficulties should notprevent efforts to release children from armedgroups or to deploy international humanrights monitors if no other protection is likelyto be effective. However, reality dictatesthat an end to conflict will produce the mostconcrete results, reinforcing the urgent needfor peaceful settlements and the inclusion ofspecific DDR provisions for child soldiers inpeace agreements. Exemptions from futureconscription of those who served as childrenshould also be included in such texts.Girl soldiers – still excludedThere is wide recognition of the involvementof girls in fighting forces, in combat andnon-combat roles and as victims of sexualslavery, rape and other forms of sexualviolence. Repeated Security Councilresolutions have highlighted the need totake into account the special needs andvulnerabilities of girls affected by armedconflict, including girls involved in fightingforces. 6 The importance of considering therequirements of girls during DDR processeswas explicitly reaffirmed by the ParisPrinciples in 2007.The existence of girl soldiers becameevident in the aftermath of armed conflictsin Angola and Mozambique in the 1990s,and girl soldiers have been present invirtually every non-international conflictsince. Yet figures from national DDRprograms reflect extraordinarily low figuresfor girls’ participation, with average levelsof between 8 and 15 per cent of those girls.In Liberia some 3,000 girl soldiers wereofficially demobilized through the formalDDR process that ended in November2004. However, as many as 8,000 wereexcluded or did not register and receivedno subsequent support. A similar situationoccurred in the DRC, where only 3,000 girls2 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

(about 15 per cent of the total number ofgirls estimated to have been involved inthe conflict) were officially demobilizedby the end of 2006 as the national DDRprogram drew to a close. Thousands of girlswho returned home informally received noreintegration support.Government armed forces known to havehad children in their ranks.ArmeniaAustraliaAustriaBangladeshBarbadosBoliviaCanadaChadCubaDemocraticRepublic of theCongoGermanyGuatemalaIrelandJordanLuxembourgMyanmarNetherlandsNew ZealandParaguayRussian FederationSomaliaSudanUgandaUnited KingdomUnited Statesof AmericaYemenThe reasons why girls have not participatedin formal DDR processes are complex. Girlsin many conflicts in Africa have been heldback, as they perform useful support rolesor are regarded as “wives”. The LRA, forexample, has refused to release some 2,000women and children on the grounds thatthey are wives and children of fighters. Girlsthemselves may not wish to be identifiedas child soldiers for fear of rejection byfamilies and communities, having beendeemed to have “lost value” throughinvolvement in sexual activity. As a result,many have returned to their communitiesinformally with their complex medical,psychosocial and economic needs unmet.The military orientation of many DDRprograms – entailing formal registrationand identification as part of a fighting force– itself presents a major obstacle to theparticipation of girl soldiers. Overlooked atthe demobilization stage, many girls remainoutside the orbit of reintegration support.It is recognized that returning girlsoldiers have multiple needs, includingspecialized medical care for physicalinjury resulting from rape or infectionfrom sexually transmitted diseases andpsychosocial support to address the realityof rape and the further trauma of rejectionby family or community. Returning girlsmay equally need support over whetherto leave or remain in relationships formedin the ranks. Girl mothers and babies whoare born of rape in situations such as theDRC, Liberia and Uganda are especiallyvulnerable to rejection.The needs of girl soldiers must beseen within broader contexts of entrenchedand complex gender discrimination andinequalities. These precede armed conflict,facilitate human rights abuses againstwomen and girls during hostilities andpersist in its aftermath. Attention mustbe paid to the fact that some girl soldiersenlist to escape sexual abuse, enforcedmarriage or a life of domestic servitude. Thecontext-specific characteristics of genderdiscrimination, sexual exploitation andabuse require careful analysis to identifythe particular vulnerabilities of girls and thetypes of discrimination in the communitiesto which they return. Awareness of theserealities has to be matched by programs toidentify girls through less formal channelsand to support their reintegration withoutreturning them to further stigmatization,violence or exploitation.Addressing the needs of childrenduring DDRAn oft-repeated error has been the failure toacknowledge and act on the well-establishedfact that many children do not register forformal DDR programs. Fearing stigmatization,thousands of child soldiers – particularlygirls – choose not to reveal their identity assoldiers by registering for DDR. The problemC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9

can be compounded by local dynamics. InColombia, for example, restrictive criteria foraccessing the government-run DDR programhas effectively excluded many former childsoldiers, including many of those dischargedby their commanders or who escaped andfound their own way home. In the DRC,anecdotal evidence from 2007 suggests thatsome child soldiers were abandoned en routeto demobilization centres by commandersfearing prosecution for child recruitment.Children who fought across borders areespecially vulnerable. For example, of some2,000 Guinean children believed to havebeen involved in armed conflict in Liberia only29 were formally demobilized and repatriatedto Guinea.Experience has additionally shown thatthe reintegration needs of both girls andboys are best served by programs basedin communities, which aim to support awide range of war-affected children. Suchprograms can militate against furtherstigmatization and resentment of childsoldiers and, by addressing broader needs,contribute more effectively to post-conflictrecovery of the children, their families andcommunities. This lesson has not, however,been consistently applied.As peace or ceasefire agreements arenegotiated, the pressure to end hostilitiesand disarm combatants drives the pace andsubstance of DDR planning, and short-termsolutions derived from adult DDR haveon occasion prevailed over longer-termcommunity-based programs. For example,best-practice principles for children’s DDRwere apparently overlooked in Nepal,where hundreds of child soldiers remainedin cantonments for over a year after apeace agreement between the governmentand the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)(Maoist). Community-based programswere too few and too late to assist all thechildren associated with the CPN (Maoist)armed wing. Despite lessons learned fromLiberia and Sudan on the sort of problemsgenerated by giving children cash packages,demobilized children were reportedlyprovided with cash payments designed foradult combatants. NGOs noted communityresentment of returning child soldiers.In Nepal and elsewhere it is necessaryfor all actors involved to examine why agreedprinciples for children’s DDR have continuedto be overlooked and to develop mechanismsto ensure that this is avoided in future.Long-term support for reintegrationThe reintegration of child soldiers is along-term process which aims to givereturning child soldiers viable alternativesto involvement in armed conflict and tohelp them resume life in the community.Elements of reintegration are wellunderstood and include family reunification(or alternative living arrangements ifreunification is not possible), psychosocialsupport, education, vocational trainingand income-generation projects. Yetsustained funding for long-term support israrely available. Lack of funding combinedwith poor planning and a tendency toprivilege demobilization over longer-termreintegration objectives, have continuedto undermine children’s prospects ofsuccessfully returning to civilian life.An artificial division of labour andfunding between the emergency phase,post-conflict recovery and development cancontribute to failed reintegration. Fundingfor national DDR programs has typicallybeen provided for immediate post-conflictdemobilization and short-term reintegrationsupport, normally for a one-year period.While child protection agencies haveprovided localized support for reintegrationprograms beyond the initial DDR process,funding for longer-term support is rarelyavailable on the scale it is needed.Inadequate provision for long-termreintegration has been reported fromAfghanistan, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia3 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

and Southern Sudan. In Guinea about 350members of government-backed civilianmilitias (adults and children) active in 2000–1 had completed training by 2004 as partof a demobilization program. Thousandsof others, many recruited as children, hadnot benefited from the program becauseof lack of funds. In the DRC, the impactof delayed, unpredictable and short-termfunding, combined with poor planning andmismanagement, resulted in some 14,000former child soldiers being excluded fromreintegration support. By the end of 2006,some four years after the start of theprogram, close to half of the total 30,000children demobilized had not receivedreintegration assistance and internationalfunding had virtually ceased.If the reintegration needs of formerchild soldiers are to be seriously addressed,these well-documented lessons must belearned. More resources should be directedat community-based programs whichare sensitive to the needs of returningchild soldiers but designed to benefit allconflict-affected children. In relation togirls, carefully designed gender-specificoutreach programs, to include provision forthe babies and children of girl soldiers, andbacked by dedicated financial resources,must be integral to DDR programming fromthe start, along with funding for sustainedreintegration to address their complexphysical, psychosocial and economic needs.Child soldiers: a blind spot in DDRDespite the accumulated knowledge, theconceptualization of fighting forces ascomprising adult male combatants hascontinued to result in the design of DDReligibility criteria that exclude girls andchildren who do not carry arms. This reveals alack of awareness by adult DDR planners thatchildren (both boys and girls) were involvedin particular conflicts in a multitude of rolesand results in DDR programs that do notinclude provisions for children.In the Central African Republic, forexample, only 26 children (almost all boys)were among over 7,500 combatants whowent through a three-year DDR programthat ended in early 2007, despite it beingknown that larger numbers of children hadparticipated in the armed conflict there. InIndonesia, the DDR program that followedthe 2005 peace agreement in Aceh made noprovision for the release and reintegration ofchild soldiers, despite evidence that childrenwere actively involved in both the Indonesianarmed forces and the armed oppositiongroup, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).Elsewhere, the failure of governmentsto acknowledge the problem, or in somecases their outright denial, means that thereis no provision to assist the release of orsupport for former child soldiers. In Myanmar,despite the establishment of a Committeefor the Prevention of Military Recruitment ofUnder-age Children and other governmentproclaimedinitiatives to stop recruitment,the authorities have so far not permittedindependent verification of how manychildren reside within the ranks of its armedforces. Additionally, no DDR arrangementsexist for children associated with armedgroups in Myanmar. In countries such asIndia, Thailand and Uganda, despite reportedrecruitment and use of children by armedgroups, there is no official support for releaseand reintegration of children. Support, whereit exists, is provided by NGOs.Evidence suggests that children arelikely to be involved in armed conflictwhen it exists. This should be reflected inDDR planning from the outset. All futureDDR efforts must be closely monitored bythose involved, including governments,donors and international bodies involvedin designing and implementing programsto ensure that agreed and well-testedprinciples are applied.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1

EndingimpunityThe international community’s commitmentto taking action against individuals whorecruit and use child soldiers has beenclearly demonstrated through the effortsof the ICC and the Special Court for SierraLeone.The inclusion of charges of forciblerecruitment and use of children in the firstever arrest warrants issued in 2005 bythe ICC – against senior members of theLRA – gives due recognition to one of thedefining crimes committed in the courseof the Uganda conflict. The first ICC trial,that of the Congolese armed-group leader,Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, on charges ofenlisting, conscripting and using childrenunder the age of 15 for active participationin hostilities, marks the beginning of thejourney towards justice for former childsoldiers there.Convictions by the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone in June 2007 of threemembers of the Armed Forces RevolutionaryCouncil (AFRC) represented the first everconvictions before an international courton charges relating to the recruitmentand use of children. A fourth guilty verdictwas handed down to a member of thegovernment-backed Civilian Defence Forces(CDF) in August the same year, while thetrial of members of the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF) for crimes includingthe enlistment of children was ongoing.The Special Court’s prosecution of CharlesTaylor, the former Liberian president andthe principal backer of the RUF, is anotherdeparture, marking the first time a formerhead of state has been brought to trial forthe crime of recruiting children.Abuses committed against childrenhave also emerged as a matter forconsideration by truth commissions, severalof which have addressed the issue ofchild soldiers. In so doing they have givenchildren and young people a platform to telltheir own stories and have contributed to abroader understanding of the experiencesof child soldiers, of how to assist theirrecovery and of how to protect children inthe future.The importance of nationalinvestigations and prosecutionsThe ICC and other ad hoc internationalor hybrid courts (combined national–international courts) will continue to playan important role in situations wherenational authorities lack the capacity orwill to prosecute war crimes and othergrave violations of human rights. However,if prosecutions are not to be limited to afew individuals in a handful of countries,national-level processes in domestic courtsmust be encouraged and supported.Justice-sector reform in the contextof international peace-building efforts hasreceived increasing attention in recentyears. However, examples of national-levelprosecutions in relation to child soldiersare rare. In one of only two cases where anational trial is known to have taken placeit proved unsatisfactory. Observers of the2006 military trial in the DRC of the formerarmed group leader Jean-Pierre Biyoyo forde facto child recruitment reported thatthe tribunal was unable to guarantee thephysical or psychosocial protection of childvictims or witnesses, and that childrenpresent at the hearings were exposed torisk. 7 On a positive note, in the ongoing trialin the DRC of a former commander of a localdefence group (Mai-Mai) on charges thatinclude the recruitment of children, variousmeasures are reported to have been put inplace to assist children participating in thetrial while protecting their identities.National-level trials in countrieswhere already weak justice systems have3 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

een further degraded by conflict requiresubstantial technical and financial supportif international standards are to be met.This is particularly so if children, includingformer child soldiers, are involved inproceedings.Political will is equally important.Amnesties or deals struck to rewardindividuals with positions in the governmentor armed forces can undermine efforts totackle impunity. In Colombia, for example,there were fears that legislation protectingformer government-backed paramilitariesfrom disclosing information about theiractivities could protect members of theparamilitaries from being held accountablefor their crimes, including child-soldierrecruitment and use. Amnesties for crimesunder international law should be opposedin all circumstances.Issues of domestic capacity andpolitical will are central to the viabilityof the agreement on accountability andreconciliation signed in June 2007 by theUgandan government and the LRA andelaborated in a February 2008 annexto that agreement. Under the termsof the agreement a special division ofthe Ugandan High Court will prosecutethose responsible for war crimes or otherwidespread or systematic crimes againstcivilians. Proposed as an alternative tothe prosecution of LRA leaders by the ICC,which the LRA has consistently cited asan obstacle to peace, a nationally basedprocess could have some benefits. If theparties to the conflict prove genuinelycommitted to pursuing accountability,the agreement offers the prospect ofboth peace and justice. Critically, it couldalso pave the way for the release of theestimated 2,000 women and childrenbelieved to remain in LRA camps in theeastern DRC and southern Sudan. However,if domestic trials are to complement theICC credibly, they must satisfy internationalfair trial standards and apply appropriatepenalties – in no circumstances should thedeath penalty be applied. As yet there is noguarantee that these conditions will be met.The scope of prosecutionsProsecutions should not, by focusingsolely on the recruitment and use of childsoldiers, exclude other crimes committedagainst children. Such an approachrisks stigmatizing child soldiers andignores the wider abuses experiencedby children in conflict situations. It is onthese grounds that some have questionedthe exclusive child-soldier focus of theICC’s charges against Thomas Lubanga.After all, the Union of Congolese Patriots(UPC/L), the armed group he led, iswidely acknowledged to have committednumerous other serious crimes againstchildren, as well as adults, includingmurder, torture and sexual violence. Abroader range of charges is contained inthe subsequent ICC indictments against twoother Congolese suspects, Germain Katangaand Matieu Ngudjolo Chui.Child soldiers frequently experience aprofoundly traumatizing array of abuses,including ill-treatment and torture, rape andother sexual violence. Many other childrensuffer similar abuses in armed conflict.The full spectrum of child victims andthe abuses they endure, including sexualviolence, must be addressed by justiceprocesses.Truth commissions and other nonjudicialapproachesTruth commissions, now an establishedelement of transitional justice, haveincreasingly recognized the importanceof addressing children. Intended tocomplement rather than provide analternative to trials, the non-judicial, lessformal, more participatory nature of truthcommissions is seen to be particularlysuited to the involvement of childrenC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3

and to addressing crimes that have beencommitted against them. The courtroomcan be an intimidating forum for childrenand few can participate in formal justiceprocesses. Their stories are frequentlynot told, at least not in their own words,and their experiences are often notwell documented or understood. Truthcommissions also look to the causesand consequences of abuses, and canrecommend reform and economic and socialmeasures aimed at repairing damage thatcan also address broader notions of justice.Several truth commissions havedevoted chapters to children in their finalreports. The Truth and ReconciliationCommission for Sierra Leone was, however,the first with an explicit mandate to pay“special attention” to the experiences ofchildren during the conflict 8 and the first inwhich children participated. Its final report,released in October 2004, testified to thelegion of legal, institutional and policyfailures that had combined to make childrenvulnerable, and directed a spotlight onwhere reform efforts should be focused.Subsequently, the report of theCommission for Reception, Truth andReconciliation for Timor-Leste, thatinvestigated human rights violationscommitted in Timor between 1974 and 1999,revealed previously little-known informationabout the extent of the involvement ofTimorese children, in particular in theIndonesian occupying forces and itsassociated paramilitary and militia groups– crimes for which no one has been heldaccountable.The Truth and ReconciliationCommission of Liberia began its workin June 2006 with a specific mandateto address the issue of child soldiers.Already several former child soldiers havetestified to the Commission, and specialchildren’s hearings are planned. Its workrepresents an important opportunityfor national and international reflectionon the circumstances that led to thesystematic and widespread use by fightingforces of girls and boys from Liberia andneighbouring countries.The mandates of truth commissionsshould make specific reference to theinvestigation of abuses against children,including, where appropriate, the issue ofchild soldiers. Those working with childrenaffected by armed conflict or on relatedissues should be consulted from the outset.At the same time, careful considerationshould be given to whether and howformer child soldiers should participatein consultations around the design andimplementation of a truth commissionand in providing information to it. Specificefforts and special arrangements areneeded to ensure that the voices of girlswho have been associated with fightingforces are heard and their concernsaddressed.The role of other non-judicialaccountability mechanisms in addressingimpunity also merits further consideration.For example, in the context of security andbroader institutional reform, vetting shouldremove from the armed forces (or otherpublic office) individuals responsible forrecruiting and using children. As part ofbroader institutional reform efforts, vettingfor these and other crimes can contributetowards preventing further abuses.Similarly, within deliberations on the designof reparations programs, consideration ofchild soldiers within the broader category ofchild victims should be included.Ensuring children’s best interestsThose designing and implementingaccountability strategies must be alertto the impact of justice processes on thebroader security and protection needsof current or former child soldiers. Goodpractice on the involvement and protectionof child victims and witnesses in war crimes3 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Countries where the minimum age for voluntary recruitment was under 18 includingfor training purposes or as cadets.ArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBarbadosBelarusBoliviaBrazilBrunei DarussalamBurundiCameroonCanadaCape VerdeChadChinaCubaCyprusDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorFranceGermanyGuinea-BissauGuyanaHungaryIndiaIranIrelandIsraelJamaicaKazakhstanKenyaKorea, (DemocraticPeople’s Republic of)KyrgyzstanLebanonLibyaLuxembourgMalaysiaMaltaMexicoMoldovaNetherlandsNew ZealandPakistanPapua New GuineaParaguayPeruPhilippinesPolandRussian FederationSao Tome and PrincipeSeychellesSingaporeTanzaniaTongaTrinidad and TobagoTurkmenistanUnited KingdomUnited States of AmericaViet NamZambiatrials and truth commissions is emerging,and important initiatives to capture andbuild on them are under way. 9 But thereare specific considerations in the caseof child soldiers that have yet to be fullyacknowledged or properly addressed.The physical security of children is ofparamount concern. This applies particularlyto children who are still in the ranks ofarmed groups or forces when prosecutionsor other accountability processes arepending. The dilemmas are evident inUganda, where the ICC indictments againstLRA leaders have been seen by some asrepresenting an obstacle to the signing of apeace deal and thereby delaying the releaseof children still in the ranks of the LRA.The effects of accountability processeson children involved in conflict and theirprospects for social reintegration mustalso be addressed. Again, this relationshipis insufficiently understood, but theresponsible promotion of justice initiativesrequires a full understanding of theirimpact, short- and long-term, on all victims,including child soldiers.In addition to questions around thebenefits and risks of former child soldiersparticipating in court proceedings or truthcommissions, there are broader issues tobe explored. These include whether andhow accountability processes help childrento make sense of their experiences, towhat extent their expectations of justiceare fulfilled, and whether trials, truthseekingor other accountability mechanismspromote understanding and acceptanceof former child soldiers by communities.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5

Through understanding how accountabilityprocesses affect the lives of child soldiers(many of whom are young adults beforesuch processes begin) and the communitiesaround them, the potential for justicemechanisms to contribute positively to theirreintegration can be maximized and risk ofharm kept to a minimum.Children and criminal responsibilityAccountability for serious crimes committedby child soldiers remains a contentiousissue. While the ICC does not havejurisdiction over under-18s and otherinternational tribunals have chosen notto apply it, the question remains whetherchildren should generally be exempt fromhaving to account for human rights abusescommitted in their capacity as members ofan armed force or group.Truth commissions in Sierra Leoneand Timor-Leste have addressed the issueof child perpetrators. The Sierra Leonecommission treated all children equally, asvictims of war, but also examined the “dualidentities” of child soldiers as both victimsand perpetrators. It emphasized that itwas not seeking to explore guilt, but tounderstand how children came to carry outviolations, what motivated them, whetherthey had the capacity to understand theiractions, and how such crimes might beprevented in the future.Recognizing that child soldiersare first and foremost victims of graveabuses of human rights, and prioritizingthe prosecution of those who unlawfullyrecruited and used them, is essential. Truthcommissions in particular can contributeto understanding the full impact of thiscrime and to the design of more effectivestrategies to assist former child soldiers inmaking their way back into society.However, victims who have sufferedabuses at the hands of a child soldier alsohave a right to justice and reparations. 10Moreover, it is reasonable to ask whetherabsolving children of responsibility forcrimes they have committed is necessarilyin the best interests of the child. In atleast some cases, where the individualwas clearly in control of their actions,and not coerced, drugged, or forced intocommitting atrocities, acknowledgementand atonement, including in some instancesprosecution, might be an important part ofpersonal recovery. It may also contribute totheir acceptance by families, communitiesand society at large.Protecting the rights of former childsoldiers in justice processes and improvingtheir chances of successful reintegrationrequire the issue of criminal accountabilityto be confronted. A clear distinction mustbe drawn between this exploration ofaccountability and the pursuit of nationalsecurity agendas that ignore juvenile justicestandards and the best interests of thechild. The framework for the accountabilitydiscussion and appropriate action alreadyexists in the international standards onjuvenile justice, with their emphasis onobjectives of rehabilitation and restorativejustice, and the accumulated best practicefrom this field. In addition, the experienceof former child soldiers, including thosewho have participated – as victims, asperpetrators or as both – in transitionaljustice processes, whether judicial, nonjudicialor traditional/customary, mustinform the debates. The views of victims,as well as of members of communities towhich child soldiers have been or will bereturned, must also be taken into account.3 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Benchmarks forchangeIn four years’ time the Optional Protocolwill have been in force for a decade. Thenext four years cannot be allowed togo by without more progress to show.The ultimate judges of that progresswill be children whose lives are blightedby their involvement in conflict and forwhom international attention is of littlecomfort unless it changes their individualcircumstances for the better. As the childrenquoted at the beginning of this introductionindicate, the damage resulting from theexperience of being a child soldier maynever be fully repaired. However, much canbe done to lessen it. A great deal can alsobe done to prevent other children from eversuffering the same experience.The task is most urgent in situationsof armed conflict, but if the recruitment anduse of child soldiers is to be definitivelyended there must be global recognitionthat armed forces are no place for a child.On this basis, the Coalition is opposed tothe military recruitment or use of any girl orboy under the age of 18. The benchmarksagainst which the progress over the nextfour years towards this goal will be judgedinclude:• A complete end to the use of childrenin hostilities in any capacity bygovernment armed forces and byany forces linked to or supported bygovernments including auxiliaries,militias and civilian defenceorganizations.• A significant increase in the numbersof non-state armed groups that havedeveloped action plans to prevent therecruitment of under-18s and the releaseof children within their ranks; thesearmed groups are being supported andmonitored in their implementation ofsuch plans.• The inclusion in all ceasefire andpeace agreements of provisions for theimmediate disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration of child soldiers.• The inclusion of provisions for childrenin the design of official DDR programsand the consistent application of theParis Principles in the implementationof all DDR initiatives, taking accountof context-specific needs and realities.The inclusion as a matter of courseof specialized culturally appropriateprograms for girls, and the building intodonor planning of long-term financialsupport for reintegration.• The establishment by governments incountries with child soldiers (but nopeacekeeping operation) of programs toidentify and release such children andsupport their reintegration.• The development of multi-faceted,multi-agency strategies to prevent childrecruitment and use by armed groups,involving legal, institutional, social,economic and cultural measures in allhigh-risk situations including countriesaffected by conflict and those wherearmed groups operate or where conflictis possible.• The explicit criminalization in domesticlaw of underage recruitment (i.e.conscription and enlistment) and useof any persons under the age of 18to participate in hostilities and theestablishment of universal jurisdictionfor such crimes.• Progress towards the systematicinvestigation and prosecution bynational and international courts ofindividuals suspected of recruitingand using children in armed forces andgroups. Where relevant this crime wouldalso be addressed by other transitionaljustice processes, including truthcommissions, reparations and vetting.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7

• The establishment of effective measuresfor refugee, asylum-seeking and migrantchildren in destination countries toprotect those who may have beenrecruited or used in hostilities.This includes ensuring their earlyidentification and providing them withculturally and child-sensitive assistancefor their physical and psychologicalrecovery and their social reintegration.• A significant increase in the numberof countries that have abandoneddomestic provisions that allow childrento be legally recruited into the armedforces at the age of 16 or 17 and haveadopted a “straight-18” standard for allforms of military recruitment.10 See, for example, Report of Diane Orentlicher,independent expert to update the Set ofPrinciples to combat impunity, Updated Set ofPrinciples for the protection and promotion ofhuman rights through action to combat impunity,and Addendum: Updated Set of Principles forthe protection and promotion of human rightsthrough action to combat impunity, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005; andUN Declaration of Basic Principles of justice forvictims of crime and abuse of power, UN Doc.A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985.1 Quotations from two boy (15 and 17 years old)former members of the Lord’s Resistance Armyin Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,“Returning Home – Children’s Perspectives onReintegration: A Case Study of Children Abductedby the Lord’s Resistance Army in Teso, EasternUganda”, February 2008.2 Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006).3 Call for Accelerated Action on the Implementationof the Plan of Action Towards Africa Fit forChildren (2008–2012), Second Pan-African Forumon Children: Mid-Term Review, 29 October–2November 2007, Cairo, Egypt.4 The monitoring and reporting mechanism isestablished in situations that feature in AnnexI or II of the Secretary-General’s reports onchildren and armed conflict. Annex I countries(situations of armed conflict on the agenda of theSecurity Council) are subject to the monitoringand reporting mechanism. Annex II countries(situations of armed conflict not on the agendaof the Security Council) are only subject to it ifthe relevant government agrees to participatevoluntarily.5 International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: TacklingRadicalism in Poso”, 22 January 2008.6 Security Council Resolutions 1314 (2000), 1325(2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003).7 See Redress Trust “Victims, Perpetrators orHeroes? Child Soldiers before the InternationalCriminal Court”, September 2006, www.redress.org. Jean-Pierre Biyoyo subsequently escapedfrom prison and returned to Bukavu as part of anofficial DRC armed forces delegation.8 Truth Commission Act 2000, Part III (2(b)).9 See, for example, UNICEF Innocenti ResearchCentre, Expert Discussion on Transitional Justiceand Children, 10–12 November 2005, BackgroundDocuments and Outcome Document.3 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

© Jonathan HyamsFormer girl soldier, abducted by the LRA, sitting with two of her children in the army’sChild Protection Unit before being handed over to a reintegration organization, Gulu,northern Uganda, 2007C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9

AFGHANISTANAfghanistanPopulation: 29.9 million (15.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 50,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 24 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ICCThere were anecdotal reports of under-18sserving in the armed forces. There werereports of the use of children as suicidebombers by anti-government elementsincluding the Taleban, and of both forcibleand voluntary recruitment by the Talebanof children in southern provinces and partsof Pakistan.ContextPresidential elections were held in October 2004and Hamid Karzai was subsequently declaredpresident. National Assembly elections were heldin September 2005. Early in 2006 the Afghangovernment and the international communitycommitted themselves to the AfghanistanCompact, a strategic framework for the rebuildingof Afghanistan. Close to 50,000 internationaltroops remained in Afghanistan: 39,500 underthe NATO-led International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) and nearly 10,000 under the US-ledcoalition forces. 1 The UN Assistance Missionin Afghanistan (UNAMA) continued to providesupport to the government including on thepeace process, the implementation of theAfghanistan Compact, and human rights.Resurgent Taleban forces challengedgovernment control in many of the southernprovinces and gained full control in somedistricts. In other areas commanders againstwhom there were credible allegations of gravehuman rights abuses and who controlled armedmilitias became further entrenched, and somewere elected to parliament. 2Weak government and an increase ininsurgency, in particular in the southernprovinces, diverted time and resources fromdevelopment and reconstruction programs andled to disillusionment among many Afghans,which was reported to have fuelled recruitmentto and support for armed groups. 3There were concerns over the increasingnumber of civilian casualties resulting bothfrom operations against insurgents by coalitionforces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) andfrom operations by the Taleban and other armedgroups. In 2006 more than 4,000 people werereported to have died as a result of the conflict,one third of them civilians. 4 There was a sharpincrease in 2006 in civilian deaths from insurgentattacks, including deliberate attacks on civiliantargets. 5 President Karzai, the AfghanistanIndependent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC),the UN and non-governmental organizations(NGOs) all expressed concern over civiliancasualties resulting from coalition forces andNATO/ISAF operations. 6 ISAF publicly stated thatcivilian casualties were its single biggest failurein 2006 and measures would be taken to reducethem. 7There was a significant increase in suicideattacks in 2006 and 2007 which were reportedto have been carried out by anti-governmentelements, including al-Qaeda, the Taleban andHizb-e Islami. A study by UNAMA concluded thatthe bombers “appear to be young (sometimeschildren), poor, uneducated, easily influencedby recruiters and drawn heavily from madrasas(Islamic religious schools) across the border inPakistan”. 8There was a sharp rise in attacks on teachers,students and schools in the first half of 2006. In2006 over 200 schools were burned, attackedor partially destroyed, at least 15 teachers killedand some 200,000 students affected by schoolclosures. 9 Although reduced from earlier levels,there were still many attacks on schools andthreats to teachers and students in 2007. 10In 2006 the government launched a NationalStrategy for Children at Risk. Designed by theMinistry of Martyrs, Disabled and Social Affairs,with the support of UNICEF and other partners,it was intended to improve care for vulnerablechildren and their families. 11GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAfghanistan’s declaration on acceding to theOptional Protocol stated that “according tothe Decree No. 20 dated 25 May 2003 on thevoluntary enrolment to the Afghan National Army… the minimum age for recruitment of AfghanCitizen to an active military service is limited bythe age of 22 to 28. All recruitments of personnelin the Afghan National Army is voluntary and isnot forced or coerced”. 12 A presidential decree(No. 97) issued in December 2003 amended theminimum age of recruitment into the ANA to 18.There was anecdotal evidence of the recruitmentof under-18s by the ANA and unconfirmed reportsof under-18s falsifying their identification recordsto join. 13The minimum recruitment age for the AfghanNational Police (ANP) was 18. There were reportsthat ill-equipped and under-trained ANP were4 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

used inappropriately as a fighting force to tackleinsurgency. 14 In September 2006 a presidentialdecree officially established the Afghan NationalAuxiliary Police (ANAP) in a scheme covering124 districts in 21 mainly southern and easternprovinces. ANAP recruits were reportedlyprovided with only ten days’ training and givenweapons and a salary equivalent to ordinarypolice. Concerns were raised that the ANAPscheme conferred an official status on privatelyowned and operated militias and that there wereinadequate command and control structuresin place to supervise them. 15 A reportedly laxapproach to recruitment and vetting meant thatit was impossible to rule out the recruitment ofunder-18s into the ANP and ANAP. There werereports of the “informal” recruitment of childrenby ANP commanders to perform duties in policecheck posts in Kandahar province. 16Armed groupsA number of armed groups were involved ininsurgency including tribal factions, criminalnetworks and groups ideologically opposed tothe government, including the Taleban and theHizb-e Islami. Most armed groups had beenresponsible for the recruitment of child soldiersduring the previous period of conflict. 17There were reports of both forcible andvoluntary recruitment by the Taleban of childrenin southern provinces and parts of Pakistan, 18 aswell as reports of the increasing use of childrenby the Taleban as messengers, couriers andfighters. 19 There were unconfirmed reports thatthe Taleban had issued a statement early in2007 claiming that they did not recruit or usechildren, in response to allegations by NATOforces that they were using children as humanshields in provinces in the south. National andinternational agencies were reportedly unable toindependently verify the allegations of the use ofchildren as human shields. 20In June 2007 it was reported that a 12-year-oldboy wearing an explosive vest had been pickedup by ISAF forces in Ghazni province. He hadreportedly been instructed by armed insurgentsto target an ISAF patrol in the area. 21 In the samemonth ISAF claimed to have defused an explosivevest placed on a six-year-old who had been toldto attack army forces in Ghazni province. 22 Inresponse, a Taleban spokesman denied the useof child soldiers, saying it was against Islamicand humanitarian law and that the report waspropaganda. 23 In July 2007 it was reported thata 14-year-old boy from Pakistan was detainedwearing an explosive vest to target a provincialgovernor of Khost province. He claimed to havebeen forced at gunpoint by the Taleban, whileat a madrasa in Pakistan, to put on the vest andattack the governor. He was publicly pardonedby President Karzai and reportedly returned toPakistan. 24 A study by UNAMA of suicide attacksdocumented the cases of children aged 15 and16 who had been tricked, promised money andforced into becoming suicide bombers. 25In April 2007 the Taleban released a videoof a 12-year-old boy beheading a Pakistani manaccused of spying. Asked why they used a boy, aTaleban official was reported as saying, “We wantto tell the non-Muslims that our youngsters arealso Mujahideens [holy warriors] and fight with usagainst you … These youngsters will be our HolyWar commanders in the future and continue thejihad for freedom. Islam allow boys and womento do jihad against occupying non-Muslim troopsand their spies and puppets.” 26In 2006 it was widely reported that theTaleban Rule Book (issued by the Talebancommand during Ramadan in 2006) includedas its Rule 19 that “Mujahideen are not allowedto take young boys with no facial hair onto thebattlefield or into their private quarters.” 27Children had been detained by US forcesat Bagram airbase in the past, 28 but it was notpossible to verify whether children continuedto be detained there. There were concernsat the apparent absence of any mechanismsamong international and national armed forcesto determine the age of detainees. 29 Detaineeswere generally transferred by NATO forces to theNational Directorate of Security (NDS) but accessto those detainees was severely restricted. 30Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)A community-based demobilization andreintegration program, established by UNICEF incollaboration with NGOs, the Ministry of Labourand Social Affairs, and the National Commissionfor Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration, which was launched in February2004, continued to facilitate demobilizationthrough the support of the local demobilizationand reintegration committees in their respectivecommunities. As of June 2007 reintegrationsupport was being provided in 29 provinces to atotal of 12,590 war-affected and at-risk children,including 5,042 former child soldiers, combininginformation education, skills training, life skillsand psychosocial support. 31DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Afghanistan and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 1

consultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Report of the UN Secretary-General on thesituation in Afghanistan and its implicationsfor international peace and security, UN Doc.A/62/345-S2007/555, 21 September 2007.2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Afghanistan’sNew Legislature: Making Democracy Work, AsiaReport No. 116, 15 May 2006, www.crisisgroup.org.3 ICG, Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, AsiaBriefing No. 59, 29 January 2007.4 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights on the situation of human rights inAfghanistan, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/98, 5 March2007.5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), The HumanCost: Consequences of Insurgent Attacks inAfghanistan, April 2007.6 See, for example, Report of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights, above note4, and “Backlash from Afghan Civilian Deaths”,Time, 23 June 2007.7 Report of the Secretary-General on thesituation in Afghanistan and its implicationsfor international peace and security, UN Doc.A/61/799–S/2007/152, 15 March 2007.8 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),September 2007, www.unama-afg.org.9 Report of the High Commissioner for HumanRights, above note 4.10 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 1.11 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006.12 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.13 US Department of State, above note 11.14 ICG, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia ReportNo. 138, 30 August 2007.15 Ibid.16 Confidential source.17 UNICEF, Rapid Assessment on the Situation ofChild Soldiers in Afghanistan, July 2003, cited inChild Soldiers: Global Report 2004.18 “Afghanistan: Civilians paying the price in Talibanconflict”, IRIN, 16 July 2007; “Recruiting Taleban‘child soldiers’”, BBC News, 12 June 2007.19 Confidential source.20 Confidential source, August 2007.21 Confidential source, June 2007.22 “Nato accuses Taliban of using children in suicidemissions”, Guardian, 23 June 2007.23 “Six-Year-Old Afghan Boy Foils Taliban Plot to UseHim in Suicide Attack on Americans”, AssociatedPress, 25 June 2007.24 “Boy forced by Taliban to become would-bebomber is pardoned”, Guardian, 16 July 2007.25 UNAMA, above note 8, refers to the cases ofAmir, aged 15, and Ghulam, aged 16, who wereinterviewed by UNAMA staff in detention, held oncharges of involvement in suicide attacks.26 “Taliban video of boy executioner causes anger”,Reuters, 26 April 2007, at www.alertnet.org.27 Henry Schuster, “The Taliban’s rules”, CNN,7 December 2006.28 See, for example, Amnesty International(AI), USA: Human dignity denied: Tortureand accountability in the war on terror (AMR51/145/2004), 27 October 2004.29 Confidential source, September 2007.30 The Afghanistan Independent Human RightsCommission (AIHRC) and five countriescontributing troops to NATO forces (Canada,Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and theUnited Kingdom), were party to memorandumsof understanding which ensured that a listof detainees handed over to the NationalDirectorate of Security (NDS) would be providedto the AIHRC. However, as of September 2007these lists did not contain information aboutthe age of the detainees. AIHRC access to NDSdetainees was limited. Confidential source,September 2007.31 Confidential source, August 2007.4 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

ALBANIARepublic of AlbaniaPopulation: 3.1 million (1.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 11,000Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution required all citizens toparticipate in the defence of the state.Conscientious objectors were required to performalternative service (Article 166).Under the 2003 Law on Military Service inthe Republic of Albania, the minimum age formilitary duty was 19 although in cases of generalor partial mobilization by law or by presidentialdecree the age could be lowered to 18. Thelength of duty was 12 months or only one monthfor university graduates. 1 Under a law passed in2006, university graduates were exempted fromcompulsory service. 2The minimum age for voluntary service was18. 3Military training and military schoolsMilitary training was offered at the Academy ofDefence “Spiro Moisiu”, the Military University“Skenderbej”, and an academy for noncommissionedofficers. The Academy of Defencewas the armed forces’ highest military teachingand scientific institution, and trained militaryleaders for all levels of command in the threearmed services. 4There was no military training within thegeneral education system, and no dedicatedmilitary educational establishment for under-18s or youth organizations with a militaryorientation. 5London stated that the Optional Protocol on theinvolvement of children in armed conflict wasunder evaluation and that Albania would “soon”adhere to it. 7 However, by October 2007 Albaniahad not yet done so.1 Communication from embassy of Albania,London, 10 April 2007.2 Law No. 9487 of 6 March 2006, Article 1, www.qpz.gov.al.3 Communication from embassy of Albania,London, June 2004.4 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.al.5 Communication from embassy, above note 3.6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Albania,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.249, 31 March 2005.7 Communication from embassy, above note 1.A — EDevelopmentsInternational standardsIn January 2005 the Albanian delegation informedthe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childof Albania’s intention to ratify the OptionalProtocols, and the Committee urged Albania todo so. 6 In April 2007 the Albanian embassy inC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 3

ALGERIAPeople’s Democratic Republic of AlgeriaPopulation: 32.9 million (12.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 137,500Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: unclearVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCAlthough the voluntary recruitment ageremained unclear, children did not appearto have been recruited into governmentarmed forces.ContextAlgeria continued to be affected by the legacy ofviolent internal conflict of the 1990s which, bythe end of 2006, had claimed over 200,000 lives.A process of National Reconciliation was underway, under which the government introducedamnesty measures, exemptions and impunityfor past human rights abuses by governmentforces and former armed group members. 1Fighting between armed groups and governmentsecurity forces persisted and violence continuedthroughout 2007. 2 The government continued itsmilitary campaign against armed groups which itclaimed were aligned with al-Qaeda, and carriedout search operations in which alleged armedgroup members were killed. There were concernsthat women and children related to armed groupmembers were also killed. 3The Salafist Group for Preaching andCombat (Groupe Salafiste de Predication et deCombat, GSPC), an offshoot of the now defunctArmed Islamic Group (Groupe islamique armé,GIA), announced in September 2006 that ithad joined forces with al-Qaeda and at thestart of 2007 officially renamed itself as theal-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.This was accompanied by increased attacksagainst commercial and military targets in2007. 4 Following the April 2007 suicide bombattacks claimed by the GSPC in Algiers, in whichsome 30 people were killed, an estimated 80Algerian men, many of whom were thought tohave received training in Iraq, were arrested byAlgerian authorities. 5According to press reports, there wereincidents in 2006 involving the kidnapping andrape of girls by armed groups. In May 2006 thebodies of 22 children were found in the provinceof Jijel. They were alleged to have been used ashuman shields by the GSPC. 6GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe legal basis for conscription into the regulararmed forces remained the National ServiceCode. Algerian men were liable for 18 months’compulsory conscription between the ages of 19and 30, and an additional six months’ service asa reservist up to the age of 50. Some 375,000young men were estimated as reaching militaryservice age annually. 7 Evading conscriptionwas punishable by a five-year prison sentencein accordance with Article 254 of the AlgerianMilitary Justice Code. 8The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentinto the armed forces or paramilitary forces wasunclear. 9Armed groupsParamilitaries and militiasAs part of its National Reconciliation initiativethe government began dismantling governmentalliedparamilitary groups and local militias. InMay 2004 the Algerian government endorsed thedemobilizing of half the 300,000 members of theLegitimate Defence Force (GLD), the self-defencemilitias established in 1997 under ExecutiveDecree. 10Armed opposition groupsIn May 2007 the purported leader of al-Qaedain the Islamic Maghreb released a recordedstatement urging the youth of Algeria to join“the growing rank of martyrs”. 11 It was not knownwhether armed groups recruited or used under-18s.DevelopmentsIn October 2005 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child expressed serious concern over thealleged cases of persons under 18 years of agebeing used by government-allied paramilitaryforces and armed political groups, and overdeficiencies in the birth registration system forchildren belonging to nomadic minorities. TheCommittee expressed deep concern over thesituation of Western Saharan children living inrefugee camps in Algeria. 12A bill on child protection (Code de protectionde l’enfant) was introduced and was expectedto harmonize existing laws pertaining to theprotection and promotion of child rights. 131 “Algeria”, Amnesty International Report 2007.2 “Algeria violence death toll jumps in September– reports”, Reuters, 1 October 2007.3 “Algeria”, above note 1.4 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

4 “Al Qaeda: profile in north Africa”, BBC News,11 December 2007; “Violence ahead of Algeriapolls”, BBC News, 14 May 2007.5 “Echoes of past as Algeria probes Iraq bomblink”, Reuters, 25 April 2007.6 US State Department, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices, Algeria, 6 March 2007, http://www.state.gov.7 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Algeria”, WorldFactbook 2007, www.cia.gov.8 UK Home Office, Border and Immigration Agency,Country of Origin Information Report, Algeria, 2November 2007, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk.9 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Algeria,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.269, 12 October 2005.10 Hugh Roberts, Demilitarizing Algeria, CarnegiePaper No. 86, Carnegie Endowment, May 2007,www.carnegieendowment.org.11 “Algeria bombing video released”, Al Jazeera, 8May 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net.12 Concluding observations, above note 9.13 Ibid.ANDORR APrincipality of AndorraPopulation: 67,000 (12,000 under 18)Government armed forces: noneCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 30 April 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ICCThe defence of Andorra was theresponsibility of France and Spain; Andorrahad no armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAndorra had no armed forces; neighbouringFrance and Spain had responsibility for itsdefence. 1 There was no possibility that Andorrancitizens would be recruited into the French orSpanish armed forces. 2 Only the Andorran policeand customs services were authorized to carryarms, and the minimum ages for recruitmentinto these services were 19 and 18 respectively.A special unit of forest wardens employed bythe Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment,who on occasion provided back-up for the policeand the fire brigade, was also permitted tocarry weapons in strictly limited circumstances.Those recruited to serve as forest wardens werebetween the ages of 18 and 35. 3A — EDevelopmentsFollowing its examination in January 2006 ofAndorra’s initial report on the Optional Protocol,the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childrecommended that the Andorran governmentadopt provisions that would allow extraterritorialjurisdiction for the crime of conscripting orenlisting children under the age of 15 into thearmed forces or armed groups, or compellingtheir active participation in hostilities. 41 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfile: Andorra, www.fco.gov.uk.2 Report of the NGO Group for the Convention onthe Rights of the Child/Liaison Unit, Child RightsInformation Network, www.crin.org.3 Initial report of Andorra to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/AND/1, 14 July 2005.4 Report of the NGO Group, above note 2.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 5

ANGOL ARepublic of AngolaPopulation: 15.9 million (8.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 107,000Compulsory recruitment age: 20Voluntary recruitment age: 18 for men, 20 forwomenVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 11 October 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCChild soldiers were used extensivelyduring the 27-year civil war by bothgovernment armed forces and the armedopposition group UNITA (União Nacionalpara a Independência Total de Angola,National Union for the Total Independenceof Angola), and were also used by thearmed separatist Cabinda LiberationFront (Frente de Liberação do Enclave deCabinda, FLEC). There were no reports ofunder-18s currently being recruited intothe armed forces.ContextStability increased following the April 2002signing of the Luena Peace Accords by thegovernment and UNITA. An estimated 4.5 millionpeople were internally displaced during theconflict and some 450,000 fled to neighbouringcountries. 1 By December 2006 a UN refugeerepatriation program had resulted in the returnof over 400,000 refugees, 2 but an estimated100,000 people remained internally displaced. 3Low-intensity fighting continued in the oil-richprovince of Cabinda between government forcesand armed factions of the FLEC. 4 In August 2004FLEC-FAC (Forças Armadas de Cabinda, CabindanArmed Forces) and FLEC-Renovada (Renewed)merged, and with the Catholic Church and civilsociety groups formed the Cabindan Forumfor Dialogue (Forum Cabindés para o Diálogo,FCD). FCD-led negotiations with the governmentresulted in the signing of a Memorandum ofUnderstanding for Peace and Reconciliation forthe province of Cabinda in August 2006. However,the agreement was rejected by a majority of thegroups in the FCD. 5The memorandum provided for specialstatus for Cabinda and an amnesty for militarycrimes and crimes against the security of thestate committed in the context of the armedconflict in that province. 6 It also provided for thedemobilization and integration of FLEC troopsinto the armed forces. 7 Political and militarytension continued and in May 2007 sporadicsmall-scale attacks by FLEC forces that hadremained active increased. 8 On 1 August 2007they changed their name to the Liberation Frontof the State (as opposed to ‘Enclave’) of Cabinda.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the constitution it was the right andhighest duty of every citizen to defend thecountry, military service was compulsory, and themanner in which it was fulfilled was establishedby law. Under Law 1/93, military service wascompulsory for all men aged between 20 and45. Women over 20 could also volunteer to join.Recruitment started at 18, with registration underthe military census. Those who failed to registerwere subject to unspecified sanctions, which inpractice amounted to the payment of fines.Under Article 8.3 of Law 1/93, the NationalAssembly was empowered to decree themilitary call-up of citizens from the age of 18in the case of a national emergency and at therequest of the Council of Ministers. The lawalso stipulated that military service was for twoyears, but the National Assembly could extendor reduce the term by a year if needed and if“conditions of service permit”. The law providedfor conscientious objectors to perform civilianservice. Decree No. 40/96 of 13 December 1996,on the application of military service, establisheda minimum age of 18 for the voluntaryrecruitment of men.Recruitment into the armed forces wassuspended during 2002 and 2003 but resumedin 2004. 9 Former child soldiers were exempt fromcompulsory military service, although they couldstill be recruited on a voluntary basis. 10Child recruitment and deploymentFrom late 2002 there were no reports of childrenbeing recruited into the armed forces or beingused by the armed forces in the fighting inCabinda. 11Armed groupsBoth FLEC-FAC and FLEC-Renovada had recruitedchildren during the war, some as young as eight,and at least 30 per cent of them were girls. 12 Morerecent information on the recruitment of childrenby FLEC was not available.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The demobilization and reintegration of formerUNITA fighters was completed by December4 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2005, by which time almost 100,000 combatantshad been demobilized. Thousands benefited fromgovernment programs of social reintegration,particularly in agricultural projects. In March2007, 30,000 soldiers in the armed forces werealso demobilized. 13 In total, around 300,000government and former UNITA soldiers had beendemobilized since the first peace agreement ofMay 1991. 14The quartering (provision of lodgings) of FLECsoldiers was declared completed in November2006 with the cantonment and disarming ofbetween 500 and 1,800 soldiers. 15 There wereno reports that child soldiers were among them.Ammunition and hundreds of weapons weredecommissioned and destroyed in January2007 when FLEC’s military organization wasformally dismantled. Of its members, 615 wereincorporated into the Angolan armed forces, 113joined the Angolan National Police and 131 wereeither retired or returned to civilian life. 16 Noinformation was provided on specific packagesfor the social reintegration of those demobilized.The “Post-war Child Protection Strategy”adopted by the government in 2002 ended in2006. The program involved the reintegration intosociety of more than 3,000 children, includingformer child soldiers. The children received skillstraining, assistance with civil registration andaccess to social assistance. 17Despite attempts by the police to collectweapons left over from the war, the numberof weapons in civilian hands as of March 2006was estimated at between 2.5 and 4 million. 18Landmines remained a threat, particularly tochildren, who continued to be killed and maimed,albeit to a lesser extent in recent years. Nongovernmentalorganizations working on mineclearance estimated that there were 500,000landmines still to clear. 19 On 31 May 2007 thegovernment announced that it had completed thedestruction of its 83,557 stockpiled landmines inaccordance with the Ottawa Convention. 20DevelopmentsAngola presented its initial report to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child on 4 June2004. In considering the report, the Committeewelcomed Angola’s efforts to strengthen theprotection of children’s rights. It also welcomedthe ratification in 2001 of the ILO Minimum AgeConvention 138 and the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention 182 and of the AfricanCharter on the Rights and Welfare of the Childin July 2003. The Committee expressed concernabout the inadequate attention given to theplight of child soldiers, especially girls, in thecontext of the disarmament, demobilization andreintegration of combatants. 21In June 2004 it was widely reported thatAngolan troops had been deployed in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). TheAngolan authorities denied the reports, butconfirmed that the government had agreed to arequest by the DRC to help train its police andarmy. 22International standardsAngola acceded to the Optional Protocol on theinvolvement of children in armed conflict on 11October 2007. The accompanying declarationstated that “the inclusion of persons in theAngolan Army, as appropriate, is done upon theirreaching 20 years of age, and the minimum agefor voluntary enlistment is 18 years”. 231 World Bank, “Angola: Emergency Demobilizationand Reintegration Project, February 2003”,Report No. PID 11534, www worldbank.org.2 Embassy of the Republic of Angola in the UnitedKingdom, Angola News, No. 120, December2006–January 2007.3 US State Department, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices, Angola – 2006, Bureau ofDemocracy, Human Rights and Labour, 6 March2007.4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Angola”, HumanRights Watch World Report 2005.5 Semánario Angolense, 4 September 2006.6 Ibinda, 26 October 2006, www.ibinda.org.7 Amnesty International Report 2007.8 Jornal Apostolado, 30 July 2007.9 Order issued by the Minister of Defence, read onRádio Nacional de Angola on 5 January 2004 andquoted by the BBC.10 Minister of Social Welfare, Mesa Redonda sobreos desafíos da Protecção da Crianza, no Processode Reintegração, 7 March 2003.11 HRW, Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers inAngola, April 2003.12 Institute of Security Studies, Country Profiles:Angola, 8 November 2002, www.iss.co.za.13 Jornal de Angola, 8 December 2005; Agora, 24March 2007; and Angola News, above note 2, No.123, April 2007.14 A Capital, 28 April–5 May 2007.15 Figures vary. For instance, Jornal de Angola, 5October and 11 November 2006, and AngolaPress Agency, 10 November 2006, refer to 500soldiers. Another report by Jornal de Angola on28 November 2006 refers to 1,804 soldiers.16 Angola News, above note 2, No. 120, December2006–January 2007.17 Confidential source, February 2007.18 IRIN, 13 March 2006, quoting the Pretoria-basedInstitute of Security Studies.19 US State Department, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices, Angola – 2005, Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 8March 2006; Initial report of Angola to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/3/Add.66, 10 August 2004.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 7

20 Angola News, above note 2, No. 120, December2006–January 2007; EFE (Spanish Press Agency),31 May 2007.21 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Angola,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.246, 1 October 2004.22 Radio France Internationale (RFI) on 8 June 2004,quoted by the BBC; AFP, 25 June 2004.23 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rightsof the Child on the involvement of children inarmed conflict, www2.ohchr.org.ANTIGUA ANDBARBUDAAntigua and BarbudaPopulation: 81,000 (27,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 170Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription(see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription into the Antigua andBarbuda Defence Force, and no legal basis forcompulsory military service during states ofemergency. 1 Under the 1981 Defence Act, nobodyunder the age of 18 could be enlisted into theregular armed forces, but the Governor-Generalhad powers to call up men for national serviceand to set the age at which they could be calledup. 2 The 1981 Act was amended by the DefenceAct 2003, No. 10 of 2006. 3Military training and military schoolsThe armed forces managed National CadetCorps units in secondary-schools, providingphysical training, basic military skills, disciplineand academic and technical guidance, andpromoting national service and patriotism. Thegovernment announced in September 2006 thatit was considering making enrolment in the corpscompulsory for every student in the first andsecond years of secondary-school. 4DevelopmentsIn November 2004 the UN Committee on theRights of the Child recommended that Antiguaand Barbuda ratify the Optional Protocol. 51 1967 Emergency Powers Act, Chapter 147, www.laws.gov.ag.2 1981 Defence Act, Chapter 132, Sections 15(2) and161.3 International Labour Organization, www.ilo.org/(natlex database).4 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

4 Prime Minister W. Baldwin Spencer, speech atthe Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force 25thAnniversary Banquet, 2 September 2006, www.antigua.gov.ag.5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byAntigua and Barbuda, Concluding observations,UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.247, 3 November 2004.ArgentinaArgentine RepublicPopulation: 38.7 million (12.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 71,700Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription(see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 10 September 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.A — EGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeCompulsory military service had been replacedby voluntary enrolment in 1994, althoughthe government retained powers to restoreconscription in an emergency. 1 Volunteers tothe armed forces were on renewable two-yearcontracts. 2 They had to be 18–24 years old and tohave seven years of basic education. Those under21 were required to have parental consent. 3If the number of volunteers failed to meetthe quota of recruits for a particular year,Congress could authorize the conscription forup to 12 months of citizens who turned 18 thatyear. 4 In such circumstances, conscientiousobjectors could carry out an alternative form ofsocial service. In an armed conflict, the wholepopulation had to support the war effort withnon-military service. 5In June 2006, Decree 727 regulating theNational Defence Law established a clearer lineof civilian command over the armed forces and inthe development of defence policies. 6 The armedforces could respond to external threats only andwere excluded from internal security operationsrelated to drug trafficking and terrorism.Military training and military schoolsEach branch of the armed forces had its ownprimary, secondary and training schools. Thearmy had seven primary and secondary-schoolsaround the country, which offered the nationalcurriculum as well as military instruction. 7Candidates for officer training at theNational Military College had to have completedsecondary education and were usually about 17or 18 years old. They needed parental consentif they were under 21. Women could takecourses that included artillery, engineering,C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 9

communications and logistics. Students wereallowed to leave the college without penalty. 8Candidates to the Military Aviation Schoolhad to be aged 16–22 and to have completedtheir secondary education. Officers graduatedafter four years as second lieutenants (alférez). 9Those seeking to enrol at the Military NavalSchool had to be at least in their final secondaryschool year (typically aged 17) and have parentalconsent if under 21. 10Candidates to the non-commissioned officers’air force school had to be aged 16–22, haveparental consent if under 21 and have completedtheir secondary education. Graduates receivedthe rank of corporal (cabo) after two years’training. 11Boys and girls aged 11–15 could enrol inmilitary high schools (liceos militares) run by thearmed forces. The schools provided a generaleducation, with military instruction for studentsin their last two years. 1212 Comando de Educacion y doctrina, www.coedoc.ejercito.mil.ar; see also Global Report 2004,above note 6.DevelopmentsIn October 2007 Argentina endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The two documents, which werepreviously endorsed by 59 states at a February2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for the protection of and assistance tochild soldiers, following a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Argentina, August2006, www.flacso.cl.2 FLACSO, above note 1.3 Ejército Argentino, Servicio Militar Voluntario,Soldado voluntario, www.ejercito.mil.ar.4 Ley del Servicio Militar Voluntario, No. 24429,Articles 19, 20 and 21.5 Ley de Defensa Nacional, No. 23554.6 FLACSO, above note 1; see also Child Soldiers:Global Report 20047 FLACSO, above note 1.8 Colegio Militar de la Nación, Preguntasfrecuentes, www.colegiomilitar.mil.ar.9 Escuela de Aviación Militar, Incorporacion yeducacion, www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar.10 Escuela Naval Militar, www.escuelanaval.mil.ar.11 Escuela de Suboficiales de la Fuerza Aérea,Información General, Condiciones y Programas deIngreso, www.esfa.iua.edu.ar.5 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

ARMENIARepublic of ArmeniaPopulation: 3.0 million (819,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 43,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18; 16–17 as a cadetVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 30 September 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s onactive duty in the armed forces, but cadetsunder 18 in military higher education wereconsidered to be military personnel. Undera pilot scheme children as young as 11received weapons training in school.ContextNegotiations with Azerbaijan continued underthe auspices of the Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) to end the disputeover the status of the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. 1 The government insisted that thepeople in the enclave had to be guaranteed theright to exist within safe borders and that a linkwith Armenia had to be maintained. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMilitary service was regulated by the 1998 Law onMilitary Duty and the 2002 Law on Performanceof Military Service. Conscription was provided forin the constitution. The 1998 Law on Military Duty(Article 11.1) stated that male citizens betweenthe ages of 18 and 27 were liable for call-upin peacetime. In 2005 the law was amendedto oblige graduates of military educationalinstitutions to sign up for professional militaryservice or else to refund the costs of theireducation. 3There were reports of physical and mentalabuse, murder and rape of army conscripts. 4Three soldiers who in 2005 had been convictedof killing two fellow conscripts in December2003 had their sentences increased in May2006 from 15 years’ to life imprisonment by theCourt of Appeal. One of them stated that militaryinvestigators beat him and threatened him withrape, coercing him into signing a confession inwhich he named the two others as accomplices. 5The three, who had consistently maintainedtheir innocence, were released by the Court ofCassation in December 2006. Shortly afterwardsthe judge who ordered their release was removedfrom his post. 6 The three soldiers submitted anapplication to the European Court of HumanRights, complaining of ill-treatment duringquestioning and unlawful detention. The Court’sdecision as to the admissibility of the case wasstill under consideration at the end of October2007. 7The Law on Alternative Service, which gavelegal recognition to conscientious objection,entered into force in July 2004. 8 A governmentorder of 9 July 2006 made available just 45 placesfor alternative service and a further 300 nonarmedmilitary positions. 9 Many conscientiousobjectors, mainly Jehovah’s Witnesses, refusedto enlist for alternative service on the groundsthat it was controlled by the military and not afully civilian alternative. 10 In 2006, 40 Jehovah’sWitnesses were convicted for their refusal to domilitary service and by May 2007 over 70 were inprison. 11The army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic(NKR), which was not internationally recognizedas an independent state, was estimatedat 18,500–20,000, of whom over half werereportedly citizens of Armenia and includedArmenian army conscripts. 12Military training and military schoolsMilitary training was compulsory for schoolstudents aged about 16–18. Boys and girls ingrades 8 and 9 in weekly classes learned how tohandle automatic weapons. Girls could begin anursing course from grade 9. 13In 2006 in one school in a poor suburb ofYerevan, the capital, military training startedmuch earlier. A class of 18 boys and six girlsaged 11 and 12, many of whom were orphans,were chosen to pilot military training for preadolescents,with the stated aim of improvingschool discipline. They were taught by a formerparatrooper to march, handle automatic weaponsand use combat skills. The Ministry of Educationand Science reportedly planned to extendthe course to 11 other “special schools” withdisadvantaged pupils around the country, andto allow children who wanted military careers totransfer to those schools. 14Military training after secondary-school wasprovided through officer training at the VazgenSarkizyan Military Institute, the Military AviationInstitute, and the Military Medical Faculty ofYerevan Medical University. Cadets could beaccepted for military higher education from theyear they turned 17. During their studies, theywere considered to be military personnel, withall the corresponding rights and duties. 15 Theinclusion of under-18s among this group was notexplicitly mentioned in Armenia’s declaration onratifying the Optional Protocol.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1

DevelopmentsInternational standardsArmenia ratified the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2005, stating in its declaration thatunder Armenian law citizens under 18 could notbe called on for either obligatory or contractual(voluntary) military service. 16In January 2006 Armenia ratified the ILOMinimum Age Convention 138 and the ILO WorstForms of Child Labour Convention 182.* Titles of non-English-language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 “Armenian, Azerbaijan Envoys Meet overNagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty (RFE/RL), 14 March 2007, www.rferl.org.2 Armenia Country Profile, BBC News, 4 March2007.3 Confidential sources, April 2007.4 “Violence in the Ranks: Army conscript sayshe was raped by comrades”, ArmeniaNow, 17February 2006, www.armenianow.com.5 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007.6 Gayane Abrahamyan, “Free at last: struggle toprove soldiers’ innocence ends with surprisevictory in court”, ArmeniaNow, 12 January 2007.7 Arayik Zalyan, Razmik Sargsyan and MusaSerobyan v. Armenia (Application Nos 36894/04and 3521/07), European Court of Human Rights,admissibility hearing 11 October 2007, www.echr.coe.int.8 Marc Stolwijk, The Right to ConscientiousObjection in Europe: A Review of the CurrentSituation, Quaker Council for European Affairs,April 2005, www.quaker.org/qcea/coreport.9 Confidential sources, above note 3.10 Emil Danielyan, “New alternative service falls flatin Armenia”, Eurasianet, 10 March 2006, www.eurasianet.org.11 International Helsinki Federation, HumanRights in the OSCE Region: Armenia, 27 March2007, www.ihf-hr.org (IHF reports); Felix Corley,“Armenia, 72 religious prisoners of conscienceis new record”, Forum 18 News Service, 2 May2007, www.forum18.org.12 International Crisis Group (ICG), Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground,Europe Report No. 166, 14 September 2005, www.crisisgroup.org.13 Confidential sources, above note 3.14 Gegham Vardanian, “Armenian pupils march tonew step”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting(IWPR), 20 July 2006, www.iwpr.net; ArmenianHelsinki Federation, above note 11.15 “Armenian National Army – 15 years old”,Respublika Armeniya, 31 January 2007,www.ra.am.16 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.AUSTR ALIAAustraliaPopulation: 20.2 million (4.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 51,600Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 26 September 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182As of mid-2007, there were nearly 500under-18s serving in the armed forces,including girls.ContextAustralian Defence Force (ADF) personnelparticipated in a major government crackdown,which included forced medical examinations forchildren, on reported widespread child abuseamong Aboriginal communities in 2007. Thisin turn prompted fears among the communitymembers of a return to former assimilationpolicies that saw a “stolen generation” ofchildren forcibly removed and placed with non-Aboriginal families. 1In July 2005 the government abandonedits policy of detaining child asylum seekers inhigh-security facilities, but unaccompaniedchildren continued to be detained under guard,and criticism of the government’s asylum andimmigration policies continued. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislationand practiceThere was no conscription in Australia, but the1903 Defence Act allowed for its introduction intime of war by a proclamation approved by bothhouses of parliament (Section 60). The minimumconscription age was specified as 18 (Section59). The legal basis for voluntary recruitmentwas provided by the Defence Act (Article 34), theNaval Defence Act 1910 (Article 24) and the 1923Air Force Act (Article 4E). 3The Defence Instructions of 2005 specified 17as the minimum voluntary recruitment age for allthree armed forces (Article 4). However, childrencould apply to join the armed forces at 16 yearsand 6 months. Children from the age of ten wereencouraged to register their details with anonline service that could put them in contact witharmed forces recruitment officers. The DefenceInstructions stated that all personnel wishing tojoin the armed forces had to present an original5 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

or certified copy of their birth certificate to theirrecruiting officer (Article 5) and that all under-18shad to have the written informed consent of theirparents or guardians (Article 6). All applicantswishing to join the armed forces had to be fullyinformed of the nature of their future duties andresponsibilities (Article 7), and the recruitment ofall children had to be genuinely voluntary (Article8). 4 The Defence Instructions stated that thearmed forces had to take “all feasible measures”to ensure that under-18s did not participate inhostilities (Article 10), and outlined a numberof limited safeguards, including that under-18sshould not be deployed in areas of operationswhere there was a likelihood of hostile action“to the maximum extent possible, and whereit will not adversely impact on the conduct ofoperations” (Article 11). However, a commanderwas not obliged to remove an under-18 fromdirect participation in hostilities in certaincircumstances, including “where it wouldprejudice the effectiveness of the mission”(Article 13). 5Australia’s declaration on ratification ofthe Optional Protocol in 2006 stated that theminimum age of voluntary recruitment was 17;that proper documentation of age and informedconsent of parents or guardians of under-18swere required; that all applicants be fullyinformed of their duties and responsibilities; andthat recruiting officers had to be satisfied thatapplications for enlistment of under-18s were ona “genuinely voluntary basis”. 6Following ratification of the Optional Protocol,the Criminal Code Act (1995) was amended in2007 to provide for a series of criminal penaltiesfor individuals who used, conscripted or enlistedchildren under the age of 15 into the nationalarmed forces or under the age of 18 into a forceor group other than the national armed forcesin both international or non-international armedconflicts. 7In October 2005 the Defence ForceOmbudsman released the report from hisinvestigation into the management andadministration of under-age personnel in thearmed forces. It included a recommendation thatthe forces undertake an analysis of the costsand benefits of accepting children for enlistmentin the ADF, with a view to determining whetherthe enlistment age should be raised to 18 years.The Defence Department disagreed with therecommendation, claiming that to raise theminimum age would “severely restrict the qualityand quantity of recruits”. 8Military training and military schoolsIn its declaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol in 2006, Australia stated that theminimum voluntary recruitment age of 17 didnot apply to military schools. Nor did it applyto cadet schemes, “members of which are notrecruited into, and are therefore not members of,the ADF”. 9The Australian Defence Force Cadetsdescribes itself as a “community-based youthdevelopment organization” of 22,000 cadetsand 2,100 cadet staff in 475 units and squadronsacross Australia, funded by the governmentthrough the Department of Defence. Theminimum age of recruitment is 12 years and 6months for navy and army cadets, and 13 forair force cadets. Training included weaponshandling. The cadet force was considered a pathto a defence career, and “a safe and fun militarylikeexperience”. 10Child recruitment and deploymentAs of 27 July 2007, there were a total of 486under-18s serving in the armed forces, including62 girls. The government stated that it had norecord of children being deployed into areas ofoperations. 11Disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration (DDR)The government was providing Australian$200,000 to help UNICEF and the UN SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflictundertake the ten-year strategic review of the1996 Machel study, “The Impact of Armed Conflicton Children”. 12DevelopmentsInternational standardsAustralia ratified the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2006, the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court in July 2002 and ILOConvention 182 in December 2006. 131 Reuters, “Australia’s Aborigines fear losingchildren”, 26 June 2007.2 Children out of Detention, www.chilout.org/;Mary Crock, Seeking Asylum Alone: Australia,Harvard, 2006, www.humanrights.harvard.edu.3 Commonwealth of Australia Law, www.comlaw.gov.au.4 Department of Defence, “Recruitment andemployment of members under 18 years in theAustralian Defence Force”, Defence Instructions(General), 4 July 2005; “Underage candidates”;“Recruitment and employment of membersunder 18 years in the Australian Defence Force”,Defence Instructions (General), 4 July 2005; all atwww.defencejobs.gov.au.5 Department of Defence, “Recruitment andemployment of members under 18 years in theAustralian Defence Force”, above note 4.6 Declaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3

7 Commonwealth of Australia Law, above note 3.8 Commonwealth and Defence Force Ombudsman,“Australian Defence Force: management ofservice personnel under the age of 18 years”,October 2005, www.comb.gov.au.9 Declaration, above note 6.10 Department of Defence, Defence Force Cadets,www.cadetnet.gov.au.11 Child Soldiers Coalition correspondence withMinistry of Defence, October 2007.12 Ibid.13 Ratification of the Optional Protocol, above note6; ICC Assembly of States Parties, www.icc-cpi.int/; International Labour Standards, www.ilo.org(ilolex database).AUSTRIARepublic of AustriaPopulation: 8.2 million (1.6 million under 18)Government armed forces: 39,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 1 February 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, IL0 182Voluntary recruitment was allowed for17-year-olds. The precise number of under-18s in the armed forces was not available.Legislation ruled out the participation ofunder-18s in active service.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution and the 1990 National DefenceAct provided the basis for compulsory militaryservice. 1 According to the National Defence Act,all Austrian men were required to register forcompulsory military service during the calendaryear in which they became 18. Recruitment orderscould not be served earlier than six monthsfollowing the decision on fitness for service by arecruitment commission. The National DefenceAct also allowed for voluntary recruitment to theAustrian armed forces at the age of 17 – althoughthe explicit consent of parents or guardians wasrequired. Volunteers under 18 could enter thearmed forces for training purposes only, andany deployment overseas of 17-year-olds wasprohibited. The Act on Dispatching of Soldiers forAssistance Abroad allowed for voluntary requestsfor international deployment to be made onlyat the age of 19. According to a 2003 NationalDefence Act amendment, women could volunteerfor military training and “functional services”in the armed forces, but were prohibited fromparticipation in armed conflict. 2 The lengthof ordinary military service was currently sixmonths. Precise figures on the number ofvolunteers under the age of 18 currently servingin the armed forces were unavailable, but thecurrent figure was believed to be very low. 3 A2001 amendment to the National Defence Actexplicitly banned “the direct participation ofpersons under the age of 18 in direct hostilities”.According to the Austrian government, “theterm ‘direct participation’ is interpreted in arestrictive manner and does not include actssuch as gathering and transmission of military5 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

information, transportation of arms andmunitions, provision of supplies, etc.”. 4The Austrian Penal Code “prohibits andcriminalizes the recruitment and use of personsof any age in hostilities by armed groups that aredistinct from the armed forces”. 5Military training and military schoolsAlthough the Austrian government statedthat there were no schools in the countrydirectly operated by the armed forces, theMilitaerrealgymnasium, located in WienerNeustadt, “offers students from age 14 a highersecondary education with a specialization innatural sciences and a military-led boardingschool. The school is supervised by the generalschool authorities in all relevant aspects. Theboarding school is governed by internal rulesunder the supervision of the Federal Ministry ofDefence.” 6Although it was not an exclusive aim,preparation for a military career as an officerwas certainly one of the institution’s statedpurposes. The government stated that thestudents of the school were not considered to bemembers of the armed forces, and emphasizedthat the pursuit of a military career followinggraduation was not compulsory. 7 In its January2005 examination of Austria’s initial report onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child notedthat students at the school were referred to as“cadets”. The Committee went on to requestthe following: “With regard to incentives forrecruitment, and in light of the fact that asignificant proportion of new recruits in thearmed forces come from the cadet forces, theCommittee requests the State party, in its nextreport, to include more detailed information andstatistics on its military school and the cadetforces … and on recruitment activities undertakenby the armed forces within the cadet forces.” 8In its report to the Committee, the governmentstated that training in international law and therights of the child was being included in thepreparation of Austrian soldiers for overseasmissions. Austrian peacekeepers were also givenparticular instruction relevant to the place of theirdeployment – as in the case of two armed forcespersonnel whose preparatory training includedspecific attention to the issue of child soldiersin the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Thecurriculum of the Militaerrealgymnasium alsoincluded instruction in the basics of internationalhumanitarian law. 9groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.2 Initial report of Austria to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocolto the Convention on the Rights on the Child onthe Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/AUT/1, 8 July 2004.3 Information from the defence attaché, Austrianembassy, London, September 2007.4 Initial report, above note 2.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Austriaon the Optional Protocol on the Involvementof Children in Armed Conflict, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CO/2,January 2005.9 Initial report, above note 2.A — EDevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Austria and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

AZERBAIJANRepublic of AzerbaijanPopulation: 8.4 million (2.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 66,740Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (as a cadet schoolstudent)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 3 July 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182Under-18s could volunteer to join thearmed forces as cadets at military school.ContextNegotiations with Armenia continued underthe auspices of the Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to end thedispute over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. 1Azerbaijan’s oil wealth was channelled into themilitary to bring its forces up to NATO standardsand to counterbalance Armenia’s armed forces.Military spending rose from US$135 millionin 2003 to US$700 million in 2006, and wasprojected to increase further. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe November 1992 Law on Military Service setthe age of conscription at 18. Boys at the ageof 16 were usually required to have a medicalexamination, and at the age of 18 were called up. 3Recruitment legislation was amended inDecember 2006 to ensure a larger pool ofconscripts. Matriculating students and peoplecaring for disabled relatives no longer had theright to defer military service. Eighteen-year-oldswho did not register for conscription could facecriminal charges. Compulsory military servicewas increased from 12 to 18 months, with call-upsfour times a year, rather than twice as previously.District military commissioners, reorganizedon a regional basis, were to answer directlyto the president, rather than the Ministry ofDefence. Conscripts could be assigned to othergovernment departments, such as the Ministriesof Justice or Emergency Situations, in addition tothe armed forces. The new system was to be fullyimplemented by 2010. 4According to Azerbaijan’s declaration onratifying the Optional Protocol in 2002, 17-year-olds could voluntarily enter active militaryservice while at military cadet schools. 5 Nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) in Azerbaijanreported that in practice 17-year-olds who hadgraduated from military secondary-schools couldgo straight into military service. 6The direct participation of children agedunder 15 in military action was prohibited. Therecruitment of minors into the armed forceswas treated as a violation of internationalhumanitarian law and punishable under Article116 of the Criminal Code. 7Advocates of military reform raised concernsthat the rights of soldiers, cadets and evenofficers were violated in the military. Livingconditions were poor, with a reported rise insuicides and criminality. In early 2007 it wasreported that during the previous year there hadbeen about 200 cases of corruption or violenceagainst soldiers. Conscripts’ housing, annualleave and salaries were reported to have beenarbitrarily withheld or withdrawn in some cases.A group researching military and security issuesreported that in 2006, in contrast to previousyears, the majority of casualties in Azerbaijan’sarmy were non-battlefield-related – 75 percent were the result of suicide or bullying. InDecember 2006 three soldiers were reportedto have fled across the front line into Armeniancaptivity to escape physical abuse and bullying inthe Azerbaijani army. 8Military training and military schoolsTwo military secondary-schools admittedpupils after eight years of education. 9 The firstwas founded in the 1970s; the second, in theNakhichevan enclave, was opened in 2004. 10Children could enter the schools at 14 yearsof age. Graduates were expected to go on tostudy at military higher-education institutions tobecome officers, but those who did not could jointhe army as ordinary soldiers. 11 Three SupremeMilitary Schools for the army, navy and air forceand the Academy of National Security acceptedpupils aged 17–19 as cadets who were consideredto be members of the armed forces. The schoolsoffered courses based on NATO standards. 12Nagorno-Karabakh Republic(NKR)The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) hadits own laws and armed forces, but remainedunrecognized internationally. The strength of thearmy was estimated at 18,500–20,000, of whomover half were reportedly citizens of Armenia. 13The remainder were largely conscripts.The NKR constitution required citizens todo compulsory military service (Article 57).Conscription and voluntary recruitment wereregulated by the Law on Military Service, asamended in 2006, and the Law on MilitaryObligations of 2001. The Law on MilitaryObligations stipulated that all male citizens atthe age of 16 submit to a medical examination5 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

(Articles 5 and 11). Those who passed had tocarry out two years’ military service between theages of 18 and 27.The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas also 18. Men could become professionalsoldiers on completing military service. Womencould also sign up voluntarily. 14* Titles of non-English-language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 “Armenian, Azerbaijan envoys meet overNagorno-Karabakh”, Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty (RFE/RL), 14 March 2007, www.rferl.org.2 Speech of President Ilham Aliyev at GraduationCeremony at Heydar Aliyev High Military School,23 June 2006, in UNDP Azerbaijan DevelopmentBulletin, Issue No. 39, July 2006, www.unaz.org/undp;Adalat Bargarar, “Azerbaijan boostsmilitary”, Institute of War and Peace Reporting(IWPR), 7 July 2005, www.iwpr.net; JasurMamedov, “Azerbaijan tiptoes towards NATO”,IWPR, 23 November 2006.3 Marc Stolwijk, The Right to ConscientiousObjection in Europe: A Review of the CurrentSituation, Quaker Council for European Affairs,April 2005, www.quaker.org/qcea/coreport.4 B. Safarov, “Parliament passed amendments tothe law on the basics of conscription”, Ekho,26 December 2006, www.echo-az.com;J. Mazakhiroglu, “Military Commissioners’ Officeswill be Abolished”, Armeyskoe Zerkalo,30 December 2006, www.zerkalo.az.5 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.6 Confidential sources, March 2007.7 Second periodic report of Azerbaijan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/83/Add.13, 7 April 2005.8 Adalat Bargarar, above note 2; Jasur Mamedov,“Army abuse claims in Azerbaijan”, IWPR,8 March 2007; Liz Fuller, “Azerbaijan: Military hasCash, but no Security Doctrine”, RFE/RL,2 February 2006.9 Confidential sources, above note 6.10 “Executive Order of President of Azerbaijan onfounding military lyceum named after HeydarAliyev”, Azerbaijan, No. 49, 27 February 2004, atwww.vescc.com.11 Confidential sources, above note 6.12 J. Sumerinli, “Reforms in the Army are a long-termprocess”, Voennoe Zerkalo, undated, http://old.zerkalo.az; Ministry of National Security, “Therole of the Ministry of National Security inNATO–Azerbaijan cooperation”, Diplomacy andLaw, No. 1 (007), April 2007, www.mns.gov.az.13 International Crisis Group (ICG), Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground,Europe Report No. 166, 14 September 2005,www.crisisgroup.org.14 Confidential sources, Nagorno Karabakh, March2007.Bahama sCommonwealth of the BahamasPopulation: 323,000 (108,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 900Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182No information was available on under-18sin the security forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe armed forces were responsible for defenceand protection, the provision of disaster relief,and, in conjunction with other law enforcementagencies, the maintenance of order. 1 The agefor recruitment into the armed forces under theDefence Act was 18. 2 There was no conscription.In times of imminent danger of invasion orother emergency, the Governor-General couldorder that the police force be liable for militaryservice. 3 The minimum age of recruitment to thepolice was 18. 4 However, the Bahamas statedin its initial report to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child that under the Police Act therecruitment age was 16 years. 5DevelopmentsIn March 2005 the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child recommended that the Bahamas ratifythe Optional Protocol. 61 Defence Act, Chapter 211.2 Initial report of Bahamas to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.50, 28January 2004.3 Police Force (Military Service) Act, Chapter 207.4 Police Act, Chapter 205.5 Initial report, above note 2.6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byBahamas, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.253, 31 March 2005.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7

ahr ainKingdom of BahrainPopulation: 727,000 (232,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 11,200Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: unclearVoting age: 20Optional Protocol: acceded 21 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182Non-commissioned officers, techniciansand specialized personnel couldapparently join the army as cadets fromthe age of 15 and as regular soldiers at17. However, Bahrain’s declaration onits accession to the Optional Protocolstated that the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment was 18.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeWhile military service was not compulsory,according to Article 30 of the constitution,“defending [the state] shall be the duty of everycitizen. Military service is an honour for thecitizens and regulated by law.”The government had stated in its 2001 InitialReport to the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild that “Legislative Decree No. 23 of 1979 …stipulates that recruits into the ranks must notbe under 17 or over 35 years of age, except in thecase of non-commissioned officers, techniciansand specialized personnel who can be recruitedfrom the age of 15 (as cadets) to the age of 40”, 1while Article 3 of the decree stated that the agelimit could be disregarded in times of necessity.However, Bahrain’s declaration on its accessionto the Optional Protocol stated that the minimumage for voluntary recruitment was 18. 2DevelopmentsInternational standardsBahrain acceded to the Optional Protocol on 21September 2004.1 Initial report by Bahrain to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.24, 23 July 2001.2 Declaration by Bahrain on accession to theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.BANGL ADE SHPeople’s Republic of BangladeshPopulation: 141.8 million (59.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 126,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16 (air force); 17(army and navy); 18 (paramilitary and auxiliaryforces)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 6 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182Under-18s were reported to be servingin the armed forces. Despite governmentassertions to the contrary a number ofarmed groups were known to be operatingin the country, and there were allegationsthat some had recruited children.ContextFollowing a series of bombings in 63 districts inAugust 2005, the government cracked down onIslamist groups. Hundreds of arrests were carriedout and several Islamist organizations – includingthe Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB),Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) andHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) – were banned. 1In January 2007 a state of emergency wasdeclared by the president. Imminent electionswere cancelled following widespread politicalviolence. A military-backed caretaker governmenttook power; it banned political rallies and otherpolitical activity and began a campaign againstcorrupt politicians and organized crime underwhich thousands of people were detained.Observers voiced concern that the slowimplementation of the 1997 Peace Accord inthe Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) threatened thereturn of organized violence. Non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) concerned with child rightsfeared that such violence would involve children. 2In May 2007 the CHT Affairs Ministry AdvisoryCommittee held its first meeting for six years todiscuss implementation of the Accord. 3India continued to allege that numerousseparatist groups active in northeast India wereoperating from inside Bangladesh’s borders.In early 2007 the caretaker government ofBangladesh appeared to acknowledge this andsaid that it would take action against them. 4According to the government in 2005, aNational Child Labour Policy had been drafted,but not finalized, which would remove anomaliesin legislation, fix a uniform age for admissionto work, and simplify and consolidate all legalprovisions for the progressive elimination of child5 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

labour, including its worst forms. 5 A BaselineSurvey conducted by the International LabourOrganization (ILO) in 2005 estimated that therewere 532,000 child workers aged 5–17 engagedin hazardous labour. 6The age of criminal responsibility was raisedfrom seven to nine years. UNICEF commentedthat “for children in conflict with the law,rehabilitation instead of punishment is yet tobecome the main aim”. 7 Under the 1974 ChildrenAct “child” and “youthful offender” were definedas a person under the age of 16, so that childrenbetween the ages of 16 and 18 were treated asadults.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no provision for compulsoryrecruitment into the armed or paramilitaryforces. There was no legislation governing theminimum age for recruitment and deployment,but according to the government the minimumage of recruitment into the army and navy was17 years, and 16 for the air force. 8 The minimumage for recruitment into Bangladesh’s armedparamilitary and auxiliary forces, including theBangladesh Rifles and the Ansars, was 18. 9 Thegovernment maintained that there was no scopefor any person to be employed for actual serviceor combat duty in the defence services, internalsecurity services or paramilitary forces beforeattaining the age of 18, because those recruitedbelow that age were required to undergo periodsof training (although in the case of the army, thegovernment indicated that training was for aperiod of only nine months). 10The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childexpressed concern about the reportedly highnumber of children under 18 who enrolled in thearmed forces and the difficulty of determiningthe real age of recruits. 11 Recruitment informationissued by the Army of Bangladesh specified theneed for education certificates, a nationalitycertificate and a certificate of parental consent,but not a birth certificate. The birth registrationrate was reported as 10 per cent (having been7 per cent in 2003). 12 The Committee alsoexpressed concern about the lack of mandatoryparental consent except for recruits to the airforce, and the lack of measures to ensure thatrecruitment of under-18s was genuinely voluntaryand well informed. 13Military training and military schoolsAccording to information provided by thegovernment to the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child, durations of training varied from onebranch of the armed forces to another. Armytraining lasted nine months and the duration ofnaval training was from 15 months to two years.The training period was the same for recruits ofall ages, including those under the age of 18, whoon completing training were required to performthe same duties as other soldiers. 14Ten cadet colleges (including one girls’college) enrolled children from the age of 12 andprovided military and academic instruction. TheDefence Ministry and the Bangladesh Army had adirect role in the operation of these colleges, anda high number of students were said to join thearmed forces on leaving. 15Armed groupsIn its initial report to the Committee on the Rightsof the Child on implementation of the OptionalProtocol, the government stated that “There isno armed group in Bangladeshi territory, so thequestion of involving under-18s in such a groupdoes not arise”. 16 However, a number of armedgroups were operating in the country, and therewere widespread allegations that many of themhad recruited children. 17Islamist groupsThere were fears that the spread of madrasas(Islamic religious schools) might make childrenmore susceptible to recruitment by militantIslamist groups. The Committee on the Rights ofthe Child expressed concern about the possiblemilitary training given to children in unregisteredmadrasas from a very young age. 18 Concreteevidence of child recruitment by Islamist groupswas scarce, but non-governmental organizations(NGOs) reported that they considered incidentsof child recruitment to be common. In the Khulnaand Rajshahi districts, some teachers in theprivately owned unregistered madrasas wereaccused of providing under-age activists to theJMB, which was involved in the serial bombingsof August 2005. It was also alleged that childrenaged 12–15 were working for the JMJB, not only ascouriers but also to carry and set off bombs. 19It was reported that most members of theJMB, including district and regional commanders,who had been arrested were barely 18–20 andthat two of those arrested in 2005 had been16. Most of the boys were said to have beenrecruited from madrasas. 20 A report in the localmedia further claimed that another militantgroup, Hizbut Tawhid, which believed in a jihad toestablish Islamic rule globally, said that groupsof 6–11 “skilled mujahids” currently operated inalmost every district in the country to persuadechildren to join in preparation for an armed jihad.Financial incentives were offered in some cases,while others received a mobile phone. The reportclaimed that most children who joined wereacting against their parents’ wishes. 21A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Maoist groupsIn southwest Bangladesh, factions of the bannedMaoist Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP)were reported to have recruited children aged 13–16 to make and plant bombs and throw grenades.Party operatives were reported to have targetedchildren from slum areas and families of victimsof political violence for recruitment. A number ofsuch children were reported to have been killedby police in “crossfire” in 2004 and 2005. 22Criminal gangsPrimary research on recruitment of children bycriminal gangs (known as mastans) was scarce,but some child rights NGOs claimed that poorchildren were being used for drugs traffickingand arms carrying in slum areas of Dhaka.The increasing availability of small arms madeunder-age slum and street children increasinglyvulnerable to recruitment by gangs. 23Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There was no formal disarmament,demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processfor children involved in the conflict in theChittagong Hill Tracts. With the governmenthaving reported to the Committee on the Rightsof the Child that there were 1,947 persons with“some sort of combatant background”, theCommittee expressed concern about the lack ofinformation about programs for DDR, in particularfor children who had been involved in theChittagong Hill Tracts conflict, taking into accountthat involvement in armed conflict produceslong-term consequences requiring psychosocialassistance. 24DevelopmentsBangladesh’s initial report on implementationof the Optional Protocol referred to a numberof plans and policies for the protection ofchildren, which focused on child trafficking, birthregistration and juvenile justice, but included nopolicies for the protection of children involved inarmed conflict. 251 International Crisis Group (ICG), BangladeshToday, Asia Report No. 121, 23 October 2006,www.crisisgroup.org.2 Charu Lata Hogg, Child Recruitment in SouthAsian Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of SriLanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, London: ChathamHouse and Coalition to Stop the Use of ChildSoldiers, 2006. (An edited extract from the report,Child Recruitment in South Asian Conflicts:Bangladesh, issued by the Coalition in April 2007,is available at www.child-soldiers.org.).3 “CHT leaders for full implementation of peaceaccord”, Daily Star, 29 May 2007.4 “No refuge to Indian insurgents: Bangladesh”,Rediff.net, 3 March 2007.5 Initial report of Bangladesh to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGD/1, 14 July 2005.6 International Labour Organization (ILO),International Programme on the Elimination ofChild Labour (IPEC), cited in US Departmentof State, Country Reports on Human RightsPractices 2006.7 UNICEF: Juvenile Justice in Bangladesh, undated,www.unicef.org/bangladesh.8 Initial report, above note 5.9 Ibid.10 Answers by the State Party to the questionsasked by the Committee on the Rights of theChild, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGD/Q/1/Add.1.11 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Bangladeshon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGD/CO/1, January 2006.12 Response to the issues raised by the Committeeon the Rights of the Child related to the reportsubmitted by the Government of Bangladesh onthe Optional Protocol to the Convention on theRights of the Child on the Sale of Children, ChildProstitution and Child Pornography in 2007, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPSC/BGD/Q/1/Add.1.13 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note11; Answers by State Party, above note 10.14 Initial report, above note 5.15 Information from websites of a number of cadetschools, including www.acocweb.com.16 Initial report, above note 5.17 Lata Hogg, above note 2.18 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note11.19 Lata Hogg, above note 2.20 “Militants found teenagers easy to brainwash”,Daily Star, 16 March 2006.21 “Turning into a militant”, Daily Star, 22 August2005.22 “Outlawed parties recruiting slum boys, streeturchins”, Daily Star, 24 July 2005.23 Lata Hogg, above note 2.24 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note11; Answers by State Party, above note 10.25 Initial report, above note 5.6 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

BARBADOS1 Latin American School of Social Sciences(FLACSO), Security and Citizenship Program,Latin America and the Caribbean Security SectorBarbadosReport, Country case study: Barbados, October2006, www.flacso.cl.Population: 270,000 (63,000 under 18)2 Information from Coalition source.Government armed forces: 6003 FLACSO, above note 1.Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription 4 Information from Coalition source.Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (younger with 5 FLACSO, above note 1.parental consent)6 Royal Barbados Police Force, Human Resources,Voting age: 18Recruitment, www.barbadospolice.gov.bb.Optional Protocol: not signed7 The Regional Security System comprises AntiguaOther treaties ratified (see glossary):and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada,CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and SaintVincent and the Grenadines; see www.rss.org.bb.Under-18s could enlist with parental8 Information from Coalition source.consent. In 2007 there was reportedly one 9 Ibid.under-18 in the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Barbados Defence Force comprised regularand reserve forces, a cadet corps and thecoastguard. There was no conscription, andvolunteers for enlistment to the regular andreserve force had to be at least 18. However,the Defence Act also allowed the possibility forunder-18s to enlist with the consent of parentsor legal guardians (Chapter 159, Article 19.2). 1 In2007 there was one under-18 in the regular forcewho enlisted with parental consent at 17 yearsand 9 months. 2The 12-year term of service could be partlyserved in the reserve. 3 Enlistment in the regularforce could be for an initial period of six years,with two three-year increments. 4Under the Police Act, the police force had toperform military duties in addition to maintaininglaw and order (Section II.5). 5 In 2006 there werenearly 1,500 police constables. Regular andspecial police constables had to be at least 19 tojoin the force. 6Military training and military schoolsInitial and further training was conducted locally.Additional training was provided regionally byJamaica, Trinidad, Belize, the Regional SecuritySystem 7 and the French Forces of the Antilles.Training was also provided by the UnitedKingdom, the USA, Canada and, more recently,the People’s Republic of China. 8In 2006 there were around 1,360 membersof the Barbados Cadet Corps in 22 units insecondary-schools. Students could enrol in thecadet corps from the age of 11. Cadet trainingincluded leadership and character-building, bandtraining, sea cadet training, adventure training,archery, paramedical and first aid, and catering. 9A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 6 1

BEL ARUSRepublic of BelarusPopulation: 9.8 million (2.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 72,900Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (men), 19(women); 17 (training); 16 (as cadets withparental consent)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 25 January 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Under-18s entering military traininginstitutions from the age of 13 wereentitled to the social benefits of militaryservicemen and obliged to accept militarydiscipline.ContextIn 2006 the National Commission on the Rightsof the Child was restructured so that it couldmonitor the government’s implementation of theUN Convention on the Rights of the Child. It hadpowers to request information from state bodiesand other organizations, and official bodies wererequired to implement its decisions. 1The government declared 2007 the Year ofthe Child as part of a four-year program focusedon children in the period 2006–10. The programincluded provisions on adoption and marriage,but not on military service.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the 1992 Law on Military Obligations andMilitary Service, between January and April everyyear boys aged 16 had to register for the draft(Article 14). Military call-up applied to all malecitizens between the ages of 18 and 27 years(Article 30). Conscription was for 18 months, or12 months for graduates of higher education.College students could defer their service untilthe end of their studies. Training contracts inmilitary-technical professions were availableto boys from the age of 17 (Article 26) andprofessional contracts in the army, navy and airforce were available to men from the age of 18and women from the age of 19 (Article 42). 2Under the Law on the Status of MilitaryServicemen and Servicewomen, militarypersonnel were under an obligation to observethe constitution of Belarus, its laws and theorders of their superiors (Article 20). They wereprohibited from obeying orders that would“contravene the international obligations ofBelarus” (Article 3). 3Military training and military schoolsPupils at the Suvorov Military College in Minskwere entitled to the social benefits of militaryservicemen under the Law on the Status ofMilitary Servicemen and Servicewomen. Theirrights to holidays and medical benefits wereset down by the Ministry of Defence (Articles12 and 13). They were obliged to accept militarydiscipline, which included “mastering militaryskills; being continually alert to new militarytechniques and technology; and looking aftermilitary property” (Article 20).The Suvorov Military College was open toboys from the age of 13, who were often thesons of existing officers. 4 It prepared cadetsaged 15–16 for fast-track admission to HigherMilitary Education Institutes. These institutes,intended for students aged 17–21, trainedofficers with a specialist profile for each armedservice or combat arm. Around 60 per cent oftheir curriculum was devoted to military serviceand weaponry. Successful students graduatedwith a university diploma and the rank of juniorlieutenant.Outside Minsk, the government could setup local branch institutions that were designedto give boys a military grounding and acceptedpupils from the age of seven years through to 16(Law on the Status of Military Servicemen andServicewomen, Article 27).DevelopmentsInternational standardsBelarus acceded to the Optional Protocol inJanuary 2006. Its declaration stated that theage for voluntary recruitment was 18, with theexception of those who, with parental consent,entered a military academy as a cadet at 17 orduring the year they turned 17. 51 Presidential Decree, No. 675, 16 November 2006,National Legal Internet Portal of the Republic ofBelarus, http://pravo.by.2 Law on Military Obligations and Military Service,No. 2/1247 of 1992, most recently amended byLaw No. 50-Z19, July 2006, at www.mod.mil.by/zakonzak.html.3 Law on the Status of Military Servicemen andServicewomen, No. 1939-XII of 13 November1992, at www.mod.mil.by/zakonzak.html.4 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.mil.by/vv/msvu1.html.5 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.6 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

BELGIUMKingdom of BelgiumPopulation: 10.4 million (2.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 39,700Compulsory recruitment age: 17 (conscriptionsuspended)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 6 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Belgium backed a “straight-18” position,but had yet to amend its nationallegislation to exclude the possibility ofunder-18s serving in the armed forces.Legislation ruled out the deployment ofunder-18s in hostilities at all times.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAlthough compulsory military service as suchno longer existed in Belgium, the ConsolidatedMilitary Service Acts of 1962 had not yet beenrepealed; the Acts allowed for the conscriptionof individuals at 18 or 19 into the armed forcesin peacetime, and permitted conscription intothe recruitment reserve at 17 in wartime. 1 In June2006 the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild called on the government to “repeal alllaws that allow the recruitment of persons underthe age of 18 into the armed forces in time ofwar”. 2 Following on from Belgium’s declarationon ratification of the Optional Protocol in May2002, the minimum age for voluntary recruitmentinto the Belgian Armed Forces was now 18.Furthermore, the declaration contained anabsolute prohibition on the participation ofany individual under 18 in armed engagementof any kind or in peacekeeping operations intimes of both war and peace (1962 legislationnotwithstanding). 3 The conscription or enlistmentof children under the age of 15 into the armedforces or armed groups, as well as compellingchildren to play an active role in hostilities,were criminalized in the Act of 5 August 2003,and could now be prosecuted as war crimes. InJune 2006 the Committee on the Rights of theChild welcomed the fact that “children who havebeen recruited into national armed forces orwho have been used for active participation inhostilities while they were under the age of 15can obtain direct access to the Belgian courts ifthere is a link between Belgium and the crime”.However, the Committee regretted the limitsplaced on extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 2003act, whereby there could be no prosecutions ofserious violations of international humanitarianlaw without the establishment of a clear linkconnecting the violations with Belgium. 4 In April2006 the Belgian senate adopted a detailedresolution calling on the government to makechildren in armed conflict a policy priority.Military training and military schoolsIndividuals who applied successfully to becomecareer non-commissioned officers in the armedforces could from the age of 16 complete theirsecondary education in a non-commissionedofficers’ college. Those who applied successfullyto become a career officer candidate and wishedto attend the Royal Military Academy had firstto have completed their secondary educationand would generally be 17 or 18 years of age onentering the academy, where courses were atuniversity level. Although there was no specificlegislation in place concerning the militarystatus of students under 18 in these institutions(including their status in a time of armedconflict), the government emphasized that, inaccordance with a March 2003 act concerningmilitary recruitment, no such mobilization wouldbe possible for those who had not alreadycompleted their secondary education. 5 Accordingto the government, “the question of protectingchildren in armed conflicts is addressed inthe training given to all military personnel. Itis brought to the attention of all categories ofpersonnel on several occasions during basic andin-service training courses on the law of armedconflict.” 6DevelopmentsIn June 2006 the Committee on the Rightsof the Child made particular note of the factthat Belgium was a “country of destination”for children migrating or seeking asylum fromwar-affected areas. The Committee praisedthe efforts of the Belgian Red Cross, workingalongside the Federal Agency for the Reception ofAsylum Seekers, to offer social and psychologicalsupport to such children. However, theCommittee called on the authorities greatly toexpand its efforts to provide specific servicesfor child refugees, asylum-seekers and migrantswho might have been participants in or victims ofhostilities in their countries of origin. 7At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Belgium and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 6 3

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Belgium to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocolto the Convention on the Rights on the Child onthe Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/1, 15 August 2005.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of the initial report submittedby Belgium, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/CO/1, 9 June 2006.3 Initial report, above note 1.4 Concluding observations, above note 2.5 Initial report, above note 1.6 Written replies of the Belgian Governmentconcerning the list of issues to be taken up inconsideration of the initial report of Belgiumto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childon the Optional Protocol to the Convention onthe Rights on the Child on the Involvement ofChildren in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/Q/1/Add.1, 3 April 2006.7 Concluding observations, above note 2.BELIZEBelizePopulation: 270,000 (117,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,100 (estimate)Compulsory recruitment age: not specifiedVoluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 1 December 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Belize Defence Force consisted of a regularforce, a volunteer element and a reserve. 1 Belizedeclared on ratifying the Optional Protocol that 16was the minimum age for voluntary recruitmentto any military service, but the Defence Act(Section 16) provided that no under-18s couldbe enlisted into the regular force. 2 However, theGovernor-General could make regulations for thecall-up that specified the age and numbers ofconscripts (Section 167). In addition, the DefenceRegulations did not specify what steps recruitingofficers should take in order to satisfy themselvesthat recruits were 18. 3 There was no minimumage for joining the police force, which could bedeployed in the service of the armed forces intime of war or emergency. 4Many members of the Police Youth CadetCorps went on to join not only the police forcebut also the armed forces. 5 Originally establishedin 1994 to “rehabilitate troubled young men”,the corps was part of the community policingprogram and was aimed at boys and girls agedbetween 8 and 17. In 2006 it numbered some 800members. 61 Defence Act (Chapter 135).2 Ibid., Section 16(2), cited in Second periodicreport of Belize to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.29,13 July 2004 and Committee on the Rights of thechild, Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Belize, Concluding observations,UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.252, 31 March 2005.3 Defence Act – Subsidiary Laws, Defence (RegularForce Enlistment and Service) Regulations.4 Police Act (Chapter 138), Section 5.5 “Cadet Corps holds camp at Benque”, Channel 5,www.channel5belize.com, 13 July 2004.6 “Police Cadet Corps enjoy sports camp”, Channel5, above note 5, 21 April 2006.6 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

BENINRepublic of BeninPopulation: 8.4 million (4.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 4,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 31 January 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1990 constitution stated that the defenceof the nation and its territorial integrity was theduty of all citizens, and that military service wascompulsory under the terms set down by law(Article 32). Recruitment to the armed forceswas governed by Law No. 63-5 of 30 May 1963,as amended by Ordinance No. 75-77 of 28November 1975.Benin’s declaration on ratifying the OptionalProtocol stated that the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment into the armed forces orgendarmerie was 18, and that applicants hadto submit a birth certificate and a certificate ofschool attendance. 1 Previously it had stated tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child thatthe age for voluntary and compulsory recruitmentwas 21. 2A new law on national service came intoeffect in October 2007. 3 It provided thatcitizens between 18 and 35 would be liable forcompulsory selection for military service in thenational interest. 4 Recruits, who had to havehigher-education diplomas, would undertakemilitary training before being deployed in sectorsdeemed to be in the national interest, includingeducation and health. 5jointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.International standardsBenin ratified the Optional Protocol in January2005.1 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.2 Initial report of Benin to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.52, 4July 1997.3 Loi no. 2007-27 portant institution du ServiceMilitaire d’Intérêt National; Gouvernement duBénin, Conseil des ministres no. 26/PR/SGG/Com/2007, 19 October 2007.4 “Le service militaire est désormais obligatoirepour les jeunes Béninois”, PANAPRESS, 24September 2007, at www.jeuneafrique.com.5 “Bientôt 3000 jeunes enseignants pour réveillerl’école béninoise”, Fraternité (Cotonou), Bénin,22 October 2007, at http://fr.allafrica.com.A — EDevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Benin and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 6 5

BHUTANKingdom of BhutanPopulation: unclear 1Government armed forces: 9,000 2Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 3Optional Protocol: signed 15 September 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRCThere were no reports of under-18s ingovernment armed forces, but armedpolitical groups were recruiting fromamong refugees in eastern Nepal and therewere reportedly many children amongthem.ContextIn December 2006 King Jigme Singye Wangchukstepped down and handed over the crown tohis son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. Theking had given up some of his absolute powersin 1998 and directed that a written constitutionshould be drafted and elections held. As of mid-2007 a draft constitution was in circulation andpolitical parties had started to register. Electionswere scheduled for 2008.Tension in south-east Bhutan decreasedafter military operations in 2003 and 2004against three armed separatist groups fromnorth-east India – the United Liberation Frontof Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Front ofBodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organization– who had set up camps in Bhutan. During thatperiod it was reported by Bhutanese and Indianofficials that 30 camps had been destroyed and650 combatants killed or taken into custody.Bhutanese authorities also said that up to 65,000local people had been moved for their safety.There were further unconfirmed reports thatBhutanese civilians suspected of supportingthese groups had been arrested and tortured. 4Family members of ULFA members, including27 children reportedly captured during theoperation, were said by the government to havebeen handed over to Indian civil authorities. 5More than 100,000 refugees from southernBhutan had remained in refugee camps in easternNepal since the early 1990s. In October 2006 theUnited States (USA) offered to resettle 60,000 ofthe refugees. Several other countries expressedsimilar interest. In this context the UN refugeeagency UNHCR started a mass campaign toinform refugees of their individual right to chooseresettlement, and the relevant procedures. 6There was tension in the camps between refugeeleaders in favour of resettlement, and otherswho opposed it and who continued to campaignfor a return to Bhutan. In late May 2007 thetension resulted in violence in one of the camps,when two teenage refugees died and otherswere injured. A third refugee was killed in aconfrontation with Indian police forces aroundthe same time, when thousands of refugeesattempted to march across the border intoIndia on their way back to Bhutan. The marchwas allegedly planned to coincide with a mockelection organized by the Bhutan government aspart of an educational exercise in the run-up tothe 2008 elections. 7 It was reportedly organizedby the Bhutan Movement Steering Committee,consisting of three political parties in exile(the Bhutan People’s Party, the Druk NationalCongress and the Gorkha National LiberationFront). 8GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe minimum age for recruitment into the militarywas 18. 9 During the 87th session of the NationalAssembly in June 2007, the commander of thearmy confirmed that the army strength was justover 9,000 soldiers, and announced that it was tobe reduced to around 8,000 by the end of 2008. 10Armed groupsDuring the National Assembly’s 87th session,in June 2007, it decided that recruitment andtraining of militias should start by the beginningof 2008. This was an apparent reversal of adecision made during a 2005 Assembly sessionnot to proceed with the recruitment of voluntarymilitias, but to strengthen the army instead. TheAssembly also resolved that the Royal BhutanArmy should decide the age limit, qualificationsand training centre for the militia training. 11According to the government, by mid-2007 fulldetails of the upcoming recruitment process hadnot been finalized. The government also statedthat none of the 700 militia volunteers recruitedearlier, in 2003, remained active. 12There were reports of increased activityby two armed political groups, the BhutanCommunist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) (BCP)with its youth wing, the Bhutan RevolutionaryYouth (BRY); and the Bhutan Tiger Force (BTF) insouthern Bhutan in early 2007. The main politicalobjective of both groups was the repatriation ofthe refugees from camps in eastern Nepal. Bothgroups were said to be recruiting in the refugeecamps, including from among children youngerthan 16 years old. 13 Recruitment was reported tobe most common from Beldangi 1 and 2 camps.There were further reports of weapons trainingfor new recruits in the forests near these camps.6 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

According to government sources, the BCP had arecruitment campaign inside Bhutan.Both the BTF and the BRY allegedly claimedresponsibility for planting several explosivedevices in Phuentsholing town, Samtse district inearly 2007. 14 Thirteen people were arrested in thisregard and were awaiting trial under the NationalSecurity Act and the Penal Code. 15 The explosionswere allegedly planned to coincide with the mockelection organized by the government in the runupto the 2008 elections.DevelopmentsInternational standardsBhutan signed the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2005.1 Estimates of the population vary widely evenamong different agencies in the UN system. TheBhutanese government’s population and housingcensus gives a figure of 672,425 (2005); theMinistry of Labour and Human Resources givesa figure of 537,900 (October 2006) (cited inKuensel, Bhutan’s national newspaper, 20 June2007). The UN statistics division gives a figureof 658,500 (2007), and the World Bank gives asimilar figure, of 0.6 million (2006). Other UNagencies, however, notably the WHO, UNICEF andthe UNDP, give figures in the region of 2 million.UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children 2007 (thesource of the population data used in the entriesthroughout this global report) gives a figure of2.2 million (983,000 under 18).2 “Militia should start in 2008”, Kuensel Online,16 June 2007, www.kuenselonline.com.3 Election Commission of Bhutan, “Bhutan VoterGuide”, 21 August 2006, www.election-bhutan.org.bt/VG/english.pdf.4 Amnesty International Report 2005.5 Correspondence to Coalition from PermanentMission of Bhutan to the UN at Geneva, 17 July2007.6 “Refugees must be free to choose own solutionin Nepal, says Guterres”, UNHCR News Stories,23 May 2007, www.unhcr.org.7 “Bhutan refugees give 15-day ultimatum toIndia”, Times of India, 30 May 2007.8 Coalition interview, Kathmandu, July 2007.9 Second periodic report of Bhutan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, 2007, UNDoc. CRC/C/BTN/2, 16 July 2007.10 “Militia should start in 2008”, above note 2.11 Ibid.12 Permanent Mission of Bhutan, above note 5.13 Coalition interviews, Kathmandu, July 2007.14 “Tight security in Bhutan after bomb found inborder town”, Hindustan Times, 25 April 2007,www.hindustantimes.com.15 “Communist Party members involved in subversiveactivities”, Kuensel Online, 13 June 2007.BoliviaRepublic of BoliviaPopulation: 9.2 million (4.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 46,100Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 15 (for pre-militaryservice)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 22 December 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182In July 2004 it was reported that under-18shad been conscripted illegally to supportanti-narcotics operations in Chapare.ContextPresident Evo Morales Ayma took office inJanuary 2006 and implemented wide-rangingreforms. He established a constituent assemblyto write a new constitution to replace the 1967constitution and aimed at giving more powerto the indigenous majority. 1 In May and June2007 the assembly approved several articlesof the new constitution, including a ban onarmed groups separate from the armed forcesand the police and the requirement for all menand women, with or without military training, todefend the nation in case of war. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the 1967 constitution, every personhad to carry out all military and civilian servicerequired by the nation for its development,defence and conservation.Fewer than one third of the Bolivian armedforces were professional soldiers. The rest wereconscripts recruited twice a year, mainly fromrural areas. 3 Around 15,000 conscripts wererecruited every year. 4 Military service was obligatoryfor men from the age of 19. 5 Proof of havingcompleted military service or voluntary pre-militaryservice was essential to gain a university orprofessional degree and, for males aged 17–55,to travel abroad. 6In case of war or emergency, women aged19–35 with no children would be required tojoin the Female Auxiliary Service for up to twoyears to carry out production activities. In case ofemergency, girls in the last three years of secondary-school(typically from age 16) could volunteerto join the Female Auxiliary Service. 7Compulsory military service could be postponedfor an individual living abroad or studying,A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 6 7

or who had a verified medical condition. Mensupporting elderly parents or whose fathers haddied in international armed conflict or duringmilitary service, theology students, the mentallyincapacitated and married or widowed men withchildren were exempted. 8Living conditions for conscripts were poor andresources meagre. In February 2006 the DefenceMinister reported that the food budget was only3 bolivianos (US$0.30) per soldier per day. 9In May 2007 President Evo Morales promisedthousands of dollars in funding for the armedforces to renew their infrastructure and improvebasic services, as part of the national program“Bolivia changes, Evo delivers” (Bolivia Cambia,Evo Cumple). 10According to reports, the government wasconsidering a new compulsory military servicelaw, after the Constitutional Court (TribunalConstitucional) in January 2006 declaredDecree 7755 (1966) on military service to beunconstitutional. 11According to the government there was nodomestic legislation on children in armed conflict“because there are no child refugees and there isno armed conflict in Bolivia”. There were no legalprovisions regarding children’s participation inhostilities. 12Military training and military schoolsThe army had five basic training institutions,including the Military College, the Sergeants’Military School (Escuela Militar de Sargentos delEjército, EMSE) and the Military School (LiceoMilitar). The Military College accepted studentsaged 17–21 who had completed or were in thelast two years of secondary education. 13 It had anenrolment of around 800, of whom 10 per centwere women. 14Secondary school graduates could apply tobecome cadets at the Navy Military School fromage 16. From the second semester onwards,cadets participated in joint training exercises withthe Argentine and Peruvian navies. Cadets completingone or more years of study were deemedto have fulfilled their military obligations. 15From 2003, female cadets were allowed intomilitary schools as day students, specializing inlogistics and administration. 16In 2005 the government offered for the firsttime scholarships to members of indigenouscommunities to attend the Military College. 17Twenty students from indigenous communitieswere enrolled in July 2005. 18 In 2006 five womenwere among the 25 new indigenous cadets. Aspart of an equal-opportunities project, indigenouscadets took a seven-month academicprogram before joining the school’s regularprogram. 19In May 2007 the government announced thecreation of 25 technological military institutes tooffer training and education to the poorer sectionsof society, with the aim of training 60,000conscripts by 2010 and preparing them for theemployment market on leaving the service. 20Young men and women aged 15–19 with basicsecondary education could also do voluntarypre-military service, involving literacy and othertraining courses, and attending military instructionevery Saturday and during holidays for 12months. 21 In Sucre alone, 1,200 young men andwomen volunteered to do pre-military servicein 2005. 22 Since military service gave conscriptsaccess to training and education they might nothave elsewhere, voluntary pre-military servicewas an attractive option for some young people.Child recruitment and deploymentIn July 2004 the government acknowledged tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child thatyoungsters between 14 and 17 had been founddoing military service. It also reported that manycases had been discovered of conscript labourbeing exploited for private gain and of conscriptsbeing subjected to ill-treatment which couldresult in irreversible injuries. 23In 2005 human rights organizations reportedthat hundreds of children in the Chapare regionand border areas continued to be subjected toviolence and harassment by law-enforcement officials,in the context of anti-drug trafficking andcoca leaf eradication operations. 24 Homes werebroken into and schools taken over and used asmilitary encampments. The government reportedthat under-18s had been conscripted illegally tosupport anti-narcotics operations in Chapare. 25Local non-governmental organizations(NGOs) organized training courses on child rightsfor members of the Rural Patrol Mobile Units(Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural, UMOPAR),rural police assigned to the area, and army andpolice officers of the Joint Task Forces (Fuerzade Tarea Conjunta, combined units of army andpolice officers working on coca leaf eradication inChapare). 26 In 2004 greater powers were given toseven local ombudsmen’s offices in the region toimprove the situation of children and adolescentsaffected by the violence. 27DevelopmentsOn reviewing Bolivia’s third periodic report, theCommittee on the Rights of the Child criticizedthe lack of specific procedures for providingspecial care and assistance to refugee children,particularly those who were unaccompaniedor separated, and urged the government toestablish a fully functioning and comprehensiverefugee status-determination mechanism, withspecific procedures for minors. 28International standardsBolivia acceded to the Optional Protocol inDecember 2004. Its declaration stated that 186 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

was the minimum age for conscription and thatvoluntary pre-military service was available foryoung people from the age of 17. The declarationmade no mention of the possibility for 15-yearoldsto do voluntary pre-military service.1 “Push for new Bolivia constitution”, BBC News,6 August 2006.2 Asamblea Constituyente, Comisión No. 21,Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, ArtículosAprobados para la nueva Constitución Política delEstado, www.constituyente.bo.3 Juan Ramón Quintana Taborga, “Documentode análisis: La gestión política de la DefensaNacional en Bolivia”, Resdal, Atlas Comparativode la Defensa en América Latina, Bolivia, 2005,www.resdal.org.4 “2,500 soldados culminan el servicio militarobligatorio”, Los Tiempos, 16 January 2005,www.lostiempos.com.5 Ley Servicio Nacional Defensa, Articulo 22, citedat Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Serviciomilitar, Disposiciones legales, www.mindef.gov.bo.6 Servicio Militar, Disposiciones Legales, www.mindef.gov.bo.7 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Bolivia, October2006, www.flacso.cl.8 Ibid.9 “Ministro comprueba la vida precaria de lossoldados”, La Prensa, 22 February 2006,www.laprensa.com.bo.10 “Evo ofrece $US50 mil para cada unidad militar”,Los Tiempos, 20 May 2007.11 “Servicio militar es inconstitucional”, LosTiempos, 8 February 2006.12 Third periodic report of Bolivia to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/125/Add.2, 16 July 2004.13 FLACSO, above note 7.14 “Otros 25 jóvenes indígenas en la carrera militar”,BolPress, 13 August 2006, www.bolpress.com.15 Escuela Naval Militar, Admisión, www.armada.mil.bo.16 “La igualdad de género llegó al liceo militar”,Bolivia Hoy, 4 February 2003, www.boliviahoy.com.17 “El Ejército será pionero con cadetes indígenasbecados”, La Prensa, 1 February 2005, atCanadian Defence Academy website, www.acd.forces.gc.ca.18 “Lanzan programa piloto denominado ‘Igualdadde Oportunidades’”, La Prensa, 26 July 2005, atCanadian Defence Academy website, above note17.19 “Otros 25 jóvenes indígenas en la carreramilitar”, BolPress.20 “Sesenta mil conscriptos tendrán formacióntécnica”, El Diario, February 2007, www.eldiario.net.21 Resdal, Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa enAmérica Latina, Bolivia, 2005; Servicio Militar,Servicio Premilitar, www.mindef.gov.bo.22 “Más de 1,200 premilitares cerraron importanteciclo”, Correo del Sur, 25 September 2005,www.correodelsur.net.23 Third periodic report, above note 12.24 Defence for Children International (Bolivia),Supplementary report to Bolivia’s third periodicreport on the implementation of the UNConvention on the Rights of the Child, 10 January2005, at www.crin.org.25 Third periodic report, above note 12 .26 Defence for Children International,Supplementary report.27 Third periodic report, above note 12.28 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of third periodic report submittedby Bolivia, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.256, 11 February 2005.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 6 9

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINABosnia and HerzegovinaPopulation: 3.9 million (807,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 11,900Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription(ended 2006)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 10 October 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.ContextBosnia-Herzegovina remained divided into twosemi-autonomous entities, the Republika Srpskaand the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,with a special status granted to the Brcko district.The international community exerted influenceover the country’s political process, in particularthrough a high representative with executivepowers nominated by the intergovernmentalbody responsible for implementing the 1995Dayton Peace Agreement. A European Union(EU)-led peacekeeping force, EUFOR, replacedNATO troops in December 2004. The EU decidedin March 2007 to reduce EUFOR’s size fromapproximately 7,000 troops to 2,500. 1 In additionto EUFOR, about 150 NATO troops remainedin Bosnia-Herzegovina, reportedly to providesupport to the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia in detaining peopleindicted for war crimes, to combat terrorism andto assist the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities indefence reform. 2 In 2007 some 200 membersof the EU Police Mission remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3In June 2006 the Peace ImplementationCouncil, an intergovernmental body thatmonitors implementation of the Dayton PeaceAgreement, began preparing the closure ofthe Office of the High Representative (OHR)in June 2007. 4 However, in February 2007 thePeace Implementation Council reviewed thisdecision and decided against closing down theOHR in 2007, with the aim of OHR closure byJune 2008 instead. The decision was taken as aresult of little progress in reform and becausethe Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia andHerzegovina had not been fully constitutedfollowing a tense electoral campaign in October2006. The engagement of the internationalcommunity in Bosnia-Herzegovina was alsoexpected to continue through the strengtheningof the Office of the EU Special Representative. 5In June 2007 UN Security Council Resolution1764 reaffirmed the importance of the highrepresentative in pursuing the implementation ofthe Peace Agreement and noted that the Office ofthe High Representative would continue to carryout its mandate, with the aim of closing the officeby 20 June 2008. 6Impunity for war crimes and crimes againsthumanity during the 1992–5 war remainedwidespread, with thousands of enforceddisappearances still unresolved. Of an estimated2.2 million people displaced by the conflict, morethan 1 million refugees and internally displacedpeople from the 1992–5 war were estimated tohave returned to their homes. 7GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription formally ended on 1 January 2006under a defence reform law passed by parliamenton 5 October 2005. The law abolished separatedefence ministries for the Republika Srpskaand the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaentities, thus creating a single unified force andin general moving the military closer to NATOstandards. 8 On 5 July 2006 the Presidency – thecountry’s three-member head-of-state bodyconsisting of a Bosniac and a Croat electedfrom the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand a Serb elected from the Republika Srpska– approved the proposals. 9In its declaration on ratifying the OptionalProtocol in October 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovinastated that voluntary recruitment into the armedforces was not permitted for anybody under theage of 18. 10DevelopmentsIn its 2005 Concluding Observations on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s initial report on the Conventionon the Rights of the Child, the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child expressed concern that,although the number was decreasing, between1992 and August 2000 a total of 4,371 people,including about 300 children, had been victimsof landmines. There were still 1 million mines inapproximately 30,000 minefields throughout thecountry, including around schools and play areas,and Red Cross sources reported that 50 childrenwere injured every month. The Committee wasalso concerned at the physical and psychologicaleffects of the armed conflict on child victims. 111 EUFOR, 16 March 2007, www.euforbih.org.7 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2 Amnesty International (AI), Europe and CentralAsia: Summary of Amnesty International’sconcerns in the region, January–June 2006,1 December 2006, AI Index Number EUR01/017/2006.3 EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina website,16 March 2007, www.eupm.org.4 AI, above note 2.5 http://www.ohr.int.6 UN Security Council Resolution 1764(2007), UNDoc. S/RES/1764(2007), 29 June 2007.7 Amnesty International Report 2007.8 War Resisters International, “Bosnia to endconscription on 1 January 2006”, CO Update, No.15, November 2005, www.wri-irg.org.9 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfile, www.fco.gov.uk.10 Declarations and Reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Bosnia andHerzegovina, Concluding Observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.260, 21 September 2005.BOTSWANARepublic of BotswanaPopulation: 1.8 million (800,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 9,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 4 October 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. The BotswanaDefence Force Act of 1977 provided thatrecruitment to the armed forces was on avoluntary basis and that recruits had to appearto be 18. 1In its 2004 Declaration accompanyingthe ratification of the Optional Protocol, thegovernment confirmed that there was noconscription into the Defence Force, thatthe minimum age for recruitment was 18and that “recruits are required to present anational identity card which states their dateof birth, school completion certificate, andother educational records where necessary. Inaddition, all recruits undergo a rigorous medicalexamination where pre-pubescence wouldbe noticed, and any person determined to beunderage is routinely rejected from recruitment.” 2In November 2006 the Botswana DefenceForce announced that it planned to begin therecruitment of women, and in September 2007some 30 women were recruited as officer cadets,who were intended to serve in a variety of noncombatroles. 3Plans were announced in September 2007that officer cadets would attend 12 months’training at the Tanzania Military Academy. 4Both the Penal Code and the Children’s Actcriminalized the abduction of children. 5A — EDevelopmentsIn its November 2004 concluding observations,the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childexpressed concern at low birth registration,particularly in rural areas, and at the extent ofchild labour. 6C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7 1

International standardsBotswana ratified the Optional Protocol to theConvention on the Rights of the Child on theinvolvement of children in armed conflict inOctober 2004.1 Initial Report of Botswana to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/51/Add.9,27 February 2004.2 Declaration by Botswana on accession toOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 “Botswana: Army rolls out carpet for women”,IRIN, 22 November 2006; “Women to sweat it outin the army”, Botswana Guardian, 10–16 August2007; “Botswana: BDF Recruits Female SoldiersToday”, Mmegi/The Reporter (Gaborone), 17September 2007, http://allafrica.com.4 Mmegi/The Reporter, above note 3, 17 September2007.5 Initial Report of Botswana, above note 1.6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Botswana,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.242, 3 November 2004.BR AZILFederative Republic of BrazilPopulation: 186.4 million (62.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 287,900Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 17; 16 with parentalconsentVoting age: 16Optional Protocol: ratified 27 January 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Although 16-year-olds could volunteerto do military service, there was noinformation on under-18s in the armedforces.ContextPublic security was a major problem, with riotingin overcrowded prisons and generally highlevels of violence, including killings of police, bycriminal gangs. 1Children as young as seven continued tobe involved in drug gangs in urban and ruralareas, often being made responsible for gunand drug smuggling and distribution. 2 Armedconfrontations between urban-based drugfactions killed hundreds of people every year. 3Children’s involvement in drug-based armedviolence was reported in small towns as well aslarger urban areas. 4 Children as young as sevenwere reported to be armed and selling drugsin Rio de Janeiro. 5 According to one study anestimated one in five youths was killed within twoyears of joining a drug gang. 6 Recruitment anduse of children by drug factions was regardedby some observers as comparable to that byforces involved in armed conflict: they targetedparticular age groups for recruitment, allocatedthem specific functions and standing withinthe command structure, and rewarded themfinancially.During 2006 state authorities in Rio deJaneiro used armoured troop carriers (caveirões)and deployed troops and tanks in an attemptto combat drug gangs controlling most of thecity’s shanty towns. There were reports that upto 92 shanty towns were under the control ofparamilitary-style militias, made up of active andformer police officers acting with the support oflocal politicians and community leaders. 77 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll citizens between 18 and 45 years of agewere liable to military duties according tothe law. 8 Individuals had to register with theMilitary Service Board (Junta de Serviço Militar)between 1 January and 30 April of the year theyturned 18. Between July and September militarycommissions throughout the country selectedthose who would be enlisted into the armedforces. Military service law stated that recruitsfor active service or for the reserves must beBrazilians who turned 19 between 1 January and31 December of the year they joined the armedforces. 9 While the law stated this position clearly,there appeared, however, to be some ambiguityon this point in Brazil’s declaration on ratificationof the Optional Protocol, which seemed toindicate that recruitment could take place at ayounger age.Military service lasted 12 months andincluded military, technical, academic andvocational instruction. According to someanalysts it was seen as a source of opportunitiesand social progress, and the number of youngmen seeking to do military service oftenexceeded the number selected. 10Those with at least three years’ secondaryeducation could choose to do their militaryservice for one year at reserve officer traininginstitutions (Centro de Preparação de Oficiaisda Reserva – CPOR, Reserve Officers TrainingCentre, and Núcleo de Preparação de Oficiais daReserva – NPOR, Reserve Officers Training Unit)and then remain as temporary army officers ifthey so wished. Medicine, pharmacy, dentistryor veterinary students who had been enlistedcould delay their entry until completing theirstudies; they had to register with the militaryauthorities within a year of graduation and beginactive service. On finishing, they could choose toremain within the armed forces as health-serviceofficials for a fixed period. 11Reservists could join the Tiros-de-Guerra (TG)training units in their own municipalities, doingmilitary service while continuing their studies orjobs. There were more than 200 TGs throughoutthe country. 12Women were exempt from conscription butcould volunteer for the armed forces. Volunteerscould do military service from the year theyturned 17. 13 Brazil’s declaration on ratificationof the Optional Protocol stated that volunteersunder 17 had to have written parental consent.Military training and military schoolsEach branch of the armed forces had its owneducational institutions, both facilities fortraining soldiers and officers, and primary andsecondary schools. Candidates to officer schoolshad to be 21–24 years of age, depending on thebranch, and to have completed their secondaryeducation. Women could only specialize inhealth, administration or engineering. 14 Allmilitary educational institutions were underthe authority of the Ministry of Education andResearch. 15Candidates to the Agulhas Negras MilitaryAcademy (AMAN) first had to attend a course atthe Army Cadets Preparatory School (EsPCEx) fora year, equivalent to the third year of secondaryschool.16 They had to be at least 16 at the endof the year in which they attended EsPCEx, andunder-18s needed to have parental consent. 17Students were given the rank of second or thirdsergeant and, on graduating, were automaticallyregistered for AMAN. On entering AMAN, EsPCExgraduates were considered to be cadets – thatis, between second lieutenant and officercandidate. 18There were 12 military schools offeringeducation to children aged 10–17. 19DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Brazil and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.2 “More and younger children in the Brazil’s MatoGrosso drug trade”, Comunidad Segura, 19October 2007, www.comunidadesegura.org.3 Amnesty International Report 2007.4 Children and Youth in Organised Armed Violence(COAV), “Youths with guns, increasingly a part oflife in Brazil’s small towns”, 9 March 2006, www.coav.org.br.5 Marcelo Monteiro, “Study shows that children asyoung as seven are taking part in Rio drug trade”,COAV, 7 March 2005.6 “Rio Slums Blighted by Drug Crime”, BBC News,21 October 2005; “Short lifespan in Rio druggangs”, BBC News, 25 November 2006.7 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.8 Decreto No. 57.654, 20 January 1966,Regulamenta a lei do Serviço Militar, Art. 98.2.a.and Art 166.2.5, www.dgp.eb.mil.br.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7 3

9 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latina yel Caribe, Informe Nacional: Brasil, August 2006,www.flacso.cl.10 Ibid.11 Exército Brasileiro, O Serviço Militar, www.exercito.gov.br.12 Ibid.13 FLACSO, above note 9.14 Ibid.15 Regimento Interno dos Colégios Militares, www.cmbh.ensino.eb.br.16 Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, Ingresso,www.aman.ensino.eb.br.17 Escola Preparatória de Cadetes do Exército,Manual Candidato EsPCEx 2007, www.espcex.ensino.eb.br.18 Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, above note16.19 Exército Brasileiro, Portal de Educação, EducaçãoFundamental e Média, www.ensino.eb.br.BruneiBrunei DarussalamPopulation: 374,000 (130,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 7,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 and a halfVoting age: not applicableOptional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThe minimum voluntary recruitment agewas 17 and a half years, but figures forserving under-18s were not available. Thearmed forces included the Boys’ Wing, inwhich 15- to 17-year-olds could enrol fortraining.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. The minimum age ofrecruitment into the Royal Brunei Armed Forces(RBAF) under the Royal Brunei Armed ForcesAct was 17 years and 6 months. 1 Section 13 ofthe Act allowed for “eligible young persons”to be enlisted into the armed forces or thereserves regiment “for the purpose of raisingand maintaining any unit consisting of orincluding boy soldiers or boy reservists withwritten consent from the boy’s parents, personwith parental rights and powers or the DistrictOfficer”. 2Military training and military schoolsThe armed forces had a Boys’ Wing, to whichboys between the ages of 15 and 16 and a halfcould apply for selection, designed to be thetraining ground for young soldiers who intendedto serve in the RBAF as technical personnel ormilitary officers. Applicants were required to havethe consent of their parents and their schoolprincipal. 3Those who joined the Boys’ Wing wereprovided with full-term higher secondaryeducation. They were required to undergo a 26-month basic military training consisting of drills,shooting skills, map reading, first aid, physicaltraining and other preparedness for combat. 4 Itwas unclear whether members of the Boys’ Wingwere considered to be part of the armed forces.74 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsOn consideration of Brunei’s initial report to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child on theConvention on the Rights of the Child in 2003, theCommittee had recommended that Brunei ratifythe Optional Protocol. 51 Ministry of Defence, www.mindef.gov.bn.2 Initial state party report on the Convention on theRights of the Child, Brunei Darussalam, UN Doc.CRC/C/61/Add.5, 13 March 2003.3 Training Institute, Royal Brunei Armed Forces,www.mindef.gov.bn.4 Training Institute, Royal Brunei Armed Forces;“Passing-out parade of the 26th and 27th intakeof Boys’ Wing recruits”, 9 February 2007; both atwww.mindef.gov.bn.5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Concluding observations on initial reportsubmitted by Brunei Darussalam, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.219, 27 October 2003.BULGARIARepublic of BulgariaPopulation: 7.7 million (1.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 51,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionphased out)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 12 February 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription was provided for in the 1991constitution, which stated that “To defend thecountry shall be a duty and a matter of honour ofevery Bulgarian citizen” (Article 59), and in theLaw on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republicof Bulgaria (Article 2).In December 2006 Bulgaria informed theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child that“Persons subject to the jurisdiction of theRepublic of Bulgaria, who are under 18 years ofage, cannot be recruited to serve in the army.According to article 97, paragraph 1, of theDefence and Armed Forces Act of the Republic ofBulgaria, the minimum conscription age is 18, andthe maximum conscription age is 27… Bulgarianlegislation also provides for the possibility ofalternative service (article 84, paragraph 1, ofthe Defence and Armed Forces Act) … [T]here areno cases of participation in armed conflicts ofpersons subject to the jurisdiction of the Republicof Bulgaria who are under 18 years of age.” 1Military service lasted nine months, or six monthsfor graduates. 2The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas also 18. 3Around one third of Bulgaria’s militarywas conscripted. 4 A law abolishing militaryconscription was approved by parliament on 29June 2006, to take effect on 1 January 2008. 5Military training and military schoolsApplicants to military colleges had to have ahigh school diploma, but there were no specificage requirements. Secondary-school graduatesunder the age of 18 could enter military schoolsuntil they were old enough to perform militaryservice. 6 In its declaration on ratifying theOptional Protocol in February 2002 BulgariaA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7 5

stated that “Persons who have not come of ageshall be trained at military schools subject to theconclusion of a training agreement to be signedby them with the consent of their parents orguardians. Having come of age, the trainees shallsign a training agreement on a regular militaryduty.”DevelopmentsIn October 2007 the Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that the governmentexplicitly criminalize the recruitment andinvolvement of children in hostilities in domesticlegislation and ensure extraterritorial jurisdictionfor these crimes when they are committed by oragainst a person who is a citizen of or has otherlinks with Bulgaria. 7At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Bulgaria and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Bulgaria to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGR/1,23 January 2007.2 Communication from Ministry of Foreign Affairs,18 May 2004.3 Initial report of Bulgaria to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.29, 12October 1995.4 “Bulgaria scraps the draft”, New York Times, 30June 2006.5 “Conscription to be dropped off, BulgarianArmed Forces to become professional”, BulgarianNational Radio, 29 June 2006, www.bnr.bg.6 Communication from Ministry of Foreign Affairs,above note 2.7 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Bulgaria,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/BGR/CO/1, 5 October 2007.BURKINA FA SOBurkina FasoPopulation: 13.2 million (7.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 10,800Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 6 July 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextA report by a UN international commission ofinquiry mandated to investigate allegationsof serious violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law which occurredin Côte d’Ivoire from 19 September 2002 to 15October 2004 called for the role of neighbouringstates, including Burkina Faso, to be clarified.It found neighbouring states to be directly orindirectly involved, including through armstransfers, the use of their territories as rear basesand involvement in a war economy. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the 1991 constitution, “Each citizenof Burkina Faso is required to contribute to thedefence and preservation of territorial integrity”(Article 10).Recruitment to the armed forces wasvoluntary. Ordinance No. 84-037/CNR/PRES of17 July 1984, modifying Law No. 49/62/AN, setthe minimum age for recruitment into the armedforces at 20 years. However, Decree No. 2000-374/PRES/PM/DEF of 1 September 2000 allowedfor recruitment from the age of 18, provided thatthe recruit was unmarried and enjoying full civicrights. Recruits reportedly underwent two yearsof training before entering into active service. 2There were no reports of under-18s in the armedforces.National development service (Servicenational pour le développement, SND) wascompulsory for all Burkinabès aged between 18and 30. The SND comprised civic education, basiceducation and vocational training. 3DevelopmentsIn December 2004 the government wrote tothe Child Soldiers Coalition, stating that while7 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

members of an Ivorian armed political group, thePatriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (Mouvementpatriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI) might havebeen present temporarily in Burkina Faso atsome point, they had never received training ormilitary equipment of any sort from the Burkinagovernment. It also stated that it had repeatedlyrequested the government of Côte d’Ivoire to takethe necessary measures to allow members of theIvorian armed forces who had sought refuge inBurkina Faso to return home. 4International standardsIn July 2007 Burkina Faso ratified the OptionalProtocol. In its Declaration at the time ofratification, the government stated that theminimum age for voluntary recruitment intothe armed forces was 18, that recruitmentwas voluntary, and that proof of age had to beprovided. 5 In April 2004 it ratified the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court.1 Rapport de la Commission d’enquêteinternationale sur les allégations de violationsdes droits de l’homme en Côte d’Ivoire, http://fr.wikisource.org.2 Letter received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairsin response to the Child Soldiers Coalition, GlobalReport 2004, ref: 004675/MAECR/SG/DAM, 22December 2004.3 Decree No. 99-445/PRES/PM of 7 December1999.4 Letter received from the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, above note 2.5 Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Convention onRights of the Child on the involvement of childrenin armed conflict, Declarations and Reservations,www2.ohchr.org.BURUNDIRepublic of BurundiPopulation: 7.5 million (4.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 35,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional protocol: signed 13 November 2001 (seetext)Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCChildren were recruited and used by thearmed opposition group FNL. Governmentforces continued to use captured childsoldiers for intelligence-gathering. Scoresof children accused of membership of orsupport for the FNL were illegally detainedand some were tortured in detention.ContextThe 2001 Arusha Peace and ReconciliationAgreement for Burundi was the starting pointfor a political transition to end more than adecade of civil war. In October 2003 a powersharingagreement (Pretoria Agreement) wassigned by the government and the oppositionNational Council for the Defence of Democracy– Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Conseilnational pour la défense de la démocratie– Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie,CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza)). In November a new,inclusive government was established after asecond Pretoria agreement granted the forcesof both sides immunity from prosecution. 1 In2005 the CNDD-FDD won parliamentary andlocal administrative elections. Pierre Nkurunziza,head of the CNDD-FDD, was elected presidentin August 2005. 2 Fighting between governmentforces and the one remaining armed group, theNational Liberation Forces (Forces Nationalesde Libération, FNL), continued sporadically. InJune 2006 the government and the FNL signedan agreement on the restoration of peaceand security. In September the same year aComprehensive Ceasefire Agreement betweenthe two parties set a date for the cessation ofhostilities and established army integrationand demobilization procedures. The agreementcreated a joint verification and monitoringmechanism (JVMM) and an African Union specialtask force to protect FNL leaders and movecombatants to assembly areas.The process stalled repeatedly, however. InMarch 2007 the FNL suspended participationin the JVMM until various demands were met,A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7 7

including the release of political prisoners andFNL incorporation into political institutions.In July, following further negotiations, the FNLdelegation left the capital, saying that it wouldnot return until army repression of its membershad ceased and agreement was reached onits political status. The security situationdeteriorated after the ceasefire agreement, witha reported upsurge in torture, arbitrary arrestand detention of children by government securityforces, and an increase in incidents of rape andother sexual violence by FNL members. 3The United Nations peacekeeping operation(Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi, ONUB)was deployed in June 2004, replacing the AfricanMission in Burundi (AMIB). It was mandated,inter alia, to support the country’s nationaldisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) process, initiated in 2003, and to ensurehuman rights promotion and protection,especially with regard to women, children andother vulnerable persons. 4 On 1 January 2007ONUB was replaced by a UN Integrated Officein Burundi (Bureau Intégré des Nations Uniesau Burundi, BINUB), mandated to support thegovernment in its efforts towards long-termpeace and stability. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe February 2005 constitution stated that nochild could be used in direct combat and that theprotection of children during an armed conflictshould be assured (Article 45). The constitutiondid not define the age of majority, but theConvention on the Rights of the Child and otherinternational human rights treaties ratified bythe government were incorporated into it (Article19). In its 1998 initial report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementingthe Convention on the Rights of the Child, thegovernment stated that recruitment into thearmed forces “is set at between 16 and 25 yearsand that in practice that limit is 18 years andthe recruit must have a primary-school leavingcertificate”. 6 The 2004 armed forces law statedthat recruitment was voluntary (Article 37), butno minimum recruitment age was specified. 7A revised criminal code was awaiting approvalby the National Assembly in October 2007. Itdefined the military recruitment of children belowthe age of 16 as a war crime and raised the age ofcriminal responsibility from 13 to 15. 8Legislation punishing and preventing thecrime of genocide, crimes against humanity andwar crimes came into force in May 2003. Thelaw defined the conscription of children under15 into national armed forces and their use inactive hostilities as a war crime. It provided forthe death penalty for those found guilty of theoffence. 9In October 2005 the Senate and NationalAssembly issued a statement calling on thearmed forces to stop using children as porters. 10Government soldiers and police regularly usedformer FNL fighters, including children, to identifysuspected members of the FNL in 2006. 11Child recruitment and deploymentFNDD-CDD (Nkrunziza)The FNDD-CDD (Nkrunziza), which joined thetransitional government at the end of 2003,reportedly continued to recruit children for civildefence militias in 2004. 12 Recruitment by theCNDD-FDD (Nkrunziza) was reported in refugeecamps in Tanzania as late as September 2004,and at the end of that year they and otherarmed political groups were reported still tobe demanding financial contributions from therefugee population. 13Armed groupsFNLFrom November 2003 the FNL was the onlyremaining active armed group in Burundi. In2004 it was reported to be forcibly recruiting andusing children for frontline duties, to transportammunition, to carry wounded or dead and forintelligence-gathering activities. 14 Recruitmentcontinued into 2006, and intensified in Juneand July, although this appeared to be linked topeace negotiations and the prospect of rapiddemobilization packages for new recruits. Thelatter reportedly included street children fromBujumbura Mairie province, and there wereanecdotal reports of recruitment through raidson schools by FNL members. Some capturedchild soldiers said that they had been promisedcars and other luxury goods if they enlisted. 15A further upsurge of recruitment was reportedimmediately after the September 2006 ceasefireagreement, and some children reported beingasked to pay to enlist voluntarily in the FNL. Morethan 48 schoolchildren were recruited in Bururiand Ngozi provinces in April and May 2007. 16Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)A DDR program for children recruited and usedduring the armed conflict began in 2003 underthe auspices of a government national structurefor child soldiers, with implementation supportfrom UNICEF. 17 A National Commission to managethe country’s DDR program was subsequentlyestablished but did not begin work untilSeptember 2005. 18 By June 2006 some 3,000children had been demobilized from the former7 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

government’s armed forces, the governmentbackedPeace Guardian militias, and all armedopposition groups except the FNL. The majorityof those who took part in the program returnedto farm and fish in their local communities, butnearly 600 returned to school. Some 1,800 formerchild soldiers received occupational training.Health care was provided for those with specialneeds and psychosocial support was providedthrough individual and group meetings. 19Concerns were expressed over the lack ofinitiatives to prevent future recruitment andthe fact that many returning child soldiers werenearing the age of majority, with adult concernsand responsibilities. The lack of programs tofacilitate sustainable reintegration was alsonoted as a flaw in the DDR process. 20In April 2006 the government assembledseveral hundred FNL fighters at a “welcomecentre” in Randa, Bubanza province, inpreparation for demobilization. By March2007 preparations for the demobilization of anestimated 500 FNL child soldiers from Randawere under way. 21 The children in Randa weretransferred to a transit centre for demobilized FNLfighters in Gitega in November 2006 and theirparents were traced. By 10 March 2007 all thechildren had been reunited with their families. 22Other treatment of child soldiersAfter taking office in August 2005, governmentforces targeted real or suspected FNL supporters,arresting, torturing and even summarilyexecuting those suspected of belonging toor supporting the FNL. 23 Although the ageof criminal responsibility was 13, children asyoung as nine were detained on suspicion ofcollaborating with the FNL. Over 170 cases ofdetention of alleged FNL child soldiers werereported to ONUB between November 2005 andJuly 2006. 24 In early 2007, 51 FNL child soldiers,including one aged 14, were in detention. 25Captured child soldiers were reportedly severelybeaten in detention, some with metal bars andhammers. Some were denied medical attentionuntil human rights groups intervened on theirbehalf. 26 Captured child soldiers injured duringcombat were also denied medical treatmentwhile in detention. 27 In February 2007 theMinister of National Solidarity was reported tohave declared that all children accused of FNLparticipation would be released. 28 More than 67children detained at Mpimba prison for allegedassociation with FNL were released in March. 29Ramazani Nahimana, aged 16, was detainedin November 2005 by the state intelligenceagency after being identified by a former FNLcombatant as a member of the FNL youth wing,the Patriotic Hutu Youth (Jeunesse patriotiquehutu, JPH). He was reportedly severely beatenduring his detention and was subsequentlyshot dead in the Kinama district of Bujumbura.The official version of events was that he hadbeen shot either as he attempted to flee or incrossfire, although evidence at the scene stronglysuggested he had been extrajudicially executed.No investigation into his death was carried out. 30DevelopmentsThe National Assembly on 28 January 2005approved ratification of the Optional Protocolto the Convention on the Rights of the Child onthe involvement of children in armed conflict.However, the instruments of ratification had notbeen deposited with the UN at the end of October2007.At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Burundi and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.The UN Secretary-General’s SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflictvisited Burundi in March 2007. She commendedthe government for its progress on the DDR ofchildren, but said that more needed to be doneto protect children in detention and called for therelease of FNL child soldiers. 31 The FNL was listedas a party recruiting and using child soldiers inthe Secretary-General’s annual reports between2002 and 2008.1 Amnesty International (AI), Burundi: Childsoldiers – the challenge of demobilization, March2004.2 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andArmed Conflict in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2006/851,27 October 2006.3 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andArmed Conflict in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2007/686,28 November 2007; International Crisis Group(ICG), Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, 28August 2007.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1545, TheSituation in Burundi, UN Doc. S/RES/1545(2004), 21 May 2004.5 UN Security Council Resolution 1719, TheSituation in Burundi, UN Doc: S/RES/1719(2006), 25 October 2006.6 Initial report of Burundi to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.58,31 July 1998.7 Loi No.1/019 du 31 décembre 2004 portantCréation, Organisation, Missions, Composition etFonctionnement de la force de Défense Nationale.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7 9

© Coalition 2006Drawing by a former child soldier of the armed group National Liberation Forces, Burundi8 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

8 “Burundi: Government committed to childprotection”, UN press release, 13 March 2007,www.un.org/children/conflict; Human RightsWatch (HRW), Paying the Price – Violations of theRights of Children in Burundi, March 2007.9 Loi No. 1/004 du 8 mai 2003, portant Répressiondu Crime de Génocide, des Crimes contrel’Humanité et des Crimes de Guerre.10 Child Soldiers Coalition meeting with thePresident of the Senate, Bujumbura, October2005.11 HRW, A Long Way from Home: FNL Child Soldiersin Burundi, June 2006.12 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9February 2005.13 AI, “Burundi: refugee rights at risk: human rightsabuses in returns to and from Burundi”, AI Index:AFR 16/006/2005, 27 June 2005.14 Amnesty International (AI), “Burundi: childsoldiers – the challenge of demobilisation”, AIIndex: AFR 16/011/2004, 24 March 2004.15 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.16 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 3.17 “Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined,why they left, how they fared”, Multi CountryDemobilization and Reintegration Program(MDRP), Working Paper No. 3, October 2007, atwww.child-soldiers.org/document.18 Action Aid, “BINUB: Good governance, securitysector reform and enhancing human rights– establishing priorities”, October 2006, www.actionaid.org.19 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.20 Confidential source, May 2006.21 World Bank, MDRP, www.mdrp.org/burundi.htm.22 Information provided by MDRP World Bankcountry office, November 2007.23 Children and armed conflict, Report of theSecretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006; HRW, “Warningsigns: continuing abuses in Burundi”, 27February 2006.24 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.25 Confidential source, April 2007.26 HRW, above note 23.27 HRW, above note 11.28 HRW, above note 8.29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.30 HRW, above note 23.31 “UN Special Representative commendsdemobilization of child soldiers in Burundi”,ReliefWeb, 27 March 2007, www.reliefweb.int..C AMBODIAKingdom of CambodiaPopulation: 14.1 million (6.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 124,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 16 July 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Although there were no reports ofunder-18s being recruited or used, therecruitment and use of children as soldierswas not specifically criminalized innational legislation.ContextChild labour was still widespread, with morethan half of Cambodian children aged under14 being put to work, despite a national legalminimum working age of 15. 1 The ExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)was established in 2006 to bring to trial thoseresponsible for serious crimes committed duringthe Khmer Rouge period. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution provided that “The State shallprotect the rights of children as stipulated in theConvention on Children, in particular, the right tolife, education, protection during wartime, and …shall protect children from acts that are injuriousto their educational opportunities, health andwelfare” (Article 48).According to the government’s initial reportto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,under-18s were not accepted for military service. 3The Law on General Statutes for the MilitaryPersonnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forcescontained separate provisions for regular militarypersonnel and those serving fixed-term contracts.It stipulated that those on contracts should beat least 18 (Article 42), but did not expresslystipulate a minimum age for other militarypersonnel. 4In October 2006 the National Assemblypassed a new law on compulsory military service,requiring all Cambodian men aged 18–30 toregister and, if required, to serve 18 months inthe Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. 5 The lawalso provided for prison sentences of up to fiveyears for men who refused to join up. 6 A similarA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 8 1

law had been rejected in 1996. 7 Critics of the newlaw accused the government of using militaryservice to hide growing unemployment figures. 8As of October 2007, regulations to establishregistration and call-up procedures had yet to befinalized, and no conscription had taken place.Military training and military schoolsCambodia operated several military schools,although full details of their structure andoperation were not clear. Four levels ofprofessional military education were set out ina Defence White Paper in 2000. Comprehensiverecruit training was to be provided bycommanders in each military region, withemphasis placed on physical training and sport.The Junior Officer School would develop courseson discipline and humanitarian law for allnewly commissioned officers. A command andstaff course would provide training to middlerankingofficers. Finally, a senior officer trainingprogram would be provided at the Officers’Academy. 9 However, an updated Defence WhitePaper in 2006 acknowledged that the control ofeducational institutions for career soldiers was“in disarray”, and announced a new series ofreforms intended to reorganize and modernizemilitary training. The 2006 White Paper alsonoted the important and extensive role intraining new recruits played by the Army NoncommissionedOfficers’ School, now planned tobe brought under the Army Training Centre. 10It was not clear whether students at thevarious military schools were considered activemembers of the military and what, if any, militarytraining was given to students below the ageof 18. The law did not set a lower age limit forregular military personnel, but the duration oftraining courses at military schools would appearto preclude students from being selected to joinmilitary ranks before the age of 18. 11Child recruitment and deploymentThe recruitment and use of children as soldierswas not specifically criminalized in nationallegislation.Recruitment of children as soldiers andcadres had been very common in the KhmerRouge period (1975–9), with evidence of childrenas young as five being trained as cadres. 12 Itwas not known whether the prosecutors’ officeof the ECCC would seek to bring charges eitheragainst former child soldiers or in relation to theirrecruitment.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Both non-governmental organizations (NGOs)and UN bodies reported many cases of underagerecruitment by the Royal Cambodian ArmedForces during Cambodia’s civil war in the yearsfollowing the end of the Khmer Rouge period in1979. 13The second phase of the government’sUS$42 million donor-assisted demobilizationprogram, which had commenced in 1999 andwas suspended indefinitely in 2003 after theWorld Bank identified irregularities in the useof funds, was not resumed. In total, 16,500 ofa planned 31,500 soldiers, most of whom wereold, sick or disabled, had been demobilizedunder the program before it was suspended. 14The program did not include a component forthe demobilization or reintegration of those whowere under 18 when recruited.In October 2006 the government announcedits intention to reduce the size of the army bya further 40,000, to a total of 70,000 troops. 15There was reported to have been an attempt toidentify former child soldiers for demobilization,but there was no follow-up action taken orfurther available information. 16 The government’s2006 Defence White Paper stated that CategoryII soldiers (the disabled, the elderly and thechronically ill) would again constitute theprincipal group for discharge over the next fiveyears. 17DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Cambodia and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.Extraordinary Chambers in the Courtsof Cambodia (ECCC)In October 2004 Cambodia ratified its May2003 agreement with the UN to establish acriminal tribunal to bring to justice suspectedperpetrators of serious human rights violationsduring the period of Khmer Rouge rule (1975–9).The ECCC was established in 2006, its judicialwork being formally launched in July with theswearing in of judicial officers. 18 The tribunal wasbased on a mixed model with both Cambodianand international judges, prosecutors anddefence lawyers, and a voting system designedto ensure that every decision had the support ofboth Cambodian and international judges. 19From its inception the ECCC was subject torepeated delays and dogged by accusations ofpoliticization and corruption, but by June 2007two obstacles to progress had been removed with8 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the unanimous adoption of ECCC internal rules 20and measures to facilitate the participationof foreign defence lawyers. 21 The first suspectwas arrested and charged with crimes againsthumanity in July 2007. 22International standardsIn July 2004 Cambodia ratified the OptionalProtocol, referring in its declaration to Article 42of the Law on General Statutes for the MilitaryPersonnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces,which set 18 as the minimum age for contractualservicemilitary personnel. 23Cambodia ratified the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention 182 in March 2006.19 Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force, “An Introductionto the Khmer Rouge Trials”, August 2004, www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/introduction_eng/index.htm.20 ECCC, above note 2, Internal Rules, 12 June 2007.21 “Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge tribunal still at risk:UN judge”, ABC Radio Australia, 24 March 2007.22 ECCC, above note 2, Statement of the CoinvestigatingJudges, 31 July 2007.23 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.A — E1 “Child labour still rampant in Cambodia: UNICEF”,ABC News, 12 June 2006.2 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts ofCambodia (ECCC), www.eccc.gov.kh.3 Initial report of Cambodia to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.16, 24 June 1998.4 Law on General Statutes for the MilitaryPersonnel of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces(1997), www.moc.gov.kh.5 “Lawmakers OK military conscription”, CambodiaDaily, 26 October 2006.6 “Cambodia defies int’l donors with militaryconscription”, China Post, 26 October 2006.7 “Cambodia introduces conscription”, CO Update,November 2006, War Resisters International,www.wri-irg.org.8 “Cambodia votes for conscription”, BBC News,25 October 2006.9 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, RoyalGovernment of Cambodia Defence WhitePaper, August 2000, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Cambodia-2000.pdf.10 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, RoyalGovernment of Cambodia Defence White Paper,August 2006.11 Ibid.12 Child Soldiers in Cambodia, LICADHO (CambodianLeague for the Promotion and Defence of HumanRights) Briefing Paper, June 1998, www.licadho.org.13 A Survey of Programs on the Reintegration ofFormer Child Soldiers, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan, 30 March 2001, www.mofa.go.jp.14 Ian C. Porter, World Bank Country Director, “WorldBank defends role in demob process”, letter,Phnom Penh Post, 22 April–5 May 2005,www.phnompenhpost.com.15 “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000”,Xinhua, 16 October 2006.16 Confidential source, October 2007.17 Defending the Kingdom of Cambodia, abovenote 10.18 Annual report on achievements of the ECCC for2006, www.eccc.gov.kh.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 8 3

C AMEROONRepublic of CameroonPopulation: 16.3 million (7.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 14,100Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18; under 18 withparental consentVoting age: 20Optional Protocol: signed 5 October 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextThere was an increased spill-over of insecurityand refugees from the Central African Republicin mid-2007, and Cameroon sent troops fromits Rapid Intervention Battalion to its easternregions. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticePresidential Decree No. 94/185 (September1994), concerning non-officer military personnel,set the minimum recruitment age at 18 (Article11); recruitment was on a voluntary basis. 2 In April2001 Cameroon reported to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child that there was noconscription in Cameroon. The government alsostated that no child under the age of 18 mightbe recruited into the armed forces, gendarmerieor police force, except with parental consent. 3No information was available on the number ofrecruits under the age of 18 in the security forces.1 International Crisis Group (ICG), CrisisWatch No.47, 1 July 2007, www.crisisgroup.org.2 Bart Horeman and Marc Stolwijk, Refusing tobear arms: A world survey of conscription andconscientious objection to military service, WarResisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.3 Initial report of Cameroon to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.16, 26 March 2001.C ANADACanadaPopulation: 32.3 million (7.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 62,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 7 July 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182Sixteen- and 17-year-olds continued to berecruited into the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeRecruitment into the Canadian armed forceswas entirely voluntary under the terms of theNational Defence Act. Most Canadian Forcesprograms permitted enrolment at 17, although16-year-olds could enrol in the Regular OfficerTraining Plan (Junior Program) and the reserves. 1As of July 2007, 139 16- and 17-year-olds wereserving in the regular Canadian armed forces,and 2,194 16- and 17-year-olds were enrolledin the reserves. 2 Those serving in the CanadianForces under the age of 18 were permitted toleave the forces at any time without penalty.However, those who had entered the RegularOfficer Training Program under the age of 18could be required to repay their educational costsshould they choose to leave after a year’s service.Under the National Defence Act, “members ofthe Canadian Forces who have not yet reachedthe age of 18 may not be deployed to any theatreof hostilities, or indeed, any area where armedcombat is a possibility. The Canadian Forces alsodo not permit persons under the age of 18 tobe deployed in any domestic emergency whereweapon use cannot be ruled out.” 3Military training and military schoolsCanada’s Royal Military College is operated andmanaged by the Canadian Forces. However, thegovernment does not regard it as being boundby the restrictions on the age of recruitmentrequired by Article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 4In June 2006 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child asked the government to “providefurther information on the status of childrenattending the Royal Military College, particularlyas to whether they are considered as just civilianstudents of a military college or already asmilitary recruits”. 58 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsOmar Ahmed Khadr, a Canadian national,was taken into US custody in Afghanistan inlate July 2002 when he was 15 years old, andsubsequently transferred to the US naval baseGuantánamo, Cuba. In November 2005 he wascharged for trial by military commission undera military order signed by President George W.Bush in November 2001. The military commissionsystem was replaced by a revised system underthe 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). InApril 2007 Omar Khadr was charged under theMCA with murder and attempted murder inviolation of the law of war, conspiracy, providingmaterial support for terrorism, and spying. 6 InJune 2007 a military judge dismissed the chargesagainst Khadr on a jurisdictional question. 7 On24 September 2007 a newly established Courtof Military Commission Review overturned theruling, allowing proceedings against Khadr tocontinue.In connection with a concern about rulesand procedures regarding the capture ofpersons under the age of 18 in the context of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF)mission in Afghanistan, the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child expressed concernin June 2006 about “the lack of informationabout measures taken to ensure that capturedpersons below 18 are treated in accordancewith international standards of human rightsand humanitarian law when transferred toother national authorities”. The Committeerecommended that the government ensure thattransfers of such detained persons to nationalauthorities only take place when “there is areason to believe that their human rights willbe respected and as long as the State party issatisfied that the receiving State is willing andable to apply the Geneva Conventions”. Notingthat Canada exported small arms and lightweapons, the Committee recommended that “theState party ensure that its domestic legislationand practice prohibit in any case the trade ofsmall arms and light weapons to countries wherepersons who have not attained the age of 18may take a direct part in hostilities as membersof their armed forces or armed groups that aredistinct from the armed forces of a State”. 8With regard to dissemination of the OptionalProtocol, the Committee urged the governmentto “strengthen education and training in alldomestic languages on the provisions of theOptional Protocol for all relevant professionalgroups, in particular military personnel”. It waslikewise suggested that the Optional Protocol bemade “widely known to the public at large and inparticular to children and their parents, through,inter alia, school curricula in a child-friendlyversion”. 9At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Canada and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Canada to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CAN/1,29 July 2005.2 Government Response to the Standing SenateCommittee on Human Rights Report, “Children:the silenced citizens – effective implementationof Canada’s obligations with respect to the rightsof children”, tabled in the Canadian Senate on 16November 2007.3 Initial report, above note 1.4 Ibid.5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Canadaon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CAN/CO/1, 9 June 2006.6 Charge sheet available at www.defenselink.mil.7 At his arraignment proceedings in Guantánamoon 4 June 2007, the military judge dismissed thecharges against him because, while Omar Khadrhad been designated as an “enemy combatant”in Guantánamo, nowhere was there a recordof his designation as an “unlawful enemycombatant”, the label which (when attached toa non-US national) is a prerequisite for trial bymilitary commission under the MCA.8 Concluding observations, above note 5.9 Ibid.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 8 5

C ape VerdeRepublic of Cape VerdePopulation: 507,000 (238,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,200Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 10 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182, ACRWC17-year-olds could volunteer for militaryservice with parental consent. Noinformation was available on the presenceof under-18s in the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the 1992 constitution, all individuals “shallhave the duty to contribute to the defence of thenation” (Article 83). The constitution also statedthat “Military service shall be compulsory” andthat “Conscientious objectors and those whoare unfit for military service shall perform civicservice, as provided by law” (Article 271).Military service, reportedly for two years, wascompulsory for all men aged between 18 and35. 1 Volunteers could enlist at the age of 17, withparental consent. 2In its declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol in 2002, Cape Verde stated that “theminimum age for special voluntary recruitmentinto the Cape Verdean armed forces is 17 years inaccordance with article 31 of Legislative DecreeNo. 6/93 of 24 May 1993”, and that “Specialrecruitment shall apply to citizens, who oftheir own freely expressed will, decide to entermilitary service subject to meeting the followingrequirements: (a) They must have attained theminimum age of 17 years; (b) They must havethe consent of their parents or legal guardians;(c) They must be mentally and physically fit formilitary service.” 31 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to BearArms: A World Survey of Conscription andConscientious Objection to Military Service, WarResisters International, London, 1998, www.wriirg.org.2 Initial report by Cape Verde to UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.23, 9 January 2001; summary record of the746th meeting: Cape Verde, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.746, 7 November 2000.3 Declaration by Cape Verde on acceding to theOptional Protocol, 10 May 2002, www2.ohchr.org.C ARIBBEANCommonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, SaintKitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincentand the Grenadines (see individual entriesfor Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba,Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidadand Tobago)Population: 505,000Government armed forces: see textCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: 18–19Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: Dominica acceded 20September 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):Dominica: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO182Grenada: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Saint Kitts and Nevis: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO138, ILO 182Saint Lucia: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: CRC, GC AP Iand II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia andSaint Vincent and the Grenadines hadno military forces; security was theresponsibility of their police forces. SaintKitts and Nevis had a small military forcethat patrolled jointly with the police. Therewere no reports of under-18s in thesesecurity forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe police force in Dominica, Grenada, SaintGrenada, SaintLucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadineswas each country’s sole security force. Nonemaintained military armed forces, althoughthe police forces carried out a range of securityduties and the police force in Saint Vincent andthe Grenadines included a coastguard and aspecial unit with paramilitary training. The policeforce in Dominica had around 400 officers, inGrenada about 750, and in Saint Vincent and theGrenadines approximately 850. 1Saint Kitts and Nevis had a defence forceconsisting of an infantry unit and a coastguard. 2Its police force could also be employed fordefence against external aggression. 3Recruitment to the security forces wasvoluntary. In Dominica and Saint Lucia, theminimum age for recruitment to the police forcewas 18. 4 In Grenada and in Saint Vincent and8 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the Grenadines the minimum age was 19. 5 Theminimum age for recruitment to the defence orpolice forces in Saint Kitts and Nevis was 18. 6Military training and military schoolsIn Grenada police officers received 18 weeks’training at the Police Training School. 7 In SaintLucia the cadet corps, a paramilitary youthorganization, enrolled around 180 members in2005 and developed new units in all secondaryschools and the community college in 2006. 8A focus of its activities in 2006 was training inemergency and disaster relief. 9 In Saint Vincentand the Grenadines a small cadet unit formedpart of the police force. 10In Saint Kitts and Nevis secondary-schoolpupils of 13 years and above could join the cadetcorps, which was organized by the defence forcesbut could not be used in military operations.The defence forces conducted basic training oftroops, and advanced training was provided byregional, Canadian, UK and US armed forces. 11DevelopmentsIn June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that Dominicaimprove its birth registration system, develop itsnational plan of action for youth and ensure thatchildren defined in Dominica as “young persons”between the ages of 14 and 18 received the sameprotection as those under the age of 14 definedas “children”. 12The government of Saint Lucia reported to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child in 2004 thatit worked with civil society groups to advance theissue of child rights and had designated 2003–4as the Year of the Child. 13 In September 2005the Committee recommended ratification of theOptional Protocol. 14International standardsSaint Kitts and Nevis ratified the ILO MinimumAge Convention 138 in June 2005 and the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court inAugust 2006. Saint Vincent and the Grenadinesratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention 138 inJuly 2006.4 Initial report of Dominica to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.48,15 October 2003; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force,Training information, www.rslpf.com.5 Royal Grenada Police Force, Training School;Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,Service Commissions, www.gov.vc.6 CIA, above note 1; Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2003Police Act.7 Royal Grenada Police Force, Training School.8 “St Lucia Cadet Corps on recruitment drive”,Caribbean Net News, 9 October 2006, www.caribbeannetnews.com.9 Government of Saint Lucia, “Cadet Corps toattend Disaster Management Training”, pressrelease, 15 March 2006, www.stlucia.gov.lc.10 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2003.11 Conway, above note 2.12 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byDominica, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.238, 30 June 2004.13 Initial report of Saint Lucia to the Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.23, 13 October 2004.14 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted by SaintLucia, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.258, 21 September 2005.A — E1 Matthias Lestrade, “Crime Management andChallenges in the 21st Century”, NationalSymposium on Crime – Commonwealth ofDominica, 2003, www.da-academy.org/; RoyalGrenada Police Force, www.spiceisle.com/rgpf;CIA, World Factbook 2007 (Saint Vincent and theGrenadines).2 Stanford Conway, “SKNDF: Over a Century andCounting”, St Kitts–Nevis Observer, 21 October2005, www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com; CIA,above note 1.3 Saint Kitts and Nevis, 2003 Police Act, www.police.gov.kn.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 8 7

CENTR AL AFRIC ANREPUBLICCentral African RepublicPopulation: 4.0 million (2.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 3,200Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The opposition Popular Army for theRestoration of the Republic and Democracy(APRD) and the Union of Democratic Forces(UFDR) used children in hostilities whichbroke out in early 2005. Both expressedwillingness to demobilize their childsoldiers, but only the UFDR had officiallyentered a disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) process byOctober 2007. Children were thought to bepresent in government armed forces, butwere not believed to be actively involved inhostilities.ContextGeneral François Bozizé won the May 2005elections after seizing power in a coup againstPresident Ange-Félix Patassé in March 2003.From May 2005 hostilities were ongoing in thenorth-western and north-eastern provincesbetween the government Central African ArmedForces (Forces armées Centrafricaines, FACA) andthe Presidential Guard (Garde présidentielle, GP),and various armed opposition groups. 1In the north-west, ex-president Patassé’straditional stronghold, the Popular Army forthe Restoration of the Republic and Democracy(Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de laRépublique et la Démocratie, APRD) launchedattacks on the government almost immediatelyfollowing the May 2005 elections. The APRDwas composed of former members of Patassé’sPresidential Guard and local armed self-defencegroups, 2 established in response to the failureof government forces to protect the localpopulation from bandits (known as zaraguinas),who commonly attacked civilians and kidnappedchildren repeatedly for ransom. 3 In January 2007the APRD launched a failed attack on the town ofPaoua, resulting in further casualties and civiliandisplacement. Conflict between the APRD and thegovernment continued in 2007. 4In the remote and marginalized northeast,the Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR)was mostly active in Vakaga province. It wascomposed of General Bozizé’s own formersupporters and members of the Gula ethnicgroup, who claimed long-standing ethnicdiscrimination by the government. 5 In Septemberand October 2006 the UFDR seized controlof several towns, prompting French militaryassistance to government forces in December2006. The French military intervened onceagain in an air strike, in which 15 children werereportedly killed, following a UFDR attack onBirao in March 2007. 6 Birao’s estimated 14,000inhabitants fled and 70 per cent of houses werethought to have been burned down followingthe recapture of Birao. 7 In April 2007 a peaceagreement was signed between the governmentand the UFDR chief of staff, Damané Zakaria, onlyto be rejected by the jailed UFDR leader, AbakarSaboune. 8The majority of human rights abuses againstcivilians in the north-west were attributedto government forces, in particular the GP.Attacks on government forces by the APRD weretypically followed by reprisals against the civilianpopulation by the FACA and the GP. By September2007 hundreds of summary executions,extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearancesand rapes of civilians had taken place. In additionthe FACA and the GP burned tens of thousands ofhouses, leading to mass internal displacement. 9By August 2007, 180,000 people were internallydisplaced in the north-west. 10 Human rightsviolations were also committed by the FACA andthe GP in the north-east against the Gula ethnicgroup. 11 As of August 2007, 30,000 people wereinternally displaced in the region. 12 By September2007 a total of approximately 212,000 peoplehad fled their homes in the north-west and northeastto take refuge in the bush. Another 80,000sought refuge in Chad, Cameroon and southDarfur, Sudan. 13The situation in the CAR was exacerbatedby regional conflict and instability. Chadiangovernment troops regularly conductedcross-border raids into the CAR, attackingCAR opposition groups, looting villages andraping women and girls. Chadian banditswere implicated in criminal groups, includingzaraguinas, attacking people in the north of thecountry. The APRD and the UFDR recruited andused children in their forces, and engaged inwidespread extortion, kidnappings and beatingsof the civilian population. UFDR members killedcaptured civilians. 148 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1994 constitution provided for (male-only)conscription or voluntary recruitment into thegovernment armed forces at 18. Conscription wasnot enforced and there was no legislation relatingto child soldiers. 15Neither the constitution nor the criminal codecriminalized child recruitment or use. The CARwas, however, a party to the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court (ICC), and theconstitution stated that international law tookprecedence over national law and policy. Therewere moves to reform the criminal code to bringit in line with the Rome Statute and to introducea military justice code, which would hold militarypersonnel criminally liable for serious humanrights violations. 16Child recruitment and useChildren were thought to be present in theFACA and the GP but not actively engaged inthe current armed conflict, in contrast to the2002–3 conflict when large numbers of childrenwere reportedly actively involved. 17 Documentsproviding proof of age of recruits enlisting in thearmed forces were checked by recruiters whenavailable. However, central government recordshad been destroyed or looted during the 2002–3armed conflict, and no one whose records hadbeen lost could obtain copies. The governmentstated that recruiters should use common senseand ask children questions that would revealwhether they were really 18. If a child joined thearmed forces, he was treated as an adult. Therewere no reports available that any recruiters orothers had been subject to disciplinary measuresor other sanctions for recruiting children. 18Armed groupsThe number of children in the APRD and the UFDRwas unknown, but both groups recruited andused child soldiers. Until May 2007 both groupsrefused to recognize 15–18-year-olds as children,but they subsequently accepted that they hadchildren in their ranks and said that they werewilling to discuss the demobilization of childrenbelow the age of 15. Reports indicated that boththe UFDR and the APDR recruited Chadian andSudanese children. Children in the north-east ofthe CAR were also reportedly forcibly recruited byChadian armed groups. 19Popular Army for the Restoration ofthe Republic and Democracy (APRD)There were large numbers of child soldiers in theAPRD ranks. APRD commanders confirmed theuse of children as young as 12 in their forces, andstated that many were armed and participatedin combat. They claimed that many childrenjoined the APRD voluntarily, for protection fromgovernment forces. 20Union of Democratic Forces (UFDR)The UFDR forcibly recruited children, andwitnesses reported seeing child soldiers with theUFDR in the October–November 2006 offensive.An inter-agency UN mission reported seeingchildren in UFDR ranks in January 2007. The UFDRreportedly used civilians, including young girls,to cook or to transport looted goods. 21 DuringUFDR attacks on the FACA in March 2007, formerstudents at the Birao government secondaryschoolwere identified among its troops. Manyof the children, aged 12 to 17 and most of themboys, who had participated in the attacks, werekilled. 22Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)An adult DDR program, administered by the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP), was in placefrom February 2004 to end-February 2007, 23with the aim, among others, of integrating excombatantsinto the national armed forces. Ofmore than 7,500 combatants who went throughthe process, only 26 children, most of them boys,were included. 24 UNICEF was not involved in theprocess.In February 2007 the APRD told the nongovernmentalorganization (NGO) Human RightsWatch that they would demobilize child soldiersimmediately, as long as their security could beguaranteed. 25 In March and June 2007 the APRDrequested assistance from the UN country teamin a children’s DDR procedure. However, by late2007 it was not clear that progress had beenmade, and formal negotiations were hamperedby insecurity in the north-western region. 26UFDRIn April and May 2007 more than 450 childrenassociated with the UFDR were demobilized, allof whom were subsequently reintegrated intotheir communities and families. Some 75 per centof this group were boys aged between 13 and17, and 75 per cent had participated in militaryoperations and combat for sustained periodsthat averaged from nine months to a year. Some10 per cent of the children were as young asten, and were used mainly for logistical supportduring 2006 and early 2007. 27 On 16 June 2007a tripartite action plan between the UFDR, thegovernment and UNICEF to allow children to bereintegrated was signed and another group ofapproximately 200 children was released. 28 Itwas claimed that by September 2007 the lastremaining 450–500 children were released intoA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 8 9

their communities; however, this was not verifiedby the joint UNICEF–UFDR monitoring structureestablished by the tripartite action plan. 29The UN Secretary-General’s Representativeon human rights of internally displaced personsvisited the country during March 2007. Herecommended that armed groups immediatelycease the recruitment of children and enterthe DDR process. He also recommended thatthe government and the armed groups complywith their obligations under internationalhumanitarian law. 30DevelopmentsThe government referred the situation of2002 and 2003 to the International CriminalCourt in December 2004. In May 2007 the ICCagreed to begin an investigation into the mostserious crimes committed after 1 July 2002.The Prosecutor stated that the investigationwould focus in particular on allegations ofrape, which, he said, appeared to have been“committed in numbers that cannot be ignoredunder international law”. Reports receivedby the ICC indicated that the victims includedelderly women, young girls and men, often withaggravated aspects of cruelty, such as rapecommitted by multiple perpetrators, in front ofthird persons, or where relatives were forced toparticipate. Many victims were subsequentlyshunned by their families and communities. TheICC Office of the Prosecutor also continued tomonitor closely allegations of crimes committedsince the end of 2005. 31On 25 September 2007 the UN SecurityCouncil adopted Resolution 1778 (2007) on theCentral African Republic and Chad. It establishedMINURCAT, a “multidimensional presence”of UN and EU personnel, comprising police,military liaison officers and civilian personnel. Itmandated the protection of civilians in danger,particularly refugees and internally displacedpersons, and the facilitation of humanitarianaid and movement of humanitarian personnelin north-eastern CAR and eastern Chad. 32 Up to4,000 UN-mandated European Union troops wereexpected to be deployed to Chad by early 2008. 33In November 2006 the mandate of the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central AfricanRepublic (BONUCA), authorized in 2000 by theSecurity Council, was renewed until 31 December2007. 34The UFDR and the APRD were among theparties listed as recruiting and using childsoldiers in the 21 December 2007 report of theSecretary-General to the UN Security Council onchildren and armed conflict. 351 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Central AfricanRepublic: anatomy of a phantom state”, AfricaReport No. 136, 13 December 2007.2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “State of anarchy:rebellion and abuses against civilians”, HumanRights Watch, Vol. 19, No. 13(A) (September2007).3 “CAR: Villagers flee kidnappers demandinghuge ransoms”, 5 March 2007, “Central AfricanRepublic – Cameroon: CAR refugees in Cameroonfear returning home”, 29 November 2007, IRIN.4 “CAR: Civilians in northwest still afraid of goinghome”, IRIN, 2 August 2007; Report of theSecretary-General on Chad and the CentralAfrican Republic, UN Doc. S/2007/97, 23February 2007.5 HRW, above note 2.6 ICG, above note 1; “CAR: Rebel activity fuelsinsecurity in the northeast”, IRIN, 8 February2007.7 Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and theCentral African Republic, UN Doc. S/2007/488, 10August 2007.8 HRW, above note 2.9 Ibid.; “Central African Republic”, AmnestyInternational Report 2007; US Departmentof State, Country Reports on Human RightsPractices 2006, Central African Republic, 6 March2007, www.state.gov/; “Caught in CAR’s deadlycrossfire”, BBC News, 30 July 2007.10 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.11 HRW, above note 2.12 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.13 UNHCR News Stories, “Central African Republic’squiet conflict uproots more than 290,000”, 27September 2007, www.unhcr.org/; “Thousandsflee from CAR violence”, BBC News, 25 March2006.14 HRW, above note 2.15 Child Soldiers Coalition, discussion with ministerfor information, Bangui, March 2007.16 “La Centrafrique va se doter d’un code de justicemilitaire”, APA Bangui, 11 July 2007, www.apanews.net.17 Confidential coalition interviews, Bangui, March2007.18 Confidential source, Bangui, March 2007.19 Confidential source, November 2007.20 “CAR: Conflict forces children into insurgency”,IRIN, 23 February 2007; HRW, above note 2.21 HRW, above note 2.22 Report of the Secretary-General on children inarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,21 December 2007.23 Funded by the World Bank Multi-country MDRPand UNDP, www.mdrp.org. See also AfricanDevelopment Bank – World Bank strategy for theCAR 2007–2008, www.afdb.org.24 Confidential source, Bangui, March 2007.25 HRW, above note 2.26 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.27 Ibid.9 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

28 UNICEF, “Central African Republic signed childsoldiers reintegration agreement, 16 June 2007,www.unicef.org.29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.30 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of internally displacedpersons, Addendum: Mission to the CentralAfrican Republic, preliminary note, UN Doc.A/HRC/4/38/Add.5, 16 March 2007.31 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Prosecutoropens investigation into the Central AfricanRepublic”, press release, 22 May 2007;“Background: Situation in the Central AfricanRepublic”, 22 May 2007; www.icc-cpi.int/32 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1778(2007) on the situation in Chad, the CentralAfrican Republic and the subregion.33 Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, “Chad fightingraises stakes of EU peace deployment”, 27November 2007, www.alertnet.org.34 UN Security Council, Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2000/5,10 February 2000; UN Security Council, Statementby the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.S/PRST/2006/47, 22 November 2006.35 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.CHADRepublic of ChadPopulation: 9.7 million: (5.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 25,400Compulsory Recruitment Age: 20Voluntary Recruitment Age: 18 (lower withparental consent)Voting Age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 28 August 2002Treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCIncreased recruitment of children byChadian armed forces and Chadian andSudanese armed groups was reported in2006 and 2007, in particular along Chad’seastern border with Sudan and from itsrefugee and displaced persons camps.Despite an agreement by the governmentto facilitate the demobilization of childsoldiers, an estimated 7,000 to 10,000children remained in armed forces andgroups in September 2007.A — EContextConstitutional changes in June 2005 allowedPresident Idriss Déby to run for a third termin office. They exacerbated tensions overgovernance and access to Chad’s oil wealth andintensified political and armed resistance tothe president. 1 Between 2005 and 2006 the twoprincipal Chadian armed opposition groups werethe United Front for Change (Front uni pour lechangement, FUC), and the Platform for Change,Unity and Democracy (Socle pour le changement,l’unité et la démocratie, SCUD). 2 These groupslaunched several attacks against the governmentbetween 2005 and 2006. 3 In April 2006 an FUCledoffensive on the capital, N’Djaména, soughtto oust President Déby and resulted in hundredsof civilian deaths. 4 President Déby, of Zaghawaethnicity, was elected for a third term in officein May 2006. The elections, in which under-agevoting was reported, were boycotted by majoropposition parties. 5In December 2006 FUC leader Mahamat Noursigned a peace accord with the government thatextended a general amnesty to all FUC soldiersand called for “the creation of the conditions” forthe integration of FUC soldiers into the ChadianNational Army (Armée Nationale Tchadienne,ANT). 6 Following the agreement Nour wasappointed minister of defence, and other FUCofficials took government posts in March 2007.The government stated that it would not acceptchild soldiers from the FUC in the ANT. 7C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1

From 2006, three, at times overlapping,dimensions of conflict contributed to an emerginghumanitarian and human rights crisis in easternChad and along the border with Sudan. Thesewere internal armed conflict between governmentforces and opposition groups, inter communaland ethnically based violence in the east, andthe Darfur conflict and tensions between Chadand Sudan along their common border, whichled to a proliferation of arms and cross-borderbanditry. In addition, the Darfur conflict enabledChadian armed opposition groups to use Sudanas a base for attacks against Chadian governmentforces, and Sudanese armed opposition groups,including the Justice and Equality Movement andthe Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), to seekrefuge in eastern Chad. 8 Increasingly frequentattacks by Sudanese government-backedJanjaweed militias on eastern Chadian villagesresulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians inlate 2006. 9 In April 2007, after attacks, allegedlyby Janjaweed, on their villages, 9,000 Chadiansmoved to Habile camp, administered by the UNrefugee agency UNHCR, for internally displacedpersons (IDPs). 10Intercommunal violence between theZaghawa and Tama ethnic groups in northeasternChad escalated during the second half of2006. Fuelled by clan disputes and competitionfor water and grazing lands, hostilities wereadditionally embedded in and informed bynational political dynamics. Dozens of Tamacivilians were killed and thousands weredisplaced in attacks on Tama villages betweenAugust and November 2006. The attacks werereportedly carried out by Zaghawa militias(loyal to the president) backed by the Chadiangovernment. 11 By January 2007 up to 1,500 FUCsoldiers, mostly of Tama ethnicity, had takenup positions in and around Guéréda in northeasternChad, prompting a renewed spate ofethnic violence between the Tama and Zaghawagroups. 12In October 2007 a peace accord was signedin Libya between the Chadian government andfour armed opposition groups, which includedtwo factions of the Union of Forces for Democracyand Development (Union des forces pour ladémocratie et le développement, UFDD), theChadian National Concord (Concorde nationaletchadienne, CNT), and the Rally of Forces forChange (Rassemblement des forces pour lechangement, RFC), a SCUD splinter group. Theagreement called for an immediate ceasefire,the integration of opposition fighters into thenational army and the start of a process tointegrate the parties into the government. 13However, heavy fighting between the ANT andthese groups resumed in eastern Chad in late2007. 14ANT forces regularly conducted cross-borderraids into the Central African Republic (CAR),attacking CAR armed opposition groups, lootingvillages and raping women and girls. Chadiananti-Déby groups based themselves in the CAR,and Chadian bandits were involved in criminalgroups attacking civilians in the northern CAR. 15Reports indicated that children in the CAR wereforcibly recruited by Chadian armed groups andthat the CAR armed groups recruited Chadian andSudanese children. 16By late 2007 there were approximately240,000 Sudanese refugees in Chad, almostall located in the east. Of these, 60 per centwere estimated to be under 18. There wereapproximately 45,000 refugees from the CARin eastern Chad and approximately 180,000internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Chad, thevast majority of whom were also located in theeast. It was estimated that school-age childrenconstituted approximately 30 per cent of the IDPpopulation in eastern Chad. 17GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeOn ratification of the Optional Protocol in2002 Chad declared that the minimum agefor recruitment into the Chadian armed forceswas 18. It stated that enlistment was voluntary,and could take place only on a fully informedbasis. 18 The 1996 constitution stated that thedefence of the country and of national territorialintegrity was the duty of every citizen, and thatmilitary service was compulsory (Article 51).A national law adopted in January 1991 on thereorganization of the armed forces stated that theminimum age of recruitment into the ANT was 18,and that the minimum age for conscription was20. 19 However, the 1992 General Statute of theArmy provided that a person under the age of 18could be enrolled with the consent of a parent orguardian. 20 The Labour Code prohibited childrenunder the age of 18 from undertaking any workwhich by its nature was likely to cause harm tothe health, safety or morals of children. 21In November 2006 the minister of defenceordered the military leadership not to recruitchildren, and a memorandum was issued by theministry stating that the recruitment of childrenbelow the age of 18 was prohibited. In February2007 the government acknowledged that childrenhad been associated with armed groups andforces in Chad and that the ANT might haverecruited and used children. 22 Following thepeace agreement with the FUC, the ANT statedthat it would not accept under-age FUC soldiersinto its ranks.Child recruitment and deploymentChildren were known to have been recruited andused in the ANT as of mid-2007. One official toldHuman Rights Watch that boys between the ages9 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

of 12 and 15 were deployed to make tea, findwater, collect firewood and mind goats. Anothersenior ANT official stated that “child soldiers areideal because they don’t complain, they don’texpect to be paid, and if you tell them to kill, theykill”. Recruitment of children between January2006 and July 2007 into the ANT took place in theSalamat and Ouddai regions in the east, and inthe Wadi Fira region in the north-east. Civilianswere reportedly recruited en masse in late 2006at a time of ANT losses, and included childrenas young as 14, who were rapidly organized intounits to defend the capital, and issued uniformsand weapons. The ANT reportedly held capturedarmed opposition-group child soldiers as youngas 13 in the same facilities as adult soldiers. 23Militias incorporated into the ANTIn late 2006 the government incorporated villageleveland ethnically based self-defence militias,composed mainly of the Dadjo clan group, intothe ANT in areas where it was militarily weak,such as the Dar Sila area in south-eastern Chad.This resulted in widespread child recruitment.An agreement between the Dadjos and theZaghawas in November 2006 stipulated that theDadjos would provide young people in exchangefor arms and training. Soldiers who appeared tobe under 18 were reported in self-defence forcesin Goungour, Borot, Koloy, Modoyna, Tiero andDogdore. 24Armed groupsUnited Front for Change (FUC)The FUC, concentrated in north-eastern Chad,recruited children as young as 12 on a large scalebefore its integration into the ANT in late 2006.More than 25 per cent of the FUC was estimatedto be made up of children, including childrenunder 15. There were confirmed reports thatbetween January 2006 and May 2007 the FUCabducted children in the Guéréda area on theirway to school or the market to strengthen theirforces. 25 Children reportedly joined up to avengekillings of family members by Zaghawa militias,or to protect themselves in a context of armedviolence and insecurity. While girls were notrecruited in large numbers, the 3rd Brigade wascomposed of 52 women and girls. Some femalesoldiers had reportedly taken part in operationsagainst ANT forces in late 2006. Girl membersof the brigade said they had enlisted after beingraped or to seek protection from rape by Zaghawamilitias. Children were also forcibly recruited bythe FUC from refugee camps in Darfur. 26Following the 2006 peace agreement, FUCleader Mahamad Nour became minister ofdefence, and in March 2007 the first FUC officialsaccepted positions in the Chadian government. 27By October 2007 FUC troops operating outsideANT control abandoned their positions in easternChad and returned to Darfur. 28Chadian-backed Sudanese armedopposition groupsMassive recruitment took place among therefugee and IDP communities in eastern Chadby Sudanese armed opposition groups in Marchand April 2006. Recruitment was at times carriedout forcibly, with reports of torture as a coercivemeans. In July 2007 the UN reported that theChadian government alleged that more than1,000 children had been recruited by the SLA inrefugee camps in the east. 29 In March 2006 theG-19 faction of the SLA, working in co-operationwith Chadian government officials, recruited,some forcibly, 4,700 Sudanese refugees,including hundreds of children, from the Breidjingand Treguine UN-supervised refugee camps 50km west of Adré, in eastern Chad. 30 Most of thesepeople subsequently returned to the camps.In 2006, Sudanese children were recruitedfrom the Djabal and Goz Amir refugee camps ineastern Chad, where teachers were among therecruiters. 31 In January 2007, 39 children wererecruited from the Breidjing refugee camp bySudanese armed opposition groups. 32Other armed groupsUnidentified armed groups increasingly recruitedchildren in the east during 2006 and 2007. Theywere known to attract new members by offeringfinancial compensation on joining as well asmonthly pay. 33 In February 2007 the governmentalleged that there were hundreds of childrenin the UFDD and claimed that a significantproportion of UFDD prisoners captured duringcombat in Abeche in November 2006 werechildren. 34Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In September 2007 an estimated 7,000 to 10,000children, used in combat and non-combat roles,were identified by the UN as needing DDR fromarmed forces and groups. 35 The government andUNICEF signed an agreement on 9 May 2007 tobegin the demobilization of children from theANT and integrated FUC forces. By July 2007, 425boys – ex-FUC members – had been released fromgovernment military installations. 36 However,despite promises from the government, UNICEFhad by July been granted access to only onegovernment military installation, at Mongo insouth central Chad, where they identified 383child soldiers, some as young as eight, in May2007. Evidence suggested that ANT personnelwere concealing children to prevent them fromregistering for demobilization. 37 Children whoA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3

were demobilized could not be reunited with theirfamilies because of ongoing hostilities. 38In May 2007 the UNHCR in Abeche organizeda series of three refugee-protection workshopsfor local authorities, with specific reference tothe need to prevent child recruitment in the east.As of July 2007 a strategy on prevention, releaseand reintegration of children associated witharmed forces and groups was being developedby a consortium of government ministries, UNagencies and local NGOs. 39DevelopmentsIn May 2006 the UN Emergency Relief Coordinatorexpressed serious concern overrecruitment in and around refugee camps andIDP sites, and the increasing militarization ofrefugee camps. 40 In September 2007 the UNSecurity Council Working Group on Childrenand Armed Conflict expressed grave concernover the recruitment and use of children byarmed groups and local commanders of theANT; strongly condemned the continuousrecruitment and use of children by armed groups,in particular the SLA, the Sudanese rebel Justiceand Equality Movement (JEM) and the UFDD;and urged the government to criminalize theunlawful recruitment and use of children inarmed conflict. 41 Chad was listed as a situationof concern in the UN Secretary-General’s October2006 and December 2007 Reports on Childrenand Armed Conflict. 42On 25 September 2007 the UN SecurityCouncil adopted Resolution 1778 (2007)concerning the CAR and Chad. Its provisionsestablished the United Nations Mission in theCentral African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT),a “multidimensional presence” of UN and EUpersonnel, comprising police, military liaisonofficers and civilian personnel. Its mandateauthorized the protection of civilians in danger,particularly refugees and internally displacedpersons, and the facilitation of humanitarian aidand movement of humanitarian personnel in thenorth-eastern CAR and eastern Chad. 43 Up to4,000 UN-mandated EU troops were expected tobe deployed to Chad by early 2008. 44At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Chad and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The document reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for protecting and assisting childsoldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “They Came Here toKill Us”: Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting ofCivilians in Eastern Chad, January 2007.2 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Chad, UN Doc. S/2007/400, 3July 2007.3 “Chad: Déby dissolves presidential guardfollowing wave of desertions”, IRIN, 31 October2005; “Chad fight-back kills ‘300 rebels’”, BBCNews, 20 December 2005.4 International Crisis Group (ICG), Chad: Backtowards War?, June 2006.5 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006, Chad, www.state.gov.6 HRW, Early to War: Child Soldiers in the ChadConflict, July 2007.7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.8 HRW, above note 1; Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.9 “Chad”, Amnesty International Report 2007;UNHCR, “Lives in limbo as terror resumes ineastern Chad”, 1 November 2006, www.unhcr.org.10 UNHCR, “Some 9,000 Chadians move to IDPcamp after brutal village attacks”, 10 April 2007,www.unhcr.org.11 HRW, above note 1.12 HRW, above note 6.13 “Chad: peace deal signed to end rebellion”, IRIN,26 October 2007.14 “Chad’s battle army in east”, BBC News, 19October 2007; “Hundreds dead in Chad fighting”,BBC News, 27 November 2007.15 HRW, “State and Anarchy: Rebellion and Abusesagainst Civilians”, September 2007.16 Confidential source, November 2007.17 OCHA, “Humanitarian Action in Chad: Facts andFigures Snapshot Report”, 15 November 2007,www.reliefweb.int.18 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.19 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.20 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers: GlobalReport 2004.21 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices, March 2007, www.state.gov.22 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.23 HRW, above note 6.24 Ibid.; Report of the Secretary-General, above note2.25 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.26 HRW, above note 6.27 Ibid.28 “Chad: Unravelling the meaning of latest exrevolt”,IRIN, 19 October 2007.29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.30 HRW, Violence beyond Borders: The HumanRights Crisis in Eastern Chad, June 2006.9 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

31 Report of the Secretary-General on children inarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,26 October 2006.32 Report of the Secretary-General on children inarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,21 December 2007.33 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.34 HRW, above note 6.35 Security Council Working Group on childrenand armed conflict, Conclusions on childrenand armed conflict in Chad, UN Docs. S/AC51/2007/16, 3 July 2007, and S/AC 51/2007/16,24 September 2007.36 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 32.37 HRW, above note 6.38 Confidential sources, February 2008.39 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 2.40 Ibid.41 Security Council Working Group, 24 September2007, above note 35.42 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 31.43 UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1778(2007) on the situation in Chad, the CentralAfrican Republic and the subregion.44 Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, “Chad fightingraises stakes of EU peace deployment”, 27November 2007, www.alertnet.org.ChileRepublic of ChilePopulation: 16.3 million (4.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 75,700Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 31 July 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There was no information about under-18sin the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMilitary recruitment was transformed followingthe death in May 2005 of 44 conscripts duringa compulsory training exercise in sub-zerotemperatures in the Andes mountains. 1 Thevictims, some of whom were from the indigenousMapuche community, had received only a fewweeks’ military training. 2 Demands for reformfocused on the recruitment system, which waswidely seen as targeted at the poorest sectors ofthe population. In practice only 15–20 per cent ofthose liable each year did active service. 3A new law came into effect in September2005 to modernize recruitment and mobilization.Under the new law all citizens were automaticallyregistered for compulsory military service at theage of 18. Citizens aged 18–45 had to fulfil theirmilitary obligations, either through two years’compulsory military service (for men) or (for menand women) through voluntary military serviceor being available for mass mobilization. Quotaswere first filled by volunteers and the remainderchosen by lottery. Those declared able to domilitary service but who delayed their enlistmentcould be called up for an additional year. Thelaw also established a channel for complaints ofill-treatment or abuse. 4In 2007, for the first time since compulsorymilitary service was introduced in Chile overa century earlier, all quotas were filled by theselection of 15,000 candidates from among40,000 volunteers. 5Students could delay military service untilthey completed their studies, when they couldchoose to serve in the regular forces for a yearor in an armed forces professional institutionfor a total of 180 days, or to follow a MilitaryInstruction Special Course (Curso Especial deInstrucción Militar) for 150 days. 6The 2005 law also increased the minimumage for voluntary recruitment from 17 to 18.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Individuals who wanted to bring forward theirregistration for military service could do so,but could only undertake active service whenthey were at least 18. This effectively preventedunder-18s from participating in hostilities. By lawthe minimum age of recruitment could not belowered even in exceptional circumstances suchas a state of emergency. 7Women aged 18–24 could volunteer to domilitary service. 8 There were around 1,000 femalevolunteers in the army, and they constitutedabout 15 per cent of the air force. 9Military training and military schoolsEach branch of the armed forces had its owntraining schools. Officer schools offered fouryears of military, legal, economic, scientific andmoral training, including human rights education.Non-commissioned officers took a two-yearcourse to obtain a technical diploma. 10Candidates to military schools offeringbasic training were required to have completedsecondary education. Some schools stipulatedalso that candidates had to be 18. Courses werefor between two and five years. 11 Students atmilitary schools were considered to be on activeservice. 1210 FLACSO, Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Chile, August 2006,www.flacso.cl.11 Initial report, above note 7.12 Ley moderniza el servicio militar obligatorio, ab.1 “Tragedia militar podría cambiar conscripciónobligatoria en Chile”, Terra, 24 May 2005, www.terra.com/noticias; “Families angry at deathsin Andes”, Guardian (UK), 21 May 2005, www.guardian.co.uk.2 “El derecho a decir No”, Quechua Network, 25May 2005, www.quechuanetwork.org.3 David Álvarez Veloso, Servicio Militar en Chile:un debate obligatorio, Facultad Latinoamericanade Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO)-Chile, July 2006,www.flacso.cl.4 Ley moderniza el servicio militar obligatorio, No.20.045 of 2005, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacionalde Chile, www.bcn.cl.5 “Por primera vez en 107 años habrá sólovoluntarios realizando la milicia en las FuerzasArmadas chilenas”, Terra, 3 April 2007, http://actualidad.terra.es/articulo/por_fuerzas_armadas_1496070.htm.6 Dirección General de Movilización Nacional,Servicio militar, www.dgmn.cl, No voluntariossorteados.7 Initial report of Chile to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CHL/1, 6July 2007.8 Dirección General de Movilización Nacional,Servicio militar, above note 6, Servicio militarfemenino.9 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Participación delas mujeres en las fuerzas armadas, March 2005,www.defensa.cl.9 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

CHINAPeople’s Republic of ChinaPopulation: 1,315.8 million (352.7 million under18)Government armed forces: 2,255,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2008Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Because of the high number of volunteers,it had apparently not been necessaryto enforce conscription. The minimumvoluntary recruitment age was apparently17. There were close links between themilitary and the education system, andsecondary-school and higher educationstudents were required by law to undergosome military training.ContextThe predominantly Muslim population in theXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, particularlyalleged Uighur nationalists characterized by thegovernment as “ethnic separatists, terrorists andreligious extremists”, 1 continued to face denial oftheir human rights, including freedom of religionand access to education. The authorities usedthe “war on terror”, initiated by the United States(USA) following the attacks of 11 September2001, as justification for the detention andimprisonment of alleged Uighur separatists. 2 Anincreased number of Uighurs were extradited toChina from Central Asian countries, reflectinggrowing pressure by China on governments in theregion. One individual, who was under 18 at thetime of his arrest in Pakistan in 2001 and who wassubsequently detained in Guantánamo Bay, wasamong a group of five Uighurs who were releasedand transferred to Albania in May 2006. 3Restrictions on the rights to religious belief,expression and association, and discriminationin employment, continued to be reported fromthe Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetanareas. 4 Many people were detained, includingchildren between the ages of approximately sixand ten. 5China was a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO), establishedin June 2001, comprising also Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistanand Uzbekistan, whose goals included mutualco-operation in security matters. 6GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1982 constitution provided for conscriptionas the sacred obligation of every citizen ofthe People’s Republic of China to defend themotherland and resist aggression, and providedfor the power of the president to proclaim a stateof war and issue mobilization orders (Articles 55and 80).The 1984 Military Service Law, revisedin 1998, provided the legal basis for militaryservice. The armed forces were recruited mainlyby conscription but included volunteers and amilitia with a reserve service (Article 2). 7 Article12 stated that “Each year, male citizens who havereached 18 years of age by 31 December shallbe enlisted for active service. Those who are notenlisted during the year shall remain eligiblefor active service until they are 22. To meetthe needs of the armed forces, female citizensmay be enlisted for active service.” Conscriptshad to be registered for military service by 30September in the year in which they turned 18(Article 13). However, it appeared that, becauseof the number of volunteers from rural areas andthe downsizing of the standing army, the Peoples’Liberation Army had not found it necessary toenforce conscription.The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas not specified in the Military Service Law,which stated, “To meet the needs of thearmed forces and on the principle of voluntaryparticipation, male and female citizens who havenot yet reached 18 years of age by 31 Decemberof a certain year may be enlisted for activeservice” (Article 22). However, in the “Decisionof the State Council and the Central MilitaryCommission on Amending the Regulations onConscription Work” of September 2001, Article3(3) of the Regulations on Conscription Work wasrevised as follows: “To meet the needs of thearmed forces and on the principle of voluntaryparticipation, male and female citizens whohave reached 17 years of age but have not yetreached 18 years of age by 31 December of acertain year may be enlisted for active service.” 8This appeared to impose a minimum voluntaryrecruitment age of 17. China’s second periodicreport to the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child quoted the Military Service Law asstipulating that “no one in China under the ageof 15 may voluntarily enlist in any armed force”. 9This might, however, be an error.In its declaration to the Optional Protocol,China stated that the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment was 17. However, there was anapparent contradiction later in the declaration,which stated that the Regulations on theRecruitment of Soldiers “provides that in orderA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 7

to meet the needs of the armed forces and onthe principle of voluntary participation, maleand female citizens who have not yet reached 17years of age by 31 December of a given year maybe recruited for active service”. 10Reservists in the militia or reserve servicehad to be between 18 and 35 (Article 23) but agelimits could be extended, including “in frontierareas on land or sea, areas inhabited by minoritynationalities as well as urban units in specialcircumstances” (Articles 37 and 38). The militiaprovided assistance and support to the People’sLiberation Army, including in preparations againstwar, defending China’s borders and maintainingpublic order, as well as participating in combatoperations (Article 36). 11Military training and military schoolsThe Law on Military Service stated that “militaryinstitutes and academies may, according to theneeds in building up the armed forces, enrolcadets from among young students. The age limitfor the cadets to be enrolled must be the sameas that for the active servicemen” (Article 30). Ittherefore appeared that under-18s could enrol formilitary training at specialist institutions.There were close links between the militaryand the education system. The Military ServiceLaw required secondary school and highereducation students to undergo one month’smilitary training (Articles 43–46).DevelopmentsThe Law on the Protection of Minors which cameinto effect in 1992 defined “minors” as “citizensunder the age of eighteen”. A revised Law onthe Protection of Minors was adopted by theStanding Committee of the National People’sCongress and came into force on 1 June 2007.It required People’s Courts to set up specialtribunals to try cases involving under-ageoffenders and ensure that a guardian was presentwhen a child was questioned by the police orprosecutors. 12While millions of children accompaniedmigrant worker parents, it was estimated thatas many as 20 million rural children, most ofthem cared for by relatives, were left behindby parents migrating to cities to work. Theresidency registration system, which restrictedaccess to education and healthcare, discouragedmigrant worker parents from taking theirchildren with them. Official reports claimednegative consequences in health, schoolingand psychological development in children leftbehind. 13A September 2006 amendment to theCompulsory Education Law (which guaranteednine years of free education to all children)provided for the right to education of childrenof migrant workers regardless of where theyresided in the country. 14 However, more than 50schools for the children of migrant workers werereportedly closed down in Beijing in September2006, the authorities claiming that the schoolswere unregistered and substandard. 15 It waswidely assumed the closures were linked to acrackdown on unregistered migrant workersin preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games inBeijing. 16China had submitted a second periodic reportto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child inJune 2003. In the concluding observations to itsconsideration of the report, the Committee calledfor an independent expert to be allowed to visitand confirm the well-being of Gedhun ChoekyiNyima, the disputed reincarnation of the PanchenLama – the second most important figure in Tibetafter the Dalai Lama. 17 Gedhun Choekyi Nyimahad disappeared in 1995, aged six, and had sincethen been held by the Chinese authorities in“protective custody”. 18At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, China and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 On the labelling of Chinese Uighur separatistsas “terrorists”, see Human Rights Watch (HRW),Devastating blows, religious repression ofUighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005.2 Amnesty International Report 2006.3 Confidential source, September 2007.4 Amnesty International Report 2007.5 “Chinese troops detain Tibetan children”,Associated Press, 11 October 2006, at www.taipeitimes.com.6 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.7 Military Service Law of 31 May 1984.8 GOV.cn (Chinese government official webportal), “Decision of the State Council and theCentral Military Commission on Amending theRegulations on Conscription Work”, September2001, www.gov.cn.9 Second periodic report of China to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/83/Add.9, 15 July 2005.10 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rightsof the Child on the involvement of children inarmed conflict, China: Ratification,20 February 2008, http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2008/101_200/164E.pdf.11 Military Service Law, above note 7.9 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

12 “Revised Law on Protection of Minors Effectivenext June”, Xinhua, 30 December 2006, at http://en.chinagate.com.cn.13 “Life bitter for migrant workers’ children lefthome alone”, Xinhua, 15 December 2006, atwww.china.org.cn.14 Chinese Radio International report, 7 July 2006,http://english.cri.cn.15 Amnesty International Report 2007.16 HRW, “China: Beijing closes schools for migrantchildren in pre-Olympic clean-up”, 25 December2006. See also Amnesty International (AI),People’s Republic of China: Internal migrants:discrimination and abuse: the human cost of aneconomic “miracle” (ASA 17/008/2007), 1 March2007.17 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by China, Concluding observations, UNDoc. CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, 24 November 2005.18 “Tibet’s missing spiritual guide”, BBC News, 16May 2005.COLOMBIARepublic of ColombiaPopulation: 45.6 million (16.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 208,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 25 May 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Children were both forcibly and voluntarilyrecruited and used by the two armedopposition groups, the FARC and the ELN.They were used as combatants, to laymines and explosives and to carry outother military tasks. Girls were subjectedto sexual abuse, including rape andforced abortion. Some children reportedlyremained with paramilitary groups whichhad failed to demobilize fully. Governmentforces used captured and surrenderedchild soldiers to gather intelligence onopposition forces.A — EContextThe armed conflict which had so far lasted 40years continued between government forcesand the opposition Revolutionary Armed Forcesof Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionariasde Colombia, FARC) and the National LiberationArmy (Ejército de Liberación Nacional,ELN), accompanied by widespread humanrights abuses and breaches of internationalhumanitarian law (IHL), including abusesagainst children. 1 The government, headedby President Alvaro Uribe Vélez, continued topursue its democratic security policy, announcedin June 2003, which involved civilians in theconflict, particularly in gathering information. 2The government reported a decline from 2002to 2007 in murders and “massacres” (definedas the killing of more than three people at thesame time and in the same place). 3 However, thenumber of enforced disappearances increasedfrom 2004 to 2005, and the level of IHL violationswas relatively constant in 2005 and 2006.Reports of hostage-taking declined during thesame period. 4Government efforts to resume peace talksand discuss the release of hostages with theFARC were stalled after the president blamedthe group for a car bomb explosion at a Bogotámilitary college in October 2006. 5 Governmentand FARC forces attacked each other throughoutC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

© Jason P. Howe 2005Female government soldier puts camouflage cream on a boy’s face during a “Soldiers for aDay” session at school, Colombia1 0 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the remainder of 2006 and periodically in 2007.Eleven FARC hostages were shot and killed inJune 2007. 6 Peace talks with the ELN, initiatedin December 2005, had produced no tangibleresults by October 2007. 7More than 31,000 adult members ofColombia’s largest paramilitary group, the UnitedSelf-Defence Forces of Colombia (AutodefensasUnidas de Colombia, AUC), were demobilizedbetween 2003 and 2006, although some unitshad not fully disbanded. 8 The army-backed AUCwas responsible for widespread human rightsabuses and child recruitment before 2003. 9The 2005 Justice and Peace Law, providing thelegal framework for demobilization, was widelycriticized for failing to comply with internationallaw, raising fears that AUC members wouldnot be held accountable for abuses and othercriminal acts. 10 The law allowed paramilitariesnot to provide information on offences they hadcommitted, not to turn over illegally obtainedassets and not to disclose information abouttheir groups’ criminal activities. 11 Article 64 statedthat “the handing over of minors by members ofoutlawed armed groups shall not be grounds forlosing the benefits referred to in this law and Law782 of 2002”. 12From early 2006 the UN and civil societygroups in Colombia increasingly warned of therearming of demobilized paramilitary units,the continued existence of groups not involvedin the AUC demobilization and the merging ofsome former paramilitary units with criminalorganizations, often involved in drug trafficking.Evidence was also emerging of new armed groupsand criminal organizations establishing businessrelations over drugs with elements of the FARCand the ELN. Some of the groups reportedlyoperated along similar lines to the AUC, includinginvolvement in counter-insurgency operationsand efforts to control territory. 13Internal armed conflict continued to havea devastating impact on civilians. They werevictims of extrajudicial executions, enforceddisappearance, death threats, anti-personnelmines, indiscriminate attacks and forcibledisplacement in large numbers. 14 Childrenformed a high proportion of the victims, inpart because fighting forces at times operatedin and near schools and other places wherechildren were likely to gather. In one case, inMarch 2006, army troops took up positions ina village school near Puerto Asís, Putumayo,causing 30 village families to leave their homesafter the FARC announced that it would attackthe site. 15 In June 2006 the Representative of theUN Secretary-General on the Human Rights ofInternally Displaced Persons observed that “thearmed forces had installed their headquarters inthe middle of the village [of Toribo, Cauca], nextto a primary-school, and had erected posts inthe central square of town immediately next to aplayground and a church centre”. 16GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe minimum age for recruitment to the armedforces was 18, established by Law 418 of 1997 forconscription and Law 548 of 1999 for voluntaryrecruitment. 17 However, the government’s 2005declaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol signalled an apparent exception torecruitment legislation. The declaration statedthat “minors in age” could be recruited with theconsent of their parents. 18 The recruitment ofchildren into illegal armed groups was an offenceunder the criminal code, with prison sentencesof between six and ten years, in addition tothe possibility of fines. 19 Law 418 of 1997 alsoprohibited the recruitment of children by armedforces or armed groups, with a penalty of up tofive years’ imprisonment (Article 14).Laws on membership of armed groups andthe use of children for intelligence-gatheringappeared to be contradictory. The Childhood andAdolescence Code expressly prohibited the useof demobilized children for intelligence-gatheringactivities. 20 However, Decree 128 of 2003 statedthat children could be used for activities relatedto intelligence work (Article 22), and could befinancially rewarded for supplying information(Article 9). Law 782 of 2002 stated that a childcould only be recognized as belonging to anarmed group by the spokesperson of the groupin question or as a result of evidence provided bythe child (Article 53), even though providing suchevidence could involve children being used inintelligence work.Laws and implementing regulations ondemobilization treated children recruited byillegal armed groups primarily as victims ofviolence requiring special care and protection.Law 782 of 2002 defined children involved inarmed groups as victims of the armed conflictrather than as combatants (Article 15). In March2005 the Constitutional Court handed downJudgment 203 which revoked another provisionof Law 782 which allowed the prosecution ofminors involved in armed groups (Article 19). 21However, under the Childhood and AdolescenceCode, prosecution for membership of, or for actscommitted during membership of, an armedgroup could be waived for all but the mostserious acts – those “which may constitute gravebreaches of international humanitarian law,crimes against humanity or genocide under theRome Statute”. 22Child recruitment and deploymentGovernment security forces did not officiallyrecruit under-18s, but continued to use capturedchildren for intelligence-gathering, despitethe legal prohibition of the practice. TheA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 0 1

Ombudsman’s Office reported that in Cauca achild demobilized from the FARC was used as aninformant during a military operation and waslater killed at the age of 19 while in combat withthe FARC. 23 Captured children continued to beheld by security forces for longer than the 36-hour period provided for by law, after which theyhad to be placed in the care of the ColombianInstitute of Family Welfare (Instituto Colombianode Bienestar Familiar, ICBF). 24 Children who hadleft armed groups told the Ombudsman’s Officethat they were kept in police stations and armybases for longer periods and were pressured togive information about the groups they had left. 25The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childexpressed concern about these practices, whichplaced children at serious risk of reprisals byarmed groups. 26Sixteen-year-olds could enter air force trainingprograms and 17-year-olds could train withthe national army as non-commissioned officersin the infantry. Students could also enrol ascadets in military secondary-schools, where theycarried out “special” military service from years4 to 6, including 1,300 hours of military trainingand participation in military exercises. 27Government programs such as “soldiersfor a day” (soldados por un día) and “peasantsoldiers” (soldados campesinos) aimed tofamiliarize children with the “war dynamic”. 28 TheUN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedomof opinion and expression was among thosewho observed that the programs “militarize thecountryside” and “ultimately endanger entirevillages, exposing them to the retaliation of theguerrillas”. 29Armed groupsChildren were recruited and used by theopposition FARC and ELN and various otherarmed groups, mostly operating in urban areas,including some paramilitaries who had failedto demobilize. 30 Recruitment of children by theFARC and ELN extended to areas of Ecuador andVenezuela near the Colombian border. 31Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC)Children were forcibly recruited by the FARC orjoined up for lack of alternatives in a context ofrural poverty. They acted as combatants, laidexplosives, ferried supplies, carried messagesand served as guides. Girls were subjectedto sexual abuse including rape and forcedabortions. 32 Child recruitment by the FARC wasrecorded in at least eight departments, includingArauca, Cauca and Putumayo. 33National Liberation Army (ELN)The ELN pledged in 1998 to stop childrecruitment, on signing the Puerta del Cieloaccord in Germany. 34 The UN High Commissionerfor Human Rights continued to receive somereports of recruitment of children by the ELN inArauca and other parts of the country. 35 Morethan 50 children demobilized in 2005 and 2006said that they had been in the ranks of the ELN.Two girls aged 14 and 15 were reported to havebeen forcibly recruited in Nariño in December2006. 36Paramilitary and other armed groupsChildren were believed to remain with the AUCand other partially demobilized paramilitarygroups, such as the Peasant Self-Defence Forcesof Casanare and the Cacique Pipinta Front. 37The Ombudsman’s Office reported that morethan 200 children in the AUC ranks had not beendemobilized in 2006. 38Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The rules and practices governing demobilizationwere unclear. Law 782 of 2002 stated thatchildren surrendering to the armed forces shouldbe placed in the care of the ICBF within 36 hours.Decree 128 stated that only those who voluntarilyleft an armed opposition or paramilitary groupwere allowed to benefit from the governmentrunDDR program. However, since child soldierswere required to identify themselves as membersof an armed group under Law 782, those whoescaped or were discharged, and those afraidto reveal their identity, were unable to receiveassistance. In practice the majority of FARC andELN child soldiers entering the DDR programhad surrendered to the security forces and beenhanded over to the ICBF. 39 Some 3,300 formerchild soldiers, mostly from the FARC, had takenpart in the government’s DDR program since itsinception in November 1999. 40Some 300 children were formally releasedby the AUC and handed over to the authoritiesduring the demobilization process which began in2003. However, the majority of AUC child soldiersleft the groups informally and made their way tothe ICBF on their own, thus failing to meet therequirements of the collective demobilizationprocess. Concerns were expressed that manyformer AUC child soldiers consequently receivedno demobilization or reintegration support. 41The DDR program was run by the ICBF,working in partnership with a number ofinternational and national organizations thatprovided direct services, care and support.Returning children initially received medicalattention and counselling at a “transition home”.They were then transferred to specializedinstitutional care centres for adolescentsup to the age of 18 for nine to 12 months inpreparation for “reintegration”. 42 The programinitially envisaged that children would be1 0 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

eunited with their families or placed in a fosterhome. In practice security concerns and therisk of re-recruitment made it impossible formany child soldiers to return to their familiesin areas affected by the armed conflict. Fostercare presented a major challenge, with familiesfearful of being targeted by the armed groups.The stigmatization of child soldiers, frequentlyperceived as violent and threatening, meantthat families were reluctant to receive formerchild soldiers. Those leaving the specializedcare centres moved either to youth homes oryouth protection facilities for those with specialprotection problems. While efforts continuedto strengthen fostering and family-based care,approximately 60 per cent of those entering theDDR program were in institutional care in 2007. 43Child soldiers from the FARC and ELN, manyof whom came from rural areas and enlistedvoluntarily for economic reasons, experiencedparticular difficulties adapting to life in thecities where the centres were located. They wereseparated from family, friends and communitysupport systems, and faced the additionalchallenge of stigmatization by the population.Child soldiers demobilizing from the AUCpresented greater psychological and behaviouralproblems, including drug addiction. 44DevelopmentsThe Committee on the Rights of the Childconsidered Colombia’s Third Periodic Reporton the Convention on the Rights of the Child inJune 2006. In its concluding observations theCommittee called on the government to takeeffective measures to prevent the recruitmentand involvement of children in armed groups. Iturged the government to issue clear instructionsand training to the armed forces to ensurethat captured child soldiers were no longerinterrogated or used for intelligence gatheringand were handed over to civilian authoritieswithin 36 hours. The Committee further urgedthe government to increase substantiallyresources for social reintegration, rehabilitationand reparations for returning child soldiers. Itasked the government to consider withdrawingits reservation under Article 124 of the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).The reservation allowed a country not to submitcases of those accused of war crimes to theICC for seven years. Once this period was over,only war crimes committed after the seven-yearmoratorium could be submitted to the ICC. TheCommittee expressed concern that the currentposition blocked accountability for thoseresponsible for the recruitment of child soldiersand the planting of landmines. 45At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Colombia and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.The FARC and the ELN were listed asrecruiting and using child soldiers in the UNSecretary-General’s annual reports on childrenand armed conflict between 2002 and 2007.Paramilitary groups were listed for childrecruitment and use between 2003 and 2005,with the eception of two listed up to 2007.1 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights on the situation of human rights inColombia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/9, 16 May 2006.2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Tougherchallenges ahead for Colombia’s Uribe”, LatinAmerica Briefing No. 11, 20 October 2006.3 Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanosy Derecho Internacional Humanitaria,Vicepresidencia de la República, “Indicadoresde situación y resultados operacionales de laFuerza Pública (comparativo 2006–2007)” and“Situación de derechos humanos y derechointernacional humanitaria,” December 2004,2005, 2006, www.derechoshumanos.gov.co.4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),“Colombia: Humanitarian Situation Remains ofConcern”, 1 February 2006; ICRC, “Colombia”,Annual Report 2006, www.icrc.org.5 “Colombia’s president vows to defeat rebels,”New York Times, 3 November 2006, www.nytimes.com.6 Simon Romero, “Colombian rebels blamed forhostage deaths,” New York Times, 28 June 2007,www.nytimes.com.7 ICG, “Colombia: moving forward with the ELN?”,Latin America Briefing No. 16, 11 October 2007.8 Alto Comisionado para la Paz, “CuadrosResumen: Areas Despejadas 2003–2006: 31.671demovilizados”, www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co.9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), You’ll Learn not toCry: Child combatants in Colombia, September2003.10 Amnesty International (AI), Colombia: Justice andPeace Law Will Guarantee Impunity for HumanRights Abusers, 26 April 2005.11 Sentencia C-370/2006, Corte Constitucionalde Colombia, 18 May 2006; HRW, “Smokeand mirrors: Colombia’s demobilization ofparamilitary groups”, August 2005.12 Article 64, Diario Oficial 45,980, Ley 975, 25 July2005.13 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights on the situation of human rights inColombia, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/48, 5 March 2007;ICG, “Colombia’s new armed groups”, 10 May2007, www.icg.org.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 0 3

14 See, for example, Human Rights Council, 4thsess., provisional agenda item 2, Report of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for HumanRights, above note 13; HRW, “Maiming thepeople: guerrilla use of antipersonnel landminesand other indiscriminate weapons in Colombia”,July 2007.15 Human Rights Council, above note 14.16 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internallydisplaced persons, Walter Kälin, Addendum:Mission to Colombia, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/38/Add.3, 24 January 2007.17 Law No. 418 of 1997 and Law No. 548, http://www.secratariasenado.gov.co/leyes.18 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.19 Law No. 599 of 24 July 2000, ‘por la cualse expide el Código Penal’, Art. 162 (illicitrecruitment).20 Código de la Infancia y la Adolescencia, Article176.21 Sentencia C-203/05, Corte Constitucional deColombia, 8 March 2005, www.secretariasenado.gov.co.22 Código de la Infancia y la Adolescencia, Article175. This article largely took the approach of Law418 of 1997 and legislation extending it.23 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/608/S/2007/757,21 December 2007.24 Law 782 of 2002.25 Defensoría del Pueblo, Caracterización de losniños, niñas y adolescentes desvinculadosde los grupos armados ilegales: Inserciónsocial y productiva desde un enfoque dederechos humanos, Bogotá, 2006, www.saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co.26 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Colombia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/COL/CO/3, 8 June 2006.27 See, for example, Colegio Militar SimónBolívar, “Reseña histórica”, www.colegiomilitarsimonbolivar.com/; Colegio MilitarJosé María Córdoba, “Información general”, www.colmiljosemariacordoba.edu.co.28 Informe alterno a la Representante Especial delSecretario General para la cuestión de los niñosy los conflictos armados, Situación de derechoshumanos y derecho humanitario de la niñez2005–2006, Bogotá, 2007, www.coalico.org.29 UN Economic and Social Council, Commissionon Human Rights, 61st sess., provisional agendaitem 11(c), Civil and Political Rights, Including theQuestion of Freedom of Expression: Report ofthe Special Rapporteur on the right to freedomof opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo,Addendum: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2005/64/Add.3, 26 November 2004.30 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S2006/826,26 October 2006.31 Coalición contra la vinculación de niños, niñasy jóvenes al conflicto armado de Colombia andCoalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,Frontiers: Children at the Borderline, February2007.32 Report of the UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights on the situation of human rightsin Colombia, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/10, 28February 2005; Special Rapporteur on the Rightsof Women of the Inter-American Commissionon Human Rights (IACHR), “Violence andDiscrimination against Women in the armedconflict in Colombia”, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 67, 18October 2006; Defensoría del Pueblo and UNICEF,“La niñez y sus derechos, Caracterización de lasniñas, niños, adolescentes desvinculados de losgrupos armados ilegales”, November 2006.33 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, above note 1; Report of the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights, above note 13.34 Acuerdo del Puerto del Cielo con el ELN, 15 July1998, www.ciponline.org.35 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, above note 1.36 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 30.37 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62-S/2007/757, 21December 2007; “Smoke and mirrors”, abovenote 11.38 Defensoría del Pueblo, Defensoría Delegada paralos Derechos de la Niñez, la Juventud y la Mujer,Caracterización de las niñas, niños y adolescentesdesvinculados de los grupos armados ilegales:Inserción social y productiva desde un enfoquede derechos humanos, Bogotá, 2006, www.saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co.39 Y Care International, Overcoming LostChildhoods, Lessons Learned from theRehabilitation and Reintegration of FormerChild Soldiers in Colombia, 2007, www.ycareinternational.org.40 Informe alterno, above note 28; ProcuraduríaGeneral de la Nación, Seguimiento a políticaspúblicas de desmovilización y reinserción,Bogotá, June 2006, Vol. II.41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 37;Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, above note 13.42 Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar,“Programa de Atención a Jóvenes Desvinculadosy Amenazados poer el Conflicto Armado”, www.bienestarfamiliar.gov.co.43 Y Care International, above note 39.44 Ibid.45 Concluding observations, above note 26.1 0 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

A — E© Christian Relief Network 2005Former child soldier talks to a professional counsellor at a rehabilitation centre in Beni,Democratic Republic of the CongoC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 0 5

COMOROSUnion of the ComorosPopulation: 798,000 (387,000 under 18)Government armed forces: unclear 1Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription in Comoros. Militaryrecruitment was governed by law No. 97-06(AF),which specified that the minimum age forentrance into the armed forces was 18. 2The 2001 constitution enshrined in itspreamble respect for international human rightsstandards, in particular those relating to therights of children, and specifically includes theright of children to be protected from violence.Armed groupsThere were no new reports of the recruitment ofchildren by armed political groups or militias.Children associated with armed groups on theisland of Nzwani during the secession crisis in1997 were reintegrated into civilian life throughtwo socio-economic programs with the supportof the World Bank and the UNDP. The programsended in 2002. 3 Nzwani still had an armed militia,thought to be about 500 strong. 4DevelopmentsInternational standardsIn August 2006 Comoros ratified the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court.1 The military resources of the Comoros consist ofa small standing army and a 500-member policeforce, as well as a 500-member defence force.A defence treaty with France provides navalresources for protection of territorial waters,training of Comorian military personnel, and airsurveillance. France maintains a small maritimebase and a Foreign Legion contingent on Mayotte.2 Confidential source, April 2007.3 Ibid.4 “Comoros: An expensive statement”, IRIN, 3August 2007.CONGO, DemocraticRepublic of theDemocratic Republic of the CongoPopulation: 57.5 million (31.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 51,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 11 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182An estimated 7,000 child soldiersremained in government forces and armedgroups, including foreign armed groupsmostly to be found in the eastern provincesof Equateur, Ituri, Katanga, North andSouth Kivu, and Maniema. They wereused as combatants, porters, guards andsexual slaves. Children were recruited fromrefugee camps in Rwanda and used byarmed groups in North Kivu.ContextNearly 5.5 million people were estimated to havedied in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC) since the beginning of the armed conflict in1998. 1 Exploitation of mineral and other economicresources fuelled the conflict, which wascharacterized by systematic human rights abusesand population displacement, particularly in theeast and north-east. Following an agreement in2002 a government of national unity took officein July 2003, composed of representatives ofthe former government, major armed groups,opposition political parties and civil society. 2Priorities for the transition included restoringsecurity and the extension of state authoritythroughout the national territory, the creation of aunified national army and the demobilization andreintegration of combatants, including children. 3The UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) maintaineda peacekeeping force of 16,000 troops across thecountry. 4Delayed presidential and legislative electionswere held in July and October 2006. In DecemberPresident Joseph Kabila was inaugurated andbecame head of the DRC’s first democraticallyelected government. 5 However, parts of thecountry remained under the control of differentarmed forces and groups, with some militarycommanders resisting army unification andoperating parallel chains of command. Tensionswere exacerbated by delayed and poorlymanaged army unification, which left thousands1 0 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

of former combatants without reintegrationsupport. 6Armed activity by foreign armed groupscontinued, causing insecurity, violence anddisplacement in the east. These groups includedthe Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberationof Rwanda (Forces démocratiques pour lalibération du Rwanda (FDLR)), and the UgandanAllied Democratic Forces and National Army forthe Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). A smallnumber of Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Armytroops were located in the remote Garamba Parkarea. 7 By late 2007 about 15,300 foreign fighters,primarily from the FDLR, had been repatriated. 8However, regional relations continued to becharacterized by tension and mistrust. In 2004Rwanda threatened three times to renew militaryoperations in the DRC, citing the need to protectCongolese Tutsi and to counter the threat posedby the FDLR. 9Hostilities continued in several areas,particularly Ituri, Katanga, and North and SouthKivu provinces, where ethnic tensions weremanipulated for political ends or control ofeconomic resources in politically or militarilystrategic areas. 10 Human rights abuses againstcivilians, including rape and murder, were widelycommitted by armed forces and groups involvedin hostilities. Those suspected of committingabuses continued to enjoy near-total impunity. Ahandful of military and armed-group leaders werearrested and prosecuted, but dozens of otherswere promoted to senior military or governmentpositions. 11Children were recruited and used by allparties to the armed conflict for combat andsupport roles, and thousands of girls were usedas sexual slaves. An estimated 30,000 childrenwere awaiting demobilization from armedforces and other parties to the armed conflictat the end of 2003. Child recruitment by theformer Congolese army officially ended in 2003,although some children remained in individualunits. National army unification and the nationaldisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs did not begin in earnestuntil 2005; some 30,000 children had beendemobilized by mid-2007. 12 Thousands of others,including many girls, escaped, were abandonedor left the armed forces without being officiallydemobilized. From 2005 the UN reported anoverall reduction in child-soldier recruitment anduse by armed forces and groups – a consequenceof a decrease in the number of active fightingzones, the progressive incorporation of armedgroups into the national army and the associateddemobilization process for adults and children. 13However, some 7,000 child soldiers remained inarmed groups and the Armed Forces of the DRC(Forces armées de la République démocratiquedu Congo, FARDC). Active recruitment continuedin some areas in 2007, particularly in North Kivu.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe February 2006 constitution defined a childas any person below the age of 18. All forms ofexploitation of children were punishable by thelaw (Article 41), and public authorities were underobligation to protect young people from threatsto their health, education and development(Article 42). The organization of military orparamilitary formations, private militias or youtharmies was prohibited (Article 190).The 2004 Defence and Armed Forces Lawprohibited the individual requisition of one ormore children below the age of 18 in the event ofa mobilization (Article 10) and the maintenanceof a youth army or youth subversive group(Article 41). Responsibility for child-soldierdemobilization was held by the Minister ofNational Defence, Demobilization and FormerCombatants (Article 25). 14 A previous decree-law,of 9 June 2000, ordered the demobilization ofchildren below the age of 18 from armed forcesand groups. A May 2005 circular issued by themilitary prosecutor instructed regional and localmilitary prosecutors to initiate proceedingsagainst all those accused of child recruitmentor use in military operations. The same circularinstructed military prosecutors to refer illegallyrecruited children accused of crimes to acompetent civilian court, or to the official DDRprogram for demobilization. 15A comprehensive Child Protection Code wasawaiting approval by parliament in October 2007.The code prohibited the forced recruitment ofchildren or their use in armed conflict (Article50a), as well as the enlistment or use ofchildren in the national armed forces, the policeand armed groups (Article 73). Prison termsof between ten and 20 years were specifiedfor these offences (Article 193). The codecriminalized rape, (Article 175) and sexual slavery(Article 189), with prison terms of 7–25 and10–25 years respectively. A wide range of otheracts of sexual violence and exploitation werecriminalized by the code. 16Child recruitment and deploymentChildren remained in FARDC units which hadcompleted the army unification program (knownas integrated units) and in those awaitingunification (non-integrated units). In mid-2006more than 26 cases of child recruitment andother violations by FARDC were brought to theattention of FARDC chief of staff by MONUC.Children were seen in FARDC brigades inKasai Occidental, Katanga and South Kivu. 17FARDC troops undergoing redeployment inIturi and the Kivus abducted children to carryequipment and belongings. 18 In mid-2007A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 0 7

local sources reported seeing children used asguards and “wives” in integrated and nonintegratedunits in the Fizi area, South Kivu.Children interviewed complained of lack of foodand harsh conditions. 19 Some child soldierswere abandoned by commanders en route tounification centres in several locations, includingSouth Kivu and Katanga, possibly for fear ofprosecution. 20 Children captured from armedgroups were detained by FARDC members inorder to gather information on armed groupsor to extort money from family members. Somehad been beaten while in detention. Former childsoldiers faced intimidation and harassment byFARDC members, including non-respect for theirofficial demobilization certificates. 21Armed groupsChild recruitment in armed units loyalto Laurent NkundaChild soldiers were actively recruited and usedin hostilities by FARDC brigades and other armedunits loyal to Laurent Nkunda, predominantlyin North Kivu. Recruitment intensified in late2006 and continued throughout 2007. Nkunda,a former military officer of the armed wing of theRwanda-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma, RCD-Goma), remained hostile to thearmy unification process and exerted controlover troops and territory. Troops loyal to Nkundaclashed with the FARDC in Bukavu in 2004 andin Sake in August and November 2006, afterNkunda mobilized his troops, ostensibly toconfront threats posed by the FDLR. 22 An arrestwarrant for Nkunda, widely accused of humanrights abuses, was issued by the government inSeptember 2005, but he remained at large as ofOctober 2007.In January 2007 some armed units loyal toNkunda agreed to enter the FARDC followingRwanda-facilitated talks under an informallyagreed process known as mixage, underwhich Nkunda-affiliated troops combined withgovernment forces into five “mixed” brigadeswhich remained in North Kivu. In practiceNkunda retained command over the newlyformed FARDC units and his own troops, andcontrolled parts of North Kivu. Troops loyalto Nkunda were deployed to fight against theFDLR and Mai Mai militias, 23 especially in Masisiand Rutshuru, throughout 2007, contributingto rising insecurity, ethnic tension and humanrights abuses in the province. 24 In July 2006Alphonse Batibwira, a non-governmentalorganization (NGO) staff member, was killedwhile trying negotiate the release of childsoldiers. A member of the non-integrated 81stbrigade, loyal to Nkunda, was accused of thekilling. 25 Commanders of mixed brigades deniedthe presence of children, obstructed access tocamps and threatened child-protection workersthroughout 2007.Some 300 to 500 children, some as youngas 13, were reportedly serving in newly formed“mixed” brigades in North Kivu in April 2007,and were deployed to fight against Mai-Mai andthe FDLR. 26 Forcible recruitment was reported inNgungu and Rutshuru (North Kivu) in July, andchildren were being hidden by troops loyal toNkunda in these and other zones in violation ofMilitary HQ Command’s orders. Children weretold to lie about their age (to state that theywere adults) and those who managed to escapereturned to their villages, where they remainedat risk of re-recruitment. 27 MONUC reported inOctober that around 200 children remained in theFARDC units loyal to Nkunda, particularly amongNorth Kivu brigades. 28An upsurge in child recruitment from refugeecamps and communities in Rwanda occurred fromJanuary 2007. 29 Children said they were offeredmoney and employment if they returned to NorthKivu, but on arrival were recruited into “mixed”brigades loyal to Nkunda. 30 Rwandan authoritiescarried out a joint assessment with officials fromthe UN refugee agency UNHCR in May. Theyvisited refugee camps to establish mechanismsfor improved child protection, including improvedcontrol over the exit of children from thecamps. 31 The Rwanda government initiated aninvestigation into the alleged removal of eightchildren from Kiziba camp in July, for deploymentin South Kivu. 32 Some Rwandan child soldiersrepatriated to Rwanda were reportedly arrestedand beaten by the authorities. 33Armed groups in IturiNumerous armed groups, often formed alongethnic lines, continued to operate in Ituri, anarea of considerable natural wealth. Tensionsbetween Hema and Lendu (pastoralist andagriculturalist respectively) and associatedcommunities, over land use, arms smuggling andother resources, persisted throughout 2004. Thegroups carried out killings, rape and abductionsof the civilian population, as well as burningproperty and looting. 34 All the groups recruitedand used children. Some groups signed an “actof engagement” with the government in May2004. They committed to joining the transitionalprocess and agreed to take part in a pilot DDRprogram initiated in September. 35 However,disarmament was repeatedly delayed ascommanders attempted to negotiate amnestiesand to secure senior FARDC posts.Several leaders of armed groups werearrested in March 2005 after nine UNpeacekeepers from Bangladesh were killed inthe Bunia area. They included Thomas Lubanga,head of the Union of Patriotic Congolese (Uniondes patriotes congolais, UPC/L), and GermainKatanga, head of the Ituri Patriotic Resistance1 0 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Front (Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri,FRPI). 36 The two were subsequently indicted byand handed over to the International CriminalCourt (ICC). From 2005 the FARDC and MONUCincreased their efforts to compel the groups todisarm and to protect the civilian population. TheCongolese Popular Armed Forces (Forces arméespopulaires congolaises, FAPC) was completelydismantled in 2006 and hundreds of children,including numerous girls, joined the DDRprogram. Some children could have remainedwith remnants of the group, which crossed theborder into Uganda. 37While militarily weakened, the FRPI and theNationalist and Integrationist Front (Front desnationalistes et intégrationnistes, FNI) continuedto operate, and in 2005 they attempted toconsolidate their remaining forces under a newalliance, the Congolese Revolutionary Movement(Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais, MRC). 38Children continued to be recruited and rerecruitedby the FNI, led by Peter Karim Udagathroughout 2005. In July 2006 Karim agreedto disarm and enter the DDR program, and 87children were demobilized from his forces. By lateAugust the UN reported that the FNI was againrecruiting children, including by force. 39 Severaldozen children were released from these groupsor escaped during the first months of 2007, butsome FNI commanders actively obstructed therelease of children. 40 Local sources estimatedthat as of April 2007 several hundred childrenremained in these groups. 41 They includedchildren forced to remain unless amnestyconditions for disarmament were met by theauthorities. 42Forces démocratiques pour lalibération du Rwanda (FDLR)Rwandan armed groups opposed to the Rwandangovernment had been present in the easternDRC since shortly after the 1994 genocide, andthe Rwandan FDLR had been active in North andSouth Kivu from about 2004. While officiallyopposed to the Rwandan government, it primarilyengaged in criminal activities in the Kivus,including extortion and trading in minerals. 43Reports persisted of Congolese governmentassistance in the form of weapons and militarysupport to the FDLR, and in early 2007 someFARDC brigades might have been assisted by theFDLR in fighting troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda.Killings, abductions and looting by the FDLR werereported throughout 2006 and 2007. 44 Numerouscases of rape were reported, including the rapeof a four-year-old girl in South Kivu in 2006. In atleast one case a group of abductees was releasedafter a ransom was paid. 45 The FDLR recruitedand used a number of children, some of whomwere deployed to fight against Nkunda-affiliatedtroops in 2007, although numbers were difficultto establish. 46Other armed groupsMai-Mai militias – local defence groups – wereactive in the eastern provinces of Katanga, theKivus and Maniema during the armed conflict.They received direct military support from thearmed forces, as well as entering opportunisticalliances with adversary groups. Some Mai-Maigroups entered the transitional process in 2003.Others, particularly in Katanga and North andSouth Kivu, were not eligible for, or remainedhostile to, army unification and the DDRprogram. 47 Seventy-six children were releasedfrom one group in Katanga in May 2006 whenMai-Mai leader Kyungu Mutanga surrendered,but children probably remained among the 2–4,000 remaining militia members. 48 Children weredeployed by Mai-Mai to fight troops affiliatedwith Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu from 2006,and recruitment was ongoing in 2007. Childrenwere recruited and used by Banyamulenge(Congolese Tutsi) militias in South Kivu. 49Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Ongoing impunity for human rights violations,including for sexual violence, hindered thesuccessful reintegration of former child soldiers.Efforts by the government, the internationalcommunity, donors and NGOs were hampered bya context of poverty, weak or non-existent stateinstitutions and an infrastructure devastated bywar.Funding for adults’ and children’s DDR wasestablished by the World Bank and the MulticountryDemobilization and ReintegrationProgram in 2002. In the absence of a nationalbody, DDR was initially carried out by UNICEFand NGOs with assistance form MONUC childprotection advisers. 50 A national body, theCommission Nationale de Désarmement,Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER), wasestablished in December 2003 to oversee a DDRprogram for an estimated 150,000 adult fightersand 30,000 children. An operational frameworkfor children’s DDR was adopted by CONADERin March 2004. 51 By December 2006 CONADERstated that 30,000 children had been releasedfrom armed forces and groups. 52 Four thousandchildren were released between October 2006and August 2007, mainly from “mixed” brigadesand armed groups. 53Implementation of the children’s DDR programwas delayed, owing to continued hostilities, lackof political and military will, mismanagement offunds and poor co-ordination and timetabling. 54Throughout 2005 CONADER, the UN and NGOswere forced to respond on an emergency basis tourgent needs to identify, demobilize, transport,shelter and feed thousands of children. Mostreintegration programs did not start until 2006. 55A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 0 9

Reintegration support was consistentlyunderfunded or entirely absent. In December2006 CONADER said that of the 30,000demobilized children some 14,000 had yet toreceive reintegration assistance. By mid-2007CONADER was winding down and internationalfunding had virtually ceased. 56 CONADERwas slow to approve funding for NGO-basedreintegration projects. Most programs wereestablished in urban centres and inaccessible tothe majority of child soldiers, who were based inrural areas. 57An estimated 11,000 children escapedor left the armed forces and groups withoutbeing officially demobilized. 58 Children, manyof them used in frontline combat, saw adultsreceive demobilization packages and supportfor a one-year period, while they returnedhome without material support, training orother assistance. Some reportedly resorted toidentifying themselves as adults to enter theadult program. 59 Others were either forcibly rerecruitedor re-enlisted “voluntarily” in the face ofa dearth of alternatives.Thousands of girls were recruited and usedby armed forces and groups during and afterthe armed conflict, and girls continued to beassociated with armed forces and groups in theeastern DRC. They performed combat dutiesand portering, provided medical assistanceand carried out domestic labour. Thousandswere raped, resulting in serious and permanentinjuries; many had children as a result of rape. 60Girl soldiers were initially largely overlookedby the government and the donor community.Most girls did not enter the official DDR program,fearing stigmatization by their communities ifthey were identified as child soldiers. Othersremained with their military “husbands” for fearof violence and recrimination if they left. 61 Only12 per cent of formally demobilized childrenwere girls, despite estimates that girls mighthave comprised up to 40 per cent of the totalnumber of child soldiers during the armedconflict. CONADER reported in May 2006 thatof the 18,500 demobilized children at that date,only 2,900 (15 per cent) were girls. A World Bankofficial told Amnesty International in March 2006that very little was being done for girl soldiers,adding that “we have no good profile of whothese girls are”. 62In April 2007 DRC Child Soldiers Coalitionmembers identified 415 girls in the ranks ofarmed forces and groups in South Kivu. All thecommanders denied the presence of girls in theirranks, alleging that they were dependents or“wives”. Local sources reported that many girlsremained with the 115th brigade of the FARDC,Mai Mai groups and the FDLR in North Kivu. 63Military commanders and fighters frequentlyassumed possession of the girls, claimed themas “wives” and saw no obligation to identify orrelease them. 64Community-based initiatives were establishedfrom 2004 to respond to the needs of girls insome regions, but thousands of girls received noreintegration support. Despite well-documentedevidence of widespread sexual violence againstgirls, their complex medical and psychosocialneeds remained largely unmet. Programs toassist girl mothers and their children remainedvirtually non-existent. 65 Existing provisionwas largely provided by NGOs working atthe community level. 66 Returning girls wererejected by their communities because of theirinvolvement in sexual activity. 67Other treatment of child soldiersChildren were arrested, detained and tried inmilitary courts for military offences and othercrimes allegedly committed while they were inarmed forces or groups. The trials contravenedArticle 114 of the Military Justice Code, whichstipulated that persons below the age of 18 didnot fall under military jurisdiction. 68 A decreelawpassed in 2000 ordered the demobilizationof children illegally recruited or used by armedforces and groups, and the provision wasreinforced in May 2005 by a circular issued by themilitary prosecutor (auditeur général) instructingmilitary prosecutors to refer illegally recruitedchildren accused of crimes to a competent civiliancourt or the national body responsible for DDRfor demobilization. 69At least 12 children were known to havebeen sentenced to death since 2003. 70 The ChildSoldiers Coalition was informed in mid-2007that executions were no longer carried out in theDRC, 71 but at least five children were believed toremain in detention under sentence of death inJuly 2007 in prisons in the eastern DRC. 72The arrest and detention of child soldiers oncharges of desertion and other military offences(such as abandonment of duty and disobeyingorders) appeared to have decreased overthe previous two years, but cases of childrendetained for desertion continued to be identified.Captured child soldiers were also held by theFARDC so that information on the activities ofarmed groups could be extracted from them. 73DevelopmentsImpunityOn 29 January 2007 the ICC confirmed threecharges against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, headof the UPC, for conscripting and enlistingchildren under the age of 15 and for using themto participate actively in hostilities in Ituri fromSeptember 2002 to 13 August 2003. 74 His trial,the first in the ICC’s history, was scheduled tobegin in early 2008. Germain Katanga, of theIturi-based FRPI, was indicted by the ICC in Juneon three counts of crimes against humanity,including murder, inhumane acts and sexual1 1 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

enslavement, and six counts of war crimes,including child-soldier recruitment and use.Katanga was transferred to The Hague in October2007.A Mai-Mai militia leader based in Katangaprovince, Kyungu Mutanga, also known as“Gédéon”, surrendered to MONUC in 2006and was subsequently held by the FARDCalong with his wife and four child soldierspreviously with his group. 75 He was chargedwith “insurrection, crimes against humanity,war crimes and terrorism”, and his trial, whichbegan in August 2007, was ongoing in October. 76National authorities prosecuted Jean-PierreBiyoyo, a FARDC member and former leaderof the Mudundu 40 militia. He was tried by amilitary court and sentenced in March 2006 tolife imprisonment for insurrection and to fiveyears’ imprisonment for the arbitrary arrestand illegal detention of children (de facto childrecruitment) carried out in South Kivu in April2004. 77 Biyoyo escaped from prison in June 2006and the following February returned to Bukavu aspart of a military delegation to address militaryunits resisting the army unification process inMinembwe (South Kivu). 78Laurent Nkunda remained at large despitebeing widely accused of serious human abuses,including responsibility for a massacre inKisangani in May 2002, summary executions,torture, rape and looting following hostilities inBukavu in 2004, as well as forced recruitmentand use of children in hostilities. In September2005 the government issued an internationalarrest warrant for Nkunda on charges ofinsurrection, war crimes and crimes againsthumanity. 79Impunity for rape and other acts of sexualviolence contributed to the widespreadand continued commission of these crimes,with children (girls and boys) comprising ahigh proportion of the victims. A handful ofprosecutions was successfully carried out. Inone important case, in April 2006, seven FARDCmembers were convicted of crimes againsthumanity for mass rapes carried out in Equateurprovince in 2003. The court applied the RomeStatute of the ICC, which qualified rape as a crimeagainst humanity. A further dozen or so FARDCsoldiers were convicted by military courts andsentenced to prison terms of between eight andten years in 2006 and 2007. 80Other developmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,the DRC and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.Mrs Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General forchildren and armed conflict, visited the DRC inMarch 2007. She urged the authorities to taketimely and decisive action against the violators ofchildren’s rights, including the arrest of LaurentNkunda, and called for measures to demobilizechildren still in the FARDC and armed groups.Mrs Coomaraswamy expressed concern at theextent of sexual violence in the eastern DRCand the prevailing climate of impunity for suchcrimes. She noted that long-term developmentstrategies were required along with adequatedonor support for the work of child-protectionagencies. 81The FARDC and numerous armed groups(including many of those named above) wererepeatedly listed as parties responsible forrecruiting and using children between 2002 and2007 in the annex to the Secretary-General’sannual reports on children and armed conflict.Most were additionally named as responsible forkillings, abductions and rape. 821 International Rescue Committee, Mortality in theDRC, an Ongoing Crisis, January 2008, http://theirc.org.2 Amnesty International Report 2005.3 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition inthe DRC, 16 December 2002, www.reliefweb.org.4 Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,UN Doc. S/2007/671, 14 November 2007.5 Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,UN Doc.S/2007/156, 20 March 2007.6 Amnesty International (AI), DRC, Children at War:Creating Hope for their Future, October 2006.7 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.9 Amnesty International Report 2005.10 Ibid.11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.12 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.13 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in the DRC, UN Doc. S/2006/389,13 June 2006, and Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.14 Loi No. 04/023 du 12 novembre 2004 portantorganisation générale de la défence et lesforces armées, Journal officiel de la Républiquedémocratique du Congo, 13 November 2004.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1 1

15 Circular No. AG/0631/D8a/2005, 19 May 2005,cited in MONUC Child Protection Section,Arrestations et détentions dans les prisons etcachots de la RDC et la détention des enfantset la justice pour mineurs, March 2006, www.monuc.org.16 RDC, Ministère de la Condition Féminine, Projetde Code de Protection de l’Enfant, versiondefinitive à traiter au Conseil des Ministres,October 2007.17 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13.18 Ibid.19 Confidential sources, South Kivu, July 2007.20 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13.21 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.22 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “DRC: Arrest LaurentNkunda for war crimes”, 1 February 2006; Reportof the Secretary-General on children and armedconflict, UN Doc. A/61/529 S/2006/826, 26October 2006.23 Mai Mai groups were locally based armedmilitias. Mainly active in the eastern provincesof Maniema, Katanga and the Kivus, they werebacked by government forces during the armedconflict but entered opportunistic alliances withopposing forces. Some entered the unificationprocess but others remained outside andengaged in armed activity against FARDC units.24 HRW, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, October2007; International Crisis Group (ICG), Congo:Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007.25 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.26 HRW, “Army should stop use of child soldiers”,19 April 2007; RDC-Humanitaire, “Implicationsof the mixage for the demobilisation of childrenassociated with armed groups”, February 2007,www.rdc-humanitaire.net; Coalition sources,eastern DRC, June 2007.27 Coalition sources, June 200728 MONUC, “MONUC denounces the presence ofchildren in FARDC’s ranks”, press statement, 31October 2007.29 Coalition sources, eastern DRC, April 200730 HRW, above note 26.31 HRW, above note 24.32 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S.2007/757,21 December 2007.33 Coalition source, July 2007.34 MONUC Human Rights Division, The HumanRights Situation in the DRC, 10 May 2006;Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2005/167, 15 March 2005.35 Third Special Report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2004/645, 12 August 2004.36 Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General,above note 34.37 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,26 October 2006.38 Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2005/506, 2 August 2005;DRC, Children at War, above note 6.39 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 37;MONUC Press release, 18 August 2006.40 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7.41 Interviews with child protection agencies, Bunia,March 2007; report on the national workshop onDDR, Goma, 12–14 April 2007.42 “RDC, Peter Karim, dernier chef milicien d’Ituri arendu les armes”, Agence France-Presse, 7 April2007; interviews with child protection agencies,Bunia, March 2007.43 ICG, The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Onceand for All, May 2005; ICG, Congo: Bringingpeace to North Kivu, October 2007.44 HRW, above note 24.45 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.46 UNICEF, Report of the National Workshop onChildren’s DDR, Goma, 12–14 April 2007.47 DRC, Children at War, above note 6; Report of theSecretary-General, above note 13.48 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, UN Doc. S/2007/381, 28 June 2007.49 Coalition information from local sources, easternDRC, June 2007.50 A separate process was established for thedemobilization and repatriation of all foreigngroups, which was managed by MONUC.51 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.52 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13.53 Report of the secretary-General, above note 32.54 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.55 Coalition sources, July 2007.56 Coalition sources, July 2007.57 Coalition sources, eastern DRC, April 2007.58 UNICEF, above note 46.59 Under the adult DDR program fighters receiveda monetary sum on demobilization followed by amonthly allowance for one year.60 Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004; report of theSecretary-General, above note 13.61 Beth Verhey, Reaching the Girls: Study on GirlsAssociated with Armed Forces and Groups in theDRC, Save the Children and NGO Group: CARE,IFESH, IRC, April, 2005.62 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.63 Coalition sources, DRC, April 2007.64 DRC, Children at War, above note 6.65 Coalition interviews, March, April and July 2007.1 1 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

66 Save the Children UK, The Forgotten Casualtiesof War, April 2005, www.savethechildren.org.uk;Verhey, above note 61.67 Verhey, above note 61.68 Military Justice Code, Law No. 023/2002 of 18November 2002, Article 114.69 MONUC Child Protection Section, Circular No.AG/0631/D8a/2005,19 May 2005, cited inArrestations et détentions, above note 15.70 MONUC Child Protection Section, Arrestations etdétentions, above note 15.71 Coalition source, July 2007.72 Ibid.73 MONUC Human Rights Section, “Monthly reporton human rights, March 2007”, 16 April 2007.74 International Criminal Court, “Pre-trial ChamberI commits Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for trial”, pressrelease, 29 January 2007, http://www.icc-cpi.int.75 MONUC, “The human rights situation in the DRC,July to December 2006”, 8 February 2007, www.monuc.org.76 MONUC, monthly human rights assessment,September 2007.77 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 13;MONUC, “RD Congo: l’ONU est ‘consternée’ parl’impunité à l’est du pays pour les coupablesdu recrutement des enfants”, MONUC News, 12March 2007.78 Le Potentiel, Kinshasa, 1 March 2007; “RDC:un officier condamné au sein d’une missionofficielle, l’ONU préoccupée”, Agence France-Presse, 1 March 2007.79 HRW, above note 22; AI, DRC, Civilians Pay thePrice for Political and Military Rivalry, September2005.80 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 7and 13.81 UN, Report of the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General for Children and ArmedConflict, UN Doc. A/62/228, 13 August 2007.82 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 32and 37.CONGO, Republic ofRepublic of CongoPopulation: 4.0 million (2.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 10,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. An unknown number of childsoldiers and former child soldiers werethought to remain with an armed group.ContextImplementation of the March 2003 peaceagreement between the government and theNational Resistance Council (Conseil nationalde résistance, CNR) (known as the Ninjas) wasrepeatedly delayed. The situation in the Poolregion in south-eastern Congo, the strongholdof the Ninjas, remained particularly difficult.By March 2007 security appeared to haveimproved, but the fragility of the improvementwas underlined by the failure fully to implementdisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs or to control the spread ofsmall arms. 1 In January 2007 CNR leader FrédéricBitsangou, alias Pasteur Ntoumi, announcedthat the CNR had applied to be registeredas a political party and committed itself todisarmament. 2 In May Frédéric Bitsangou wasappointed by presidential decree as generaldelegate in charge of promotion of peace andpost-conflict reconstruction, but failed to take uphis post as expected in September after a disputewith the government. 3Former CNR child soldiers, not always underthe control of their former leaders, were reportedto be a major factor in the insecurity in thePool region through their involvement in armedrobbery. UNICEF expressed concern that the presenceof armed elements increased the threat ofsexual violence. 4A — EGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere had been no conscription since 1969.Enlistment in the armed forces was voluntarywith a minimum recruitment age of 18. 5C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1 3

Armed groupsNo recent information was available on therecruitment of child soldiers by the CNR. Thevast majority of former child soldiers who hadfought with the CNR during the conflict wereby 2007 believed to be over 18. However, childsoldiers were reported as guarding the railway inthe Pool region, suggesting that recruitment insome form may have been continuing. 6 Estimatesdating from 2003 were that some 1,500–1,800former child soldiers required demobilization,but the reliability of these figures had not beenestablished. 7Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The governmental commission for thereintegration of former combatants, HautCommissariat à la Réinsertion des Excombattants,estimated that over 4,600 childsoldiers took part in Congo’s conflicts between1993 and 2002. 8Between February 2002 and December2004, 965 former child soldiers, most of whomwere by then over 18, were among 9,000former combatants taking part in an EmergencyDemobilization and Reintegration Program (Projetd’Urgence de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion,PDR). 9After significant delays due in part tothe difficulty in establishing the number ofbeneficiaries and a financial managementsystem, a National Disarmament, Demobilizationand Reinsertion Program (Programme nationalde désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion,PNDDR), partially funded by the Multi-countryDemobilization and Reintegration Program(MDRP), 10 received its first disbursement inOctober 2006. It was expected that by July 2007reintegration support would have been deliveredto some 1,000 former combatants who had selfdemobilized.11 Up to 30,000 former combatants,including 19,000 from the 1998–9 conflict, wereexpected to benefit from the PNDDR. 12Of former child soldiers to have beenprovisionally identified, 517 were girls and 1,261boys. 13Building on the lessons of other MDRP-supportedDDR programs in the region, the PNDDRexplicitly recognized the necessity of addressingthe particular needs of former child soldiers,recruited as children but demobilized as youngadults. It proposed that particular attention bepaid to psychosocial counselling and support,life skills, independent living skills, employmentorientation and guidance for former child soldiersup to the age of 21 in the case of males and 25 inthe case of females. 14 The PNDDR also recognizedthe special attention required to address theneeds of former girl child soldiers, including encouragingparticipation in the program, adaptingpsychosocial support to female trauma profilesand conflict experiences, providing appropriateapprenticeships and training, and sensitizingspouses and families. 15A project on Prevention and Reintegration ofChildren involved in Armed Conflict was implementedbetween 2004 and 2007 by the InternationalProgram on the Elimination of Child Labour(IPEC) of the International Labour Organization(ILO). It focused on socio-economic reintegrationsupport and preventing recruitment of childrenby armed groups. Approximately 200 former childsoldiers, more than 70 of them girls, receivedprofessional training or work placements, whileover 650 vulnerable children, including more than200 girls, participated in the anti-recruitmentprogram. 16In 2006 an estimated 34,000 weapons wereillegally held in Congo by members of formerarmed groups as well as by the civilian population.In September 2005, 507 firearms and over3,600 pieces of ammunition were destroyed,and weapons collected between December 2005and March 2006 from 800 civilians and formersoldiers were destroyed in March 2006 throughan internationally funded weapons collectionprogram. 17The CNR received an unknown sum of moneyfrom the Congolese government to disarm itscombatants in the Pool region. Progress was notclear, and in May 2007 a first symbolic burning ofcollected weapons was postponed. 18DevelopmentsIn 2006 the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child expressed concern that despiteinternational support for a DDR process, thephysical and psychological recovery needs ofmany former child soldiers had not been met. Itrecommended that particular attention be paid tothe specific needs of girls and to the reintegrationof former child soldiers into the educationsystem. 19At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, the Republic of Congo and 58 other statesendorsed the Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards and operationalprinciples for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.International standardsThe Republic of Congo ratified the Rome Statuteof the International Criminal Court (ICC) in May1 1 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2004 and the African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child in September 2006.COSTA RIC A1 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Report 2007:Republic of Congo, www.unicef.org/har07.2 “Congo: Govt, agencies welcome decisionto make rebel group political party”, IRIN, 1February 2007, www.irinnews.org.3 “Congo: Ntoumi ‘problem’ is solved, sayspresident”, IRIN, 5 October 2007.4 UNICEF, above note 1.5 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, Children:The Invisible Soldiers, Rädda Barnen (Save theChildren–Sweden), Stockholm, 1998; Guy S.Goodwin-Gill and Ilene Cohn, Child Soldiers,Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.6 Information from Haut Commissariat à laRéinsertion des Ex-combattants, May 2007.7 Information from Lead Specialist, World Bank,April 2007.8 Haut Commissariat, above note 6.9 Ibid.10 The Multi-country Demobilization andReintegration Program (MDRP) supportsdemobilization and reintegration of excombatantsin the greater Great Lakes region ofcentral Africa (Angola, Burundi Central AfricanRepublic, the Democratic Republic of Congo,Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda).It is financed by the World Bank, 12 donorgovernments and the European Commission,and involves governments in the region, the UNand its agencies, and regional organizations. Seewww.mdrp.org.11 World Bank, above note 7.12 MDRP, Republic of Congo Activities at a Glance,www.mdrp.org, updated March 2007.13 Haut commissariat, above note 6.14 World Bank Document, Technical Annex for aProgram of US$17 million from the MDRP multidonortrust fund to the Republic of Congo for anemergency reintegration program, Report No.33787, 14 December 2005, www.mdrp.org.15 World Bank, above note 7.16 Le projet BIT/IPEC fait le bilan de ses activités,www.congo-site.com).17 “Congo: small arms continue to threaten politicaltransition and stability”, IRIN, 9 May 2006.18 Haut commissariat, above note 6.19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by theRepublic of Congo, Concluding observations, UNDoc. CRC/C/COG/CO/1, 20 October 2006.Republic of Costa RicaPopulation: 4.3 million (1.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 24 January 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for recruitment to thepolice, the country’s only security force,was 18.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the 1949 constitution, which abolished thearmed forces, the police force was the country’sonly security force, and military forces could beorganized only under a continental agreementor for national defence and had always to besubordinate to civilian control. 1Police recruits had to be 18 and to havecompleted their third year of general basiceducation (secondary education). 2 Police trainingwas vocational, accredited by the Ministry ofEducation and civilian in nature, and directedtowards upholding civil law, democracy andhuman rights. 3The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childrecommended in May 2007 that the prohibitionon recruiting children under 15 and their directparticipation in hostilities be expressly set outin law. 4Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There were about 13,000 refugees in Costa Rica,10,000 of whom were Colombian. 5 In May 2007the Committee on the Rights of the Child notedthe lack of information in Costa Rica’s 2005report to the Committee about child refugeesand migrants from countries affected by armedconflict, and about “measures adopted withregard to their identification, physical andpsychological recovery and social reintegration”.The Committee recommended early identificationof those who might have been recruited or usedin hostilities, and assistance for their recoveryand reintegration. 6A — E1 Constitución Política de la República de CostaRica, Article 12.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1 5

2 2001 Ley General de Policía.3 Initial report of Costa Rica to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CRI/1, 22 December 2005.4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted by CostaRica on implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CRI/CO/1, 1 May 2007.5 “Costa Rica, el segundo país con más refugiadosen Latinoamérica”, EFE, 15 June 2006, at www.acnur.org.6 Concluding observations, above note 4.Côte d’IvoireRepublic of Côte d’IvoirePopulation: 18.2 million (8.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 17,050Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCChildren, including former child soldiersfrom the Liberian conflict, were recruitedfor use in pro-government militias and thearmed opposition group Forces arméesdes Forces nouvelles (FAFN) at least untillate 2005. Active recruitment of childrenappeared to have stopped from October2006, but by late 2007 children reportedlycontinued to be associated with bothmilitias and the FAFN, despite concertedefforts at demobilization.ContextThe conflict in Côte d’Ivoire began with anattempted coup against President LaurentGbagbo in September 2002, and led to thecountry being divided into two territories. Thesouth was controlled by the government andthe north by the opposition New Forces (Forcesnouvelles), which had been formed out of theCôte d’Ivoire Patriotic Movement (Mouvementpatriotique de Côte d’Ivoire, MPCI), and two otherarmed opposition groups, the Ivorian PopularMovement of the Great West (Mouvementpopulaire ivoirien du grand ouest, MPIGO), andthe Justice and Peace Movement (Mouvementpour la justice et la paix, MJP). The January2003 Linas-Marcoussis agreement, signed by allparties to the conflict and aimed at bringing themall within a transitional government of nationalreconciliation, was only partially and reluctantlyimplemented. 1Interests within neighbouring countriesfuelled the conflict. The Liberian government ofPresident Charles Taylor reportedly supportedarmed opposition groups in western Côted’Ivoire, which included fighters from armedgroups in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Liberianfighters and Liberian nationals recruited fromrefugee camps in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana foughtin both pro-government militias and armedopposition groups. 2In April 2004 a UN peacekeeping force (UnitedNations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI) wasdeployed. Also present in the country were1 1 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

French troops, initially sent in September 2002to protect foreign nationals, whose presence hadsubsequently been endorsed and clarified by UNSecurity Council resolutions. 3 The internationaltroops patrolled a buffer zone, known as the“zone of confidence”, between the north andsouth of the country.A number of agreements, including the AccraAgreement III of July 2004 4 and the PretoriaAgreement of April 2005, 5 were reached withinternational mediation, but political stalemates,disagreements about implementation andoutbreaks of violence hindered the peaceprocess. 6 Presidential elections originallyscheduled for October 2005 were postponedseveral times. In November 2006 UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1721 extended the transitionalgovernment’s mandate and tasked it withcompleting the peace process by October 2007.In March 2007 President Gbagbo and theleader of the Forces nouvelles, GuillaumeSoro, signed the Ouagadougou peace accord,under which Guillaume Soro was named primeminister. 7 The agreement included provisionsfor creating a new transitional government,merging the Forces nouvelles and the nationaldefence and security forces within an integratedcommand centre, disarming combatants,granting amnesty for all crimes relating tonational security committed since September2000, and organizing a presidential election. 8As a supplement to the agreement, in April thepresident signed a decree, applicable to bothsides, granting amnesty for crimes committedduring the armed conflict. However, contraryto the Ouagadougou agreement and the 2003amnesty law, which excluded from amnesty“crimes constituting serious violations of humanrights and international humanitarian law andcrimes listed in Articles 5–8 of the Treaty of Romeon the International Criminal Court”, the amnestydecree did not expressly exclude crimes underinternational law, such as the recruitment anduse of children as soldiers. 9In April 2007 there were reports thatdemilitarization in the zone of confidence hadled to an increase in violence, including rape,against people living in the region. 10 The fragilityof the peace process was highlighted in June bya rocket attack on Prime Minister Soro’s aircraft.He escaped uninjured but four of his companionswere killed. 11Many aspects of the conflicts in Liberia andin Sierra Leone since the 1990s and in Côted’Ivoire since 2002 were intricately linked, withoperations across borders, including in Guinea,which bordered all three countries, and acomplex web of governments and armed groupsproviding support to factions in neighbouringcountries. 12 A migrant population of thousandsof young fighters, including child soldiers,crossing the borders between Liberia, Guinea,Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, saw conflictmainly as an economic opportunity. Manyhad first been forcibly recruited as children inone conflict, and then had willingly crossedborders to take up arms in another conflict,often with a different armed group. A 2005study by Human Rights Watch found that mosthad been motivated by promises of financialgain, and many could not articulate the politicalobjective of the group they fought with. Therisk of re-recruitment was exacerbated by highrates of youth unemployment and corruptionand deficiencies in the implementation ofdisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs. 13 An August 2006 report by theUN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted thathigh levels of unemployment, particularly youthunemployment, across west Africa posed a riskto stability in the region. This was reiterated in a2007 report by the UN Secretary-General whichhighlighted also the importance of reform of thesecurity sector in countries in the region as ameans of addressing it. 14GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Armed Forces Code of 7 September 1995established a minimum age of 18 for compulsoryand voluntary military service for men andwomen.In October 2006 the UN reported that therewas at that time no tangible evidence of childrenparticipating in the regular armed forces (Forcesnationales de Côte d’Ivoire, FANCI), but thatchildren were evidently associated with armedmilitia groups close to the ruling party, thePopular Ivorian Front (Front populaire ivoirien,FPI). 15Armed groupsChildren were associated with armed groupson both sides of the conflict, in pro-governmentmilitias and the Forces armées des Forcesnouvelles (FAFN). 16 By August 2007 the UNreported that there had been no substantiatedevidence of the active recruitment and use ofchildren by armed groups since October 2006. 17Anecdotal reports from the west of the countryindicated that children continued to be used asservants and that girls were sexually abusedby the FAFN. The environment continued to beunstable, and delays in the disarmament ofmilitias and the FAFN and in the establishmentof a joint military structure made childrenvulnerable to re-recruitment and use by thesegroups.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1 7

© Coalition 2006Children in a local community group beside a military camp in Bouaké, northern Côted’Ivoire1 1 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Pro-government militiasAccording to reports, scores or even hundredsof Liberian children who had been reunited withtheir families following their demobilizationin Liberia were re-recruited in Liberia betweenlate 2004 and early 2005 to fight alongsidepro-government militias in the west of Côted’Ivoire. Most of these children had originallybeen forcibly recruited by various armed groupsduring the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 18In late 2004 around 20 child members of the Limaforce supplétive, a militia operating alongside theIvorian armed forces, were reportedly recruitedfrom a camp for Liberian refugees in westernCôte d’Ivoire. 19 In September and October 2005,in Liberian counties bordering governmentcontrolledareas of Côte d’Ivoire, Liberianchildren, alongside hundreds of other formerfighters in the Liberian conflict, were recruitedinto pro-government militias in western Côted’Ivoire in anticipation of renewed fighting withopposition forces. 20At least four pro-government militiasoperational in areas under the control of thegovernment in the west of the country – theLiberation Front for the Great West (Front pourla libération du grand ouest, FLGO), the PatrioticAlliance of the Wè People (Alliance patriotiquedu peuple Wè, APWE), the Patriotic ResistanceUnion of the Great West (Union patriotique derésistance du Grand Ouest, UPRGO) and theIvorian Liberation Movement for the West of Côted’Ivoire (Mouvement ivoirien de libération del’ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire, MILOCI) – reportedlycontinued to maintain child soldiers in their ranksin late 2006. 21 These four groups were amongthe parties listed by the Secretary-General inFebruary 2005 and October 2006 as recruiting orusing children in situations of armed conflict. 22The Young Patriots (Jeunes Patriotes), apro-government party, used children in violentdemonstrations. In one such demonstrationin Guiglo in January 2006, during which UNpeacekeepers were also attacked, five Ivorians,including two children aged 14 and 16, werekilled. 23Forces armées des Forces nouvelles(FAFN)In November 2004 demobilized Liberian childrenin Bong and Nimba counties in eastern Liberiawere believed to have been recruited to fightwith the FAFN in Côte d’Ivoire. Former Liberiancommanders were identified as being involvedin the recruitment. 24 Six hundred children inDanané, near to the Liberian border, who in 2006were reported as having self-demobilized, hadreceived military training from pro-FAFN Liberianfighters. 25In February 2006, pursuant to SecurityCouncil Resolution 1572 (2004), the UNSecurity Council imposed a travel ban and anassets freeze on several individuals for seriousviolations of human rights and internationalhumanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire. Among themwas a FAFN commander, Martin Kouakou Fofié.According to the Security Council, forces underhis command had, among other abuses, engagedin recruitment of child soldiers. 26The FAFN was one of the parties listed inreports of the Secretary-General in February2005 and October 2006 as recruiting or usingchildren in situations of armed conflict. The FAFNwas also named as being responsible for rapeand other grave sexual violence. 27 The Secretary-General’s report of October 2006 indicated thatwhile children continued to be associated withthe FAFN, they had committed to an action planin November 2005 to demobilize children. 28 TheFAFN leadership had objected to their continuedinclusion on the list stating that it was not theirpolicy to recruit children, although children mightbe found around their camps in search of basicassistance such as food. 29Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The disarmament, demobilization andreintegration (DDR) process, which under theAccra III Agreement was due to start in October2004, was delayed in its implementation, attimes because the FAFN were not willing todisarm in the absence of the implementation ofother agreed reforms, 30 and later on becausepro-government militias were unwilling to hand intheir arms. 31In 2004 the National Commission forDisarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration(Commission nationale de désarmement,démobilisation et réintegration, PNDDR)estimated that 30,000 ex-combatants wouldparticipate in the program, including 26,000 FAFN(of whom 3,000 were children), and 4,000 FANCIpersonnel recruited since September 2002. 32 Alater estimate was that just over 48,000 wouldbenefit from the DDR program, including 5,500FANCI and over 42,500 FAFN. 33By June 2007 UNICEF indicated that it hadhelped 1,900 of an estimated 4,000 child soldiersto be reinserted into their communities, butconcerns remained that instability in the countrycould lead to the re-recruitment of these children.Pro-government militia groupsIn 2005 the PNDDR estimated that there were10,000 militia members, considered by theUN to be an underestimate. 34 By September2005, 4,800 militia members had beenformally registered but no weapons had beencollected. 35 In early August 2006, when almost1,000 had disarmed, the PNDDR suspended thedisarmament of the militias because of the lowA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 1 9

atio of weapons to combatants and the highnumber of unserviceable weapons surrendered. 36In late 2005 four pro-government militiagroups had submitted a list of 150 children forDDR, but the UN noted that an effective end tothe use of child soldiers by such groups woulddepend on being able to identify the groups,which required the full involvement and supportof the government. 37 In September 2006 the fourmain militia groups in the west, FLGO, MILOCI,APWE and UPRGO, submitted action plans tothe UN to end the association of children withtheir forces. 38 In April 2007, at militia-group focalpoints for child demobilization, the PNDDR andUNICEF began to identify children within thesegroups in areas near to the border with Liberia.A total of 204 children, including 84 girls, wereregistered for demobilization and were by Augustbeing assisted through UNICEF programs. TheUN noted that there were particular challengesto identifying and reintegrating children inthis process, arising from the fact that thecombatants and associated children were notalways based in camps but often dispersedwithin their communities. 39 The UN estimated inMay 2007 that 1,100 militia members remained tobe disarmed. 40Forces armées des Forces nouvelles(FAFN)The UN estimated a caseload of around 4,000children for demobilization from the FAFN,although no exact figures were available. 41 Thefirst demobilizations of children by the FAFNtook place in Bouaké between October 2003 andFebruary 2004. Further demobilizations occurredin April and July–August 2004. In February 2005demobilizations took place in Man, where bylate June 87 children had been identified, theyoungest being nine years old. Nine girl soldiersidentified could not be demobilized at that timeas there were no reception facilities for them. 42In November 2005 the FAFN submitted tothe Secretary-General’s Special Representativein Côte d’Ivoire an action plan for preventingrecruitment and releasing children associatedwith their forces, and made serious efforts withregard to implementation. 43 In October 2006the Secretary-General stated that since July2005, 327 children associated with fightingforces in areas under the control of the Forcesnouvelles had been demobilized, in addition to600 children trained by Liberian commanderswho had self-demobilized in Danané. By October2006 the Forces nouvelles claimed that no morechildren were associated with their forces inBouaké and Katiola and sought assistance fromUNOCI in identifying and demobilizing childrenin other areas under their control. 44 In August2007 the FAFN (which under the terms of theMarch 2007 Ouagadougou agreement wasto be merged with the national defence andsecurity forces, as the Forces de défense et desécurité–Forces nouvelles) submitted a reporton the implementation of the action plan whichindicated that 85 children, including 27 girls, hadbeen identified for release to UNICEF. 45DevelopmentsCôte d’Ivoire was among the conflicts designatedby the UN Security Council for the setting upof a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism(MRM) on six grave violations of children’s rights(including child recruitment and use) establishedby its Resolution 1612 (2005) on children andarmed conflict. The action plans by FAFN andpro-government militias for ending the use ofchild soldiers were the first such action plans tobe negotiated by the UN under the frameworkestablished by Resolution 1612 (2005). 46The UN Special Representative for Childrenand Armed Conflict visited Côte d’Ivoire inSeptember 2007. Although the Ouagadougouagreement made no explicit reference tochildren, the Special Representative obtainedfirm commitments from the government and nongovernmentactors with regard to the protectionof children associated with armed groups andarmed forces. In particular, the governmentpromised to create an inter-ministerial structureto co-ordinate work on these issues. The SpecialRepresentative also stressed the importanceof ending the use and involvement of youths inpolitical violence. 47There were allegations of other seriousviolations of children’s rights, including thetrafficking of children and the use of child labourparticularly in cocoa plantations. 48 In June 2007UNICEF reported that it was working with theco-operation of the government and the Forcesnouvelles, particularly along the borders, tocurtail trafficking, and had intercepted 100children. 49 Sexual violence against women andgirls by members of, or persons affiliated to,government forces, armed groups and progovernmentmilitias took place in a climateof widespread impunity. 50 There were alsoallegations of UN peacekeepers involved insexual exploitation and abuse of women andgirls. 51At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Côte d’Ivoire and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 2 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

International standardsIn June 2007 Côte d’Ivoire ratified the AfricanCharter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.1 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Côte d’Ivoire”,www.crisisgroup.org.2 For a more detailed account see Child Soldiers:Global Report 2004.3 Amnesty International (AI), “Côte d’Ivoire: clashesbetween peacekeeping forces and civilians:lessons for the future” (AFR 31/005/2006), 19September 2006.4 Second Report of the UN Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2004/697, 27 August 2004.5 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2005/398, 17 June 2005.6 See, for example, Reports of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Cote D’Ivoire,2004.7 ICG, above note 1.8 Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNDoc. S/2007/275, 14 May 2007.9 AI, “Côte d’Ivoire: Crimes under international lawcannot be amnestied” (AFR 31/006/2007), 4 May2007.10 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Ivory Coast:Increasing violent attacks against civilians in theformer Zone of Confidence”, 25 April 2007.11 “Des roquettes contre la paix ivoirienne”, LeFigaro, 30 June 2007.12 See entries on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone inthis volume.13 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Povertyand Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’sRegional Warriors, March 2005; Report of theSecretary-General on ways to combat subregionaland cross-border problems in West Africa, UNDoc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004; Report of theSecretary-General on inter-mission co-operationand possible cross-border operations betweenthe UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission inLiberia, and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNDoc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005.14 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), YouthUnemployment and Regional Insecurity inWest Africa, 2nd edn, August 2006, www.un.org/unowa; Report of the Secretary-Generalon cross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc.S/2007/143, 13 March 2007.15 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2006/835, 25 October 2006.16 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826,26 October 2006.17 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2007/515, 30 August 2007. See also SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Conflict, “Côte d’Ivoire:The Government is committed to give childrenan eminent place in the peace process”, pressrelease, 7 September 2007.18 HRW, above note 13.19 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72,9 February 2005; Coalition correspondence withOffice of UN Special Representative on Childrenand Armed Conflict, March 2005.20 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Government Recruits ChildSoldiers in Liberia”, 28 October 2005.21 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 15.22 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 19and 16.23 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16.24 HRW, above note 13.25 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 15.26 UN Security Council, “Security Council Committeeconcerning Côte d’Ivoire issues list of individualssubject to measures imposed by resolution 1572(2004)”, SC/8631, UN Department of PublicInformation, 7 February 2006.27 Reports of the Secretary-General, above notes 19and 16.28 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16.29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 17.30 See, for example, Third progress report of theSecretary-General on the UN Operation in Côted’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2004/962, 9 December 2004,and Fifth progress report, above note 5.31 See, for example, Tenth progress report of theSecretary-General on the UN Operation in Côted’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2006/821, 17 October 2006.32 Third progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 30.33 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 5.34 Fourth progress report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2005/186, 18 March 2005.35 Sixth progress report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2005/604, 26 September 2005.36 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2006/939, 4 December 2006.37 Seventh progress report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2006/2, 3 January 2006.38 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 17.39 Ibid.40 Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 8.41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 15.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 2 1

42 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers andDisarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation andReintegration in West Africa, November 2006.43 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 16.44 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 31.45 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 17.46 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 15.47 Office of the UN Special Representative onChildren and Armed Conflict, above note 17.48 “Child cocoa workers still ‘exploited’”, BBC News,2 April 2007.49 UNICEF, “Child trafficking in Côte d’Ivoire: effortsunder way to reverse a tragic trend”, pressrelease, 14 June 2007.50 AI, Côte d’Ivoire: Targeting women – the forgottenvictims of the conflict (AFR 31/001/2007), 15March 2007.51 UN News Centre, “Côte d’Ivoire: UN, Moroccanofficials meet to address allegations of sexualabuse”, 23 July 2007; “Des Casques bleussuspectés d’abus sexuels en Côte d’Ivoire”, LeFigaro, 21 July 2007.CROATIARepublic of CroatiaPopulation: 4.6 million (873,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 20,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: noneVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 1 November 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.ContextImpunity for war crimes committed during the1991–5 war remained widespread. The Croatianjudicial system failed to address adequatelywartime human rights violations, regardless ofthe ethnicity of the victims or of the perpetrators. 1The government, supported by UNICEF,the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) anddomestic institutions, provided a nationalprogram for child victims of the war to combatlong-term consequences such as post-traumaticstress disorder, and somatic and psychologicalsymptoms. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription was provided for in Article 47.1 ofthe 1990 constitution, and was further regulatedby the 2002 Defence Law. The length of militaryservice was six months, and all men between theages of 18 and 27 were eligible for conscription.Reservist obligations applied up to the age of 55during wartime. 3In its Initial Report to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,the government stated that “[a]lthough there isno need to bring a treaty into the legal systemby enacting a specific law, the Defence Law(Official Gazette Nos. 33/2002 and 58/2002)has specific provisions related to compulsoryrecruitment of male conscripts, but only thosewho have reached the age of 18, as the DefenceLaw has no provision for the compulsoryrecruitment of children … Under the provisionsof articles 34, 42 and 43 [of the Defence Law],the requirement to enlist takes effect at thebeginning of the year in which the person subjectto military service reaches the age of 19, andunder all circumstances, lapses at the end of theyear in which he turns 30 … Croatian legislation1 2 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

does not recognize the institution of ‘voluntaryrecruitment’ (‘enlisting’).” 4In February 2007 it was reported that Croatiawas initiating a large-scale plan for all-volunteerarmed forces. One of the first steps toward thiswould be the suspension of compulsory militaryservice, only voluntary recruits being enrolled inthe armed forces. However, obligatory militaryservice could be periodically reactivated if therewere not enough recruits to meet defence needs.An all-volunteer Croatian army would most likelynot be achieved before 2010. 5Military training and military schoolsIn its Initial Report on the Optional Protocol,Croatia stated that it had “no high schoolsoperated by or under the control of the armedforces within the meaning of article 3, paragraph5, of the Protocol. Nevertheless, pursuant toarticle 4 of the Law on the Service in the ArmedForces of the Republic of Croatia (OfficialGazette Nos. 33/2002, 58/2002 and 175/2003)a conscript is also a cadet who is defined asa ‘person educated at a military school undera contract of education’, but the point here isthat a person of age is educated at university(faculties) for the requirements of the CroatianArmed Forces.” 6 In January 2005 the Ministryof Defence introduced student scholarships atZagreb University and Split University. Successfulcandidates would have the status of “cadet”,take part in army training and be obliged to stayin the armed forces for at least ten years aftergraduating. 72 Initial report of Croatia to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/HRV/1,11 January 2007.3 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Right toConscientious Objection in Europe, 2005, www.wri-irg.org.4 Initial report, above note 2.5 Vjesnik On-line, in Croatian, www.vjesnik.hr.6 Initial report, above note 2.7 Croatian Ministry of Defence, www.morh.hr.8 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Croatia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/HRV/CO/1, 5 October 2007.A — EDevelopmentsIn its Concluding Observations on Croatia’s InitialReport on the Optional Protocol, the Committeeon the Rights of the Child recommended thatviolation of the provisions of the OptionalProtocol regarding the recruitment andinvolvement of children in hostilities be explicitlycriminalized in legislation and that extraterritorialjurisdiction be established for these crimes whenthey are committed by or against a citizen of orsomeone with links to Croatia. 8In October 2007 Croatia endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The two documents, which werepreviously endorsed by 59 states at a February2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for the protection of and assistance tochild soldiers, following a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Amnesty International Report 2007.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 2 3

CUBARepublic of CubaPopulation: 11.3 million (2.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 49,000Compulsory recruitment age: 16Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 16Optional Protocol: ratified 9 February 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138Sixteen-year-olds were liable forcompulsory military service in the armedforces or the police.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeBoys had to register for conscription with themilitary authorities in the year they turned 16. 1All male citizens were liable for two years ofcompulsory military service between 1 Januaryof the year they turned 17 and the last day ofthe year they turned 28. Men up to the age of 45were liable for service in the reserve for up to oneyear. A form of alternative service was availableas long as the armed forces were able to maintainmilitary preparedness. 2 The minimum age forvoluntary recruitment for both boys and girls was17. 3 Compulsory military service could becarried out in the armed forces or the police.“Exemplary” conscripts could be granted earlyrelease from service or assisted in obtaininga university education on discharge. Thegovernment reported that thousands of femalevolunteers had joined the armed forces. 4 Allmembers of the Communist Youth (JuventudComunista) organization, male and female, wererequired to do military service, except in casesof physical impediment or need beyond theircontrol. 5A new recruitment drive in December 2004was reported to have been necessary becauseof a reduction in the number of males availabledue to a lower birth rate and the shorter periodserved by university students. 6Military preparedness was based on adefence system in place since the 1980s calledthe “war of all the people” (guerra de todo elpueblo). In the event of large-scale externalaggression, this would deploy every citizenand all society’s moral and material resourcesorganized into a territorial defensive system toconfront the enemy in their own place and ways. 7The Youth Labour Army (Ejército Juvenil delTrabajo, EJT) was part of the armed forces, andits members were paid a salary. Their activitiesfocused on promotion of social and economicdevelopment and the rational use of naturalresources, as well as environmental protection. 8Territorial troop militias (milicias de tropasterritoriales) were considered part of thearmed forces when on active military service. 9One million men and women in militia unitsthroughout the country had rapid access toinfantry and artillery equipment. 10Military training and military schoolsGirls and boys who had completed nine years ofbasic education and were aged 15 could enterone of 14 Camilo Cienfuegos military schools,which provided pre-university vocationalofficer training and secondary-school diplomasin sciences and humanities. Graduates wereexpected to go on to one of the militaryacademies. 11There were eight military academies trainingmembers of the regular armed forces. 12 TheCollege of National Defence was a postgraduateinstitution managed by the armed forces forthe training of military personnel and civiliansresponsible for national defence. 13Every province had a school for defencepreparedness that trained territorial troop militialeaders and municipal, local and regional defencecouncils. Militias and other bodies regularlyparticipated in “defence days”, when theyreceived military training. 14Basic military instruction for defencepreparedness was compulsory for pre-universitystudents from age 15. 15DevelopmentsInternational standardsCuba ratified the Optional Protocol in February2007. It declared that the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment into its armed forces was17, and that the guarantees and safeguards forthis provision were contained in Act No. 75 (theNational Defence Act) of 21 December 1994 andDecree-Law No. 224 (the Active Military ServiceAct) of 15 October 2001. 161 Confidential source, March 2007.2 Ley de la Defensa Nacional, No. 75.3 Declaration by Cuba on ratification of theOptional Protocol, 9 February 2007, www2.ohchr.org.4 Servicio Militar Activo, www.cubagob.cu.5 “La defensa de la Patria: primer programa dela Revolución”, Juventud Rebelde, 4 December2004, www.juventudrebelde.cu.1 2 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

6 Gerardo Arreola, “Pide Raúl Castro a rama juvenildel Partido Comunista reforzar su apoyo alreclutamiento militar”, Revista Opositor, 9–16December 2004, www.elveraz.com.7 Guerra de todo el pueblo, Sistema DefensivoTerritorial, www.cubagob.cu.8 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Ejército Juvenildel Trabajo, www.cubagob.cu.9 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Milicias detropas territoriales.10 Preparación para la defensa, Preparación de losCiudadanos, www.cubagob.cu.11 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Escuelasmilitares Camilo Cienfuegos.12 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Academiasmilitares.13 Preparación para la defensa, Colegio de DefensaNacional.14 Preparación para la defensa, Escuelas dePreparación para la Defensa, and Preparación delos Ciudadanos.15 Ministerio de Educacion, Estructura de los planesde estudio de la educacion pre-universitaria,www.rimed.cu/preuniversitario/estructura.asp.16 Declaration, above note 3.CYPRUSRepublic of CyprusPopulation: 835,000 (205,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 10,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (not confirmed)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitment agewas believed to be 17, but it was not knownwhether under-18s were serving in thearmed forces.ContextCyprus had been divided since 1974. Thenorthern part, named the Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus, remained occupied byTurkish armed forces and was not recognizedinternationally as a separate state from theRepublic of Cyprus, the southern part. A bufferzone patrolled by the UN Peacekeeping Forcein Cyprus (UNFICYP) separated the two parts.In April 2004 Greek and Turkish Cypriots tookpart in separate simultaneous referendumson whether Cyprus should be reunited when itjoined the European Union (EU) on the basis of apower-sharing agreement brokered by the UN. Amajority of Turkish Cypriots (65 per cent) votedyes, but Greek Cypriots rejected the settlementby a three-to-one majority (76 per cent). As aresult, Cyprus remained divided when it joinedthe EU on 1 May 2004. The whole island wasby law an EU member state, but the body oflaws that states had to adopt to join the EU wassuspended in the north. 1A — EGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution provided for conscription,stating that “No person shall be required toperform forced or compulsory labour”, but thatthis should not include “any service of a militarycharacter if imposed or, in case of conscientiousobjectors, subject to their recognition by a law,service exacted instead of compulsory militaryservice” (Article 10).Conscription was regulated by the NationalGuard Law, No. 20, of 1964. All male citizenson completion of their eighteenth year and upto the age of 50 were liable on 1 January eachyear for national service of 25 months’ duration.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 2 5

Among those exempted from conscription weremembers of the clergy; the only or eldest sonof a family whose father or brother died or wentmissing during national service or during or afterthe 1974 Turkish invasion; and members of theMaronite, Armenian and Latin (Roman Catholic)communities. Military service could be reducedin a number of cases, including to 13 months fororphans and the eldest sons of large familiesand to 21 months for conscripts with only oneliving parent. Women could enlist as volunteerson a contract for an initial duration of three yearsthat could be renewed for subsequent three-yearperiods. 2The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childin 2003 noted that it was possible to volunteerfor military service from the age of 17 in 2003,and expressed concern that under-18s could bedeployed, since no distinction was made betweenthe ages for recruitment and for deployment.The Committee encouraged Cyprus to clarify theminimum age for voluntary recruitment and toensure that no one under 18 was deployed as acombatant to armed conflicts. 3Military training and military schoolsNo information was available on militarytraining and schools. However, male and femalegraduates of military schools in Greece couldbecome officers of the National Guard. 4DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Cyprus and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.Turkish Republic of Northern CyprusPopulation: 201,000 5Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Treaties ratified: not applicableThe minimum voluntary recruitment agewas 17, but it was not known whetherunder-18s were serving in the armedforces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the constitution, all citizens were liable formilitary service: “National service in the armedforces shall be the right and sacred duty of everycitizen” (Article 74). 6The legal basis for conscription was theMilitary Service Law, No. 59, of 2000. All citizenswere liable for compulsory military service fromthe age of 19. The length of service ranged from8 to 15 months. Those considered Turkish Cypriotcitizens because of their parents’ origin but whoresided abroad could qualify for shorter terms.Recruits planning to go into university educationcould defer or bring forward their service. 7 Theminimum age for voluntary recruitment was 17,provided that the recruit had parental consent(Article 18).Military training and military schoolsThere were no military schools. 81 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfile, www.fco.gov.uk.2 Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office,“Cyprus National Guard”, 2005, at CyprusNet,www.cyprusnet.com.3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Cyprus,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.205, 2 July 2003.4 Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office,“Cyprus National Guard”, 2005.5 North Cyprus Online, Demographic Information,http://www.northcyprusonline.com.6 The Constitution of the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus, www.cypnet.com.7 Guvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanligi, “Obligation ofmilitary service”, www.mucahit.net.8 Information from Office of the Representative ofthe Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, London,2004.1 2 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

CZECH REPUBLICCzech RepublicPopulation: 10.2 million (1.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 24,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionphased out by 2005)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 30 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription ended in December 2004, withthe last conscripts due to leave the Czech armythat month. 1 As of 1 January 2005, compulsoryrecruitment would only occur in a state of“national danger” or war. 2 All men between theages of 18 and 28 had previously been liable forcompulsory military service. 3 Men and womenwho were at least 18 could volunteer for militaryservice under the terms of Act 221/1999 onRegular Soldiers. Act 585/2004 allowed thoseover 18 to volunteer for the Active Reserve. 4The government reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child in 2005 thatthe state’s security was ensured by the armedforces and security corps, that no member ofthese forces could be under 18 years old, andthat this age limit could not be lowered in anycrisis situations. 5Military training and military schoolsSome military secondary schools were downsizedand stopped admitting new pupils in theacademic year 2003–4; these were the school inVyskov which trained specialists for the artilleryand engineer corps, the school in Brno whichprovided warrant officer training and the MilitaryConservatory for military musicians. 6 The schoolsin Vyskov and in Brno closed in 2006 and theMilitary Conservatory was due to close by the endof August 2008. The military education systemcurrently comprised the Military High School andHigh Technical School of the Ministry of Defenceat Moravska Trebova, the University of Defence inBrno, and the Educational and Training Centre ofthe Ministry of Defence at Komorni Hradek. 7The minimum age for enrolment in a militarysecondary-school was 15. The governmentreported to the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child in 2005 that under-18s could entermilitary secondary-schools, and that theyprovided four years of general education and“education and training for duties on the warrantofficer level, training for a chosen specialization,as well as full secondary vocational and technicaleducation”. The government also reportedthat “Students entering military schools arenot soldiers and do not become soldiers inthe course of study. This rule would continueto apply in crisis situations: teachers-soldierswould be detailed to other duties and theschools temporarily closed down. Military schoolgraduates do not incur any financial or otherobligations towards the armed forces. There isno pressure on the students to apply for regulararmy jobs.” 8DevelopmentsIn its Concluding Observations on thegovernment’s initial report on the OptionalProtocol, the Committee on the Rights of theChild recommended that the provisions in thedraft Criminal Code be strengthened so that thecriminalization of the recruitment of childrenin armed forces is not limited to recruitment intimes of war or armed conflict. The Committeefurther recommended that the involvement ofchildren in hostilities be explicitly made a crimesubject to the principle of universality. 9At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, the Czech Republic and 58 other statesendorsed the Paris Commitments to protectchildren from unlawful recruitment or use byarmed forces or armed groups and the ParisPrinciples and guidelines on children associatedwith armed forces or armed groups. Thedocuments reaffirmed international standardsand operational principles for protecting andassisting child soldiers and followed a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsored bythe French government and UNICEF.International standardsThe Czech Republic ratified the ILO Minimum AgeConvention 138 in April 2007.1 “Bill brings end to nearly 140 years of compulsorymilitary service”, Radio Prague, 24 September2004, www.radio.cz.2 Initial report of the Czech Republic to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/CZE/1, 15 August 2005.3 Bart Horeman and Marc Stolwijk, Refusing toBear Arms: A world survey of conscription andconscientious objection to military service, WarResisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.4 Information from the embassy of the CzechRepublic in the UK, 28 June 2007.5 Initial report, above note 2.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 2 7

6 Ibid.7 Ministry of Defence, Military Education, www.army.cz.8 Initial report, above note 2.9 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by the CzechRepublic, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/CZE/CO/1, 21 June 2006.DENMARKKingdom of DenmarkPopulation: 5.4 million (1.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 21,700Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 27 August 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe obligation to perform military service wasset out in Article 81 of the 1953 constitution andthe 1980 National Service Act. 1 According to theDanish Defence Personnel Organization, men andwomen between the ages of 18 and 30 were liablefor conscription. 2 The 1998 Ministry of DefenceOrder No. 1083 stipulated that no one under theage of 18 could be conscripted or could volunteerfor service in the armed forces. This minimum ageof 18 also applied to joining the volunteer HomeGuard, in keeping with the provisions of the 2004Home Guard Act. 3 The 1987 Civilian Service Act(amended in 1992 and 1998) provided for analternative service for conscientious objectors– with the length of alternative service matchingthat of military service. 4DevelopmentsIn its November 2005 Concluding Observationson Denmark’s initial report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child concerningimplementation of the Optional Protocol,the Committee expressed concern that thegovernment had failed to follow reportingguidelines and had not included relevantlegislation with its submission. The report alsofailed to include information regarding assistancefor the physical and psychological recovery offormer child soldiers and dissemination of theOptional Protocol and its incorporation intotraining programs for relevant professionals. 5At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Denmark and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards and1 2 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

operational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.2 Information from the Danish Defence PersonnelOrganization, October 2007.3 Initial report of Denmark to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocolto the Convention on the Rights of the Child onthe Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/DNK/1, 21 April 2005.4 Right to Conscientious Objection, above note 1.5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byDenmark on implementation of the OptionalProtocol, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/DNK/Co/1, 24 November 2005.DJIBOUTIRepublic of DjiboutiPopulation: 793,000 (383,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 11,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 14 June 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP 1 and 2, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextDjibouti had experienced no armed conflictsince the signature in May 2001 of a final peaceagreement between the government and thearmed faction of the Front for the Restoration ofUnity and Democracy (Front pour la restaurationde l’unité et de la démocratie, FRUD). 1France provided significant amounts of aidand financial support. Some 2,700 French troopsremain stationed in Djibouti under agreementssigned at independence. Djibouti also hosted1,800 US troops and was the headquarters of theUS-led Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa(CJTF–HOA) which supported counter-terrorismactivities in the region. 2A — EGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution stated that “the defence of theNation and the territorial integrity of the Republicis the sacred duty for every Djiboutian citizen”.There was no compulsory military service, andthe minimum age for voluntary recruitment was18. 3 A voluntary national service program, theService national adapté (SNA), which acceptedvolunteers between the ages of 17 and 25,continued to operate. One of the stated aimsof the SNA was to assist unqualified youngpeople by providing them with professionaltraining with the Djiboutian armed forces. Duringthe two-year training, recruits were subject tomilitary discipline and on its completion weregiven priority for jobs. There was no obligationor expectation that recruits would remain withthe armed forces, 4 and military training couldform no more than 30 per cent of trainingprovided. Military activities covered by the SNAincluded participation in operations to help thepublic in cases of natural or industrial disastersand activities relating to guarding militaryinstallations. 5C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 2 9

DevelopmentsDuring the 1991–4 conflict, both governmentforces and the FRUD used landmines. Thegovernment declared the country to be “minesafe” in January 2004 following a five-yearde-mining program. However, in February2004 the Minister of Foreign Affairs reportedlyacknowledged that more work was needed ifDjibouti were to be mine-free by March 2009.Three girls were reportedly injured by a mine inSeptember 2004. 6A UN Security Council committee repeatedlyreported that several countries, includingDjibouti, were violating an arms embargo onSomalia by providing military support to anarmed group, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).Djibouti was specifically accused of supplyingmilitary uniforms and medicines, which itdenied. 7 The UIC was responsible for significantlevels of new recruitment and training of childrenin Somalia, some as young as ten, in late 2006. 8Djibouti signed the Optional Protocol inJune 2006 9 and ratified the International LabourOrganization’s Worst Forms of Child LabourConvention 182 in February 2005. 101 US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs,Background Note: Djibouti, January 2008, www.state.gov.2 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfiles, Djibouti, 2007, www.fco.gov.uk.3 Initial report of Djibouti to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.39,3 August 1998.4 Journal official de la République de Djibouti,Décret N. 2003-0240/PRE portant création duService national adapté, 17 December 2003,www.presidence.dj.5 Journal official de la République de Djibouti,Arrêté No. 2003-0914/PR/MDN portantorganisation et modalités de fonctionnementdu Service national adapté, 21 December 2003,www.presidence.dj.6 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, Djibouti, www.icbl.org.7 UN Security Council, Report of the MonitoringGroup on Somalia pursuant to Security Councilresolution 1676 (2000), UN Doc. S/2006/913, 22November 2006.8 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc.A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006.9 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.10 International Labour Organisation, Worst Formsof Child Labour Convention C 182, 1999, www.ilo.org (ilolex database).DOMINIC ANREPUBLICDominican RepublicPopulation: 8.9 million (3.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 24,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription inpeacetimeVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 9 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 16.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the Armed Forces Law, enlistment intothe armed forces was compulsory in times ofwar or serious public disorder, and voluntary inpeacetime. The minimum age to be a memberof the armed forces was 16. 1 However, thegovernment reported to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child in 2007 that the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment was 18. 2Military training and military schoolsThe Armed Forces Superior Studies SpecializedInstitute (Instituto Especializado de EstudiosSuperiores de las Fuerzas Armadas, IEESFA)was established in 2005 to centralize all militarytraining and instruction. It grouped eightmilitary academies and institutes, includingthe Military Institute of Human Rights andInternational Humanitarian Law. Its courseshad to be approved by the Ministry of HigherEducation, and its procedures and methodologyhad to promote and defend democratic values,emphasizing respect and protection of humanrights and a culture of peace. 3DevelopmentsIn May 2005 thousands of Haitians andDominicans of Haitian origin were expelledacross the border to Haiti. 4 In September 2005the Inter-American Court of Human Rightsfound the state’s application of nationalitylaws and regulations to be discriminatory inthe case of two girls of Haitian descent, born inthe Dominican Republic, who had been deniedDominican nationality. 51 3 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

1 Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas.2 Second periodic report of Dominican Republic tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UNDoc. CRC/C/DOM/2, 16 July 2007.3 Decreto No. 146-05, “Que crea el InstitutoEspecializado de Estudios Superiores de lasFuerzas Armadas (IEESFA)”.4 Jesuit Refugee Service, “República Dominicana:Autoridades dominicanas expulsan en masa amiles de haitianos y dominicanos de ascendenciahaitiana”, 16 May 2005, www.jrs.net.5 Amnesty International Report 2006; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the GirlsYean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgmentof 8 September 2005, Series C No. 130, www.corteidh.or.cr.ECUADORRepublic of EcuadorPopulation: 13.2 million (5.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 56,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 7 June 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 17. Very few Colombian former childsoldiers benefited from assistance inEcuador.A — EContextThe Colombian armed conflict continued to affectEcuador profoundly, with a marked increasein incursions by Colombian armed groups,thousands of asylum seekers, and smugglingand violence in border areas, as well as healthconcerns related to coca-eradication by means ofspraying with glyphosate. 1 Ecuador maintained aposition of non-interference in the armed conflictin Colombia. 2Between 2000 and 2006, 700 killings werereported in Sucumbíos province, near the borderwith Colombia, as a result of the increased militarizationof the area. None had been investigatedby the authorities. 3 The victims included civilianmen, women and children. 4There were approximately 250,000 Colombianasylum seekers in Ecuador. In 2006 between600 and 700 Colombians requested asylum eachmonth. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the Law on Military Service, militaryage started at 18, when males had to fulfil theirduties as determined by law, while women couldbe called up if required by national defenceneeds. 6 Married men, household heads, membersof religious orders, the disabled, prisoners,military and police cadets, students at militaryschools and Ecuadoreans abroad were exemptedfrom military service. 7At the age of 17 all males were required toregister with the military authorities and thenselected to serve through a lottery system. Onturning 18 they were enlisted into active servicein three batches, in February, May and August. 8Military service lasted for nine months but couldC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3 1

also be performed for shorter and more intensiveperiods. 9 In 2007 nearly 5,000 18-year-olds weredue to join active service. 10 Recruits receiveduniforms, meals and a monthly stipend, as wellas literacy, vocational and academic instruction. 11Those who had not been selected to join activeservice were at the age of 19 included in theCivil Defence Auxiliary Units (Unidades Auxiliaresde la Defensa Civil) at their places of residencefor a fixed time determined by law. 12Every male aged 18–55 had to have hismilitary passbook (libreta militar) to work, studyor travel abroad or to obtain his university degreeor driver’s licence. Ecuadorean males wishing totravel abroad paid a “military compensation”:those who did not do military service paid US$32,exempted men $20 and former conscripts $5. 13All male and female nationals and residentsaged 18–60 and regardless of their family circumstanceswere required to participate in nationalmobilization in case of necessity. National mobilizationincluded military, civilian and economicmobilization. 14In June 2007, following a prolonged campaignby human rights non-governmental organizations(NGOs), the Constitutional Court declared Articles88 and 108 of the Compulsory Military ServiceLaw to be unconstitutional. Article 88 establishedpenalties for those not fulfilling military serviceobligations, including being unable to register foruniversity, run for public office and travel abroad,while Article 108 provided that objectors had todo alternative service inside military units. 15Volunteers for the navy had to be at least 17and to have completed secondary education. 16The Resistance Forces (Fuerzas de Resistencia)were made up of civilians organized, trainedand equipped by the army as a reserve force, tosupport military activities in civil defence, first aidand environmental protection. At the end of 2006the Resistance Forces had 1,600 members. 17The National Police was an auxiliary force,assisting in the maintenance of internal securityand defence. 18Military training and military schoolsIndividuals wishing to become professionalsoldiers underwent a practical and technicalcourse, including jungle training, and were thengiven a three-year contract. 19Students at the Army Polytechnic SuperiorSchool and the Naval University obtained nationallyrecognized tertiary-level degrees on graduating.Human rights courses were incorporatedthroughout the military educational system. 20The air force had five primary and secondary-schools(Ecuadorian Air Force ExperimentalEducational Units, Unidades Educativas Experimentalesde la Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana, UEFAE)throughout Ecuador accepting children fromgrade 1 (typically age six). 21Secondary school students in the fifth year(usually age 16) were required to participate incommunity service programs organized by theMinistry of Education, such as teaching literacyand undertaking cultural promotion and civildefence activities. 22 As part of this program,students could volunteer to attend military instructionevery Saturday morning from Novemberto June as members of the Voluntary MilitaryStudent Instruction and Community Support Program(Instrucción Militar Estudiantil Voluntaria yApoyo a la Comunidad). 23Armed groupsDuring 2005 and 2006 Colombian militaryforces and armed groups reportedly enteredEcuador’s border areas. 24 In April 2007 eightmen and one woman, presumed members ofthe Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,FARC), were detained in Cuembí and Sansahuari,Sucumbíos province, Ecuador, by members of theEcuadorean armed forces. 25Although Ecuador had no official records ofColombian children and young people formerlyinvolved in the armed conflict in Colombia, mostorganizations working with children and adolescentsbelieved that there could be dozens ofColombian former child combatants in Ecuadorand hundreds more who had crossed the borderwhen faced with the threat of recruitment. 26Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Between 2004 and 2006 around 7,500 peoplerequested asylum each year. 27 It was estimatedthat 27 per cent of asylum seekers were under18. 28 Although the 2002 Children’s and YouthCode had a stated policy of protection of childrenin the event of disaster or armed conflict, 29 therewere no special protection policies for refugeechildren. 30 Data was scarce and incomplete andthe government did not keep its own statistics. 31Only a very few demobilized Colombianchildren were known to have benefited fromreception programs in Ecuador. Most youngColombians did not admit to being combatantsbecause of the stigma attached to it, as well asfear of being denied asylum. 32DevelopmentsIn September 2005, on considering Ecuador’sconsolidated second and third report, the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child reiteratedits concern over the high number of victimsof violence and displacement, and the healthand environmental effects of spraying of illegalcrops. 331 3 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

International standardsEcuador ratified the Optional Protocol on 7June 2004. Its declaration stated that under theconstitution military service was compulsory,commencing at 18 years of age, with provision foralternative service for conscientious objectors. 341 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Directiva deDefensa Nacional, 2 September 2005, http://midena.gov.ec.2 “‘Ecuador no se entrometerá en conflicto armadode Colombia’, reitera su Ministra de Defensa”,El Tiempo (Colombia), 14 March 2007, www.eltiempo.com.3 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional(CEJIL), “CEJIL y organizaciones ecuatorianasdenuncian ante la CIDH la violencia e impunidaden la frontera de Ecuador y Colombia”, 25October 2006, www.cejil.org.4 Amnesty International Report 2007.5 Noticias ACNUR, “Misión del Alto Comisionado aEcuador y Colombia”, 9 March 2007, www.acnur.org.6 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition fromEcuadorean embassy, London, 10 May 2007.7 “Se acuartelarán la próxima semana”, La Hora, 12February 2007, www.lahora.com.ec.8 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Resumen deNoticias, 25 March 2007.9 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Ecuador, August2006, www.flacso.cl.10 Resumen de Noticias, above note 8.11 “Se acuartelarán la próxima semana”, above note7.12 Ley de Seguridad Nacional, at http://midena.gov.ec (Información institucional, Seguridadnacional).13 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Obtener lalibreta militar”, 17 April 2007.14 Ley de Seguridad Nacional.15 Serpaj (Servicio Paz y Justicia) Ecuador, “Pasemosla voz: ni un joven más al servicio militar”, 2 July2007, www.serpaj.org.ec; Ley de Servicio MilitarObligatorio en las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales,Articles 88 and 108.16 Armada de la República del Ecuador, Ingreso a laArmada, Tripulantes, www.armada.mil.ec.17 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Fuerzas deresistencia conmemoran aniversario”, 22 January2007.18 Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas, Ley No.109. RA/1990, at http://midena.gov.ec.19 FLACSO, Informe Nacional, above note 9.20 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Libro Blanco dela Defensa, Capitulo V, Sistema de la DefensaNacional, “Educación”.21 Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana, Apoyo al Desarrollo,Educación, www.fuerzaaereaecuatoriana.org.22 Ministerio de Educación, “En vigencia reglamentosustitutivo de participación estudiantil”, 21 July2006, www.educacion.gov.ec.23 Colegio Mixto Isaac Newton, www.isaacnewton.edu.ec.24 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.25 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, “Militaresecuatorianos capturaron a ocho presuntosmiembros de las FARC en la frontera norte”,Boletín No. 26, 25 April 2007.26 Coalition interview with Simone Schwartz,UNHCR Ecuador, 10 January 2006.27 Ministerio de Defensa, Plan Ecuador.28 Cladem Ecuador, Alternative report to theConvention on Children’s Rights, Period:1996–2002, November 2004, www.crin.org.29 Consolidated second and third periodic reports ofEcuador to the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.28, 15 July 2004.30 Foro Ecuatoriano permanente de organizacionespor y con los Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes,El Cumplimiento de la Convención sobre losderechos del niño en el Ecuador: 15 añosdespués, 16 May 2005, www.crin.org.31 Respuestas escritas del Gobierno del Ecuador alComité de los Derechos del Niño, UN Doc. CRC/C/RESP/86, 2 May 2005.32 Coalition interview with social worker from Tulcán(Ecuador), 25 February 2005.33 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of combined second and thirdreports submitted by Ecuador, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.262, 13September 2005.34 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3 3

EGYPTArab Republic of EgyptPopulation: 74.0 million (29.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 468,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 6 February 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCMilitary service remained compulsoryfor men aged between 18 and 30, and theminimum age for voluntary recruitmentremained 16.ContextIn April 2006 the government renewed for anadditional two years the Emergency Law (LawNo. 162 of 1958), which allowed for the trialof civilians before military and state securitycourts. 1 New armed political groups emerged,such as the Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (Unity and HolyWar), accused by the government of beingresponsible for bombings in the Sinai Peninsulawhich left hundreds of civilians killed and injuredbetween 2004 and 2006. 2 Members of al-Gama’aal-Islamiya (Islamic Group), which renouncedviolence in late 1997, were reported to haveforged links with al-Qaeda in 2006, althoughthis was denied by its leadership. 3 There were noreports of under-18s in these groups.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMajor constitutional amendments in March2007 did not affect military service, which, inaccordance with Article 58 of the constitution andArticle 1 of the 1980 Military and National ServiceAct, remained compulsory for men aged between18 and 30. Standard military service lasted threeyears; lesser terms were stipulated for thosewith certain types of education, such as highereducation graduates.The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentinto the armed forces remained 16. In itsdeclaration on accession to the Optional Protocolin February 2007, the government statedthat “in accordance with its current laws theminimum age for conscription into the armedforces of Egypt is 18 years and the minimumage for voluntary recruitment into the armedforces is 16 years. The Arab Republic of Egypt iscommitted to ensuring that voluntary recruitmentis genuine and entirely willing, with the informedconsent of the parents or legal guardians afterthe volunteers have been fully informed of theduties included in such voluntary military serviceand based on reliable evidence of the age ofvolunteers.” 4Military training and military schoolsMilitary training for recent secondary schoolgraduates was provided in some militaryacademies, such as the Air Defence Academyand the Egyptian Naval College in Alexandria,the Egyptian Air Academy in the SharqiyaGovernorate and the Armed Forces TechnicalInstitute. 5 Children aged between 11 and 15 couldbe accepted in certain military schools providedthat they had completed their primary schooleducation. 6DevelopmentsIn December 2005 police violently dispersedmore than 2,500 Sudanese refugees andmigrants who had been staging a peaceful sit-innear the office of the UN refugee agency UNHCRin Cairo since the previous September. As aresult, at least 27 Sudanese nationals, includingseveral children, were killed and others wereinjured. 7International standardsEgypt acceded to the Optional Protocol on 6February 2007. 81 “Egypt”, Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.2 International Crisis Group, “Egypt’s SinaiQuestion”, 30 January 2007, www.crisisgroup.org.3 “Egyptian group denies Al-Qaeda tie-up”, Al-Jazeera, 11 August 2006, http://english.aljazeera.net.4 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.5 Egyptian armed forces website, http://www.mmc.gov.eg.6 Law 122 (1982) on Establishing ElementaryTechnical Military Schools, Article 14.7 “Egypt”, Amnesty International Report 2007;“Egypt must probe Cairo violence”, BBC News, 31December 2005.8 See www2.ohchr.org.1 3 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

EL SALVADORRepublic of El SalvadorPopulation: 6.9 million (2.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 15,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 18 April 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Military service was compulsory for 18-year-olds. There were no under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextHarsh anti-gang laws and law enforcementmeasures were used against gangs (maras).There were an estimated 10,500 gang membersin El Salvador, with connections to other CentralAmerican countries and the USA. 1 In 2004 theNational Council for Public Security startedimplementing a Safe Country plan, the SuperHeavy Hand (Mano Súper Dura) policy. 2 Membersof the armed forces patrolled with the civilianpolice. Children were blamed for increasingcriminal violence, although of the 300,000suspects detained between 2000 and 2006,fewer than 6 per cent were under 18. Humanrights organizations accused the government ofthe arbitrary detention of hundreds of youthsunder the security policy. 3 Some 43 per centof under-18s were held without proof of illegalassociation. 4The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childcalled on El Salvador to abrogate its second AntigangLaw of April 2004 and to apply the JuvenileOffenders Act as the only legal instrument inthe area of juvenile justice. 5 The authoritiesconsidered lowering the age of criminalresponsibility to 12, with penalties ranging fromtherapy to custody in a juvenile detention centre. 6In March 2005 the Inter-American Courtof Human Rights requested El Salvador toestablish a national commission to determine thewhereabouts of children who had disappearedduring the 1980–91 armed conflict. 7 Children hadbeen abducted and given to families in othercountries for illegal adoptions. In September2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred thecase of the Serrano Cruz sisters, on which theCourt’s decision was based, for investigation. 8In September 2005 the governments of ElSalvador and the USA signed an agreementto establish an International Law EnforcementAcademy (ILEA) to train police officers,prosecutors and judges in the region on drugenforcementand counter-terrorism practices. 9GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution provided for compulsory militaryservice for all nationals aged 18–30 (Article 215).Individuals had to enrol on the militaryregister within one month of turning 17, butonly 18-year-olds could be called up. The ArmedForces (Military and Reserves Service) Actstated that “Salvadorans over 16 years of agemay voluntarily submit to the Recruitment andReserves Department or its subsidiary offices anapplication to perform military service, and theDepartment shall accept them according to theneeds of the service”. 10 El Salvador’s declarationon ratification of the Optional Protocol statedthat such applications required parental consent.However, there was a permanent order from theGeneral Staff of the Armed Forces “to refrainfrom accepting minors among newly recruitedpersonnel”. 11The Committee on the Rights of the Childrecommended that El Salvador explicitly prohibit bylaw the voluntary recruitment of 16- and 17-yearolds,to reflect current practice, and the recruitmentof children under the age of 15, into armed forcesor groups. It also recommended the prohibition ofunder-18s directly participating in hostilities. Thegovernment told the Committee that legal reformswere under way to raise the minimum age ofvoluntary recruitment from 16 to 18. 12Military training and military schoolsCandidates for the Capitán General GerardoBarrios Military School had to be aged 17–22 andto have completed their secondary education. 13In 2005 there were four 17-year-olds attendingthe school – three males and one female. Thefive-year curriculum of military and academicsubjects, approved by the Ministry of Education,included study of the international law of armedconflict and human rights. Most teachers weremilitary officers. 14Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In 2006 the government reported that formermembers of the Farabundo Martí NationalLiberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martípara la Liberación Nacional, FMLN), who were15 and 16 in January 1992 and who had notbenefited from a land program agreed betweenthe government and the FMLN, had receivededucational and technical training. 15 Accordingto official statistics, 152 children had opted toreturn to school, while 97 had chosen technicalA — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3 5

training. Only nine children had successfully beenincorporated into the educational system and justone had completed the course of studies. Duringthe armed conflict an estimated 2,000 childrenserved in the FMLN, and 80 per cent of recruits inthe government armed forces were under 18. 16In 2006 the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child criticized the lack of information onmeasures and the program adopted with regardto former child soldiers and children affected bythe armed conflict. 171 USAID, Central America and Mexico GangAssessment, April 2006, www.usaid.gov.2 Pais Seguro: Plan de gobierno 2004–2009, www.servicios.gob.sv.3 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional(CEJIL), “Políticas de seguridad salvadoreñasviolan derechos humanos de la niñez yadolescencia”, 7 March 2007, www.cejil.org.4 Comunidad Segura, “Toward a national youthpolicy in El Salvador”, 24 October 2006, www.comunidadesegura.org.5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by El Salvador, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.232, 30June 2004.6 Ministry of Interior, Proyecto de Reformas a la LeyPenal Juvenil, www.gobernacion.gob.sv.7 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case ofSerrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment of1 March 2005, Series C, No. 120, www.corteidh.or.cr.8 Written replies by the Government of El Salvadorto the Committee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/SLV/Q/1/Add.1, 12 May 2006.9 Gobierno de El Salvador, Noticias y Eventos, “ElSalvador quinto país del mundo en contar conILEA”, 21 September 2005, www.gobernacion.gob.sv.10 Initial report of El Salvador to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SLV/1,15 August 2005.11 Ibid.12 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by El Salvadoron implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SLV/CO/1, 2 June 2006.13 Escuela Militar, “Cap. Gral. Gerardo Barrios”,www.escmilitar.edu.sv.14 Initial report, above note 10.15 Written replies, above note 8.16 Child Soldiers Coalition, “El Salvador: Childrenin the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front(FMLN) and the Armed Forces of El Salvador(FAES)”, July 2006.17 Concluding observations, above note 12.EQUATORIALGUINEARepublic of Equatorial GuineaPopulation: 504,000 (257,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,300Compulsory recruitment age: not establishedVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCAlthough obligatory by law, in practicemilitary service was voluntary. Only menover 18 years old could volunteer formilitary service.GovernmentNational recruitment and legislationThe constitution stated that military service iscompulsory and “regulated by law”. 2 However, nolaw was enacted to regulate military service andrecruitment and, in practice, military service wasvoluntary. The government periodically called onmen over 18 years of age to enlist voluntarily inthe armed forces for a minimum two-year period.There were no reports of recruitment of under-18s. 3The 1990 Labour Act regulated child labourand set the minimum legal age for employment at14, although 12-year-olds were permitted to workin certain jobs; it also stated that the minimumage for admission to employment “which by itsnature or owing to the conditions under whichit is performed may place at risk the health,safety or morals of children shall be 16 years”. 4 Inpractice, however, the law was seldom enforced.DevelopmentsIn its concluding observations on EquatorialGuinea’s initial report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, the Committeerecommended that the government ratify theOptional Protocol to the Convention on the Rightsof the Child on the involvement of children inarmed conflict. 51 CIA, World Factbook.1 3 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to BearArms: A World Survey of Conscription andConscientious Objection to Military Service, WarResisters International, London, 1998, www.wri-irg.org/; Report of the UN Secretary-Generalto UN Commission on Human Rights on civiland political rights, including the question ofconscientious objection to military service, UNDoc. E/CN.4/2000/55, 17 December 1999.3 Confidential source, July 2007.4 Initial Report of Equatorial Guinea to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/11/Add.26, 28 January 2004.5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by EquatorialGuinea, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.245, 3 November 2004.ERITREAState of EritreaPopulation: 4.4 million (2.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 201,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: acceded 16 February 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ACRWCForcible recruitment of under-18s hadpreviously been reported. However therewas no recent information, due to severerestrictions on access to independentobservers by the government.A — EContextThe 2000 Algiers Agreement, 2 ending warbetween Ethiopia and Eritrea, established a25-km-wide demilitarized zone known as theTemporary Security Zone (TSZ) and created theEritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 3 Ethiopiadeployed an additional seven military divisionsto the border in December 2004 4 and tensionsbetween the two countries steadily escalated. 5The Boundary Commission suspended itsoperations in March 2005, citing Ethiopian nonco-operationover demarcation, 6 and indicatedthat it would close in November 2007 unless itwas allowed to proceed to demarcation. 7 Thepeacekeeping capacity of the United NationsMission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE),mandated by UN Security Council Resolution1320 (September 2000), was severely limited byEritrean restrictions on its movements, and itsforce was reduced to 1,700 peacekeepers in April2007. 8By October 2007 Eritrea maintained 4,000troops in the TSZ, in violation of the AlgiersAgreement, and an estimated 120,000 troopsin the border area. 9 Ethiopia maintained anestimated 100,000 troops along the border.An increase in the number of cross-borderabductions and missing persons, includingchildren, was reported. This was attributed inpart to the Eritrean government’s conscriptioncampaign. 10Eritrea provided military assistance to theSomali armed group Union of Islamic Courts(UIC), which seized control of Somalia’s capital,Mogadishu, in June 2006. There were reports ofmilitary assistance and links between Eritrea,the UIC and two Ethiopian opposition groups– the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Ethiopiaprovided Eritrean opposition groups, includingC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3 7

the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front, withtraining and arms, and the Shiraro and Shimbelarefugee camps in Ethiopia were used as recruitinggrounds by Eritrean opposition groups. 11 TheEritrean government faced the threat of armedopposition from the Ethiopia-based EritreanDemocratic Alliance. 12In 2006 the government decided to returnthe large majority of internally displacedpersons (IDPs) to their villages of origin in theTSZ. Despite the danger posed by the presenceof landmines, and tensions relating to thestalemate over demarcation, 13 by May 2007 thenumber of IDPs was reduced to 12,000 due to thegovernment’s promotion of returnee programs. 14GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe forcible recruitment of under-18s hadpreviously been reported, but there was norecent information due to severe restrictionsimposed by the government on access toindependent observers.The constitution stated that all citizens had to‘be ready to defend the country’ and ‘complete …National Service’ (Article 25). Under the NationalService Proclamation No. 82/95 of 23 October1995, national service of six months of militarytraining and twelve months of military servicewas obligatory for men between the ages of 18and 40. 15 However, in practice national serviceremained extended indefinitely. Conscript reserveduties extended to the age of 50 and formerEritrean People’s Liberation Front veterans werealso subject to recall. 16 Recruitment of under-18s into the armed forces was prohibited underProclamation 11/1991. 17 The law prohibitedchildren under the age of 18 from performingcertain dangerous or unhealthy labour. 18The government required that all studentsattend their final year of secondary-school at alocation adjacent to the Sawa military trainingfacility. Students who did not attend this yearcould not graduate. Many students elected torepeat grades to avoid being forced to go toSawa. 19 Other Eritreans at the age of conscriptionand final year secondary school students fled thecountry in their thousands or went into hiding. 20The authorities instituted harsh measuresto counter the widespread evasion of militaryservice and desertion by thousands of conscripts.Police searches and round-ups were carried out,and in mid-2005 the government made hundredsof arrests of family members of children whohad not reported to the military training campat Sawa for their final year of high school orhad not reported for national service. 21 Thiscontinued into 2007 and relatives were releasedonly on payment of a large financial bond and thesurrender of the missing conscript. Thousandsof military conscripts accused of desertion werearbitrarily detained without formal charge, heldincommunicado and frequently tortured. 22 A nongovernmentalorganization (NGO) reported that161 young Eritreans were shot and killed trying toescape Wia Military Camp in June 2005. 23Exit visas, which were required for leaving thecountry, were rarely granted to men of militaryage. 24 During 2006 the government beganrefusing to issue exit visas to some children whowere 11 and older, on the grounds that they wereapproaching the age of eligibility for nationalservice. 25Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)A demobilization program which began in 2000was managed by the National Commission forDemobilization and Reintegration Program(NCDRP), established in 2001 by presidentialdecree. 26 As of December 2006, some 104,400soldiers had been demobilized, 27 while the initialtarget was to reduce the 300,000–350,000military personnel by approximately 200,000. 28It is not known whether there was any child DDRin this program. In June 2007 it was reported thatdemobilization was suspended due to tension inthe region and Eritrea’s strained relations withEthiopia. 29DevelopmentsEritrea’s Second and Third Periodic Reports tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childstated that the minimum recruitment age was18, and that full-time students and those whowere temporarily medically unfit could have theirservice deferred. 30UN Security Council Resolution 1767 (2007)provided for the extension of the peacekeepingmandate of UNMEE until January 2008. 31International standardsEritrea acceded to the Optional Protocol on 16February 2005. Its declaration stated that theminimum age for recruitment into the armedforces was 18. 321 CIA, “Eritrea”, World Factbook, www.cia.gov.2 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea(UNMEE), Algiers Peace Agreement 2000, www.unmeeonline.org.3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Ethiopia andEritrea: preventing war”, Africa Report No. 101, 22December 2005.4 Ibid.1 3 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2005/142, 7 March 2005; UN Security CouncilResolution 1622, UN Doc. S/RES/1622 (2005), 13September 2005.6 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2005/400, 20 June 2005.7 ICG, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: stopping the slide towar”, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5 November 2007.8 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2006/140/, 6 March 2006.9 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 7.10 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2007/440, 18 July 2007; UN Security Council,Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia andEritrea, UN Doc. S/2006/749, 19 September2006; Report of the Secretary-General, 7 March2005, above note 5.11 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 7.12 “Eritrea”, Amnesty International Report 2007.13 “Horn of Africa: the way forward”, New Routes,Vol. 12, No. 2 (2007), www.brookings.edu.14 OCHA Regional Office for Central and East Africa,Displaced Persons Report, Issue 1 (January–June2007), www.nrc.ch.15 UK Home Office Border and Immigration Agency,Country of Origin Information Report, Eritrea, 22October 2007, www.homeoffice.gov.uk.16 “Eritrea”, above note 12.17 UK Home Office, above note 15.18 US Department of State, Country reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006, Eritrea, 6 March2007, www.state.gov.19 Ibid.20 “Eritrea”, Human Rights Watch World Report2007.21 “Eritrea”, Human Rights Watch World Report2006.22 “Eritrea”, above note 12; confidential source,February 2008.23 Eritreans for Human and Democratic Rights,“Brutality beyond imagination”, 29 July 2005,http://ehdr.org.uk.24 “Eritrea”, above note 12.25 US Department of State, above note 18.26 Eritrea – Demobilization and ReintegrationProgram, World Bank report No. P1D10371, 2001,www-wds.worldbank.org.27 UNDP, “Technical assistance to demobilizesoldiers”, Eritrea project fact sheet, November2006, www.er.undp.org.28 Royal Institute of International Affairs (ChathamHouse), “Eritrea’s economic survival”, summaryrecord of a conference held on 20 April 2007,www.chathamhouse.org.uk.29 UN/Office of the Special Adviser on Africa(UN/OSAA), “Overview: DDR processes in Africa”,Report of the Second International Conference onDDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, 12–14 June 2007, www.un.org.30 Second and third periodic reports of Eritrea to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/ERI/3, 23 October 2007.31 UN Security Council Resolution on the Situationbetween Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc. S/RES/1767 (2007), 30 July 2007.32 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 3 9

E STONIARepublic of EstoniaPopulation: 1.3 million (265,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 4,100Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (but see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (but see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 24 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Seventeen-year-olds could be liable forcall-up but active combat duties werereserved for those aged 18 and over.Under-18s could volunteer for the NationalDefence League which provided weaponstraining.ContextIn May 2004 Estonia amended its Child ProtectionAct. 1 As amended, the Act recognized as a childanyone under 18 years of age, and requiredthe government to provide and protect theinternationally recognized rights and freedomsof the child (Article 1). The Act banned themanufacture or sale of toys that imitated objectsused to destroy people, and prohibited themaking or broadcast of films, audio and videomaterial for children that promoted cruelty andviolence (Article 48). The Act recognized a childwhose health or life was in danger as being inneed of immediate assistance (Article 32).Estonia joined NATO in 2004.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeEstonia amended its Defence Force ServicesAct, most recently in 2007. 2 The revised lawrequired all male Estonian citizens to be “liable”for service in the Defence Forces from the age of16 to 60, during which time they were liable tobe registered and conscripted, or to serve in thereserve (Article 3). Boys eligible for the draft hadto register at the age of 16, until call-up or releasefrom mandatory military service (Article 7).Between the ages of 18 and 27 they were liableto conscription (Article 46). In practice, any boyaged 17 on 15 September was liable to call-upthe following year, even if he had not reached theage of 18. Periods of service were variable anddepended on the date of call-up, ranging from8–11 months. 3The Defence Force Service Act set up twoagencies to administer recruitment, aided by amedical commission. A new Defence ResourcesAgency registered boys eligible for the draft(Article 46) and considered written applicationsfor alternative service. These could be madeon religious or moral grounds, and applicantscould appeal against the agency’s decisions to aDefence Forces Service Commission (Article 47)and then to an Administrative Court. The DefenceForces Service Commission might “exceptionally”grant appeals, but the circumstances were notspecified (Article 41). Alternative service was for12–18 months (Article 74), to be carried out in therescue, emergency or social care services of theInterior Ministry or Ministry of Social Affairs. 4Armed forces reserves included formerconscripts but were mostly made up of membersof the voluntary paramilitary National DefenceLeague, open to boys and girls, administered bythe Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its 9,980 membersin 2005 included 3,788 girls in the HomeDaughters section, and 4,019 boys in the YoungEagles section. 5 League members were trainedin the use of weapons, and in giving assistanceto internal security, border control and rescueservices.Under the Defence Force Services Act,as amended, 18-year-old reservists couldbe mobilized in active conflict (Article 139).Previously, 16-year-old reservists had beeneligible.Volunteers aged 18 and over could signcontracts for military service (Article 79). Theintroduction of a non-conscript army wasincreasingly discussed after Estonia joined theEuropean Union in May 2004.There was no specific legislation criminalizingthe recruitment or use of under-18s by armedgroups, but in March 2007 there were plans toamend the law in this respect. 6DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Estonia and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.International standardsEstonia ratified the ILO Minimum Age Convention138 in March 2007. It said it intended to takesteps to ratify the Optional Protocol in 2007. 71 Child Protection Act, RT I 2004, 27, 180, May2004.1 4 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2 Defence Force Services Act, 14 March 2000.3 Estonian Institute for Human Rights, Overview ofthe Human Rights Situation in Estonia in 2005,www.eihr.ee.4 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition fromEstonian embassy, London, March 2007.5 Estonian Institute for Human Rights, above note3.6 Communication from Estonian embassy, abovenote 4.7 Ibid.ETHIOPIAFederal Democratic Republic of EthiopiaPopulation: 77.4 million (39.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 152,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of child recruitmentor use by government forces or armedopposition groups, although independentmonitoring was severely limited.A — EContextThe 2000 Algiers Agreement, 1 ending warbetween Ethiopia and Eritrea, established a25-km-wide demilitarized zone, known as theTemporary Security Zone (TSZ), and created theEritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. 2 Ethiopiadeployed an additional seven military divisionsto the border in December 2004 and tensionsbetween the two countries steadily escalated. 3UN Security Council Resolution 1640 (2005)demanded that Ethiopia “accept fully and withoutfurther delay the final and binding decision of theEritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission”. 4The Boundary Commission suspended itsoperations in March 2005, citing Ethiopian nonco-operationover demarcation, 5 and indicatedthat it would close in November 2007 unlessit was allowed to proceed to demarcation. 6The peacekeeping capacity of the UN Missionin Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was severelylimited by Eritrean restrictions on its movementsand its force was reduced to 1,700 peacekeepersin April 2007. 7 By October 2007 Ethiopiamaintained an estimated 100,000 troops alongthe border. Eritrea maintained 4,000 troops inthe TSZ and an estimated 120,000 troops inthe border area. 8 An increase in the number ofcross-border abductions and missing persons,including children, was reported. This wasattributed in part to the Eritrean government’sconscription campaign. 9The government continued to face internalopposition from armed groups, including theOgaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), whichsought self-determination for ethnic Somalis inthe Ogaden region, and the Oromo LiberationFront (OLF). 10 In April 2007 ONLF gunmen killed74 people and kidnapped seven others at anoilfield in Abole, a remote region of Ethiopiapopulated by ethnic Somalis. 11 In June 2007 thegovernment launched a major military campaignC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 4 1

in the Ogaden against the ONLF, committingwidespread human rights violations, blockingfood deliveries and forcibly relocating thousandsof people. 12 By October 2007 the government wasreportedly forcing civilians in the region to formmilitias to fight the ONLF, and those who refusedfaced possible detention and torture. 13 During2006 the authorities in Oromia state reportedlyimprisoned, tortured and harassed their critics,including schoolchildren. 14The ONLF and the OLF reportedly receivedmilitary support from Eritrea and Somalia.Ethiopia provided Eritrean armed groups withtraining and arms and the Shiraro and Shimbelarefugee camps in Ethiopia were used as recruitinggrounds by these groups. 15In October 2006 Prime Minister Zenawideclared Ethiopia officially at war with Somaliaafter the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) declareda jihad (holy war) against the Ethiopiangovernment over its military involvementin Somali affairs. 16 In late 2006, Ethiopiantroops entered Somalia to support Somalia’sTransitional Federal Government (TFG) againstthe UIC and forced the UIC from Mogadishu andother areas, remaining in Somalia as of late2007. 17 Ethiopian forces fired into urban civilianareas and summarily executed civilians, resultingin the deaths of hundreds of civilians, includingchildren. 18GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeEthiopia set 18 as the minimum age forrecruitment into the armed forces. However,because of the lack of adequate birth registrationin Ethiopia the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child expressed concern over possibleflaws in the recruitment process. 19 According tothe government, recruits and conscripts wererequired to produce documents such as schoolor medical records testifying to their age. Militaryauthorities reportedly refused to permit childrenunder 18 to enlist. 20Military service was not compulsory. However,Defence Force Proclamation No. 27/1996 statedthat the Defence Ministry “may, in accordancewith criteria issued by it from time to time, recruitpersons fit and willing for military purposes”(Article 4). In call-up notices, these criteriadefined a minimum recruitment age of 18. 21Failure to respond to call-up was punishableby “simple” imprisonment and, in times ofemergency, general mobilization or war, by up to10 years’ “rigorous” imprisonment. 22There was no available evidence regardingchild soldiers in Ethiopia, and reports of childrenbeing unofficially involved in either governmentor armed group activity were difficult to verify.23There were no reports of child soldiers beingused by Ethiopian forces in the conflict inSomalia. 24The constitution stated that children would“not be subject to exploitative practices, neitherto be required nor permitted to perform workwhich may be hazardous or harmful to [their]health or well-being” (Article 36).Armed groupsOgaden National Liberation Front(ONLF)In September 2007 the ONLF told the ChildSoldiers Coalition that “The minimum age forrecruitment into the ONLF military wing is 18years and there are no ONLF fighters underthe age of 18.” The ONLF said that it “fullyrecognizes and has adopted all articles enshrinedin the Convention on The Rights of The Childand in particular the Optional Protocol to theconvention”. 25 There was no available informationfrom independent sources about the use by theONLF of child soldiers.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The Ethiopia Emergency Demobilization andReintegration Project (EDRP), funded by aWorld Bank loan, ended on 30 June 2007. Noneof the soldiers supported under this programwere under the age of 18 at the time of theirdemobilization. 26 There were reportedly noprograms in 2007 that specialized in supportingthe demobilization of children. 27DevelopmentsIn November 2006 the Committee on theRights of the Child urged Ethiopia to take allpossible measures to prevent the recruitmentof children and to ratify the Optional Protocol.The Committee also recommended that Ethiopiaprovide physical and psychological recoverymeasures for all children affected by armedconflict. 28UN Security Council Resolution 1767 providedfor the extension of the peacekeeping mandate ofUNMEE until January 2008. 29Ethiopia hosted around 100,000 refugeesfrom Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo and Eritrea, with 300 people crossingto Ethiopia each month to seek asylum, almosthalf of whom were children. 301 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea(UNMEE), Algiers Peace Agreement, 2000, www.unmeeonline.org.2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Ethiopia andEritrea: preventing war”, Africa Report No. 101, 22December 2005.1 4 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

3 Ibid.; UN Security Council, Report of theSecretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNDoc. S/2005/142, 7 March 2005; UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1622, UN Doc. S/RES/1622(2005), 13 September 2005.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1640 on theSituation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc.S/RES/1640 (2005), 23 November 2005.5 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2005/400, 20 June 2005.6 ICG, “Ethiopia and Eritrea: stopping the slide towar”, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5 November 2007.7 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2007/440, 18 July 2007.8 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6.9 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 7;UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN Doc.S/2006/749, 19 September 2006; Report of theSecretary-General, above note 3.10 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6.11 “Scores die in Ethiopia oil attack”, BBC News, 24April 2007.12 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ethiopia:crackdown in the east punishes civilians”, pressrelease, 4 July 2007.13 “Ethiopians said to push civilians into rebel war”,New York Times, 15 December 2007.14 “Ethiopia”, Human Rights Watch World Report2007.15 “Stopping the slide to war”, above note 6.16 “Ethiopia says technically at war with SomaliIslamists”, Reuters Alertnet, 24 October 2006,www.alertnet.org.17 ICG, “Somalia: the tough part is ahead”, AfricaBriefing No. 45, 26 January 2007; “Ethiopiabogged down in Somalia”, BBC News, 27November 2007.18 HRW, “Shell-shocked: civilians under siege inMogadishu”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.12(A), August 2007.19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 1 November 2006.20 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,Summary record, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1164, 22September 2006.21 Information from Rädda Barnen (Save theChildren – Sweden), March 2004. As cited in ChildSoldiers Coalition, Global Report 2004.22 Amnesty International Netherlands Section 1998,“Ethiopia: dienstwigering en desertie”, citing WarResisters’ International, Ethiopia: CONCODOC1998 report, 17 August 1998, http://wri-irg.org.As cited in Coalition Global Report 2004.23 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September2007.24 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andArmed Conflict in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/259,7 May 2007.25 E-mail from ONLF to Child Soldiers Coalition, 7September 2007.26 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September2007; World Bank, “Ethiopia – Demobilizationand Reintegration Project”, EnvironmentalAssessment, 31 May 2004, www.web.worldbank.org/, as cited in Coalition Global Report 2004.27 Confidential source, Addis Ababa, September2007.28 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Ethiopia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 1 November 2006.29 UN Security Council Resolution on the Situationbetween Eritrea and Ethiopia, UN Doc. S/RES/1767 (2007), 30 July 2007.30 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2007, Ethiopia, www.unhcr.org/; Concluding Observations ofthe Committee on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination, Ethiopia, UN Doc. CERD/C/ETH/CO/15, 20 June 2007.A — EC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 4 3

FIJIRepublic of the Fiji IslandsPopulation: 848,000 (317,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 3,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: signed 16 September 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Over 2,500 Fijian soldierswere serving in the United Kingdom (UK)army, where the minimum voluntaryrecruitment age was 16. It was not knownwhether they included under-18s. 1ContextThe head of the armed forces, CommodoreVoreqe Bainimarama, declared a state ofemergency following a military coup on 5December 2006. Military forces could benefitfrom an amnesty decree passed in January 2007for human rights violations committed by theirmembers between 5 December 2006 and5 January 2007. 2DevelopmentsInternational standardsFiji signed the Optional Protocol on 16 September2005.1 “British Army plans to limit troop quota”, FijiTimes Online, 3 April 2007, www.fijitimes.com.2 Amnesty International (AI), “Fiji: Human rightsprotections must be upheld”, AI Index: ASA18/001/2007, News Service No: 033, 16 February2007; Human Rights Watch (HRW), Letter toInterim Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama andPresident Ratu Josefa Iloilo of Fiji, 5 February2007.3 Royal Fiji Military Forces Act, Chapter 81, PartII(5)(3).4 “Induction Service for new recruits”, MataivaluNews, Issue No. 10, January–February 2006,www.rfmf.mil.fj.5 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfiles, Fiji, www.fco.gov.uk.6 Royal Fiji Military Forces Act, Chapter 81, PartIII(18).7 Australian Broadcast Corporation, ForeignCorrespondent, “Fiji – Green Tribe”, broadcast11 January 2005, www.abc.net.au.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. An individual hadto be at least 18 to be recruited into the army.However, “the Commander may permit theenlistment of such number of persons of orabove the age of sixteen years and under the ageof eighteen years as he may from time to timedetermine”. 3 New recruits into the Fijian armedforces underwent a 12-week training course. 4There were over 2,500 Fijian soldiers servingin the UK armed forces. 5Military training and military schoolsThe Royal Fiji Military Forces Act stated thatthe “Minister may establish Cadet Units, thedescription of, numbers in, enrolment in, andorganization of which shall be such as theMinister may from time to time prescribe”. Cadetunits, made up of boys between the ages of 12and 18, did not form part of the armed forcesbut were affiliated to them and regarded as a“training unit for the Forces”. 6 Cadet trainingwas in practice compulsory for all high schoolstudents, and children took part in drills andschool parades. 71 4 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

FINL ANDRepublic of FinlandPopulation: 5.3 million (1.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 29,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 10 April 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeSection 127 of the constitution (731/1999)required all Finnish citizens to play a role inthe country’s defence. Section 1 of the MilitaryService Act of 1991 obliged all Finnish men toperform military service. Women wishing to dovoluntary military service of a complementarynature were permitted to do so under the termsof the 1995 Act on Voluntary Women’s Service.With regard to the overall structure of nationaldefence, provisions for non-armed service werealso included in the 1991 Military Service Act,while civilian service was organized in accordancewith the 1991 Civilian Service Act. All men andwomen had to be at least 18 before they could beconscripted or volunteer for service in the FinnishDefence Forces, even in a state of emergency.Recruitment of any person under the age of 18 ina situation of armed conflict was classified as awar crime in the Finnish Penal Code. 1 Conscriptsusually completed military service at the age of19 or 20, although entry into the armed forceswas possible between the ages of 18 and 29. 2While a civilian alternative to compulsory militaryservice was offered to conscientious objectors,the length of the service (395 days) was 215days longer than military service and couldtherefore be considered punitive. During 2006Amnesty International reported on the cases of11 imprisoned conscientious objectors whomthe organization considered to be prisoners ofconscience. 3Military training and military schoolsIn its June 2004 initial report to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child concerningimplementation of the Optional Protocol, thegovernment stated that there were no schoolsoperated or controlled by the Finnish DefenceForces. 4DevelopmentsIn March 2004 the government’s human rightspolicy as expressed in its initial report to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child on theOptional Protocol specifically mentioned thespecial protection needs of children in situationsof armed conflict. 5The Committee on the Rights of the Child(CRC) noted in October 2005 that “the State partyis a country of destination of asylum-seeking andmigrant children coming from war-torn countrieswho may have been victims of traumaticexperiences”. 6At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Finland and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Finland to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FIN/1,10 March 2005.2 Finnish Defence Forces, Conscript 2005, www.mil.fi.3 Amnesty International Report 2007.4 Initial report, above note 1.5 Ibid.6 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Finlandon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FIN/CO/1, 21 October 2005.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 4 5

FR ANCEFrench RepublicPopulation: 60.5 million (13.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 254,900Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionsuspended since January 2003)Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 5 February 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182While in its 2006 report to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the ChildFrance stated there were no under-18sin the Foreign Legion, revised 2005legislation still fixed the minimum age ofrecruitment to it at 17, with consent fromtheir “legal representative”.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription was suspended from 1 January 2003under the National Service Reform Act, Act No.97-1019 of 28 October 1997, which amended the1972 National Service Code. The law allowed thegovernment to reinstate conscription at any time(Article L112-2) 1 and the legislation providing fornational service was not repealed. 2Law No. 2205-207 of 24 March 2005 on theGeneral Status of Servicemen, which revisedthe body of provisions contained in previouslaws, entered into force on 1 July 2005. 3 Article20(4) of this new legislation stated that no onecould become part of the armed forces if not “atleast 17 years of age or 16 years of age in orderto receive general or vocational training as avolunteer in the armed forces or as a pupil in amilitary school”. 4Foreign Legion recruits had to be agedbetween 17 and 40. 5 Selected candidates signeda five-year unconditional contract to serveanywhere in the world. They were trained forfour months at the Fourth Foreign Regiment inCastelnaudary before being posted. 6 Under-18s had to have the consent of their “legalrepresentatives” to enlist. However, Article83 of the Law No. 2205-207 offered no legalguarantee regarding the verification of age: “themilitary authorities designated by the Ministryof Defence can, in the absence of the necessarysupporting documents, accept the enlistment [ofa candidate]”.On consideration of France’s Initial Reporton the Optional Protocol, the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child recommended thatthe recruitment and involvement of childrenin hostilities be explicitly criminalized inlegislation and that extraterritorial jurisdictionbe established for these crimes when theyare committed by or against a person who isa citizen of or has other links with France. TheCommittee encouraged the government to raisethe minimum age of recruitment into the armedforces and Foreign Legion to 18. The Committeefurther recommended that the government“provide by law for a special status, differentfrom that of the military, for 16 to below 18 yearsold children enrolled in military schools and forthose in the Foreign Legion”. 7Military training and schoolsMilitary schools in France included four for thearmy (Prytanée nationale militaire, Lycée Militairede Saint-Cyr, Lycée Militaire d’Aix-en-Provenceand Lycée Militaire d’Autun) and one for the navy(Lycée Naval de Brest). Students were admittedto the air force school, the Ecole d’EnseignementTechnique de l’Armée de l’Air de Saintes, from theage of 16. There was also a Polytechnic School(Ecole Polytechnique). Under Law No. 70-631of July 1970, as amended by Law 94-577 of July1994, candidates for the Polytechnic School hadto be 17 to sit admission examinations and couldenter the school during the year in which theyturned 18. 8DevelopmentsFrance dedicated part of its development aid tochildren in armed conflicts, financing directlyor indirectly through multilateral funds childdemobilization and reintegration programs,particularly in Africa. From 2002 it increased itsco-operation with UNICEF, the UN refugee agency(UNHCR) and non-governmental organizationsworking in this area. In 2006 France increasedits contribution to UNICEF by 30 per cent. Thismoney supported UNICEF’s Innocenti ResearchCentre, which studied, among other things,questions relating to the reintegration of childrenwho have been released from armed groups. Themoney also supported a long-term program forWest Africa and the Great Lakes. 9Following an extensive review of the CapeTown Principles and Best Practices, led by UNICEFin 2006, in February 2007 the French governmentand UNICEF jointly sponsored a ministerial-levelmeeting in Paris. At the meeting France and 58other states endorsed the Paris Commitments toprotect children from unlawful recruitment or useby armed forces or armed groups and the ParisPrinciples and guidelines on children associatedwith armed forces or armed groups. Thedocuments reaffirmed international standards1 4 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

and operational principles for protecting andassisting child soldiers.France had chaired the UN Security Councilworking group on children and armed conflict,established under the provisions of SecurityCouncil Resolution 1612 (2005), since its creationin July 2005.1 Initial report of France to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FRA/1,6 November 2006.2 Loi no 97-1019 du 28 octobre 1997 portantréforme du service national.3 “National implementation of internationalhumanitarian law – biannual update on nationallegislation and case law – January–June 2005”,International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87(859) (September 2005), www.icrc.org.4 Loi no. 2005-270 du 24 mars 2005 portant statutgénéral des militaires, NOR: DEFX0400144L.5 Act of 21 March 2005, Art. 83, Ch. II.6 Portail Web Légion, www.legion-etrangere.com.7 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byFrance on the Optional Protocol, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/FRA/CO/1,5 October 2007, unedited version.8 Ministère de la Défense, www.defense.gouv.fr.9 Information provided in meetings with theMinistry of Foreign Affairs.GABONGabonese RepublicPopulation: 1.4 million (651,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 4,700Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 20Voting age: 21 1Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thegovernment security forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Gabonese constitution stated that it was theduty of every citizen to defend the country. Thestate security forces defended the nation andsafeguarded public order, and the creation ofprivate militias was forbidden. 2There was no conscription into the armedforces. 3 Under Act No. 004/98 of February 1998on the general organization of national defenceand public security, the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment was 20.F — JDevelopmentsInternational standardsGabon ratified the African Charter on the Rightsand Welfare of the Child in 2007.1 Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). TheGabonese constitution, however, gives the votingage as 18 (Article 4).2 Article 1(21) and (22).3 Initial report of Gabon to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.10, 13 July 2001.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 4 7

GambiaRepublic of the GambiaPopulation: 1.5 million (704,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 800Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 21 December 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s beingused in the armed forces.ContextIn April 2007, ten former army officers wereconvicted of treason and sentenced to lifeimprisonment by a military court for attemptingto overthrow President Jammeh in March 2006.Five people who had been arrested as part ofthe attempted coup in March 2006 were fearedto have been executed in April 2006 after thegovernment stated that they had escaped whilebeing transferred to a different prison. 1DevelopmentsIn August 2006 over 4,000 Senegaleserefugees fled into Gambia from Senegal’ssouthern Casamance region to escape fightingbetween Senegalese troops and a splintergroup of the armed political group DemocraticForces of Casamance (Mouvement des forcesdémocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) led bySalif Sadio. 5 According to the UN refugee agency(UNHCR) there were over 6,000 refugees by theend of October 2006. 61 “Gambia jail terms for coup plot”, BBC News, 20April 2007.2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Gambia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.165, 6 November 2001.3 See NewGambia.com, www.newgambia.gm.4 US Department of State, Country Report onHuman Rights Practices 2006, the Gambia, March2007, www.state.gov.5 “Thousands flee Senegal fighting”, BBC News, 24August 2006.6 UNHCR, “Gambia: New arrivals from Senegal”,press briefing note, 31 October 2006.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. Section 23 of theArmed Forces Act stated, “Where a personenlisting has not attained the age of eighteenyears, his period of enlistment shall commencefrom the date he attains the age of eighteenyears.” Although in November 2001 the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child asked thegovernment to establish a clear legal minimumage for enlistment into the armed forces, 2 itappeared that no action had been taken.The government reported that it planned toestablish a military academy, an infantry centreand school, and military primary and secondaryschools.Currently a number of countries weretraining the Gambian military. 3The Children’s Act, passed in June 2005, wasdesigned to protect and promote the welfareof children and to curb abuses against them,including trafficking. The definition of a child wasset as any person under the age of 18. As a resultof the Act one of five regional children’s courtsopened in February 2006. The Act also protectedchildren from exploitative labour or hazardousemployment. 41 4 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GEORGIAGeorgiaPopulation: 4.5 million (1.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 11,320Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s inthe armed forces. Firearms training wasavailable for boys and girls from the age of15 in Patriot Camps.ContextIn May 2004 Georgia regained control over theautonomous region of Ajaria without resortingto force. However, most of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia remained unrecognized self-proclaimedrepublics. 1 Georgia reiterated its aim to join NATOand strengthen ties with the European Union(EU). 2 The USA continued to develop its trainingprogram for Georgia’s army. 3 The UN ObserverMission in Georgia (UNOMIG) continued to carryout peacekeeping activities, including monitoringthe 1994 ceasefire between Georgian and Abkhazforces, in co-operation with a Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) peacekeeping force. 4In August 2004 an attempt to retake SouthOssetia militarily resulted in dozens of deaths. 5 InJuly 2006 Georgia regained control of the KodoriGorge in Abkhazia from a former paramilitarygroup which had continued to operate despitebeing disbanded. The authorities in Abkhaziaregarded the action as a breach of agreementsto demilitarize the gorge. 6 Four Russian militaryofficers were arrested in late September2006 and charged with spying, and Russiasubsequently imposed a range of sanctions onGeorgia. 7 The Russian government denied that ahelicopter attack in the gorge in March 2007 wascarried out by Russian forces. 8GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll male citizens and residents aged 18–27 weresubject to conscription. Military service was for18 months. Women, and men in the reservesafter completing compulsory service, could jointhe army on a professional basis on a four-yearcontract. 9Georgia planned to switch to an entirely nonconscriptarmy by the end of 2009. The increasedcosts were estimated at US$4,226 for the annualcost of every non-conscript soldier comparedwith US$1,001 for every conscript. 10Military training and military schoolsThe military schools which formerly existed inGeorgia were reportedly no longer in operationand there was no military education in schools. 11There were four tertiary-level militaryacademies. 12 Of these, the NCO School admittedapplicants straight from school; the DefenceAcademy had previously also taken schoolgraduates, many from poor families andorphanages, and including 17-year-olds, but nowrestricted entry to graduates. 13The government strongly supported andfully funded a number of Patriot Camps aroundthe country, which offered ten-day residentialprograms in gun handling, sport and leadershiptraining for young people (male and female)aged 15–20. Handling guns, including automaticweapons, was taught by military trainers. 14 In2005, 15,000 young people attended PatriotCamps, and in 2006, 30,000. 15 In 2006 thegovernment announced plans to hold a camp inthe Kodori Gorge. 16 Opposition politicians werecritical of the militaristic nature of the camps. 17AbkhaziaAbkhazia’s 1995 Law on Universal Military Serviceset 18 as the minimum age for conscription. Boyswere registered with the authorities at the ageof 17. 18There were some reports that boys underthe age of 18 had been conscripted illegally intothe Abkhazia forces or released on paymentof bribes, including in the ethnic Georgian Galiregion under the control of Abkhazia. 19 Theauthorities in Abkhazia denied that an attempthad been made in November 2005 to conscriptethnic Georgians. 20 In March 2007 UNOMIGassigned a human rights officer to its office inGali, to coordinate with the newly establishednon-governmental Human Rights Centre in thedistrict. 21In the final two grades of school, betweenthe ages of 15 and 17, pupils received “preconscriptiontraining for civil defence” for twohours a week. However, in many schools thecourse did not take place because of its obsoletenature and the lack of trained staff, and theMinistry of Education planned to produce a newcourse. Entrance to Abkhazia’s Military Academyand entry to the reserve officer training corps inhigher education institutions was limited to thoseover 18. 22In August 2007 it was reported that a militaryschool in Abkhazia was to be reopened withF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 4 9

support from the Russian armed forces. Nodetails of enrolment policy were available. 23The Monadire paramilitary groupThe Monadire paramilitary group based inAbkhazia’s Kodori Gorge was officially disbandedin 2005 and disarmed by the Georgiangovernment in mid-2006. It was reported to havehad up to 700 members at times. 24 It was notknown if any of its members were under 18.South OssetiaThe South Ossetian army reportedly followed themilitary regulations of the Russian Federation,with a minimum age of 18 for conscription. Thebulk of its security training took place in Russia.Military service was for 18 months. A SouthOssetian military official stated that there wasno bullying in the army because soldiers servedmainly in their home areas. 25* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 See, for example, Amnesty International Report2005.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minister’s Directivesfor 2007, undated, www.mfa.gov.ge.3 “US Signs New Military Assistance Accord withGeorgia”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Newsline, 20 September 2006, reported inGeorgia Daily Digest, www.eurasianet.org.4 UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unomig.5 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Georgia:Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report No.159, 26 November 2004, www.crisisgroup.org.6 Giorgi Kupatadze and Inal Khashig, “Georgian–Abkhaz tensions rise over Kodori Gorge”, Instituteof War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 25 August2006, www.iwpr.net.7 Claire Bigg, Russia: 2006 – A Year of Muscle andMissteps, RFE/RL, 28 December 2006, www.rferl.org; “Georgia orders Russia ‘spies’ held”, CNN, 29September 2006.8 “Georgian official says Kodori attack came fromRussia”, RFE/RL, 14 March 2007.9 Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces of Georgia,Military Service, www.mod.gov.ge.10 J. Mazakhiroglu, “Military commissioners’ officeswill be abolished”, Armeyskoe Zerkalo, 30December 2006, www.zerkalo.az.11 Confidential source, November 2007.12 Ministry of Defence, above note 9, Educationalinstitutions.13 Human Rights Centre (HRIDC), “Students ofthe Military Academy voice a protest in frontof parliament”, 22 September 2005, www.humanrights.ge; Tamar Maisuradze, “The paradein front of the state chancellery”, 24 hours pressagency, 10 June 2005, www.24hours.ge.14 Natalia Antelava, “Patriot games for youngGeorgians”, BBC News, 19 September 2005;Lawrence Sheets, “‘Patriot camps’ cause concernin former Soviet republic”, Morning Edition,National Public Radio (NPR), 12 October 2005,www.npr.org.15 Government of the Autonomous Republic ofAdjara, “President accompanied by guests visited‘patriot’ camp”, 25 May 2006, www.adjara.gov.ge.16 “Georgia revives despite blockade – Saakashvilitells ‘patriots’”, Civil Georgia, 16 September2006, www.civil.ge.17 Natalia Antelava, above note 14.18 Confidential sources, Abkhazia.19 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2005 and 2006.20 “UN Expresses Concern at Situation in Abkhazia’sGali region”, RFE/RL, 7 November 2005; “Someof the conscripts detained in Gali region returnedto their families”, Novosti-Gruziya, 14 December2005, www.newsgeorgia.ru.21 Report of the UN Secretary-General on theSituation in Abkhazia, Georgia, UN Doc.S/2007/182, 3 April 2007.22 Confidential sources, Abkhazia, March 2007.23 “Separatists Open Military School”, GeorgianTimes, 8 August 2007, www.geotimes.ge.24 Nino Khutsidze, “Military expert on Kodorioperation”, Civil Georgia, 26 July 2006, www.civil.ge.25 “Tskhinvali army begins spring draft”, Regnum,5 April 2006, www.unomig.org.1 5 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GERMANYFederal Republic of GermanyPopulation: 82.7 million (14.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 245,700Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 13 December 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Under-18s continued to serve in the armedforces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 12 of the 1949 Basic Law (constitution)provided the legal basis for conscription tomilitary service. In accordance with the 1956Military Service Act, all German males becameliable for compulsory military service, lasting ninemonths, at the age of 18. Article 4b of the 1949Basic Law established a right to conscientiousobjection to military service, and currentprovisions for alternative service, also lastingnine months, were set out in the 2003 Law onConscientious Objection. 1 For those who becameeligible for conscription at 18, a pre-inductionmedical examination took place no earlier thansix months before their 18th birthday. Voluntaryenlistment in the German armed forces waspermissible at 17, provided that the individualvolunteering had the consent of a parent orguardian. In such cases, a pre-induction medicalexamination took place six months before theapplicant’s 17th birthday. Volunteers under 18were enrolled for military training only, and wereexpressly prohibited from participating in anymilitary operations and from performing anyfunction requiring the use of firearms, includingdeployment for armed guard duty. However,17-year-old volunteers could receive firearmstraining; at the time of their enrolment theyreceived written instructions stating that their useof firearms would be strictly limited to training,and that they would not be involved in any activitythat may lead to armed conflict. 2 In 2005 therewere 1,229 males and females under the age of 18serving in the German armed forces. The numberof under-18s serving in 2006 was 906. 3DevelopmentsA group of German non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) working on children’s rightssuggested that the recruitment of child soldiers byarmies or armed groups was not recognized by theauthorities as a basis for granting refugee status;the number of former child soldiers currentlyliving in Germany was estimated to be between300 and 500. The German Code of Crimes againstInternational Law criminalized the recruitmentor enlistment of children under the age of 15 intoarmed forces or armed groups, as well as theiractive participation in international or internalarmed conflicts, including such acts committedoutside, or having no connection with, Germany. 4During the first quarter of 2006, Germanycontributed approximately 83 million towardsthe cost of projects aiming at the reintegrationof ex-combatants, especially child soldiers, inAngola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.Approximately €1.4 million were directed towardscivil peace service programs in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Uganda. 5At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Germany and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.International standardsGermany ratified the Optional Protocol on 13December 2004. In its declaration entered uponratification, Germany confirmed that 17 was theminimum age for voluntary recruitment to thearmed forces, and that “persons under the age of18 years shall be recruited into the armed forcessolely for the purpose of commencing militarytraining.” 61 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “The rightto conscientious objection to military service inEurope: A review of the current situation”, April2005.2 Initial report of Germany to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/DEU/1,17 April 2007.3 Confidential source, August 2007.4 Kindernothilfe, Terre des Hommes and theGerman Coordination for Child Soldiers, ShadowReport in the Context of the States ReportProcedure Pursuant to Article 8 of the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of theChild on the Involvement of Children in ArmedConflicts, 2007.5 Initial report, above note 2.6 Declaration of Germany on ratification of theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5 1

GhanaRepublic of GhanaPopulation: 22.1 million (10.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 13,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 24 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn 2005 the government reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child that theminimum age for voluntary enlistment into thearmy was 18, that there was no conscription andthat by law under-18s were not allowed to join thearmed forces. 1 There were no reports of under-18sin the armed forces.Ghana’s National Service Scheme (NSS),which lasted for one to two years and wascompulsory for able-bodied persons betweenthe ages of 18 and 40, consisted mainly of publicservice, but military training was an option forsome. 2and guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Second periodic report of Ghana to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/GHA/CO/2, 14 July 2005.2 Ghana’s National Service, History and ProfileSection.3 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2008–2009.4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Ghana,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/GHA/2,17 March 2006.DevelopmentsIn 2005 significant numbers of Togolese refugeesarrived in Ghana, fleeing political violence intheir home country, joining the large numbersof Liberian refugees. In its planning for 2008the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) estimated thatthere were present in the country almost 10,000Togolese refugees and asylum seekers and over32,000 Liberians. 3An increase in sexual exploitation, inparticular for commercial purposes, was raisedby the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childin its concluding observations on Ghana’s secondperiodic report, in March 2006. The committeealso expressed concern about the existence ofdiscrimination against girls and street childrenand other groups of vulnerable children. Itwelcomed the National Plan for Action entitled“Ghana Fit for Children” and the passing of theHuman Trafficking Act of 2005. 4At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Ghana and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principles1 5 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GREECEHellenic RepublicPopulation: 11.1 million (1.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 147,100Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 22 October 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum legal age for voluntaryrecruitment was 18.ContextThe state of mobilization from 1976 because ofthe conflict in Cyprus ended on 18 December2002. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeA new conscription law in 2005 provided formandatory military service of 12 months formen between the ages of 19 and 45. All healthymale citizens had to register at the age of 18.Deferments were available to students in highereducation, on health grounds or to those withbrothers serving in the armed forces. The lengthof military service could be reduced for variousreasons, for example for the eldest sons of largefamilies in which the father had died, or for menwho had dependent elderly parents. Peopleexempt from conscription included fathers ofmore than three children or fathers whose wiveshad died or were incapable of work and whosechildren could not support themselves. The2005 law allowed alternative civilian serviceto be suspended in times of war, and for thoseperforming such service to be integrated into“unarmed military service” (Article 65). 2On ratifying the Optional Protocol in October2003, Greece declared that the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment to the armed forces was 18years. 3A law that had not been repealed but wasreportedly not enforced required all men andwomen aged between 18 and 60 who were notserving in the armed forces to complete servicein universal defence units for up to four days ayear. Certain women were exempt, such as thosewho were pregnant or had children under theage of 12. The functions of such units includedresponding to natural disasters, guarding vitalinstallations and providing first aid. They couldbe provided with arms and ammunition duringmobilization, for the purposes of exercises, or forspecific operational missions in border areas. 4Military training and military schoolsMilitary educational institutions included theHellenic Military Academy, the Hellenic NationalDefence College and the Non-commissionedOfficer Army School. Military academies enjoyedthe same status as universities, and entrancewas conditional on completion of high schooleducation. Students also trained abroad atinstitutions of other NATO member countries. 5Both male and female students at the Greekmilitary academies could not be married, havechildren, be pregnant or become pregnant duringtheir studies. They had to be under 21 on entry, 6but there was no information available about theminimum age of entry.DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Greece and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 Presidential Decree 371 of 2002, GovernmentGazette, FEK 320A, 18 December 2002, www.et.gr.2 Conscription Law, No. 3421 of 2005, 13 December2005, www.stratologia.gr/; Ministry of Defence,official conscription website, www.stratologia.gr; OMHROI.GR, “Conscription in Greece”, www.omhroi.gr.3 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Universal Defence Law, No. 2641 of 1998;information from Amnesty InternationalGreece 2007; Amnesty International “Right toconscientious objection should be introduced innew Universal Defence Law”, 22 June 1998.5 Hellenic Army General Staff website, “Cadres’Training”, www.army.gr.6 NATO, Committee on Women in the NATO forces,“Frequently Asked Questions”, www.nato.int.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5 3

Guatemal aRepublic of GuatemalaPopulation: 12.6 million (6.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 15,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Some 16-year-old boys in eastern partsof the country were recruited and used assoldiers.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeGuatemalans had to register with the militaryauthorities on becoming 18, regardless of theirplace of residence. Women were required to joinactive military service in times of war. 1The Law of Social and Civic Service(Legislative Decree 20-2003) provided foralternative service for conscientious objectors.There were no specific policies on indigenouspopulations, who formed a considerableproportion of recruits. 2Non-governmental organizations reportedthat in some areas 16-year-olds were “delivered”to army officials by their families, in the beliefthat military service was an essential partof their becoming men. Military authoritiesreportedly permitted this type of recruitment ineastern regions of the country, where the birthregistration process was weak. 3The Law of Integral Protection of Children andAdolescents (Legislative Decree 27-2003) statedthat “in the event of armed conflict, children andyoung persons have the right not to be recruitedand the State shall abide by and enforce theapplicable norms of international humanitarianlaw. The State shall take all possible measures toensure that persons who have not yet attainedthe age of 18 years do not take a direct partin hostilities and are not recruited for militaryservice at any time.” 4There was no legal provision criminalizingthe recruitment of children, but several statutoryoffences described in the Criminal Code, such asabduction of children and abuse of power, couldbe applied against recruiters. 5 There were noplans to include a provision expressly prohibitingthe recruitment of children under 18 in theCriminal Code. 6Military training and military schoolsThe International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) assisted in training members of thearmy in international humanitarian law; 7 thegovernment reported that more than 14,000 menand 970 women in the armed forces had receivedhuman rights training. 8There were 11 educational establishmentsadministered by the armed forces. 9 Undernational law, children attending military schoolswere not members of the armed or reserve forces,and were not required to join the armed forces. 10In the event of an emergency or armed conflictthey could not be designated active members ofthe armed forces or be enlisted. 11Officer cadets followed a four-year course atthe Polytechnic School (Escuela Politécnica). 12Candidates had to be at least 17 and havecompleted secondary-school. Cadets at thePolytechnic School could apply to become navalofficers at the Navy School after completing atleast one year of studies. 13 The minimum ageof entry to the Adolfo V. Hall schools, whichcombined academic and military educationover five or six years, was 11; graduation aftercompleting five years was as a sub-lieutenantin the army reserve. Candidates to theMilitary Aviation Technical School had to havesuccessfully completed the third grade of basiceducation, but no minimum age was specified.Cadets at the Military Aviation School had to havecompleted a minimum of two years’ study at thePolytechnic School. 14There were reports of the use of corporalpunishment in military schools and that noadequate impartial complaints mechanisms wereavailable to students. 15Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)According to the government the NationalCompensation Program provided psychosocialrehabilitation and material compensation tovictims of serious human rights violations duringthe internal armed conflict which ended in 1996,including the forced recruitment of children. 16 Itwas estimated that of the 3,000 members of thearmed opposition group Guatemalan NationalRevolutionary Unity (Unidad RevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca, URNG) who participatedin reintegration programs, 214 were under 18years of age. 17Non-governmental organizations reportedthat a lack of information on the number andage of those recruited during the conflict hadprevented former child soldiers from benefitingfrom any reparation or reintegration programs,most of which were aimed at widows and formermembers of armed opposition groups and selfdefencegroups. 181 5 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsThere were no reports of armed politicalgroups operating in the country, but gangs andcriminal groups with links to private securitycompanies and former and current members ofthe police committed hundreds of killings andother crimes. 19 It was estimated that there werearound 340 gangs in Guatemala, with as many as165,000 members in all, mostly under 24 yearsof age. 20The UN Committee on the Rights of theChild, on reviewing Guatemala’s initial OptionalProtocol report in June 2007, expressed concernabout the lack of specific legal provisionscriminalizing child recruitment and of informationon safeguards adopted to ensure that childrenwere not recruited or involved in armed conflict. 21In October 2007 Guatemala endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The two documents,which were previously endorsed by 59 statesat a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, reaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for the protection of andassistance to child soldiers, following a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsored bythe French government and UNICEF.10 NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, State Party Examination of Guatemala’sInitial Report on the OPAC, Session report, 8 June2007, www.crin.org.11 Written replies, above note 6.12 Escuela Politécnica, Admisión.13 Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, AcuerdoGubernativo No. 714-95, December 1995, www.congreso.gob.gt.14 Initial report, above note 4.15 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Guatemala,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/GTM/CO/1 (unedited version), 8 June 2007.16 Committee against Torture, above note 8.17 Initial report, above note 4.18 Movimiento Social por los Derechos de la Niñez,above note 3.19 US State Department, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices 2006: Guatemala, 6 March 2007,www.state.gov.20 USAID, Central America and Mexico GangAssessment, Annex 2: Guatemala Profile, April2006, www.usaid.gov.21 Concluding observations, above note 15.F — J1 Decreto No 72-90, Ley Constitutiva del Ejército,Leyes de Guatemala.2 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Guatemala, August2006, www.flacso.cl.3 Movimiento Social por los Derechos de la Niñez,Adolescencia y Juventud en Guatemala, “InformeAlternativo sobre el Cumplimiento del ProtocoloFacultativo de la CDN sobre la Participación delos Niños en Conflictos Armados”, November2006, www.crin.org.4 Initial report of Guatemala to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/GTM/1, 17 July 2006.5 Ibid.6 Written replies by Guatemala to the Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/GTM/Q/1/Add.1, 23 April 2007.7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),“Guatemala: respetar el derecho humanitariodesde el entrenamiento”, 19 July 2006, www.icrc.org.8 UN Committee against Torture, Thirty-sixthsession, Summary record of the 701st meeting:Guatemala, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.701, 12 May 2006.9 Initial report, above note 4.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5 5

GUINEARepublic of GuineaPopulation: 9.4 million (4.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 12,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s ingovernment armed forces. Guineannationals, including children, whohad taken part in the Liberian conflictwere demobilized from Liberian armedgroups, but only very few took part indemobilization programs. There werereports of re-recruitment of formercombatants.ContextDrastically deteriorating living standards for themajority of the population after over 20 yearsof authoritarian rule under President LansanaConté led to two general strikes in Februaryand June 2006. A third general strike in January2007 became an unprecedented popular revoltcalling for political change. Demonstrations inthe following weeks, in which school studentsand other young people played an active part,were violently suppressed by the security forces.Estimates of those killed ranged from 130 to over180 with over 1,500 injured. Some of them werechildren. 1Guinea was an immediate neighbour ofCôte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Whenconflicts broke out in those countries thousandsof refugees, as well as large numbers of returningGuinean nationals, crossed the border intoGuinea. Most of them found refuge in the isolatedForest Region of Guinea (Guinée forestière),where the borders of all four countries met. 2 By1997–8 there were close to half a million refugeesand asylum-seekers in Guinea registered with theUN refugee agency (UNHCR), reducing to about100,000 in 2004–5 as neighbouring countriesbecame more stable and refugees returnedhome. 3 By 2007 around 12,000 refugees – about70 per cent from Liberia and about 30 per centfrom Sierra Leone – remained in Guinea. 4 Theyincluded about 350 Sierra Leonean childrenseparated from their families. 5Guinea was involved in the complex web ofconflicts in neighbouring countries – in SierraLeone from 1991–2002, in the Liberian conflictsof 1990–7 and 2000–3, and in Côte d’Ivoiresince 2002. 6 The Guinean security forces werereportedly involved in providing or facilitating theprovision of arms flows to combatants in thosecountries. 7 At times attacks were mounted fromthose countries into Guinea.In the 1990s Guinea was intimately involvedin the conflict in Sierra Leone, from where theRevolutionary United Front (RUF) launched crossborderattacks on Guinea in 2000–1. Guinea usedrecruits from Sierra Leonean refugee camps inGuinea to fight off those attacks, and played anactive role in defeating the RUF in the final stagesof the Sierra Leone conflict. 8Around the same time as the attacks by theRUF, Guinea was attacked also from Liberia. Thearmed group Liberians United for Reconciliationand Democracy (LURD) was based in Guinea,and in contravention of the UN arms embargoon Liberia the Guinean Ministry of Defencereportedly provided arms to LURD around thetime of its attacks on Monrovia in July 2003 whichultimately overthrew President Charles Taylor. 9Guinea was also involved in the conflict inCôte d’Ivoire. The Guinean government reportedlywas transhipping arms for the government ofCôte d’Ivoire, at least until the imposition of a UNarms embargo in November 2004. 10 In June 2004the Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN)in Côte d’Ivoire claimed that an attack on themby unidentified armed elements which killed 11civilians in Korhogo, in the north of the country,was supported by the Guinean government. 11 InDecember 2006 a UN expert group reported thatit had credible information that Guinea had beenused as a transit point for the training of fightersloyal to Côte d’Ivoire President Gbagbo. 12The Forest Region of Guinea was thecrossroads for arms trafficking and a migrantpopulation of thousands of young fighters,including child soldiers, crossing the bordersbetween Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côted’Ivoire who saw conflict mainly as an economicopportunity. Many had first been forciblyrecruited as children in one conflict, then willinglycrossed borders to take up arms in another,often with a different armed group. A 2005study by Human Rights Watch found that mosthad been motivated by promises of financialgain, and many could not articulate the politicalobjective of the group they fought with. Therisk of re-recruitment was exacerbated by highrates of youth unemployment and corruptionand deficiencies in the implementation ofdisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs. 13 An August 2006 report by theUN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted thathigh levels of unemployment, particularly youthunemployment, across west Africa posed a riskto stability in the region. This was reiterated in a2007 report by the UN Secretary-General whichhighlighted also the importance of reform of the1 5 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

security sector in countries in the region as ameans of addressing it. 14GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder Order No. 072/PRG/SGG/90 of 25 July1990, all Guinean citizens aged 18–25 could becalled for military service for 18 months (Article1). 15 While conscription was provided for in law,there was no military service in practice. 16Guinean law and army regulations prohibitedthe recruitment of under-18s into the armedforces. 17 However, there were insufficientmeasures with regard to birth registration,especially in rural areas. 18 This meant that it wasnot always be possible to be sure whether ayoung person was 18.Child recruitment and deploymentAt the time of the cross-border attacks intoGuinea from Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000–1,more than 7,000 young men volunteered for theYoung Volunteers (Jeunes volontaires), civilianmilitias supporting the Guinean army. 19 Thegovernment had undertaken that they would beemployed in the regular army afterwards but infact very few of them were. 20The extent of child recruitment into theYoung Volunteers was not established and wasconsistently denied by government authorities.There had been training for officers with regardto children’s rights, including preventing therecruitment and use of children. 21 One formerYoung Volunteer claimed to have been as youngas 13 when he was recruited. 22Only a small minority of Young Volunteershad completed a demobilization process, andthe status of those who had not demobilized wasunclear. Some retained their arms and reportedlycontinued to act as volunteer soldiers; otherswere reportedly employed providing securityservices for non-governmental organizations(NGOs) and UN agencies operating in the ForestRegion. 23 There were also reports that some ofthem set up roadblocks, looting vehicles androbbing passengers. 24 In March 2006 the UNreportedly estimated that some 4,000 volunteersoldiers, all or almost all by then over 18,operated in the Forest Region, providing theirown uniforms and hoping to be formally recruitedto the armed forces. 25Armed groupsMany of the combatants in the conflicts inneighbouring countries were from Guinea. Morethan half of the over 600 disarmed combatants inLiberia who were identified as foreign nationalswere from Guinea. 26 The same applied also toforeign national children formerly associated withthe fighting forces who were repatriated fromLiberia by the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC). 27In mid-2005 it was reported that manyformer LURD combatants, who had operatedfrom Guinea during the Liberian conflict, weremoving back from Liberia to the Forest Region ofGuinea. 28From mid-2004 there were reports of activerecruitment of former combatants in Liberia forboth pro and anti-government groups in Guinea.Recruitment was reported to be taking placein Monrovia and counties bordering Guinea,among former combatants associated withformer President Charles Taylor, as well as formerLURD combatants. 29 According to some reports,Guinean military officials associated with the sonof a former president of Guinea, Sékou Touré,offered money to former LURD combatants to joinan attack on Guinea. There were also allegationsthat Liberians may have been involved in anassassination attempt against President Contéin January 2005. Other former LURD combatantswere recruiting on behalf of the Guineangovernment. Some of those being recruited werereported to be children. 30 However, despite thewell-documented recruitment, and reports ofinfiltration into Guinea in late 2004, attacks bythe armed groups allegedly plotting to overthrowPresident Conté did not materialize. 31 In October2006 the Secretary-General reported that the UNhad obtained no confirmation of the allegationsof recruitment of child soldiers by Liberianarmed groups in connection with the situation inGuinea. 32During the crisis in early 2007 there weresome reports of fighters crossing into Guineafrom neighbouring countries in anticipationof recruitment into armed groups or militias.However, there was no evidence of such groupsbeing formed, or of children being targeted forrecruitment. Former armed group commanderswere reported to have said there was now noneed to recruit children given the numbers ofexperienced combatants – many of them formerchild soldiers – to recruit from. 33Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)By 2004 about 350 Young Volunteers hadcompleted training as part of a demobilizationprogram, but thousands of others, manyrecruited as children, had not benefited from theprogram because of lack of funds. 34 In 2007 itwas reported that some rehabilitation projectsaimed at former Young Volunteers continued. 35In November 2003 UNICEF estimated thatsome 2,000 Guinean child soldiers, includingchild soldiers returning from Liberia, requireddemobilization, disarmament and reintegration. 36F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5 7

In the event, the number of Guinean childsoldiers who took part in DDR programs wassubstantially lower than this estimate. As ofJune 2006, 29 Guinean child soldiers had beendemobilized in Liberia and returned to Guinea. 37Many children reportedly self-demobilizedthrough fear of being stigmatized. NGOs workingwith children in Guinea reported that a barrierto both successful reintegration of former childsoldiers and prevention of new recruitmentwas the difficulty of discussing the issueopenly because of the stigma attached to childsoldiering. This meant that many former childsoldiers were unwilling to reveal that they hadbeen combatants. 38Former child soldiers were also reported tobe having difficulty in adapting to civilian life,in particular the loss of the power and relativewealth gained through association with an armedgroup. 39 In 2007 large numbers of former childsoldiers were believed to be present, withoutsupport, in the Forest Region. 401 International Crisis Group (ICG), Guinea: Changeor Chaos, Africa Report No. 121, 14 February2007, and Guinea: Change on Hold, AfricaBriefing No. 49, 8 November 2007; HumanRights Watch (HRW), Dying for Change: Brutalityand Repression by Guinean Security Forces inResponse to a Nationwide Strike, April 2007;Amnesty International (AI), Guinea: “Soldierswere Shooting Everywhere” – The Security Forces’Response to Peaceful Demands for Change (AFR29/003/2007), 27 June 2007.2 “Guinea’s Forest Region – living on the edge”,IRIN, January 2005, www.irinnews.org.3 UNHCR, Country Data Sheet: Guinea, 2005UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 30 April 2007,www.unhcr.org.4 UNHCR, Global Appeal 2008–2009.5 Report of the UN Secretary-General oncross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc.S/2007/143, 13 March 2007.6 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and SierraLeone in this volume.7 ICG, Stopping Guinea’s Slide, Africa Report No.94, 14 June 2005.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Second report of the Secretary-General on the UNoperation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2004/697,27 August 2004.12 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia, UN Doc.S/2006/976, 15 December 2006.13 See HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood: The LethalLegacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors, March2005; Report of the Secretary-General on ways tocombat subregional and cross-border problemsin West Africa, UN Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March2004; Report of the Secretary-General on intermissionco-operation and possible cross-borderoperations between the UN Mission in SierraLeone, the UN Mission in Liberia, and the UNOperation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2005/135,2 March 2005.14 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), YouthUnemployment and Regional Insecurity in WestAfrica, 2nd edn, August 2006, www.un.org/unowa; Report of the Secretary-General, abovenote 5.15 Initial report of Guinea to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.48,17 June 1997. (This corrects the error in ChildSoldiers: Global Report 2001 and 2004.)16 Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004, citingconfidential source, Guinea, May 2004.17 Ibid., citing confidential source.18 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report submitted byGuinea, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.100, 10 May 1999.19 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, above note 7; Guinea:Change or Chaos, above note 1.20 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers andDisarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation andReintegration in West Africa, November 2006.21 Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005; informationfrom confidential source, 2007; see also ChildSoldiers: Global Report 2004.22 “Guinea: in a desperate bid for jobs, youths signup as ‘volunteers’”, IRIN, 6 March 2006.23 Ibid.; Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005;Confidential sources, Guinea, August 2007.24 Coalition interviews with army officers and NGOsin Guinea, June 2007.25 IRIN, above note 22.26 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/972,17 December 2004.27 Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2005/391, 16 June 2005.28 Stopping Guinea’s Slide, above note 7.29 Ibid.; Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 13.30 Report of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, UNDoc. S/2005/30, 13 June 2005.31 Guinea: Change or Chaos, above note 1.32 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006-826,26 October 2006.33 Confidential source, May 2007.34 For a more detailed account see Child Soldiers:Global Report 2004.35 Coalition interviews in Guinea, June 2007.1 5 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

36 UNICEF, “A window on West Africa’s war-wearychildren”, 4 November 2003.37 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 32.38 Coalition interviews in Guinea, 2005.39 Ibid.40 Confidential source, May 2007.GUINEA-BISSAURepublic of Guinea-BissauPopulation: 1.6 million (856,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 9,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 16, younger withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThere were no reports of child soldiersserving in the armed forces, although bylaw children aged under 16 years could beenlisted with parental consent.F — JContextPolitical tension and army unrest persisted. InOctober 2004, a year after ousting PresidentKumba Ialá, General Veríssimo Correia Seabra,the chief of staff of the armed forces, and ColonelDomingos de Barros were killed in a revoltby soldiers who were demanding payment ofarrears owed to them for their service in theUN peacekeeping force in Liberia. 1 No one wasprosecuted for those deaths. 2 The revolt wasended by a deal with the military hierarchy whichincluded an offer of an amnesty for offencescommitted by soldiers between 1980 and 6October 2004. 3 However, the amnesty law hadnot yet been approved by parliament. There wasserious unrest in the run-up to the July 2005presidential elections, which were won by aformer president, João Bernardo “Niño” Vieira.Fighting erupted in March 2006 betweenthe armed forces and a dissident faction of theSenegalese separatist armed group Democraticforces of Casamance Movement (Mouvement desforces democratiques du Casamance, MFDC), ledby Salif Sadio, which had entered Guinea-Bissauterritory. The ensuing conflict, which lasted for amonth, resulted in the isolation of over 20,000people in rural communities in the north, and thedisplacement of at least 10,000 people, mostlywomen and children, some 2,000 of whom fledto Senegal. The MFDC reportedly laid mines andother explosive devices in the area. 4 There wereno reports of children taking part in the fighting.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeDecree 20/83 of 9 July 1983 provided forcompulsory military service for men agedC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 5 9

etween 18 and 25. However, obligatory militaryservice ceased to be implemented from thesecond half of the 1980s. 5 The decree alsoprovided for boys under 16 to perform militaryservice with parental or guardian consent.Currently, no under-18s appeared to be serving inthe armed forces.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In October 2005 the government announcedthe destruction of its entire stockpile ofapproximately 5,000 landmines. 6 Emergencyde-mining in the north got under way followingthe fighting in March–April 2006. 7 Nevertheless,Guinea-Bissau remained plagued by landminesand other explosive devices, and according to aUnited Nations Development Program (UNDP)report, 32 of 39 sectors remained contaminatedby mines and other munitions. This had aparticularly negative impact on the rural poorand the national economy, since much of the landcould not be cultivated. 8According to the Ministry of Defence, asecurity sector reform envisaged the reduction ofthe armed forces from 9,650 to 3,440. 9 In 2007the UNDP agreed to finance an independentcensus of the armed forces, in order to take intoaccount the needs and numbers of armed forcesto be targeted for demobilization. 108 “Guinea-Bissau: International attention on drugtrafficking could help demining efforts”, IRIN, 26July 2007.9 Report of the UN Secretary-General, above note7.10 Report of the UN Secretary-General ondevelopments in Guinea-Bissau and on theactivities of the UN Peacebuilding Support Officein that country, UN Doc. S/2007/715, 6 December2007.11 Confidential sources, May 2007.DevelopmentsSenegalese children of MFDC fighters or whowere refugees from the conflict in Casamancegrew up in extreme poverty in Guinea-Bissau,and were exposed both to conflict and to armedcriminal activity. 111 “Soldiers Stage Revolt in Guinea-Bissau”, AP, 6October 2004.2 US State Department, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices, 2006: Guinea-Bissau, Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 6 March2007, www.state.gov.3 “Guinea-Bissau renegade troops reach deal withmilitary”, AFP, 10 October 2004.4 Report of the UN Secretary-General ondevelopments in Guinea-Bissau and on theactivities of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office(UNGBIS), UN Doc. S/2006/487, 6 July 2006.5 Confidential sources, 31 July 2007.6 “Guinea-Bissau: Stockpiles gone but landmines acontinued threat”, IRIN, 26 October 2005.7 Report of the UN Secretary-General ondevelopments in Guinea-Bissau and on theactivities of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office(UNGBIS), UN Doc. S/2006/946, 6 December2006.1 6 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

GuyanaRepublic of GuyanaPopulation: 751,000 (261,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,100Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (no conscriptionin practice)Voluntary recruitment age: 16; 14–16 withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces but legislation providing forrecruitment from the age of 14 was still inforce.2 Initial report of Guyana to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.47,6 August 2003.3 Defence Act, Chapter 15.01.4 Guyana Defence Force; see also Initial report,above note 2.5 National Service Act, Chapter 15.02.F — JGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Guyana Defence Force consisted of aregular force and reserves and was charged withthe defence of, and maintenance of order in,Guyana. According to the Guyana Defence Force,individuals aged 18–25 with a “good primaryeducation” were eligible to apply. 1In August 2003 Guyana reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child that, underthe Defence Act, “A recruiting officer shall notenlist a person under the age of eighteen yearsin the regular Force.” 2 However, provisions in theDefence Act permitting recruitment from the ageof 14 had not been repealed or amended. Section18.2 of the Defence Act stated that “A recruitingofficer shall not enlist a person under the age ofsixteen years in the regular Force, unless consentto the enlistment has been given in writing.” Thisconsent could be given by either of his parents,anyone with “parental rights and powers inrespect of him”, or “if there is no such person …any person in whose care (whether in law or infact) the person offering to enlist may be”. Thesame section stated that “no person under theage of fourteen years shall be enlisted in theregular Force”. 3There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.There was no conscription in practice, 4 but theNational Service Act was still in force, stating thatevery male citizen ordinarily resident in Guyanawho had attained the age of 18 years was liablefor national service. 51 Guyana Defence Force, “Become a Soldier,” www.gdf-gy.org.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 6 1

HAITIRepublic of HaitiPopulation: 8.5 million (3.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 15 August 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182Armed gangs, mostly in Port-au-Prince,continued to use children as spies andguards, to transport weapons and toparticipate in clashes with the police andUN troops. Rape of women and girls bygang members was widespread and girlsassociated with gangs were subject tosexual abuse and exploitation.ContextPresident Jean-Bertrand Aristide resigned andleft the country in February 2004 after an armedgroup took control of much of the northern partof the country. A transitional government wasestablished, but the government and a weakenedpolice force were unable to respond to a dramaticupsurge in violent crime in the capital, Portau-Prince.1 The large quantity of small arms incirculation fuelled criminal activities and humanrights abuses. In late 2004, despite the presenceof the UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti(MINUSTAH), armed gangs loyal to Aristidelaunched ‘Operasyon Bagdad’, in which theycalled for the return of the former president,targeting and killing several Haitian NationalPolice (HNP) officials. A spate of kidnappingsof wealthy Haitians further destabilized Portau-Prince,peaking in May and June 2005 andeventually targeting any Haitian perceived tobe able to raise a ransom. 2 The government andMINUSTAH came under severe pressure fromHaitian civil society organizations to deal withgang activity and crack down on kidnappers. 3Armed criminal gangs, including under-18s,established themselves in the impoverishedneighbourhoods of Bel Air and Cité Soleil. Humanrights organizations affiliated to the pro-Aristidemovement accused the transitional governmentand MINUSTAH of human rights violationsagainst the civilian populations in these areas. 4Delayed presidential elections took place inFebruary 2006, returning to power the formerpresident René Garcia Préval. Throughout 2006Préval continued to be confronted with violentcrime, and a controversial policy of dialoguewith gang leaders showed no real results. Thesituation came to a head in December 2006,when a spate of kidnappings of children forransom caused the closure of schools andwidespread panic in Port-au-Prince, promptingtougher military operations against the gangs byMINUSTAH in Cité Soleil. UN troops concentratedon the stabilization of Bel Air, given its proximityto the port and the presidential palace, and bythe end of 2006 a number of gang members hadeither been arrested or had dispersed to otherareas. Following major MINUSTAH operationsin late 2006 and early 2007, security improvedin Cité Soleil, but gang activity and kidnappingspersisted, albeit to a lesser extent. Street gangscontinued to operate in Port-au-Prince, inparticular in the poor areas of Bel Air, Cité Soleiland Martissant. 5 In Gonaïves, rival gangs fromthe neighbouring areas of Jubilé and Raboteaufought each other, each reportedly controlled bydifferent political groups. 6Former military officials were grouped inbases in Port-au-Prince, the Central Plateauand the towns of Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes andOuanaminthe throughout 2004 and some of2005, pressuring the government to compensatethem for wages not paid since the dissolution ofthe armed forces in 1995. In 2005 the transitionalgovernment agreed to pay former militaryofficials a total of US$2.8 million, and theyabandoned their bases. Most were not disarmed,however, and their weapons remained at large. 7The poorest country in the Americas, Haitiranked 154th on the UN Human DevelopmentIndex and 78 per cent of Haitians lived below thenational poverty line. Child mortality was high,most children lacking access to safe drinkingwater and sanitation; illiteracy was widespreadas most children did not finish primary-school. 8The humanitarian situation was particularly acutein areas such as Cité Soleil, where siege-likeconditions persisted as MINUSTAH attemptedto root out gangs, compounding the conditionsof destitution that already existed. Access tomedical facilities for civilians caught in crossfirewas limited to a hospital run by the humanitarianmedical aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1987 constitution provided for compulsorymilitary service by all Haitians who reached theage of 18 (Article 268). However, there had beenno military service since January 1995, when thearmed forces were disbanded by presidentialorder, although no constitutional amendmentwas passed to confirm their dissolution. 91 6 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Armed gangsA variety of armed gangs continued to operate,primarily in Port-au-Prince and Gonaïves. Whileprimarily criminal in nature, the gangs varied inorganizational structure, activities, motivationand degree of political affiliation, and could bemobilized for political purposes during periodsof heightened tension. 10 Among them were gangswhich evolved from “popular organizations”established in impoverished communities duringAristide’s term of office, when they were givenjobs and in many cases supplied with weapons.These groups actively demonstrated between2004 and 2007 for the return of Aristide. CorruptHNP officers reportedly led some of the gangs,and other gangs could have been co-optedand paid to mobilize on behalf of various nontraditionalpolitical actors during the sameperiod. 11 Many armed gangs were primarilyorganized to carry out criminal activities. Theextreme poverty of families in destitute urbanneighbourhoods and their inability to feedchildren or send them to school rendered childrenvulnerable to recruitment by the armed gangs. Ina context of poverty and insecurity, gang leaderswere at times perceived as community leadersor even heroes. In Cité Soleil, gang leaderscultivated an almost parental status with thechildren – who lacked affection and authorityfigures – and were often known as “uncle” or“father”. 12In early 2007 some seven or eight main armedgangs reportedly operated across Cité Soleil’s 32neighbourhoods, each with about 20 full-timemembers and dozens of additional “helpers”,including children. 13 Gangs were involved inarmed confrontations with MINUSTAH and theHNP during 2006 and on occasion childrenwere said to have been involved. 14 Childrenwere reported to have actively participated inOperasyon Bagdad in 2004. 15 Children wereused by these and other gangs as spies, guards,messengers or general helpers, or to transportweapons. They were used as guards to watch outfor MINUSTAH troops or the HNP, to watch overkidnap victims and to run errands. On occasionthey were ordered to throw stones at MINUSTAHtroops during armed confrontations, andMINUSTAH documented one case in which veryyoung children cut brake cables in their tanksduring an operation to arrest gang leaders. 16Along with women, children were used as shieldsby gang members fleeing arrest. 17 In Gonaïves,children sent from rural areas to be “fostered”by relatives ended up on the streets or joininggangs when the host family did not live up to itspromises of food and schooling, or was violentor abusive to the children. 18 Girls were said tohave been used to transport illegal weaponsfrom the village port of Anse Rouge to Gonaïves,and children were dressed in school uniformsand instructed to look out for the police orMINUSTAH. 19Rape of women and girls was widespreadand the UN estimated in 2006 that up to 50 percent of girls living in violent neighbourhoodssuch as Cité Soleil had been raped and that in theCarrefour and Martissant areas of Port-au-Princeand the southern town of Les Cayes gang rapeswere common. Girls in the custody of the HNPwere also reportedly raped. 20 From January toJune 2007 the UN documented the cases of 54children raped by armed gang members, amongthem ten who were gang-rape victims. 21 Rapewas used by gangs to intimidate and control thelocal population, to extort money or as revengefor acts by rival gangs. Girls associated withgangs were subjected to rape and exploitation. 22Children associated with armed gangs werealso reported to have committed rape. Ajudicial official reported a case in 2006 in whichunder-18s were found guilty of participation inkidnapping and rape and were sentenced torehabilitation in a juvenile detention centre. Thechildren were released, however, since therewas no centre to accommodate them. 23 Fewrapes were reported to the authorities and thegovernment failed to take significant steps toaddress the problem. 24Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In February 2005 the transitional governmentannounced the creation of a NationalCommission for Disarmament, Demobilizationand Reintegration (CNDDR) but a presidentialdecree establishing the commission was notissued until August 2006. 25 DDR activities wereextremely slow to get off the ground, and humanrights organizations accused the transitionalgovernment of lacking the political will toimplement disarmament. 26 The Commission’swork was not helped by the controversygenerated by the nomination of a Bel Air gangleader, Samba Boukman, to the Commission, anappointment contested by some human rightsorganizations, who claimed that Boukman hadbeen a leading participant in the 2004 OperasyonBagdad. 27 Despite a slow start, however, theCNDDR appeared to have shown some progressby the end of March 2007. On 19 March CNDDRpresident Alix Fils-Aimé announced that animportant arms consignment of automaticweapons and more than 40 boxes of cartridgeshad been handed over to the Commissionfollowing pressure on gangs by MINUSTAHoperations in Cité Soleil. 28The disparate and heterogeneous natureof the gangs, the prevalence of small armsheld by private citizens and the fact that nontraditionalactors were involved in fomentinginstability presented particular challenges forF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 6 3

the implementation of a DDR program. In 2007the UN country team developed a communityviolence reduction program and focused oninstitutional support to build the strength of theCNDDR. The program focused on labour-intensiveprojects to present an alternative to criminalityto those in violence-affected communities,pending larger-scale economic recovery efforts.Reintegration projects facilitated the return offormer gang members to their communities.Several of the projects were aimed at womenwho had been victims and perpetrators of armedviolence. 29By early 2007 MINUSTAH had offered aDDR program to several hundred young people,including children in Cité Soleil and Martissant,providing education, vocational training and asmall allowance. Critics of the program statedthat the gangs had sent young people to takepart who had never been armed and that gangmembers remained armed and on the streets. 30Child protection agencies nevertheless expressedconcern for the safety of under-18s who signed upfor disarmament – in particular their vulnerabilityto HNP arrest and detention, or attack by theirown or rival gangs. 31DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Haiti and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.International standardsHaiti ratified the Protocol Additional to theGeneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,and relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and theProtocol Additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protectionof Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts(Protocol II) on 20 December 2006. Haiti ratifiedILO Convention 182 on 19 July 2007.1 Réseau national de défense des droits humains(RNDDH), “Situation chaotique au sein de laPNH”, open letter to the director-general of thePNH, 10 March 2004, www.rnddh.org.2 Report of the Secretary-General on theUN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc.S/2005/631, 6 October 2005.3 Organization of American States (OAS), FirstQuarterly Report of the Secretary-General on theSituation in Haiti in Compliance with ResolutionAG/RES 2147, 20 October 2005, page 7, www.oas.org.4 Haiti Information Project, “Evidence mounts of aUN massacre in Haiti”, 12 July 2005.5 Report of the Secretary-General on theUN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc.S/2007/503, 22 August 2007; confidentialsources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.6 Youri Latortue, a senator representing the partyLatibonit an Aksyon (LAAA), was said to controlthe gangs in Raboteau, while those of Jubiléwere said to be controlled by Winter Etienne, anassociate of Guy Philippe, leader of the Front deResistans Nasyonal, the armed group that ledthe uprising that led to the departure of Aristide.Interview with local NGO, Port-au-Prince, 14March 2007.7 Amnesty International (AI), Haiti, Disarmamentdelayed, Justice Denied, 28 July 2005.8 UN Millennium Development Goals data, 2004,http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals.9 OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti,The Haitian National Police and Human Rights,July 1996; Report of the UN Secretary-General onHaiti, UN Doc. S/2004/300, 16 April 2004.10 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,21 December 2007.11 Confidential sources, March 2007.12 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March,2007.13 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March2007.14 Interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March2007.15 Interview with NGO, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.16 UN sources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.17 Interview with NGO, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.18 Interview with local NGO, Port-au-Prince, March2007. The restavek system is one of domesticslavery, whereby the children of destitute familiesare sent to work as domestic helpers in familiesof greater economic means.19 Interview with local NGO, March 2007.20 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,26 October 2006.21 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 10.22 Alex Renton, “The rape epidemic”, Observer, 2December 2007; interviews with NGOs, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.23 Confidential sources, Port-au-Prince, March 2007.24 Amnesty International Report 2006 and 2007.25 OAS, Secretary-General’s report to PermanentCouncil, 28 March 2005; Presidential Decree ofAugust 29, 2006 (“Dilia Lemaire quitte le navire”,Le Nouvelliste, 28 September 2006).26 AI, above note 7.1 6 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

27 RNDDH, “Le Terreur s’installe à Port-au-Prince”,news release, 6 December 2006.28 Confidential sources, Port-au-Prince, March2007; “Bélony en cavale remet des armes”, LeNouvelliste, 22 March 2007.29 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 5.30 NGO and UN sources, Port-au-Prince, March2007.31 UN sources, March 2007.Holy SeeHoly SeePopulation: 1,000Government armed forces: 100 1Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 19Voting age: not applicableOptional Protocol: ratified 24 October 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThere were no under-18s in the SwissGuard.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. Defence of theVatican and the protection of the Pope werethe responsibility of the Swiss Guard, foundedin 1506 and, with approximately 100 members,the world’s smallest army. 2 Service in the SwissGuard was entirely voluntary, and was open tothose between the ages of 19 and 30. Entry intothe Swiss Guard required that the volunteer bea Swiss national and a member of the RomanCatholic Church. Candidates had also to beunmarried, to hold a professional or secondaryschool diploma, and to have completed militaryservice in Switzerland. The minimum term ofservice was two years. 3 The voluntary nature ofservice and the minimum age limit of 19 wereconfirmed in the Holy See’s declaration made onratification of the Optional Protocol in October2001. 4F — JDevelopmentsExpressions of the Holy See’s continuing concernabout the impact of armed conflict on childrenincluded a statement in the 2006 Christmas EveHomily of Pope Benedict XVI. With reference tothe birth of Christ, the Pope stated that “Thechild of Bethlehem directs our gaze towards allchildren who suffer and are abused in the world.”Among several examples of such especiallyvulnerable children he mentioned “childrenwho are placed as soldiers in a violent world”. 5In August 2007, during a visit to northernUganda, Cardinal Renato Martino, presidentof the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,condemned the Lord’s Resistance Army for thekidnap and forced recruitment of thousands ofchildren into their forces. He also called on theinternational community to increase its fundingand support for the reintegration of former childsoldiers. 6C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 6 5

1 “Pope’s guards celebrate 500 years”, BBC News,22 January 2006.2 “First non-white joins Vatican guard”, BBC News,4 July 2002; “Vatican’s honour to Swiss Guards”,BBC News, 5 June 2006.3 Holy See, Roman Curia, “The Swiss Guard:Admission Requirements”, www.vatican.va.4 Declaration of the Holy See on ratification of theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.5 Holy See, Holy Father, “Homily of His HolinessBenedict XVI, 24 December 2006”, www.vatican.va.6 “Vatican official: Ugandan thugs must stopforcing children to fight”, Catholic News ServiceBriefs, 6 August 2007, www.catholicnews.com.HONDUR A SRepublic of HondurasPopulation: 7.2 million (3.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 12,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription inpeacetime (see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 14 August 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextAn estimated 36,000 individuals were membersof gangs (maras). 1 In 2004 and 2005 over 800children and youths were killed, many of themstreet children. 2 The Special Attorney for HumanRights stated in April 2007 that members of thepolice and armed forces had reportedly beeninvolved in 360 such killings over nine years. 3Longer periods of detention without chargeand tougher penalties were introduced forleaders of gangs. 4 In December 2006 the UNHuman Rights Committee called on Honduras toamend the definition of the offence of “unlawfulassociation” in the Criminal Code to be morerestrictive, as it was often used by the police toarrest adolescents on suspicion, including inmass round-ups based on appearance alone andwithout judicial warrant. 5In September 2006 the Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights, in a case relating to theextrajudicial execution of four youths in 1995,ordered Honduras to establish a child rightstraining program for police and other officials. 6GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder Article 276 of the constitution militaryservice was compulsory in times of conflict for allHondurans “capable of serving”. The constitutionalso provided for compulsory peacetime militaryservice for all Hondurans aged 18–30, but thiswas modified by a 1994 decree making peacetimemilitary service voluntary. 7Military training and military schoolsSeveral military schools and academies providedtraining for cadets and officers. 8 Graduates fromthe Liceo Militar del Norte, a military secondaryschoolin San Pedro Sula, were considered to be1 6 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

officers and given priority to enter officer trainingacademies. The Liceo Militar del Norte alsomaintained a primary-school. 9The Centre for Naval Studies offered technicaland specialized courses for officers. 10 Under-18swishing to enter the Military Aviation Academyas pilot cadets or technical students had to haveparental authorization, signed by a lawyer. 11 TheHonduras Defence University and the NationalDefence College offered degrees in military, airand naval sciences, and defence and security. 12DevelopmentsThe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childrecommended that Honduras pay more attentionto social factors and root causes of the gangproblem and focus on preventive measures,refraining from treating the issue exclusively in apunitive and repressive way. 13HUNGARYRepublic of HungaryPopulation: 10.1 million (2.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 32,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18; 17 with parentalconsentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 11 March 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitment agewas 17 with parental consent. It was notknown whether under-18s were serving inthe armed forces.F — J1 “El Salvador, Honduras y Guatemala, los másviolentos del Istmo”, Prensa Libre (Guatemala),27 April 2007, www.prensalibre.com.2 Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos,Informe al Congreso Nacional, Año 2004,“Seguridad y Justicia”, 8 March 2005, www.conadeh.hn; Amnesty International Report 2005and 2006.3 “Fiscalía involucra a policía en asesinatos enHonduras”, El Nuevo Herald (Miami), 25 April2007, www.elnuevoherald.com.4 Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional(CEJIL), “Honduras es denunciada por su políticaanti pandillas”, 19 October 2005, www.cejil.org.5 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration ofinitial report submitted by Honduras, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1, 13December 2006.6 CEJIL, “Nueva condena internacional contraHonduras”, 23 October 2006; Inter-AmericanCourt of Human Rights, Case of Servellón-Garcíaet al. v. Honduras, Judgment of 21 September2006, Series C, No. 152, www.corteidh.or.cr.7 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Honduras, October2006, www.flacso.cl.8 Ejército de Honduras, Centros de Estudio, atFuerzas Armadas de Honduras, www.ffaah.mil.hn.9 Ejército de Honduras, Centros de Estudio, LiceoMilitar del Norte, www.ffaah.mil.hn.10 Centro de Estudios Navales, www.ffaah.mil.hn.11 Academia Militar de Aviación, Documentos, www.academiamilfah.com.12 Universidad de Defensa and Colegio de DefensaNacional, www.ffaah.mil.hn.13 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of third periodic report submittedby Honduras, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/HND/CO/3, 2 February 2007.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll men between the ages of 18 and 50 living inHungary were liable for conscription. 1 However,the government’s Second Periodic Report to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child statedthat “universal conscription” for men started atage 17. 2 They had to register with the authoritiesby 1 January of the year they were 18. Regularmilitary service, armed or unarmed, was for sixmonths, with obligations for reserve service ofup to five months. Before enlistment, certainconscripts declared fit for military service couldvolunteer to take part in preliminary homedefence specialized training with the approvalof the Recruiting Command. Alternative civilianservice was for 11 months, and could be carriedout in hospitals, schools or other public services.Conscripts could be enlisted between the ages of18 and 25, or could volunteer from the age of 17with parental consent. Those over 18 could applyfor the voluntary military reserve. Professionalcontracted military service was available forHungarian citizens aged from 18 to 47. 3Another source indicated that conscriptionwas suspended in November 2004 but couldbe reintroduced during war or emergency, andthat by December 2004 the armed forces werecomprised entirely of volunteers. 4Military training and military schoolsMilitary educational institutions included the BeriBalogh Adam Secondary-school and Dormitoryfor Home Defence for elementary school students(boys and girls) below the age of 17. The intakewas 60 pupils and the course was for four years.Students aged between 18 and 23 could attendthe Kinizsi Pal Professional Non-commissionedC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 6 7

Officers Training School or the Zrinyi MiklosNational Defence University for officers. 5DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Hungary and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.In 2002 Hungary had advised the UN GeneralAssembly Special Session on Children that theconstitutional process for ratifying the OptionalProtocols to the Rights of the Child was underway. 6 In 2006 the Committee on the Rights of theChild urged Hungary as a matter of urgency toratify the Optional Protocols, 7 but as of October2007 Hungary had not done so.1 The laws governing conscription are the Statuteon National Defence (CX/1993), as amended;Government Decree on the execution of theStatute on National Defence (178/27 December1993); Statute on Service Relations of Conscripts(XLIV/1996); Decree on the Judgment of Fitnessfor Military Service (7/1996); and Statute onCivilian Service (XXI/1997).2 Second Periodic Report of Hungary to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.25, 24 May 2005.3 Ministry of Defence, www.honvedelem.hu(Recruitment, General conscription, Contractedmilitary service).4 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “Countryreport: Hungary”, The Right to ConscientiousObjection in Europe: A Review of the CurrentSituation, April 2005, http://www.quaker.org.5 Ministry of Defence, above note 3 (Recruitment,Educational institutions).6 Permanent Mission of Hungary to the UN,Statement by State Secretary Imre Szakacs, 8May 2002, www.humisny.org.7 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Hungary,Concluding observations: Hungary, UN Doc.CRC/C/HUN/CO/2, 17 March 2006.ICEL ANDRepublic of IcelandPopulation: 295,000 (78,000 under 18)Government armed forces: noneCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 1 October 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no armed forces and noevidence of child recruitment or use.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIceland had no armed forces, although it was afounder member of NATO (1949), which remainedcentral to its security policy. A 1951 bilateralagreement with the United States provided forIceland’s territorial defence, and approximately2,200 US armed forces personnel (the IcelandDefence Force) were stationed at Keflavik(chiefly for the purpose of North Atlantic airdefence) until the station’s closure in 2006. TheIcelandic Crisis Response Unit (ICRU), a registerof approximately 200 volunteers from a range ofprofessions, provided personnel for a variety ofinternational peacekeeping missions. 1In its July 2005 Initial Report to theUN Committee on the Rights of Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, whichhad come into force in Iceland in February2002, the government stated that “the rule inIceland is that international agreements do notautomatically acquire the force of law in thecountry, even though Iceland is a party to them”.Nevertheless, it also emphasized that the currentpractice was to interpret current legislation in thelight of international obligations. Icelandic courtswere also said to be increasingly linking theirjudgments to the country’s commitments underinternational human rights law. 2DevelopmentsThe Icelandic Red Cross, which receivedfunds from the government, in October 2004organized a national financial appeal for theassistance of children involved in or otherwiseaffected by armed conflict. The appeal includedthe distribution of information materials andtelevision programs, and awareness events wereheld in schools and offices. 3In June 2006 the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child expressed its concern that the absence1 6 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

of armed forces in the country itself did notpreclude “the possibility of individuals or groupsundertaking efforts to recruit children for foreignarmed forces or groups”, and recommended thatIceland explicitly criminalize the recruitment ofchildren under the age of 15 into armed forcesor armed groups and their direct participationin hostilities. The Committee also called onthe government to establish extraterritorialjurisdiction for these crimes when perpetratedby or against an Icelandic citizen or an individualconnected in some way with Iceland. 41 Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.is/; Iceland’s Security Co-operation: Icelandand NATO, www.iceland.org/; confidentialinformation October 2007.2 Initial report of Iceland to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ISL/1, 15July 2005.3 Ibid.4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Iceland,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ISL/CO/1, 21 June 2006.INDIARepublic of IndiaPopulation: 1,103.4 million (420.7 million under18)Government armed forces: 1,316,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 years and 6monthsVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 30 November 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRCNo information was available on howmany under-18s were serving in thearmed forces. There were allegations thatchildren were recruited by governmentsupportedanti-Maoist village defenceforces. Armed groups, including Maoistsand groups in Jammu and Kashmir and inthe north-east, were reported to be usingchildren. Children accused of membershipof armed groups were detained in conflictareas.F — JContextViolence by Maoists (Naxalites) 1 increaseddramatically in 2005 in a number of states, andtribal people became the victims of human rightsabuses perpetrated by both Maoists and thesecurity forces. The violence affected at leastten states, with the worst violence taking placein Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.According to the Asian Centre for Human Rights(ACHR), some 750 people – security personnel,alleged Maoists and almost 300 civilians – werekilled in 2006. 2 The Prevention of Terrorism Act(POTA) 2002, which had led to widespread humanrights violations, was repealed in September2004 by the government, but similar provisionswere included in December 2004 amendmentsto the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. 3They were subsequently used to detain humanrights activists working with tribal communities inareas of Maoist violence. 4Armed conflicts also continued in severalnorth-eastern states (Assam, Manipur, Nagalandand Tripura) and in Jammu and Kashmir. Adecade-long ceasefire between the NationalSocialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN (Isaac-Muivah, I-M)) and the Indian governmentcontinued, but sporadic clashes took place andfactional fighting between the NSCN(I-M) and theNSCN (Khaplang) claimed many lives, includingthose of children. 5 A temporary ceasefire betweenC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 6 9

the central government of India and the UnitedLiberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in 2006 failedto reduce violence, in which civilians continuedto be targeted by both security forces and armedopposition groups. In Jammu and Kashmir theceasefire announced in November 2003 betweenIndia and Pakistan continued, but little progresswas made towards a political solution to theconflict.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe minimum age for recruitment into thearmed forces was raised from 16 to 17 yearsand 6 months in mid-2004, although legislationgoverning the armed forces did not stipulatea minimum recruitment age. 6 However, India’sNovember 2005 declaration on ratifying theOptional Protocol did not reflect the rise inminimum age, stating that the minimum ageof recruitment was 16. The declaration did,however, contain a clear statement reiteratingthe government’s position that after enrolmentand a requisite training period, personnel weresent to operational areas only after reaching theage of 18.Recruitment for the Territorial Army (reserve)was from 18, as was recruitment for variousauxiliary forces including the Central ReservePolice Force, the Border Security Forces and theAssam Rifles. 7Military training and military schoolsA number of military schools and institutions,including the Rashtriya Indian Military College(RIMC), provided preliminary training for studentswishing to go on to join the army. The RIMCenrolled students between the ages of 11 yearsand 6 months and 13, and encouraged only thosewishing to have a career in the defence forcesto apply. The National Cadet Corps recruitedschool and college students from the age of 13to take part in military and other training on avoluntary basis. Although not obliged to signup for military service, cadets who succeededin passing exams were given concessions whenapplying to the army, navy or air force as well asauxiliary forces. Cadets were involved in reliefoperations in southern India following the 2004Asian tsunami. 8Child recruitment and deploymentThe lack of systematic birth registration,particularly in rural areas, made it difficultto verify ages, making it impossible to ruleout the possibility that under-18s mightparticipate actively in hostilities. There wereactive recruitment drives targeting “youths”,particularly in the Kashmir valley. 9Detention of childrenThere was evidence that in areas of armedconflict children accused of being members ofarmed groups were detained, often in violation ofnational legislation designed to protect childrenin conflict with the law. In Manipur it was allegedthat the system established under the JuvenileJustice Act 2000 was non-functioning due toinadequate resources; in particular no juvenilehome had been established. As a result, securityforces (including police) who detained childrenin anti-insurgency operations were reportedlyclaiming that they were over 18 when registeringcases against them and sending them to adultdetention centres. Human rights organizationsattempting to address individual cases ofdetained children on behalf of parents werehampered by the absence of birth certificates toprove age. 10The Kashmir Bar Association, visiting theDistrict Jail, Kathua, in November 2006, foundfour boys aged between 16 and 18 who hadbeen detained under the Jammu and KashmirPublic Safety Act 1978 without their cases beingheard. 11 There were also reports of children beingarrested and detained for long periods by policein Chhattisgarh. In one reported incident inNovember 2005 police shot at a group of youngpeople who had been abducted by Maoists,injuring two young girls who were subsequentlydetained in Jagdalpur hospital and then JagdalpurCentral Jail, and killing three boys whose bodieswere later disposed of by the police (it wasnot clear if the young people were under 18). 12The National Commission for Women (NCW – astatutory body mandated to protect and promotethe rights of women), visiting Jagdalpur CentralJail in December 2006, also reported seeingyoung girls (possibly between the ages of 17 and20) who had been in detention for over a year,accused of being Maoist activists. 13Armed groupsState-backed village defence forcesThere were widespread reports of under-18sbeing recruited to state-backed anti-insurgencygroups in Chhattisgarh. In an attempt to addressMaoist violence in the state, the central andstate governments were reported to supportthe establishment of village defence forces. TheSalwa Judum campaign emerged in Chhattisgarhin 2005, its leaders claiming that it was aspontaneous and voluntary movement againstviolence perpetrated by Maoists. A number ofcamps were established where around 50,000mainly tribal people were living in temporaryshelters. There were allegations that many ofthese people had been forcibly displaced andrecruited to the Salwa Judum campaign as ameans of isolating the Maoists and clearing1 7 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

land for development. Special police officers(SPOs) were recruited from among Salwa Judummembers to join village defence forces andprovided with arms and training by state policeand security forces, including the Naga IndianReserve Battalion. 14 There were allegations thatunder-18s were being recruited as SPOs. 15In March 2006 a human rights organizationvisited Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh, andfound evidence of children, including nine girlsaged between 14 and 16, being recruited asSPOs. The girls said that they were being giventraining in fighting tactics, including how to useguns, as well as being used as informers. 16 Thecentral government Home Ministry reportedlysubsequently issued directions that personsbelow 18 years old were not to be recruited. 17However, in December 2006 members of theNCW visited Salwa Judum camps in Dantewadadistrict and reported that tribal girls and boys hadbeen recruited as SPOs and were being used ascombatants in the Salwa Judum campaign againstthe Maoists. 18 There was no official response tothe NCW’s allegations and its recommendationthat such recruitment should stop. 19MaoistsThere was a reported increase in the recruitmentof children by Maoists since 2005.Sources in the Communist Party of India (CPI)(Maoist) and in the Andhra Pradesh police werereported to have stated that children as youngas 14 or 15 were being recruited into armedsquads in Andhra Pradesh. Maoists claimed thatits children’s division, the Bal Mandal, was notused in hostilities but that children were usedonly as messengers and informers. However, theyadmitted that they were provided with militarytraining to prepare them for any situation. 20Recruitment of under-18s by Maoists was alsoreported to have increased in Chhattisgarh andJharkhand. Some children were reportedly takenfrom school without their parents’ consent. 21Almost all those under-18s recruited by Maoistswere reported to be illiterate and from tribalcommunities.Jammu and KashmirThere was evidence that armed groups in Jammuand Kashmir, in Pakistan-administered Kashmirand in Pakistan were actively recruiting children. 22The Jammu and Kashmir police claimed thataround 200 children had been reported missingin the state since 2004, alleging that most ofthese were children of poor and illiterate familieswho had been recruited by militants, althoughthis could not be independently confirmed. 23Some were said to be as young as 13 or 14 andusing sophisticated weapons. In August 2004 theIndian Army claimed to have caught nine childrenwho were armed. The army claimed that some ofthem were from Pakistan and had been trained byPakistan-based armed groups including the Jaishe-Mohammedand Harkat-ul-Mujahideen as wellas the Hizbul Mujahideen. 24 Children in Jammuand Kashmir were said to be being indoctrinatedand recruited from schools and mosques. Lackof education and employment opportunities foryoung people were said to be major factors in therecruitment of children by armed groups. 25Children as young as ten were said to be usedby armed groups as messengers and couriersand provided with basic training in the use ofweapons. Some children were reported to havebeen used by armed groups to throw grenadesand plant improvised explosive devices. 26 Theuse of children by armed groups put them atincreased risk from the security forces. During2005 and 2006 there were two major incidentsin which security forces opened fire on children.In Bangergund in Kupwara district soldiers ofthe Rashtriya Rifles waiting to ambush militantsclaimed to have mistakenly shot dead three boysand critically injured a fourth on the night of 23July 2005. The army said that the boys had actedsuspiciously by failing to stop when challenged.In Doodipora, Handwara, on 22 February 2006soldiers shot at a group of children playingcricket, claiming that militants were among them,killing four boys including an eight-year-old. 27North-eastMuch of the evidence of the involvement ofchildren in the various conflicts in north-easternstates was anecdotal and generalized, with a lackof primary field-based research on the issue.In May 2007, for example, it was reportedthat ULFA used teenagers to ferry explosivesand throw grenades, although they did notopenly recruit child soldiers. 28 The report furtherclaimed that other armed groups operating inthe north-east, including the NSCN (it was notreported which faction), the United LiberationFront (Manipur) and the People’s Liberation Army(Manipur) openly recruited children. The reportclaimed that the smallest boys, as “the mostfearless”, were placed closest to the enemy. 29In Manipur, a culture of violence as a resultof decades of conflict was said to be fuelling thedesire of children to handle weapons and joinarmed groups, many of which were organizedalong ethnic lines. Some of the more recentlyformed ethnically based groups were reported tobe commonly recruiting children. 30Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There were no official government programsspecifically targeted at the rehabilitation offormer child soldiers. Human rights organizationsworking in areas of armed conflict confirmedthat there were few effective policies orfacilities in place to reintegrate former militants,F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7 1

particularly children, into the mainstream. Adraft Integrated Child Protection Scheme wasunder consideration by the government. Thedraft document acknowledged the inadequateresources allocated to child protection to dateand consequent lack of structural mechanisms todeal with children in need, referring specificallyto the lack of intervention for children affected bymilitancy. However, the draft did not contain anyspecific proposals relating to children involved inarmed conflict. 31DevelopmentsA National Commission for the Protection of ChildRights was established at the end of 2006 and achairperson appointed in February 2007. 32 TheAct under which it was established defined “childrights” as including “the children’s rights adoptedin the United Nations Convention on the Rightsof the Child,” but did not refer explicitly to theOptional Protocol. 33 It was not known whether theCommission would take up matters relating tothe use of child soldiers.International standardsIndia ratified the Optional Protocol in November2005. Its declaration referred to the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment (see above) and statedthat there was no conscription. 341 The term “Maoist” is used throughout this entry.However, Naxalism in India, which emerged inthe 1960s, encompasses a range of left-wingrevolutionary movements. The largest of theseis currently the Communist Party of India (Maoist)(CPI-Maoist), formed in 2004 from the MaoistCommunist Centre of India and the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War, which has ties withMaoists in Nepal.2 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “749 killed in2006 in the Maoists’ conflict in India”, pressrelease PR/IND/03/07, 10 January 2007, www.achrweb.org.3 Amnesty International Report 2005.4 Amnesty International (AI), “India: Chhattisgarhgovernment detains human rights defender,refuses to arrest police officials suspected ofinvolvement in unlawful killings of Adivasis” (ASA20/013/2007), 24 May 2007.5 “Tangkhul youth shot dead at Kohima”, SangaiExpress, Imphal, 4 October 2006, at www.nagalim.nl.6 “Age for army recruitment raised”, Times of India,15 July 2004.7 Territorial Army, http://indianarmy.nic.in/arta1.htm; Central Reserve Police Force, Recruitmentwww.crpf.nic.in; Border Security Force, www.bsf.nic.in/recruitment/r150.pdf; Recruitment inAssam Rifles, www.assamrifles.com/ar_rect_advt.htm.8 See Rashtriya Military College, www.rimc.org;National Cadet Corps, http://nccindia.nic.in.9 “Concession for Kashmiris in CRPF recruitment”,United News of India (UNI), 30 April 2007, athttp://news.oneindia.in.10 Confidential source, June 2007.11 Kashmir Bar Association, Jail Visit Report, www.kashmirbarassociation.org/jail_report_jmu_kathua.html (accessed June 2007; link notfunctioning when finalizing this text).12 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Wherethe State Makes War on Its Own People: A Reporton Violation of Peoples’ Rights during the SalwaJudum Campaign in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh,April 2006, www.pucl.org.13 Malini Bhattacharya and Manju SnehlataHembrom, Report on Visit to Dantewara,Chhattisgarh, to Examine the Situation of TribalWomen in ‘Salwa Judum’ Camps, NationalCommission for Women (NCW), December 2006.14 PUCL, above note 12.15 “Inside India’s hidden war”, Guardian, 9 May2006.16 Asian Centre for Human Rights, The Adivasis ofChhattisgarh: Victims of the Naxalite Movementand Salwa Judum Campaign, March 2006.17 Asian Centre for Human Rights, India HumanRights Report 2007.18 Bhattacharya and Hembrom, above note 13.19 Information from member of NCW investigationteam, June 2007.20 “Maoist rebels spread across rural India”,Christian Science Monitor, 22 August 2006.21 “Children at war in insurgency zone”, Times ofIndia, 29 May 2007.22 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Everyone livesin fear”: Patterns of impunity in Jammu andKashmir, September 2006.23 Prakriti Gupta, “Child Warriors of Kashmir”, 20November 2005, at www.boloji.com.24 “Army grappling with ‘child warriors’ in J&K”,Hindustan Times, 1 August 2004.25 HRW, above note 22.26 Gupta, above note 23.27 HRW, above note 22.28 A confidential source in June 2007 also reportedunsubstantiated claims that unemployed youthaged between 16 and 20 were being given cashby ULFA cadres to plant roadside bombs.29 “Child soldiers in northeast raise concerns”, NewDelhi TV, 5 May 2007, www.ndtv.com.30 Confidential source, June 2007.31 Department of Women and Child Development,The Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS)– A Centrally Sponsored Scheme of Government– Civil Society Partnership, 27th Draft, 27December 2006, http://wcd.nic.in/drafticps.pdf.32 “Shanta Sinha is chief of child rightscommission”, The Hindu, 24 February 2007.33 Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act2005.34 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.1 7 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

INDONE SIARepublic of IndonesiaPopulation: 222.8 million (75.6 million under 18)Government armed forces: 302,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 17, or married at time of registrationOptional Protocol: signed 24 September 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of the use of under-18s by either government forces or armedgroups.ContextWith the signing of a peace agreement in August2005, armed conflict came to an end in NangroeAceh Darussalam (Aceh). The province wasdevastated by the December 2004 tsunami,which killed almost 170,000 people in Aceh,displaced 513,000 others and destroyed muchof the infrastructure in the west of the province.In mid-2007 some 70,000 people were stillinternally displaced. 1In December 2006 Irwandi Yusuf, a seniormember of the Free Aceh Movement (GerakanAceh Merdeka, GAM), the Aceh armed separatistgroup, was elected as governor of Aceh. Afterthe signing of the 2005 agreement security hadimproved considerably, although bomb andgrenade attacks and other violent incidents,some allegedly due to conflicts over resourcesand aid allocation, were reported during the firsteight months of 2007. 2In March 2007 the police arrested sevenmembers of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a radicalarmed Islamist group, and seized a largestockpile of weapons and explosives. 3 In June twosenior leaders were arrested.Support for independence was reportedlywidespread in the two provinces of Papuaand West Papua, although the armed Papuanseparatist Free Papua Movement (OrganisasiPapua Merdeka, OPM) controlled no territory andreportedly did not pose a large security threat tothe Indonesian armed forces (Tentara NasionalIndonesia, TNI). There were some 12,000 TNItroops there, 4 and TNI and police abuses werereported, including the rape by TNI troops of a 16-year-old Papuan girl in May 2005. 5 Competitionover resources, inter-tribal tensions, and tensionsbetween Papuans and Indonesian settlers werealso reported. 6GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn July 2003 Indonesia reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child that“Indonesia has set the minimum age forrecruitment or enlistment into the armed forcesat 18 years, as set forth in Act No. 2/1988.” 7Article 15 of the Republic of IndonesiaLaw Number 23 Year 2002 on Child Protectionprovided for the protection of every child frominvolvement in armed conflict, social unrest oran “event that involves violence” and “misusefor political activities”. Article 63 stated that“All persons shall be prohibited from recruitingor equipping children for military or similarpurposes, and from putting the lives of children indanger.” Article 87 provided for imprisonment ofno more than five years and/or a maximum fineof 100 million rupiah (approximately US$11,000)for recruiting and equipping children for militarypurposes, or misusing children by “involvingthem in political activities, or in an armed conflict,social disturbance … or in a violent event”. It wasnot known whether anyone had been prosecutedunder this provision. Article 1(1) defined a child assomeone under 18 years of age.Article 17(1) of the Child Protection Lawprovided that “Every child whose liberty hasbeen taken away shall be entitled to: a. Receivehumane treatment and be housed separatelyfrom adults”, and also provided for entitlementto legal assistance. During the conflict in Aceh,under-18s were among those the authoritiesarrested and brought to trial. In many cases theywere tortured for their alleged involvement in orsupport for GAM. In 2003–4 under-18s allegedlyinvolved in GAM were arrested by TNI and werenot granted legal representation. 8 In August 2005a 16-year-old Muslim boy, arrested in Ambonfor allegedly planting a bomb which injured apedicab driver, was sentenced to approximatelyseven years’ imprisonment; he began serving hissentence at Ambon prison, where he was heldwith adults. 9Armed groupsJemaah IslamiyahJI, an Islamist armed group whose long-termgoal was the establishment of an Islamic statein Indonesia, was thought to comprise over 900members across Indonesia. 10 According to theInternational Crisis Group, JI had a “systematicindoctrination program”, starting with playgroupsfor children under five and continuing on toreligious boarding schools across Java whichwhole families attended; however, enrolment insome JI schools seemed to be declining. 11 Most JImen arrested for violent crimes were reportedlyF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7 3

in their 20s and 30s. They would not normallybe accepted as members until after graduatingfrom JI schools, usually at about the age of 18.Members were also recruited who were outsidethe JI school network. 12AcehAfter the tsunami armed conflict continuedbetween GAM and TNI. Following talks facilitatedby the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI, aninternational mediation organization), theHelsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)between GAM and the government was signedon 15 August 2005, 13 ending an almost 30-yearconflict. Previously under-18s had been used byboth GAM and TNI, including as informants orguards, for logistical support and, less frequently,as combatants. 14 The total number of childreninvolved in the conflict was not known.Not all people associated with GAM’s armedwing, Tenara Negara Aceh (TNA), includingunder-18s, were on active duty all of the time. 15In an interview with the Child Soldiers Coalition,former child soldiers stated that in 2003–4, whenthey were aged about 14–17, they were pressuredby TNA to run errands, look out for police andpurchase supplies. They lived in a village ina GAM stronghold where they were able tocontinue their education, although they reportedfrequent skirmishes and a general lack of securityduring that time. 16The MOU (Article 5) provided for theAceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), comprisingAssociation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)and European Union nationals, whose functionwas to assist with monitoring the implementationof the MOU, and whose mission ended inDecember 2006. 17 The MOU (Articles 2.2 and2.3) also provided for a human rights court anda truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). 18 InMay 2007 community consultation on the TRCbegan in Aceh. 19 In June 2007 a written proposalfor a TRC was issued by the Coalition for TruthRecovery (KPK), a coalition of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) from Aceh and Jakarta.This document called for “protection and specialmeasures for … children”. 20 However, the TRC’sfuture was not clear, following a December 2006ruling by the Constitutional Court which declaredthe national truth and reconciliation commissionunconstitutional; this could affect the legal statusof the Aceh TRC. 21Central SulawesiIntercommunal violence on the whole declinedafter the signing of the Malino I Agreementin December 2001, but in October 2005 threeChristian schoolgirls were beheaded near Poso,central Sulawesi. 22 In May 2006, police arrestedthree men for the killings and in March 2007the alleged leader was given a 20-year prisonsentence and the others 14-year sentences. 23In January 2007 police conducted two majorraids in Poso, central Sulawesi, the scene ofprevious widespread intercommunal violenceand of subsequent attacks since 2004 by armedMuslim groups. The stated purpose of the raidswas the arrest of a group of men, reportedlymostly local JI members, who were suspectedof responsibility for bombings, beheadings anddrive-by shootings against local Christians andpolice. 24 A police raid on 22 January 2007 facedheavy armed resistance; 15 people, includingone police officer, were killed. During theoperations a 16-year-old Muslim boy was killed;police reportedly said they found a weapon inhis possession. 25 Since January 2007 no seriousviolence had occurred in Poso. 26Maluku provinceIntercommunal violence declined in Malukuafter the signing of the Malino II agreement inFebruary 2002. Although a bomb exploded inAmbon in April 2007, injuring six people, 27 andan estimated 50,000 people remained displacedby the violence there, 28 the security situationimproved. 29Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The Aceh MOU provided for the demobilizationof 3,000 adult GAM combatants and thedecommissioning of weapons, and theunconditional release of some 2,000 politicalprisoners (Articles 4.2, 4.3 and 3.1 respectively).In the MOU, GAM set the number of theircombatants at 3,000 (Article 4.2), althoughobservers believed the true number to be higher,and stated that many former GAM combatantswere not receiving any assistance. There wereno provisions in the MOU for the DDR of childrenwho had been involved in the conflict. Amongthe 2,000 political prisoners released were 19boys between 14 and 17 years of age who hadbeen arrested for alleged association with GAM.There were reportedly several 17-year-old femaleprisoners who were treated as adults becausethey were married. 30 UNICEF and the InternationalOffice for Migration (IOM) provided assistanceto 21 individuals who were under 18 at the timeof their arrest. IOM also helped to provide adultformer political prisoners and former GAMcombatants with vocational training and businessadvice. 31Former TNA soldiers were not formallydischarged, officially counted or registered.At the end of 2005 GAM established the AcehTransition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh,KPA), comprising former GAM commanders. 32Part of the role of the KPA leaders was to overseethe reintegration of GAM combatants throughaid projects. In February 2006 the governmentestablished the National Reintegration Agency1 74 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

(Badan Reintegrasi Aceh, BRA), to offerreintegration assistance to both combatantsand civilians affected by the conflict. 33 Manyobservers noted the lack of transparency anduneven levels of assistance in the reintegrationprocess. 34Some observers expressed concern aboutthe high level of unemployment of young men,including former child soldiers. 35 Althoughchildren in former conflict areas received someassistance from UNICEF, some internationalaid agencies and local non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), most of the aid programsfocused on the tsunami victims. Local NGOshighlighted the disruption of education duringthe conflict and the continuing lack of educationfor children. 36 Moreover, the deaths and thedestruction of an already crippled local economycaused by the tsunami compounded the effectsof the long-term armed conflict on children,many of whom lost one or both parents in thetsunami. 37In Central Sulawesi and Maluku province,which had been affected by previous widespreadintercommunal violence, UNICEF and local andinternational NGOs conducted programs forchildren on peace building, conflict resolutionand cultural diversity. 38DevelopmentsIn its Concluding observations on the secondperiodic report of Indonesia, the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child recommended that itratify the Optional Protocol on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflict. 39At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Indonesia and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.At the February 2007 ministerial meeting,the government said in its public statement that“Indonesia believes that first and foremost,[what] governments should do is to adopt andratify the Optional Protocol to the Conventionon the Rights of the Child … To prevent impunity,governments should adopt and implement lawto punish severely those involved in recruitingchildren in armed conflicts.” 40 However, Indonesiahas not yet ratified the Optional Protocol.Discussion by the National Human RightsCommission of Indonesia (Komisi Nasional HakAsasi Manusia, known as Komnas HAM), theIndonesian Commission for Child Protection(Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia,established by Article 74 of the 2002 ChildProtection Law), parliament and civil societyabout ratification of the Optional Protocolcontinued. At the same time proposals forparliament to enact a law which would upgradethe status of the Convention on the Rights of theChild from a presidential decree to parliamentarylegislation were also put forward. 411 Oxfam, “Over 25,000 landless families in Acehstill waiting for new land and homes”, pressrelease, 7 December 2006; UN Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Indonesia,Sri Lanka, Maldives: Earthquake and TsunamiOCHA Situation Report No. 37, www.reliefweb.int.2 Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1–31 August2007, World Bank, Conflict and DevelopmentProgram, www-wds.worldbank.org.3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Indonesia,Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status”, Asia BriefingNo. 63, 3 May 2007.4 ICG, “Papua: answers to frequently askedquestions”, Asia Briefing No. 53, 5 September2006.5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Out of sight,endemic abuse and impunity in Papua’s CentralHighlands”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.10(C), July 2007.6 ICG, “Indonesian Papua: a local perspective onthe conflict”, Asia Briefing No. 66, 19 July 2007.7 Second periodic report of Indonesia to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/65/Add.23, 7 July 2003.8 HRW, “Aceh at war: torture, ill-treatment andunfair trials”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 16, No.11(C), September 2004; Amnesty International(AI), “Indonesia: New military operations,old patterns of human rights abuses in Aceh(Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD)”, October2004, AI Index ASA 21/033/2004.9 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.10 ICG, “Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s currentstatus”, press release, 3 May 2007.11 Sidney Jones, “Inherited Jihadism: Like Father,Like Son”, Australian Financial Review, 6 July2004.12 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.13 Keynotes, DDR Programme in Aceh Indonesia2005–2006, Cranfield Centre for Security SectorManagement Case Study Series, http://cranfield.ac.uk.14 Armed Conflict in Aceh: Involvement of Childrenin Armed Forces, Kelompok Kerja Studi Perkotaan(KKSP), Yayasan Anak Bangsa (YAB), People’sCrisis Centre (PCC), Jesuit Refugee Service(JRS), 2004, copy with Child Soldiers Coalition(Coalition).15 7 May 2007, Coalition meeting in Banda Aceh.16 8 May 2007, Coalition interview of four youngmen formerly associated with GAM, Banda Aceh.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7 5

17 Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC),“Re-paving the road to peace, Analysis of theimplementation of DD & R, Brief 35”, 2007, www.bicc.de.18 Memorandum of Understanding between theGovernment of the Republic of Indonesia and theFree Aceh Movement, www.aceh-mm.org.19 Confidential source, Banda Aceh, May 2007.20 “A Proposal for Remedy for Victims of GrossHuman Rights Violations in Aceh”, Working Paper,14 June 2007, English translation, Coalition copy.21 Confidential source, October 2007.22 “Three Indonesian girls beheaded”, BBC News,29 October 2005.23 Annual Report of the United States Commissionon International Religious Freedom, May 2007,www.uscirf.gov.24 ICG, “Jihadism in Indonesia, Poso on the Edge”,Asia Report No. 127, 24 January 2007.25 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.26 ICG, “Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso”,Asia Briefing No. 75, 22 January 2008.27 Jakarta Post, April 2007, in Indonesia NewsDigest 16, www.asia-pacific-action.org.28 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Tensof thousands of IDPs still waiting for assistance”,June 2007, www.internal-displacement.org.29 Confidential source, Jakarta, May 2007.30 Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh, 7 May 2007;BICC, above note 17.31 7 May 2007, Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh.32 ICG, “Aceh: Post-conflict Complications”, AsiaReport No. 139, 4 October 2007.33 BICC, above note 17.34 Coalition meeting in Banda Aceh, 7 May 2007.35 Coalition meetings in Banda Aceh, May 2007.36 Coalition meeting, above note 34.37 Coalition discussions in Jakarta and Banda Aceh,May 2007.38 Coalition discussions in Jakarta, May 2007.39 Concluding observations of the Committee on theRights of the Child: Indonesia, 30 January 2004,UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.223.40 Remarks by the ambassador of the Republicof Indonesia to the Republic of France and thePrincipality of Andorra, H.E. Arizal Effendi, Headof Delegation, Paris, 6 February 2007, Coalitioncopy.41 Coalition discussions, above note 38.IR ANIslamic Republic of IranPopulation: 69.5 million (25.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 545,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (regular forces);unknown (paramilitary forces)Voluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 182The number of under-18s in governmentarmed forces was unknown, but theofficial paramilitary Basij recruitedschoolchildren. It was not known whetherarmed opposition groups had children intheir ranks.ContextBomb explosions in October 2005 and January2006 in Khuzestan province reportedly killed atleast 12 people and injured hundreds of others.There were also attacks against oil installationsthere in September and October 2005. Theprovince bordered Iraq, and was home to a largepart of Iran’s Arab minority. Much of Iran’s oilresources were located in the province, and longstandinggrievances about resource distributioncontinued to be reported. The response of thesecurity forces to unrest in Khuzestan resulted inhuman rights violations. 1Iran allegedly supported Hizbollah, apolitical party and armed group in Lebanonwhich reportedly trained children for militarypurposes. Support included military equipmentand training of Hizbollah fighters by members ofthe Iranian al-Quds Force (a branch of the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps) in Lebanon. 2 Iranalso allegedly gave financial support to Hamas,a Palestinian political party with an armed wingwhich was currently in control of the Gaza Strip. 3Financial support was also given to Islamic Jihad,another armed group in Palestine. Both groupsused children in military attacks and training. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeCurrent information about recruitment wasdifficult to obtain. The constitution statedthat “the government is obliged to provide aprogramme of military training, with all requisitefacilities for all its citizens, in accordance withthe Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens1 7 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

will be able to engage in the armed defence ofthe Islamic Republic of Iran” (Article 151). Thegovernment stated in 1998 that “according toarticle 2 of the Public Conscription Act, everyIranian citizen is eligible for military serviceas of 21 March of the year he reaches 19”,and that “the minimum employment age forthe armed forces for the purpose of receivingmilitary training is 16 and the minimum agefor employment for the Police Forces is 17”. 5The voluntary recruitment age was 16. 6 Militaryservice was carried out in the Iranian ArmedForces and the Iranian Revolutionary GuardCorps, the latter established shortly afterthe 1979 revolution and with its own air andnaval services. Most of the armed forces werereportedly made up of conscripts who receivedminimal training and served for 18 months. Therewas also a large army reserve, who received“negligible” training. 7 There was a militaryacademy in Teheran, and a signals training centreand special forces and airborne training facility inShiraz. 8 The number of under-18s in governmentarmed forces was unknown.Armed groupsParamilitariesThe Basij, under the control of the RevolutionaryGuards, 9 was a paramilitary organizationreportedly made up of volunteers, includingschoolchildren. 10 Basij members were reportedlymostly boys, older men and recent veterans.Middle-school members were known as Seekersand high-school members as the Vanguard.Ansar-e Hizbollah was a semi-official paramilitaryorganization aiming to enforce Islamic standardsin Iranian society. Most of its members reportedlyalso belonged to the Basij or were veterans of theIran–Iraq War. 11Armed opposition groupsIn March 2006 Jondallah, a Baluchi armed group,killed 22 Iranian officials and took at least sevenpeople hostage in Sistan-Baluchistan province. 12Human rights abuses by both the Iranian securityforces and Jondallah against children werereported, including the killing of two boys by theIranian security forces in January 2006. 13Although some Iranian Kurdish armed groups,including Komala and the Kurdistan People’sDemocratic Party (KDPI) had carried out armedresistance in the past, they had renouncedarmed struggle and supported a federal solution.However, the Kurdistan Independent Life Party(PJAK, affiliated to the Turkish PKK, KurdistanWorkers’ Party) had reportedly begun armedoperations in 2004, which continued into 2007.Violent unrest broke out in July 2005 in Kurdishareas, mainly in the north-eastern provinces,after the security forces shot dead a Kurdishopposition activist. 14It was not known whether armed oppositiongroups recruited or used under-18s.DevelopmentsDuring 2006 at least four people were executedwho were under 18 at the time of the allegedoffence, including one who was under 18 at thetime of the execution. A 14-year-old ethnic Azeriboy was arrested in April 2006 and reportedlytortured before being released. In Septemberhe was rearrested and beaten. 15 As of January2007 there were reportedly 23 under-18sawaiting execution. 16 In March 2007 the UNSpecial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summaryor Arbitrary Executions called the execution ofjuveniles in Iran “completely unacceptable”.Referring to Iran’s ratification of the Conventionon the Rights of the Child in 1994, he remindedthe government that this was “a clear andunambiguous legal commitment not to imposethe death penalty for offences committed bypersons less than 18 years old”. 17The government delivered its second periodicreport to the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild in July 2002. Among its recommendationsthe Committee urged the government toensure that all children were registered at birthand acquired irrevocable nationality withoutdiscrimination. The Committee also expressedconcern that Iran had not signed or acceded toeither of the two Optional Protocols. 181 Amnesty International (AI), “Iran: Newgovernment fails to address dire human rightssituation”, report, 16 February 2006, AI IndexMDE 13/010/2006.2 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Support of theHezbollah in Lebanon, Institute of Strategic andInternational Studies, 15 July 2006.3 Patrick Saint-Paul, “L’Axe Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas s’organise contre les forces modéréesen Palestine”, Le Figaro, 5 January 2007, www.lefigaro.fr.4 “Iran’s Khamenei calls on Islamic govts to supportHamas”, Reuters, 20 February 2006, http://asia.news.yahoo.com.5 Initial report by Iran to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.5, 23July 1998.6 UK Home Office, Border and Immigration Agency,Country of Origin Report, Iran, 4 May 2007, www.homeoffice.gov.uk.7 Janes Information Group, “World Armies Profile:Iran”, 29 August 2006, www.janes.co.uk.8 Global Security, “Iran Army”, www.globalsecurity.org.9 Global Security, “Intelligence, NiruyehMoghavemat Basij, Mobilisation ResistanceForce”, www.globalsecurity.org.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7 7

10 Wahied Wahdat-Hagh, “Basij – the RevolutionaryPeople’s Militia of Iran”, Middle East MediaResearch Institute, Inquiry and Analysis SeriesNo. 262, 1 February 2006, www.memri.org.11 Global Security, “Ansar-i Hizbullah, followers ofthe party of God”, www.globalsecurity.org.12 Amnesty International Report 2007.13 AI, “Iran”, above note 1.14 AI, “Iran: new government fails to address direhuman rights situation”, 16 February 2006, AIIndex MDE 13/010/2006.15 Amnesty International Report 2007.16 AI, “Iran: fear of imminent execution”, 26 January2007, Amnesty International Urgent Action, AIIndex number AI MDE 13/008/2007.17 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur onExtrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,UN Doc. A/HRC/4/20, 27 March 2007.18 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Iran, Concluding observations, UNDoc. CRC/C/15/Add.254, 31 March 2005.Ir aqRepublic of IraqPopulation: 28.8 million (13.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 227,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the Iraqi armed forces formed in 2003after the US-led occupation. Armedpolitical groups reportedly used childrenas combatants.ContextAccording to the UN Secretary-General, childrenin Iraq continued to “suffer most in the ongoingviolence” in the country. The Secretary-Generalalso noted that “statistics from United Nationspartners and Iraqi authorities suggest thatapproximately half of all Iraqi refugees arechildren, as are as many as 38 to 40 per cent ofinternally displaced persons.” 1The new Iraqi constitution was adopted inOctober 2005 with the acceptance of all religiousgroups. Elections were held in December 2005for a new 275-seat National Assembly. In June2006 Prime Minister Nouri Maliki announced a24-point National Reconciliation Plan addressingthe political and security crises in the country.The plan provided for mechanisms to facilitatethe political process, the disbanding of armedmilitias and the establishment of security plans.The Plan contained provisions for dealing withinternal displacement, for enacting legislativeand judicial reforms, for a partial amnesty fornon-terrorist offences and for accountabilitymechanisms for human rights abuses. 2 Politicaluncertainty continued, however, as sectarianviolence persisted. 3The US-led Multi-National Force–Iraq(MNF-I) and the Iraqi government facedincreasing attacks from supporters of the formergovernment and other armed groups. Attacks bythe various groups intensified after the February2006 bombing of the Samara Mosque, a Shiashrine, reportedly carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq.The incident sparked increased sectarian violenceand resulted in mass displacement. The bombingwas followed by retaliatory violence; over ahundred people were killed in the immediateaftermath and at least 165 in the followingdays. 4 Iraq’s civilian population was faced withdaily violence perpetrated by armed groups,1 7 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

criminal gangs, religious radicals and militias.There were also injuries and deaths resultingfrom operations by the security forces. Civiliansaccounted for the majority of these casualties.Human rights abuses, ranging from killingsto discrimination on the basis of political andreligious affiliation, gender, sexual orientationand professional group, had an enormous impacton the population. 5Abductions of children by Iraqi armed groupsrelated to the sectarian violence increasedsignificantly, in addition to the number of childrenabducted for ransom. A survey conducted byseveral local non-governmental organizations(NGOs) in Baghdad indicated that at least20,000 people had been abducted throughoutthe country in 2006, half of them women andchildren. 6The Secretary-General reported that therehad been “frequent attacks on schools, childrenand teachers” in Iraq since 2006. In January 2007members of an armed group were said to havedeliberately targeted a girls’ school in westernBaghdad, with five students killed and 21 othersinjured in the incident. In June 2007 members ofan armed group were said to have abducted 30students between the ages of 17 and 19 from asecondary-school in Saydiyah. 7In mid-March 2006 five MNF-I soldiers werecharged with the rape and murder of a 14-yearoldgirl and the murder of her family, includingher 5-year-old sister, in Mahmoudiyah, south ofBaghdad. 8GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 9 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution stated that“[t]he Iraqi Armed Forces and Security Serviceswill be composed of the components of theIraqi people with due consideration given to itsbalance and its similarity without discriminationor exclusion and shall be subject to the control ofthe civilian authority”, and that “[m]ilitary serviceshall be regulated by law”.In May 2003 the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) had ordered the completedismantling of the Iraqi army, the demobilizationof all enlisted soldiers and the indefinitesuspension of universal conscription. The August2003 CPA order creating the new armed forcesspecified that the minimum age of recruitmentwas 18 and that recruitment was voluntary.Former military officers of the rank of lieutenantcoloneland below were being accepted into thenew army; all other males between the ages of 18and 40 who were not listed on excluded lists wereallowed to sign up at recruiting centres. 9Military training and military schoolsMNF-I implemented a structured training andassessment process for the Iraqi military forces.Training was divided into two areas: for newrecruits and for former soldiers. Membershipof the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade requiredadditional training. All Iraqi Special OperationsForces (ISOF) soldiers underwent a threeweekassessment and selection course. Theyplayed crucial roles in major combat operationsalongside, and sometimes independently of,multinational forces. A small number of armypersonnel attended advanced training with NATOand in US army schools. 10Armed groupsA wide range of armed groups operated in Iraq,most of them opposing the occupation of themultinational forces or engaging other sectarianmilitia groups. Iraqi armed groups opposingthe occupation were mainly Sunni, althoughSunni armed groups also attacked Shia targets.Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Qaeda of Jihad Organizationin the Land of the Two Rivers) was the mostprominent insurgent group. 11Children were reportedly involved in attackscarried out by armed groups at least sinceNovember 2005, when a boy aged between tenand 13 carried out a suicide bombing targetingthe police commander in the city of Kirkuk. Nogroup claimed responsibility for the attack. 12Later the same month two boys aged 12 and 13reportedly carried out attacks against MNF-Ipatrols in Fallujah and Hweejah. 13Various armed groups allegedly used childsoldiers. The two main child recruiters wereal-Qaeda in Iraq and Jaysh al-Mahdi (Army of theMahdi), according to research conducted by anIraqi NGO. These groups reportedly used moneyto entice children into the group. 14The Sunni group al-Qaeda in Iraq was led byAbu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006.The group was believed to be led subsequentlyby Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as AbuAyyub al-Masri). Al-Qaeda in Iraq targeted mainlythe MNF-I presence and individuals co-operatingwith MNF-I. It also launched attacks againstcivilians, often targeted at the Iraqi Shia majority,in an attempt to incite sectarian violence. Al-Qaeda was estimated to have more than 1,000active members. Reports indicated that the grouprecruited children to carry out its attacks, but thenumber involved was not known. 15Mentally disabled children were allegedlysold to or abducted by al-Qaeda in Iraq and usedby the group in night raids and as decoys todivert the attention of US or Iraqi forces in therun-up to attacks in cities such as Diyala, Ramadiand Fallujah. 16On 21 March 2007 mentally disabledchildren were allegedly used by al-Qaeda inF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 7 9

Iraq operatives in a suicide attack on a marketin the Adhamiyah neighbourhood of Baghdad.According to a spokesperson for the Ministry ofInterior, “they were put in the back of a car withanother two adults in the front. The military lettheir car pass through the check point since ithad children as passengers. When they reachedthe market, they [the adults] left the car withthe children inside and detonated a bomb inthe vehicle, killing the children and another fiveIraqis.” 17Children orphaned since the US-led invasionin 2003 were allegedly used by the group asspies, or sent to gather information or distracttroops while the group prepared to detonatebombs nearby. According to the Ministry ofInterior, at least 12 children had died by April2007 as a result of such bomb explosions. 18Jaysh al-Mahdi, led by radical cleric SheikMuqtada Sadr, had a large presence in the citiesof Najaf and Karbala and the “Sadr City” suburbin Baghdad. It was created in 2003 following thecollapse of the Saddam Hussein government, andsought to replace more traditional factions as thevoice of Iraq’s Shiite majority. As of early 2004it was estimated to consist of about 500–1,000trained combatants along with another 5,000–6,000 active participants, including under-18s. 19In summer 2004 Muqtada al Sadr directed arevolt that affected the primarily Shia south ofIraq, with the fighting against the MNF-I in theholy city of Najaf being particularly fierce. Childsoldiers were allegedly used by the al-Mahdimilitias during the fighting, some as young as12. 20 In September 2006 children were reportedlyused to throw stones at US troops in “SadrCity”, although an Al-Sadr spokesman deniedorganizing children for this purpose, stating thatthe rock-throwing was “spontaneous”. 21Ansar al-Islam, one of two main ethnicKurdish Islamist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, witharound 600 fighters, was accused of links withal-Qaeda, and reportedly included non-Kurdishfighters. 22 Since its establishment in 2001, thegroup engaged in intermittent clashes with theforces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),in whose stronghold Biyara and Tawela werelocated. There was no available information as towhether this group recruited children.Detention of suspected child soldiersChildren were reportedly held in centres underthe jurisdiction of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.Some were suspected of having taken part inclashes against government forces, includingthose suspected of being linked to the MahdiArmy. 23By mid-2007 around 800 children agedbetween ten and 17 were held in an MNF-I basein Baghdad, accused of making and plantingroadside bombs for armed groups or caughtwhen acting as lookouts or carrying guns.According to a US Army spokesperson, thenumber of child arrests was on the rise, from 25 amonth in 2006 to 100 a month in 2007. 24US soldiers within MNF-I described abusesagainst child detainees in detention centres runby MNF-I, including the rape of a 15-year-oldboy at Abu Ghraib prison, forced nudity, stresspositions, beating and the use of dogs. 25As of October 2007 it was not clear whetherchildren in MNF-I custody in Iraq were subjectto the same detention review process as adults,who did not have access to lawyers and had tosign pledges of good behaviour and produce aguarantor to be released. 26 According to Major-General Douglas Stone, as of September 2007between 50 and 60 children aged 15 to 17 hadbeen turned over to Iraqi custody for trial. 27DevelopmentsThe government, through the Commission ofChild Care, began to address the challengesconfronting children in Iraq. The Commissionestablished a committee, which recommendedthat the government sign the Optional Protocol tothe UN Convention on the Rights of the Child onthe involvement of children in armed conflict. 281 Report of the UN Secretary-General to theSecurity Council on Children and armed conflict,UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21 December2007.2 United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), www.uniraq.org/; see also Human Rights Watch,Country Summary, January 2007.3 UNAMI, 11th report on the situation of humanrights in Iraq, 1 April–30 June 2007, www.uniraq.org.4 “Bombing shatters Mosque in Iraq”, WashingtonPost, 23 February 2006, www.washingtonpost.com.5 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),“Iraq: a desperate situation”, interview withBéatrice Mégevand-Roggo, 22 September 2007,www.icrc.org/; ICRC, “Iraq: civilians withoutprotection”, report, 11 April 2007, www.icrc.org.6 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andArmed Conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,October 2006; see also Amnesty International(AI), “Iraq: decades of suffering, now womendeserve better”, 22 February 2005.7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 1.8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.9 Global Security, “New Iraqi Army”, www.globalsecurity.org.10 Ibid.11 “Guide: Armed groups in Iraq”, BBC News, 15August 2006.12 “World: Islamic clerics condemn use of childrenin suicide bombings”, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 3 November 2005, ww.rferl.org.1 8 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

13 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.14 Confidential information, Iraq, May 2007.15 Ibid.16 “Iraq: mentally handicapped children are used inattacks”, IRIN, 10 April 2007.17 Ibid.18 Ibid.19 Global Security, “Al- Mahdi Army”,www.globalsecurity.20 Peter W. Singer, “Young Soldiers Used in ConflictsAround the World”, Washington Post, 12 June2006.21 “Young children fight US troops in Iraq”,Associated Press, 9 September 2006, at www.globalpolicy.org.22 Global Security, “Ansar Al Islam”,www.globalsecurity.org.23 Human Rights Watch, “The New Iraq? Torture andIll-treatment of detainees in Iraq and Custody”,January 2005.24 “US Detains nearly 800 juveniles in Iraq”, AgenceFrance-Presse (AFP), 19 August 2007, www.timesofoman.com.25 Amnesty International, “USA: human dignitydenied: torture and accountability in the ‘war onterror’”, October 2004.26 “US command in Baghdad launches bid torehabilitate Iraqi detainees”, Inside the AirForce, Vol. 18, No. 29 (20 July 2007); NancyMontgomery, “Board decides fate of thousandsof Iraqi detainees: panel of Iraqis and Americanmilitary has released more than 14,000 in 18months”, Stars and Stripes, 23 February 2006.27 Walter Pincus, “US working to reshape Iraqidetainees: moderate Muslims enlisted to steeradults and children away from insurgency”,Washington Post, 19 September 2007.28 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.IREL ANDIrelandPopulation: 4.1 million (1.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 10,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17; 16 as apprenticesVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 18 November 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitmentage was 17, but under-18s serving inthe armed forces were unlikely to bedeployed in hostilities because of trainingrequirements.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution and a series of Defence Actsfrom 1954 to 1993 provided the basis for theIrish Defence Forces. Compulsory military serviceand conscription had never existed in Ireland,and recruitment to the Irish Defence Forces(made up of a Permanent Defence Force and aReserve Defence Force) was entirely voluntary.Defence Forces Regulations and AdministrativeInstructions stated that enlistment in any branchof the Irish Defence Force could take place atthe age of 17. Cadets entering the PermanentDefence Force for year-long intensive trainingleading to a commission as a junior officer alsohad to be 17. The Defence Forces AdministrativeInstructions explicitly barred the overseas serviceof any member of the armed forces under theage of 18. Following enlistment, most 17-yearoldrecruits underwent a six-month period of“essential core basic training” before activelyassuming military duties in the PermanentDefence Force. Consequently, the governmentemphasized that “the possibility of a person whohas not attained the age of 18 being exposedto any ‘hostile’ incident is virtually negligible”.According to the government, “the onlytheoretical situation where a person who hasnot attained the age of 18 could be exposed to‘hostilities’ would be where hostilities had brokenout and were occurring within the State’s ownjurisdiction”. In February 2007 it was reportedthat there were more than 300 17-year-olds inthe Reserve Defence Force, although mandatorytraining requirements in the second year of theirservice meant that they were not permitted totake part in any actual operations until theywere at least 18 or 19. Members of the ReserveF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 8 1

Defence Force were expressly prohibited fromparticipation in civil power back-up operationsand were also prohibited from taking part in anyinternational operations. All those seeking entryto any branch of the Irish Defence Forces whowere under 18 were required to have the writtenconsent of their parent or guardian prior toenlistment, and to have had a personal interview.An estimated 22 per cent of personnel enteringthe Irish Defence Forces were younger than 18in recent years; of those, fewer than 45 per centwere reportedly still under 18 at the conclusion oftheir basic training. 1Military training and military schoolsIrish military regulations allowed 16-year-oldsto be recruited as “apprentices”, receivingspecial training for three or four years at bothmilitary and civilian technological colleges. Theywere completely prohibited from performingany military duties, and would normally be 19or 20 by the time they completed their studiesand gained their qualification. Only then wouldthey assume active military duties includingpossible deployment abroad. In current practice,the minimum entry age for apprentices wasgenerally 17, comparable with the age of ordinaryenlistment in the Irish Defence Forces. 2in armed conflict and children are referred tothese services where necessary”. 5At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Ireland and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Ireland to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/IRL/1, 5 February 2007.2 Ibid.3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Information from the Irish ambassador to theUnited Kingdom, September 2007.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Ireland contributed 500,000 in 2005 to theUN Development Programme’s Disarmament,Demobilisation, Reintegration and RepatriationTrust Fund for Liberia, supporting work with bothadult and child ex-combatants. 3DevelopmentsIn preparing its 2006 Initial Report to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, thegovernment consulted with a wide range ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) andstatutory bodies and included some of the viewsexpressed in the consultation in its report to theCommittee. Among concerns identified in theprocess was the exclusion of those members ofthe Irish Defence Forces under the age of 18 fromthe investigative mandate of the Ombudsmanfor Children and the need for specific trainingof refugee determination personnel on issuesrelating to child ex-combatants. 4A community-based Child and AdolescentMental Heath Service, established by theIrish Health Service Executive, organizedmultidisciplinary teams of health professionals,social workers and speech and languagetherapists, prepared to “treat psychiatric andpsychological manifestations associated withtraumatic experiences such as those experienced1 8 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

© Coalition 2005F — JSchool sign, East Jerusalem – children are vulnerable even at schoolC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 8 3

ISR AELState of IsraelPopulation: 6.7 million (2.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 168,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 18 July 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age of conscription was 18and volunteers were accepted from age17. Military training was widespread forunder-18s. Under-18s were recruited asvolunteers in the police-affiliated civilguard. Israeli children around Hebronwere used by extreme settler movementsin violent activities. Israeli military forcescontinued to arrest large numbers ofPalestinian children, some of whom weretortured during detention. Palestinian andLebanese armed groups launched attackson Israeli civilian targets, killing andinjuring a number of Israeli children.ContextThe Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israelioccupation continued into 2007. Nearly 6,000people had been killed during the conflict,including 129 Israeli children killed by Palestinianforces 1 and 889 Palestinian children killed byIsraeli forces. 2 Israel withdrew settlers and troopsfrom the Gaza Strip in August–September 2005,although since then it had conducted frequentarmed raids into the area. 3 Israeli withdrawalfrom four West Bank settlements also took place,but Israel confiscated Palestinian land through itsconstruction of the “separation barrier” aroundthe West Bank. 4 The wall reduced the scope fordirect conflict, but there were frequent clashesbetween settler communities and Palestinians.Syria and Lebanon remained formally at warwith Israel, which occupied disputed territoryof both countries. In July 2006 Israel launchedan intensive month-long military campaign inLebanon after the abduction of two of its soldiers.The July 2006 conflict resulted in the deaths ofseven Israeli and nearly 400 Lebanese children. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll Israelis were required to perform militaryservice from the age of 18. 6 Men were expected toserve for 36 months and women for 24 months.Children were assessed and interviewed forservice in the armed forces from the age of 16and a half, and at 17 were issued formal call-upnotices. Voluntary recruitment was allowed fromthe age of 17, although the armed forces statedthat “frontline” duties were only possible from18. 7 Exemption was possible on medical groundsand by discretion of the Minister of Defence. 8Only women could state religion or family statusas grounds for exemption. 9Military training and military schoolsIsraeli children received familiarizationand military training well below the age ofrecruitment. Most schools had uniformedteacher-soldiers and youth guides on their staffwho provided a link between the educationsystem and the military establishment. 10 Officialpre-recruitment activities started at the age of15–16 (tenth grade). 11 By the 11th–12th grade(age 16 up) students were reportedly “saturatedwith the idea of enlistment” through a range ofpromotional events and material. 12 Gadna, oryouth battalions, ran a one-week military trainingprogram on an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) baseas part of the curriculum for 16–17-year-olds atmost Jewish state schools. 13The armed forces also directly administeredschools, including the Beit Biram MilitaryBoarding School in Haifa, which acceptedstudents from age 14. 14 Pupils were called cadetsand wore military uniforms. 15 The Israeli Air Force(IAF) ran four technical schools for children aged13 and above. Amal High School in Ramat Davidwas a joint military–civilian facility for childrenaged 13 and older based on an IAF base. 16A number of voluntary summer and extracurricularcourses involving military trainingwere available for Israeli and foreign childrenfrom the age of 14–15. These included coursesrun directly by the IDF and those run by otherorganizations, such as the scouts. 17 Trials to servein elite units of the military began from the age of17. In 2006 there was controversy when 17-yearoldItai Sharon died of heatstroke during IsraeliAir Force (IAF) trials. 18 The subsequent internalinquiry identified a series of failures in the IAF’streatment of Sharon. 19 Also in 2006, 17-year oldAharon Tzarfati died accidentally during physicalevaluations for a naval commando program. Hewas among two hundred 17–18-year-olds takingpart. 201 8 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Child recruitment and deploymentThere were no reported instances of under-18sserving in combat duty with the IDF. However, inHebron young Israeli children from settlementsoften mingled with soldiers on duty and sat inmilitary checkpoints, even when Palestinianswere present. 21 On occasion IDF soldierswere reported to have stood by, or given tacitencouragement, as Israeli children engaged inhostile behaviour towards Palestinians. 22 In onecase an Israeli soldier showed a Palestinian’sidentity papers to two settler children, agedaround 12. They and four other children thenthrew stones at the Palestinian under the gaze ofthe soldier. 23In 2007 three incidents were documentedwhere Palestinian children were used as humanshields by the IDF in and around Nablus, twoyears after an Israeli Supreme Court rulingbanned this practice. 24 In one case, an 11-year-oldgirl was sent into a derelict building ahead of IDFsoldiers investigating the source of shooting. 25 Inanother case, a 15-year-old boy was told to walkahead of soldiers searching his family home, thesoldiers firing five or six shots. 26Israel’s internal security agency, known asShabak or Shin Bet, was also alleged to haveattempted to recruit Palestinian children asinformants. An official from the PalestinianAuthority (PA) security forces told DCI-Palestine,a non-governmental organization (NGO), that 40per cent of Palestinians accused of collaboratingwith the Israeli forces and arrested by the PAwere children. The youngest he had encounteredwas 12. 27 A 16-year-old boy from Hebron wasarrested by Israeli forces and held in solitaryconfinement at Ashkelon Prison in Israel for35 days in 2007. He was mistreated during hisdetention and pressed to become an informant. 28Previous studies showed that such approacheswere common during detention. 29In 2006 around 700 Palestinian under-18swere detained by Israeli forces, under militaryprovisions that contravened internationalhumanitarian law and standards of juvenilejustice. 30 Incidents of ill-treatment and tortureremained common. 31 In one case, a 17-year-oldboy was arrested in July 2007 on charges ofattempting to recruit a suicide bomber. Duringthe journey to the detention centre, he waskicked and trampled on by Israeli soldiers.Interrogators slapped him repeatedly andslammed his head against a desk. After initialinterrogation he was held for five days in a cellwith Palestinian informants and for 15 days insolitary confinement. 32The Israeli police force encouraged olderIsraeli children to volunteer for its 70,000-strongcivil guard. 33 The guard undertook communitypolicing alongside more security-focused rolessuch as foot patrols, checkpoint security andsecurity sweeps. 34 Under-18s were noted takingpart in a limited capacity from the tenth gradeand received weapons training and firearms from11th grade (16–17). 35Armed groupsPalestinian groupsThe military wings of Palestinian political groups– Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)– continued attacks against Israelis in Palestinianareas and in Israel. 36 One hundred and twentynineIsraeli children were killed in attacks since2000. 37 They included two 16-year-olds whowere killed in a suicide bombing at a Netanyashopping centre in July 2005. 38 The attack wascarried out by 18-year-old Ahmed Abu Khalil andclaimed by Islamic Jihad. 39 One older Palestinianchild was killed during attempts to cross theIsraeli border on behalf of an armed group. Nounder-18s were known to have been involved insuicide bombings since 2004. 40 The shelling ofSderot, on the border with Gaza, by Palestinianarmed groups constituted a threat to children onboth sides of the border. 41 In September 2007Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a rocketattack that landed metres away from an Israelikindergarten. 42Lebanese groupsHizbollah conducted a number of raids andshelled Israeli positions prior to the July 2006war. During the month-long battle, Hizbollah’sshelling of northern Israel resulted in the deathsof seven children, as well as damage to 23schools and 11 kindergartens. Six thousandIsraeli children required psychological treatmentas a result of the violence. 43Israeli settlersIsraeli children living in settlements werefrequently involved in violent confrontationswith Palestinian neighbours and, on occasion,international observers. In Hebron, observersreported the systematic use of youngsters under12 to carry out acts of violence and vandalismagainst Palestinians and their property. 44 Israel’spolice commander in the Hebron region said, “Wehave a major problem here. They [the settlers]understand our weak point – and they usechildren under the age of criminal responsibility,under the age of twelve. They do thisintentionally. They [the children] are the tacticalwing, even the strategic wing, of the adults.” 45The Israeli NGO Yesh Din found that of 150cases of complaints of settler violence openedin 2005 and closed by November that year,50 involved children under the age of criminalresponsibility, all from the Hebron area. 46 Oneadult victim from the Tel Rumeida area of Hebronreported that “settler children attack us, withF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 8 5

the parents encouraging them and standing nextto them”. 47 A number of videos of child settlerviolence were posted on the Internet in 2006–7. 48Attacks by groups of older Israeli children againstPalestinians in the area were reported on arelatively frequent basis. 49Throughout the West Bank, and formerlyin the Gaza Strip, older Israeli children werereportedly involved in the building and securingof new outposts. This included four under-18swho were charged in 2007 for their role inbuilding the outpost of Shevut Ami on Palestinianland. 50 The precise affiliation of the child activistswas unclear, although observers said that theywere well organized and briefed. 51 They wereoften referred to in the Israeli press as “HilltopYouth”, although this was an umbrella term fora number of diverse groups. 52 During the firstseven months of 2005, 688 Israeli under-18swere detained for their role in protests againstthe pull-out from Gaza and outpost settlements,but in 2007 state prosecutors decided to dropcharges against 60 minors indicted for assaultagainst the security forces in August 2005. 53During the IDF evacuation of Homesh in thenorthern West Bank in March 2007, up to 2,500activists, most of them teenagers, attempted torepopulate the area. 54 In April 2006 a movementcalled “Youth for the Land of Israel” rallied 1,000protestors for a demonstration at Bet El, whena 17-year-old participant was injured in clasheswith Palestinians. 55“Youth for the Land of Israel” was also allegedto have organized “hikes” in the West Bank bymeans of leafleting campaigns in schools. 56 Thisactivity often involved groups of Israeli settlerstrespassing on Palestinian land and sometimesended in clashes. Local settlement councils alsoencouraged older children to participate in hikesas part of local youth activities. 57DevelopmentsIsrael and the Occupied Palestinian Territory(OPT) were noted as situations of concern in theUN Secretary-General’s reports to the SecurityCouncil on Children and Armed Conflict inFebruary 2005 and October 2006. 58 The SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Conflict visited the area inApril 2007. She recommended the establishmentof independent investigation mechanisms tofollow up alleged violations of children’s rights.She suggested that Israel review its policies ondetention for Palestinian children. The SpecialRepresentative also called on Palestinian armedfactions in Gaza to respect humanitarian law andhalt all indiscriminate rocket fire into Israel. 59A number of government and non-governmentprograms supported Israeli children affectedby the conflict. This includes the PsychologicalCounselling Service in state schools. 60 The IsraelCenter for the Treatment of Psychotrauma set upthe “Living Under Fire” program for children inSderot, Nahariya and Haifa after the 2006 conflictwith Lebanon. 61 NATAL – the Israel Center forVictims of Terror and War – was one of a numberof groups running programs for residents ofSderot, including children. 62International standardsIsrael ratified the Optional Protocol in July 2005.Its declaration confirmed that the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment was 17 and that noone under 18 could be posted to combat duty.The declaration said that in order to ensurethat recruitment of under-18s was not forced orcoerced, written permission from the parents orguardian, reliable proof of age and explanation ofthe duties were required. 63 In March 2005 Israelratified ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms ofChild Labour. 641 B’Tselem statistics to 31 October 2007 from 29September 2000, www.btselem.org.2 Information from DCI Palestine Section, to 5November 2007.3 See for example “One year after the‘Disengagement’: Gaza still occupied and underattack”, al Haq, September 2006, www.alhaq.org.4 UN Office for Co-ordination of HumanitarianAffairs, “The Humanitarian Impact on Palestiniansof Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure inthe West Bank”, July 2007, www.ochaopt.org.5 The UN estimated that a third of 1,191 deaths inLebanon were minors: “Major violations on bothsides in Israel–Lebanon conflict, say UN Experts”,4 October 2006, www.unhchr.ch.6 Defence Service Law, Consolidated Version 5746-1986.7 New Profile (Israeli non-governmentalorganization), “Child Recruitment in Israel”, 29July 2004.8 Defence Service Law, above note 6.9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2005, www.mfa.gov.il.10 Interview with New Profile, 11 September 2007.11 Hanan Greenberg, “IDF to look at teen’smotivation”, Ynet News, 29 August 2006.12 Interview with New Profile, above note 10.13 New Profile, above note 7.14 Ibid.15 See www.panmaz.co.il.16 New Profile, above note 7.17 See Gadna programmes at http://dover.idf.il/;Tzofim brochure, www.chetz-vkeshet.org.il.18 Information from DCI-Israel, 18 October 2007.19 Nir Hasson and Yoav Stern, “Report: IAF failuresto blame for teen’s death in pre-pilot course”,Ha’aretz, 17 December 2006.20 Amos Harel, “Naval Commando Candidate DiesDuring Pre-Conscription Trials”, Ha’aretz, 19September 2006.1 8 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

21 Interview with international observers in Hebron,13 September 2007.22 See numerous case studies in Yesh Din, “ASemblance of Law”, June 2006.23 Ibid.24 B’Tselem, “Human Shields”, background,www.btselem.org.25 Incident in February 2007, information receivedfrom DCI-Palestine Section, 10 September 2007.26 B’Tselem, “Israeli soldiers use ’Amid ’Amirah,15, as human shield, Nablus, February 2007”,www.btselem.org.27 DCI-Palestine, “Dealing with alleged childcollaborators in the Occupied Palestinian Territoryin the spirit of the Convention on the Rights of theChild”, April 2005, www.dci-pal.org.28 Documented by DCI-Palestine Section,19 July2007, www.dci-pal.org.29 “Dealing with alleged child collaborators”, abovenote 27.30 UN Report, Visit of the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General for Children and ArmedConflict to the Middle East, 9–20 April 2007.31 DCI-Palestine Section, “Palestinian ChildPrisoners Report 2006”, March 2007, www.dcipal.org.32 Information received from DCI-Palestine Section,28 November 2007.33 Israeli police website, www.police.gov.il.34 Israeli police civil guard information, www.police.gov.il.35 New Profile, above note 7.36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Suicide and OtherBombing Attacks in Israel since the Declaration ofPrinciples (Sept 1993)”, www.mfa.gov.il.37 B’Tselem, “Statistics to 29 September 2007 fromstart of Intifada, 29 September 2000”,www.btselem.org.38 B’Tselem, “Israeli minors killed by Palestinians inIsrael and Palestine to 31 October 2007”,www.btselem.org.39 “Israel reoccupies West Bank town”, BBC News,13 July 2005.40 Information from DCI-Palestine Section, 20October 2007.41 For instance Qassam rocket damage to a schooland shrapnel injuries to a child, reported by childprotection agencies working in the OccupiedPalestinian Territory (OPT), July–August 2007.42 “Sderot schools launch strike because ofPalestinian resistance’s rockets”, Paltoday NewsNetwork, 4 September 2007.43 UN Report, above note 30.44 Yesh Din, above note 22; B’Tselem andAssociation for Civil Rights in Israel, “Ghost town:Israel’s separation policy and forced eviction ofPalestinians from the center of Hebron”, May2007.45 Meron Rappoport, “Ghost Town”, Ha’aretz, 18November, 2005.46 Yesh Din, above note 22.47 Testimony of Taysir Aby ’Ayeshe, “Ghost town”,above note 44.48 See Ali Waked, “Hebron settlers filmed throwingrocks at Palestinians”, Ynet News, 3 August 2007;Nir Hasson, “Hebron settler filmed attackingArabs”, Ha’aretz, 12 January 2007.49 Testimony of Fawzi Abu Armila of stone-throwingby 16–19-year-olds, given to B’Tselem, 14 January2007, www.btselem.org.50 Email contact with Yesh Din, 29 October 2007.51 Telephone conversation with DCI-Israel, 18October 2007; interview with Amir Givol, NewProfile, 11 September 2007.52 E-mail conversation with New Profile, 24 October2007.53 Tal Rosner, “688 minors detained”, Ynet News,9 August 2005, www.ynetnews.com/; www.israeljustice.com.54 Amos Harel and Nadav Shraqai, “Police planningto clear Homesh protesters by early Wednesday”,Ha’aretz, 27 March 2007.55 “Yaakov Katz Beit El marchers defy IDF closure”,Jerusalem Post, 16 April 2006.56 Ezra HaLevi, “Youth answer terrorism withtrans-Samaria hike”, Arutz 7, 2 July 2006, www.shechem.org/; Ezra HaLevi, “Hikes, concertsand festivities planned for the Sukkot holiday”,6 October 2006, IsraelNationalNews.com, www.israelnationalnews.com.57 Telephone interview with Director of Research,Yesh Din, 18 October 2007.58 UN Secretary-General’s reports to the SecurityCouncil on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc.A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9 February 2005; UN Doc.A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006.59 UN Report, above note 30.60 “Delays in school and trauma in northern Israelfollowing Israel–Hezbollah conflict”, Ha’aretz,22 August 2006.61 Israel Center for the Treatment of Psychotrauma,www.traumaweb.org.62 NATAL, www.natal.org.il.63 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol:www2.ohchr.org.64 International Labour Organization (ILO), Databaseof International Labour Standards, www.ilo.org/(ilolex database).F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 8 7

ITALYItalian RepublicPopulation: 58.1 million (9.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 191,200Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionsuspended from January 2005)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182According to 2004 legislation the minimumage for voluntary recruitment into thearmed forces was 18, but the declarationmade at the time of ratification of theOptional Protocol, indicating 17 as thevoluntary recruitment age, had not yetbeen amended.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeLaw No. 226/2004, enacted in August 2004,suspended conscription with effect from 1January 2005 (Article 1). Conscription could bereintroduced if war was declared or if there wasa serious international crisis and numbers in theservices were insufficient. 1 Law 226/2004 alsoprovided that the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment into the armed forces was 18, for afixed one-year or four-year contract. 2 However,the declaration made by the government at thetime of the ratification of the Optional Protocol,which indicated 17 years as the voluntaryrecruitment age, had neither been withdrawn noramended.Italy had not adopted legislation to prohibitand criminalize the recruitment or use inhostilities of children by armed groups distinctfrom the state armed forces. The MilitaryPenal Code of War omitted the war crime ofconscripting or enlisting children under theage of 15 into armed forces or groups or usingthem to participate actively in hostilities. 3 In itsConcluding Observations on Italy’s Initial Reporton the Optional Protocol, the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child recommendedthat Italy introduce such legislation. 4 TheCommittee also expressed concern at the lackof definition of “take a direct part in hostilities”in Italian legislation, 5 and queried this issuespecifically during the dialogue with countryrepresentatives. 6Military training and military schoolsItaly had three military schools: the TeulièMilitary School in Milan, the Nunziatella MilitarySchool in Naples and the Francesco MorosiniNaval Military School in Venice. Applicants had tobe between 15 and 17 years of age and pass anentrance examination. 7 In addition to the normalschool curriculum, students received militarytraining, including combat and weapons training. 8Italy’s Initial Report on the Optional Protocolwas ambiguous as to whether students enrolledin military schools were considered part ofthe armed forces. It was particularly unclearregarding the status of students aged 16 andover, who had to sign a three-year contract of“special voluntary recruitment” into the armedforces before they were allowed to continuetheir studies. 9 Failure to sign the contractresulted in expulsion from the military school, 10raising questions as to whether the recruitmentwas genuinely voluntary. Although parents orguardians had to authorize a child’s age (as 15 orabove) before he could be admitted to a militaryschool, a parent or guardian’s informed consentwas not required for the contract of “specialvoluntary recruitment” into the armed forces,signed by military school students at the ageof 16. There was no obvious requirement thatstudents had to be fully informed of the dutiesinvolved in military service before signing thecontract. The Initial Report also said nothingabout 16-year-olds providing “reliable proof ofage” at the point of signing the contract.Despite this contract of “special voluntaryrecruitment” into the armed forces, Italymaintained the position that such studentswere not part of the armed forces. The relevantparagraphs in the Initial Report suggested someconfusion between the concept of membershipof the armed forces and that of taking a directpart in hostilities. 11 The Initial Report didnot clarify when the three-year contract ofvoluntary recruitment would begin, and alsofailed to make it clear whether the studentswould be considered military recruits duringtheir education at the military school, or ongraduation.DevelopmentsChildren seeking asylum in Italy were routinelydetained, contrary to domestic law andinternational human rights standards. Thosedetained included former child soldiers. 12 In itsConcluding Observations on Italy’s Initial Report,the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childexpressed regret about the lack of informationon specific reintegration programs or activitiesfor former child soldiers in Italy and the lack ofsystematic data collection on asylum seekersunder the age of 18 who were affected by armedconflict. The Concluding Observations welcomed1 8 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the Italian government’s international andbilateral technical co-operation activities andfinancial assistance aimed at preventing theinvolvement of children in armed conflict andassisting the recovery of child victims of armedconflict and of child combatants. 13At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Italy and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICE.1 Law 331/2000, Article 2.1(f).2 Law 226/2004, Articles 4 and 11.3 Amnesty International (AI), “Italy – Law reformneeded to implement the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court”, AI Index: EUR30/009/2005, www.iccnow.org.4 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Italy,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ITA/CO/1, 23 June 2006.5 Ibid.6 Committee on the Rights of the Child, 42ndsession, Summary Record – Italy, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1125, 24 May 2006.7 Ministry of Defence and Military Schools, www.esercito.difesa.it/ and www.difesa.it.8 Initial report of Italy to the Committee on theRights of the Child on the implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ITA/1,14 July 2004.9 Ibid.10 Concluding observations, above note 4.11 Initial report, above note 8.12 AI, “Italy: Invisible children – The human rightsof migrant and asylum-seeking minors detainedupon arrival at the maritime border in Italy”, AIIndex: EUR/30/001/2006, 23 February 2006.13 Concluding observations, above note 4.JAMAIC AJamaicaPopulation: 2.7 million (992,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 2,830Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 years and6 months (training only)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 18 years. Younger recruits could entertraining at 17 years and 6 months withparental consent.ContextThe police faced high levels of violence related todrugs and arms trafficking and one of the highesthomicide rates in the world, while in turn beingresponsible for hundreds of arbitrary killings,including extrajudicial executions. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to Jamaica’s declaration on ratificationof the Optional Protocol, all service in the JamaicaDefence Force (JDF) was voluntary. Recruits of 17years and 6 months could enlist in the JDF, butthose under 18 required written parental consent,and they could not graduate from traininginstitutions until the age of 18. Recruits over 18served in the regular force or in the regular andreserve forces under service contracts for periodsof up to 12 years. Under-18s could serve a longerterm, as their 12-year service began only whenthey reached the age of 18. Contracts could befurther renewed. 2 Candidates for the reserve hadto be over 18. 3The 2004 Child Care and Protection Actaimed to bring all child legislation in line with theConvention on the Rights of the Child, but it didnot specifically prohibit the enlistment of under-18s in the defence forces. 4Military training and military schoolsA new Military Education Policy was beingdeveloped to improve education andperformance standards in the armed forces. 5Around 560 boys and girls in secondaryschoolsthroughout Jamaica were members ofthe Jamaica Combined Cadet Force, which wasaffiliated to but not formally part of the armedF — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 8 9

forces. 6 Members received basic military trainingaimed at stimulating interest in a military careerand at showing how defence forces functioned.The JDF took part in international trainingexercises with the United Kingdom, Canadaand the USA and with countries in the RegionalSecurity System. It also provided training to theforces of other Caribbean countries. 79 UN Secretary-General, World Report on Violenceagainst Children, 20 November 2006, www.violencestudy.org.10 Dowdney, above note 8.11 UNICEF Jamaica, Violence, www.unicef.org.Armed groupsUnder-18s were reportedly among members ofarmed gangs which developed in the contextof the political patronage and political violencethat characterized electoral politics from the1960s to the 1980s, and which were responsiblefor gang and community violence. 8 A quarter ofthose arrested for violent crimes were school-agechildren, mainly boys. 9 The large number of gunsin inner-city areas appeared to be an importantfactor in the recent upsurge of more informalgroups not connected to political patronage.Boys of 16 or 17 were often considered “soldiers”in gang warfare, and 14-year-olds acted as guncarriers or lookouts. 10The government’s Violence PreventionAlliance, launched in 2004, brought togethernon-governmental, business, internationaland intergovernmental agencies. The Xchangemovement, a regional initiative supported byUNICEF to bring about positive change amongyoung people and adults, was launched inJamaica in May 2005. Other programs includedthe training of community youth leaders andoutreach activities such as skills and mediationtraining in communities severely affected byviolence. 111 Latin American School of Social Sciences(FLACSO), Security and Citizenship Program,Latin American and the Caribbean Security SectorReport, Country case study: Jamaica, October2006, www.flacso.cl; Amnesty InternationalReport 2007.2 1962 Defence Act, www.moj.gov.jm (laws ofJamaica).3 Jamaica Defence Force, Reserves, www.jdfmil.org.4 UNICEF, Advancing Children’s Rights in Jamaica:Report on Legislative Reform Initiative, November2004, www.unicef.org.5 Jamaica Defence Force, JDF members.6 Jamaica Defence Force, JCCF, Cadet Force.7 FLACSO, above note 1. (The Regional SecuritySystem comprises Antigua and Barbuda,Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts andNevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and theGrenadines; see www.rss.org.bb.)8 Luke Dowdney, Neither War nor Peace, Childrenand Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV),2005, www.coav.org.br.1 9 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

JAPANJapanPopulation: 128.1 million (21.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 240,400Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 20Optional Protocol: ratified 2 August 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Although 15-year-olds couldbecome youth cadets, they were neverdeployed.ContextSix hundred ground troops deployed by Japanto Iraq in January 2004 were withdrawn in July2006. However, around 200 air force personnelcontinued to airlift personnel and cargobetween Iraq and Kuwait, with deployment to bereviewed in July 2008. 1 This was the first foreigndeployment of Japanese troops since the endof the Second World War, apart from under theauspices of the UN, and it was criticized for beingin potential breach of Article 9 of the constitution,which defined Japan as pacifist. 2A nuclear test by North Korea in October 2006intensified public debate in Japan on whetherto revise the constitution towards taking a moreaggressive stance. 3 In May 2007 the Japaneseparliament passed legislation setting out theprocedures for a referendum on amending theconstitution, while the government was workingon draft amendments that were expected to moveaway from the pacifist approach. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1947 constitution stated that the Japanesepeople “forever renounce war as a sovereignright of the nation and the threat or use of forceas means of settling international disputes …land, sea and air forces, as well as other warpotential, will never be maintained. The rights ofbelligerency of the state will not be recognized”(Article 9). The Self-Defence Forces wereestablished in 1954 to defend against invasionand to maintain the peace, independence andsecurity of Japan.In 2003 Japan reported to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child that “Article 25 ofthe Enforcement Regulations of Law and theInstructions for Assignment of Youth Cadetsstipulate that the Self-Defence Forces mayaccept applications only from those who are18 years old or over, except for attending itseducational institutions through the youth cadetprogramme”. 5There was no conscription. 6 However,emergency security legislation passed in 2002calling for “people’s co-operation” in the eventof an emergency raised concerns that this couldentail conscription. 7Military training and military schoolsAll three branches of the Self-Defence Forces(ground, maritime and air) operated youth cadetprograms for lower-secondary-school graduates. 8Cadets from the age of 15 received secondaryschooleducation, basic military training andtraining to become technical specialists in thearmed forces. According to the governmentthey were not deployed on front lines and notexpected to engage in hostilities, even in theevent of an emergency. 9 They were, however,considered to be adopted as members of theSelf-Defence Forces. 10In addition, university-level militaryacademies existed, and about 1,700 cadetsattended the National Defence Academy, wherethe emphasis was on academic education.Cadets received further military training at officercandidate schools after graduation. 11Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The Japanese government provided assistanceto demobilization and reintegration efforts ina number of countries through the JapaneseInternational Co-operation Agency (JICA). 12Projects included support to the demobilizationprocesses in Afghanistan and Cambodia, andprovision of skills training for demobilizedsoldiers in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea,Rwanda and Sudan. JICA’s programs were notspecifically directed at the DDR of under-18s, butin some situations children could be among thoseto benefit. 13DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Japan and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9 1

International standardsIn August 2004 Japan ratified the OptionalProtocol, stating in its declaration that “TheGovernment of Japan, by relevant laws andregulations, recruits only those who are at andabove the minimum age of 18 as a member of theJapan Self-Defense Forces, with the exceptionof the cases of the students solely receivingeducational training at the schools within thestructure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (…‘Youth Cadets’), which come under ‘schools’stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 5 of theOptional Protocol”. The declaration further statedthat the minimum age of recruitment of theYouth Cadets was 15 years, and set out a numberof safeguards designed to ensure that therecruitment of the Youth Cadets was not forcedor coerced. These included the requirement ofconsent from a parent or guardian, documentaryproof of age for being at or over 15 years,and confirmation that a candidate was fullyinformed in advance of the duties involved. 14Although more than two years had passed sinceratification, Japan had yet to submit its initialreport on the Optional Protocol. 15Japan acceded to Additional Protocols I andII to the Geneva Conventions in August 2004 andto the Rome Statute of the International CriminalCourt in July 2007.1 “Japan will extend Iraq deployment till July 2008,Shiozaki says”, Bloomberg News, 10 July 2007,www.bloomberg.com.2 “Japan’s Iraq troops arrive home”, BBC News, 20July 2007.3 Amnesty International Report 2007.4 “Japan approves constitution steps”, BBC News,14 May 2007.5 Second periodic report of Japan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/104/Add.2, 24 July 2003.6 Ibid.7 “Emergency legislation may allow forconscription”, Japan Today, 3 May 2002, www.japantoday.com.8 Global Security, “Japan Ground Self DefenceForce, Nihon Rikujyo Jieita”, 2000, www.globalsecurity.org.9 Initial report of Japan to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.1, 5August 1996.10 Letter to Child Soldiers Coalition from Embassy ofJapan, London, 25 February 2004.11 National Defence Academy, www.nda.ac.jp.12 Coalition correspondence with JICA, June 2007.13 Ibid.14 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.15 UN Treaty Bodies Database, http://tb.ohchr.org.JordanHashemite Kingdom of JordanPopulation: 5.7 million (2.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 100,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 23 May 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The presence of some under-18s continuedto be noted in the armed forces, but theywere reportedly not deployed. Therewere no reports of armed political groupsrecruiting children.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe government decided in 2007 to reintroduceconscription, which had been suspended in1999. Those first affected by the change weremales aged over 18 and born after 1989, whowould serve for a period of up to two years. 1Conscription would be extended to females whenthe necessary trainers were available; youngwomen would serve in universities and schoolsrather than in military facilities. 2 The governmentsaid that the aim of reintroducing universalconscription was to instil a sense of nationalpride and discipline in the country’s youth andprovide training to help them find employment. 3The revised conscription law was to rule outwaivers for only sons or those who had brotherskilled in service, 4 but they would be availablefor health reasons; deferrals were availablefor students. 5 In a separate move, the age forvoluntary recruitment was raised to 18. 6Military training and military schoolsThe Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) ran 21institutions for military training, including theRoyal Jordanian Military College in Amman. 7In 2007 the JAF set up a non-profit companyin co-ordination with the Ministry of Labour totrain unemployed youth to fill vacancies in theconstruction sector and elsewhere. This followedprevious involvement in vocational training forover-16s. 8 In its first phase, the Jordan Companyfor Training and Recruitment (JCTR) would runa six-week military training program followedby vocational and on-the-job-training for 4,000Jordanians between the ages of 18 and 35. 9Trainees would receive a wage of 190–300 dinars1 9 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

(approximately US$269–424), and social andmedical security benefits. 10Child recruitment and deploymentIn its third periodic report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, considered in March2006, Jordan stated that its armed forcesemployed 21 individuals under the age of 18,all of whom were 17; this number comprised 17serving in the military sector and four in the civilservice sector. No under-18s could take part inmilitary operations. 11In correspondence with the Child SoldiersCoalition, the government stated on 19 October2007 that “Recruitment of persons under theage of 18 is suspended concerning militarypurposes and is only limited to vocational tasks… All members of the armed forces who areparticipating in peace operations are over 23years old.” 12The Compulsory Military Service Act No. 23 of1986 put the minimum age limit at 18; this wouldbe retained in the 2007 amendments. 13 However,the issue of child recruitment was not mentionedin Jordan’s draft Children’s Act of 2004, whichin 2007 was still awaiting parliamentaryapproval. 14 The Act was intended to implementthe provisions of the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child. 15Armed groupsA number of Palestinian political armed groupswere represented in Jordan, including the FatahaffiliatedBadr Brigade, which was under thecontrol of the JAF. 16 There were no reports thatthey recruited or trained under-18s.DevelopmentsThere were 750,000 refugees from the Iraqconflict in Jordan, of whom the UN estimated thatsome 250,000 were of school age. 17 Of these,40,000 were expected to enter the Jordanianschool system in 2007. 18 There were no reportsof the involvement of under-18s in cross-borderinsurgency in Iraq. Care International was runningcounselling programs for Iraqi refugees affectedby the conflict in Iraq, including children, withfunding from the UN refugee agency UNHCR. 19Jordan made efforts to promote awarenessof human rights and international humanitarianlaw (IHL) in its security forces, including throughtraining programs run for the Police Academyand members of the armed forces by the NationalCentre for Human Rights and Mizan. 20 IHL wasalso integrated into military training in January2006. 21 The Jordan Institute of Diplomacy’sRegional Human Security Centre organized anumber of meetings on child soldiers, whichresulted in recommendations for legal andadministrative measures on such issues asrecruitment age. 22Jordan’s National Plan of Action for Children,to run from 2004 to 2013, also mentioned theneed for protection of children in armed conflict.It aimed to provide training in this regard forthose working in the field of child rights. 23In July 2007 Jordan hosted the 27thInternational Arab Children Congress (ACC) onthe subject of security and development, whichincluded workshops on the impact of war andviolence on children. 24International standardsThe government ratified the Optional Protocol inMay 2007, five years after signing it. 25 Jordan’sdeclaration was not yet available.* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 “18-year-olds to do three months’ militaryservice”, Jordan Times, 15 March 2007. The exacttimeframe was to be set by the cabinet, on thebasis of advice from the designated minister andthe head of the joint forces. Nifin Abd al-Hadi,“Service length fixed by cabinet”, Ad-Dustour,June 2007.2 Mu’adh Furaihat, “Deputies agree flag law”,Ammannet, 10 June 2007.3 Mohammad Ben Hussein, “Conscription lawamendment approved”, Jordan Times, 19 April2007.4 Jihad al-Munsi, “Draft flat law cancelsexceptions”, al-Ghad, 18 March 2007.5 E-mail contact with the National Centre forHuman Rights, 9 October 2007.6 Third periodic report of Jordan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/JOR/3, 2 March 2006.7 Jordanian Armed Forces website, www.jaf.mil.jo.8 Third periodic report, above note 6.9 Harun al-Khitab, “Civilian requests welcomed inMaan for training in the armed forces”, al-Rai, 1October 2007, www.alrai.com.10 Khaled Neimat, “Army-run recruitment companylaunched”, Jordan Times, 6 September 2007.11 Third periodic report, above note 6.12 Correspondence with Jordan mission to Geneva,19 October 2007.13 Mustafa al-Riyalat, “Representatives agree flagand reserve law”, ad-Dustour, April 2007.14 Contact with National Centre for Human Rights,above note 5.15 “Parliament Approves CRC”, ad-Dustour, 26August 2006.16 David Eshel, “The Jordanian Badr Brigade – can itsave Abu Mazen’s West Bank?”, Defense Update,2 October 2007, www.defense-update.com.17 Linda Hindi, “US pledges $30 million to supportIraqis’ host countries”, Jordan Times, 29 August2007.F — JC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9 3

18 “Iraqi children join Jordanian peers at school”,Jordan Times, 23 August 2007.19 Linda Hindi, “Helping cure deep war wounds”,Jordan Times, 29 August 2007.20 Third periodic report, above note 6.21 International Committee of the Red Cross, AnnualReport, 2006, www.icrc.org.22 Third periodic report, above note 6.23 UNICEF, Jordanian National Plan of Action, www.unicef.org.24 Hani Hazaimeh, “Children’s congress to focus onsecurity, development”, Jordan Times, 26 June2007.25 Ratifications, www2.ohchr.org.K AZAKHSTANRepublic of KazakhstanPopulation: 14.8 million (4.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 65,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 19 (16 as militaryacademy students)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 10 April 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s inthe armed forces. Children could attendmilitary schools from the age of 11.Secondary-school students receivedweapons training at 16 or 17.ContextIn November 2004 security forces announcedthe arrests of 17 people, including four fromUzbekistan, in connection with explosions andattacks in Uzbekistan earlier in the year. All weredescribed as members of a previously unknownorganization, the Mujahedin of Central Asia, 1which was alleged by the Kazakh authoritiesto be linked to the armed opposition group theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (seeUzbekistan entry) and al-Qaeda. 2 The Uzbeksamong them were reportedly returned toUzbekistan. 3 Others were reported to have beensentenced in Kazakhstan in January 2006 toprison terms of between eight and 25 years. 4Kazakhstan was a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO), established inJune 2001, comprising also China, Kyrgyzstan, theRussian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,whose goals included mutual co-operation insecurity matters. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeFollowing moves to convert the armed forcesto a non-conscript basis, by January 2007 only15 to 20 per cent of the army was made up ofconscripts. 6 The reduction in the length of militaryservice and transition towards a non-conscriptmilitary was said to have reduced hazing – thesystematic abuse and humiliation of new recruitsby longer-serving or senior soldiers. However, asignificant number of hazing incidents continuedto be reported. 7A new Military Obligation and Military ServiceAct of 8 July 2005 retained 18 as the minimum1 9 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

age for compulsory military service (Article 23),while reducing the length of standard militaryservice from 24 to 12 months. 8 The governmenttold the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childthere was no provision for reducing the age ofconscription in a state of emergency or armedconflict, and that there had been no cases ofchildren being recruited into military service sincethe Optional Protocol came into force. 9According to Kazakhstan’s declaration onratifying the Optional Protocol in 2003, theminimum age for voluntary recruitment was 19. 10The 2002 Children’s Rights Act prohibitedenlisting children “for participation in militaryactions or armed conflicts, or to create children’smilitary units”. 11Military training and military schoolsMilitary preparation classes were available forsenior school students, whose studies includedhuman rights and human rights law. From theages of 16 or 17 students received training inthe use of airguns, rifles and Kalashnikovs. 12 Ifmartial law was declared, boys from the age of16 and girls from 18 were required to undertakemilitary training, including in the use of firearmsand grenades. 13Boys from the age of 11 could enrol in theZhas Ulan national military school, and from theage of 15 or 16 in the national military boardingschools. In 2005–6 about 4,000 children werestudying in military schools, from where about65 per cent of students went on to become armyofficers. Pupils entered voluntarily and with theirparents’ consent. By law the pupils could notparticipate in armed conflict or other militaryactivities. 14The Zhas Ulan military school offered thestandard school curriculum as well as weaponshandling and physical training. Priority inselection was given to orphans, children in careand children from large and poor families andfamilies of soldiers. 15 The Cadet Corps tookboarding students for three-year courses fromthe age of 15–16, after which they became lowrankingofficers. Cadet Corps students at the ageof 18 committed themselves to five years’ militaryservice after graduation. 16 Those who did not signup were liable for the cost of their education andto conscription. 17Young people were eligible to enter militaryacademies from the year they turned 17. Studentswere considered to be carrying out military dutiesin accordance with the rules on carrying outmilitary service. They could sign contracts formilitary service on reaching the age of 18, but notbefore completing one year of studies. 18Armed groupsIt was not known if under-18s from Kazakhstanwere recruited to either the Mujahedin of CentralAsia or the IMU. Pakistani military sources in2004 claimed that armed groups operating inPakistan were increasingly recruiting teenagersfrom Central Asia, but these claims were disputedand could not be confirmed. 19The recruitment, training, financing or othermaterial support for mercenaries was prohibitedunder the criminal code (Article 162) andpunishable by 7–15 years’ imprisonment whereminors were involved. The government told theCommittee on the Rights of the Child that therewas no problem of minors in Kazakhstan beingrecruited for involvement in armed activities. 20DevelopmentsIn January 2006 the Ministry of Education andScience established a Committee on Protection ofChildren’s Rights with responsibility for ensuringcompliance with the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child and the Optional Protocol. 21In September 2006 the Committee on theRights of the Child noted with concern that therewas no specific provision in law criminalizing therecruitment of children below the age of 18. TheCommittee called on the government to explicitlyprohibit by law the recruitment of under-15s intoarmed forces or armed groups and their directparticipation in hostilities, and to establishextraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes whencommitted by or against a person who was acitizen of or had other links with Kazakhstan. 221 This group is known by a number of othernames, including Islamic Jihad Group, the IslamicJihad Union, and the Jamaat of Central AsiaMujahadins.2 Amnesty International Report 2005.3 Information from Amnesty International (AI).4 Marat Yermukanov, “Kazakhstan exacerbates‘religious threat’ by maneuvering betweenBeijing and Washington”, Jamestown FoundationEurasia Daily Monitor, 9 May 2006, www.jamestown.org.5 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.6 Viktor Litovkin, “Kazakhstan wants to buildits army in accordance with the best foreigntemplate”, Voenno-Promyshlenniy Curer, 17–23January 2007, www.vpk-news.ru.7 For example, see US Department of State,Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006.8 Military Obligation and Military Service Act, No.74-III, 8 July 2005, at http://ru.government.kz.9 Written replies by the Government of Kazakhstanto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KAZ/Q/1/Add.1, 21 August2006.10 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org/; Military Service onContract Basis Act, No. 167-II 3PK, 20 March 2001,Article 17(1).K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9 5

11 Initial report of Kazakhstan to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KAZ/1,21 November 2005.12 Written replies, above note 9.13 Government Decree of 11 May 2006 in accordancewith the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 8July 2005 “On Military Obligation and MilitaryService” (Article 41), at www.mod.kz.14 Written replies, above note 9; Statement ofKazakhstan to the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child, 43rd session, 11 September 2006.(Kazakhstan’s report to the Committee indicatedthat children could enrol in the Zhas Ulan schoolfrom the age of 11; the written replies, however,gave the age of enrolment as 12–13.)15 Government of Kazakhstan, Admission Rules forthe Republican “Zhas Ulan” school, undated, athttp://ru.government.kz.16 Ministry of Defence, “Republican school ‘ZhasUlan’ named”, and “The Cadet Corps of theMinistry of Defense”, www.mod.kz .17 Military Obligation and Military Service Act,above note 8, Article 31.18 Ibid.19 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”,Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda usingchildren for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk(for more detail see Tajikistan entry).20 Initial report, above note 11; Statement, abovenote 14.21 Kazakhstan NGOs’ Working Group on Protectionof Children’s Rights, Explanatory Note tothe Report on Activities Undertaken by theRepublic of Kazakhstan in the Framework ofImplementation of the Provisions of the OptionalProtocol to the UN Convention on the Rights ofthe Child Concerning the Children’s Participationin the Armed Conflicts, 2006, at www.crin.org.22 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Kazakhstanon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KAZ/CO/1, 29 September 2006.KENYARepublic of KenyaPopulation: 34.4 million (17.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 24,120Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18, younger withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 28 January 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCNo children were reported to be serving inthe armed forces. Children were membersof or implicated in the activities of gangsinvolved in criminal violence.ContextHundreds of people died during periodicoutbreaks of inter communal violence, oftenover livestock and grazing land. Long-standingdisputes over land in the Mount Elgon district ofwestern Kenya led to violent clashes in December2006 and continuing violence during 2007. InJune 2007 it was reported that the violence hadresulted in the displacement of an estimated60,000 people and the deaths of at least 200.This included some 36 people, mostly children,who died of malnutrition. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Children’s Act stated that “No child shalltake part in hostilities or be recruited in armedconflict, and where armed conflict occurs, respectfor and protection and care of children shall bemaintained in accordance with the law”, and thatit was the government’s responsibility “to provideprotection, rehabilitation care, recovery andre-integration into normal social life of any childwho may become a victim of armed conflict”. 2In its declaration on the Optional Protocol, thegovernment stated that “the minimum age forrecruitment of persons into the armed forcesis by law set at eighteen years. Recruitment isentirely and genuinely voluntary and is carriedout with the full informed consent of the personsbeing recruited. There is no conscription inKenya.” 3 However, the Armed Forces Act, Chapter199, allowed for the enlistment of under-18s withthe consent of parents, guardians or the districtcommissioner. 4Recruits had to be in possession of a nationalidentity card, issued only when a citizen was 18,1 9 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

and able to produce a birth certificate. 5 Recruitsalso had to be able to show their school-leavingcertificates. 6 Although there were no reports ofunder-18s serving in the armed forces, the lack ofan effective system for registering births meantthat there was a risk of under-age recruitment. 7Armed groupsChildren were known to be involved in theactivities of armed criminal gangs, includingtransporting weapons. 8 Members of the bannedMungiki gang were reportedly responsible for arange of criminal activities including extortionand killings. In June 2007 police killed morethan 30 people in the settlement of Mathareduring operations against gang members.The operations followed a number of killingsattributed to Mungiki members. The gang had ahistory of involvement in political violence andin 2007 two former and two current members ofparliament were arrested and questioned overtheir alleged links to the group. 9 An alleged gangleader was sentenced to five years’ imprisonmentin June 2007, and another was arrested in August2007, reportedly as a move to limit the gang’sactivities ahead of the elections to be held inDecember 2007. 10DevelopmentsIn 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild recommended that Kenya implement anefficient birth registration system, including byproviding free birth registration and registeringthose individuals who had not been registeredat birth. 11As of the end of 2006, Kenya hosted arefugee population of over 270,000, mainly fromSomalia. 12 The Dadaab group of camps in easternKenya held around 175,000 refugees, includingsome 35,000 children under the age of five. 13In January 2007 Kenya forcibly returned about400 Somali asylum seekers to Somalia. 14 Giventhe unstable situation in Somalia, humanitarianworkers were concerned that refugee childrencould be at risk of being recruited by warringparties there. 15 The UN refugee agency (UNHCR),in its planning figures for 2008–9 indicatedthat there would be over 277,000 refugees andasylum seekers in Kenya, most from Somalia. 16International standardsKenya ratified the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court on 15 March 2005. 173 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Second periodic report of Kenya, above note 2.5 Information provided by Rädda Barnen (Save theChildren – Sweden), March 2004.6 Information provided by the High Commission ofthe Republic of Kenya, July 2007.7 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Kenya,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 2 February 2007.8 Second periodic report of Kenya, above note 2.9 Amnesty International, “Kenya: Police operationsagainst Mungiki must comply with Kenya’sobligations under international human rightslaw”, AI Index AFR 32/008/2007, 11 June 2007.10 “Banned Kenya gang leader caught”, BBC News,23 August 2007.11 Concluding Observations, above note 7.12 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook, 2006 (provisional),http://www.unhcr.org.13 UNHCR, “Kenya: Malnutrition levels in refugeecamps cause alarm”, briefing note, 3 July 2007.14 Refugee International, “Kenya denying asylum toSomali refugees”, January 2007, www.refintl.org.15 IRIN, “Kenya–Somalia: Which way out of thecamps for Somalia’s young refugees?”, in Youthin Crisis: Coming of Age in the 21st Century,February 2007, www.irinnews.org.16 UNHCR Global Appeal 2008–2009, Kenya.17 International Criminal Court, states parties, www.icc-cpi.int.K — O1 Kenya Red Cross Society, “Kenya: Mount ElgonClashes”, 8 June 2007.2 Second periodic report of Kenya to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/KEN/2, 4 July 2006.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9 7

KOREA, DemocraticPeople’s Republic ofDemocratic People’s Republic of KoreaPopulation: 22.5 million (6.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 1.1 millionCompulsory recruitment age: 18 (unclear)Voluntary recruitment age: 16 or 17 (unclear)Voting age: 17Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP IBoth the conscription and voluntaryrecruitment ages were unclear, althoughinformation indicated that the minimumvoluntary age for enlistment was 17. Itwas not known whether under-18s wereserving in the armed forces. Children werereportedly subjected to military trainingand indoctrination in school from a youngage.ContextAlthough there was currently no armed conflictin North Korea, no peace treaty had been signedwith South Korea and the two states technicallyremained at war.In October 2007 the leaders of North andSouth Korea agreed moves towards formallydeclaring an end to the war, although a full peacetreaty is not expected for years. 1 The governmentpledged to disable all nuclear facilities by the endof 2007 in return for multilateral economic aid. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1972 constitution, amended in 1992 and1998, states that “the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea rests on the people’snationwide defence system” (Article 58); that thestate would implement a system of “self-reliantdefence”, which would involve arming the “entirepeople”, as well as training and modernizing thearmy “on the basis of equipping the army and thepeople politically and ideologically” (Article 60);and that “National defence is the supreme dutyand honour of citizens. Citizens shall defend thecountry and serve in the army as required by law”(Article 86).In 2003 the government reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child that thelegal minimum age for voluntary enlistment in thearmed forces was 16 – the age of graduating fromsenior middle school – but in practice volunteerstook an oath to respect the military code ofconduct and began their regular military serviceonly at the age of 17 after pre-service militaryeducation that lasted for six months or more, ona selective basis. The report went on to state thatthose selected were educated in full-time militaryor technical educational institutes for one to twoyears before being posted to units as servicemenon active duty. It emphasized that enlistmentwas on a voluntary basis and that there was nosystem of forced conscription. 3Other reports claimed that there waswidespread conscription. According to onesource all men between the ages of 18 and 24were liable for military service. Women werenot liable for regular military service, but hadto undergo annual and other military traininguntil they were 40. 4 Another source gave theconscription age as 20–25, followed by part-timecompulsory service in the Worker-Peasant RedGuards until the age of 60. 5Elsewhere it was claimed that ten years’service was mandatory for all conscripts andenlisted personnel, according to a directiveissued by head of state Kim Jong-Il in April 1993,the system being revised in October 1996 torequire service until the age of 30 for men and26 for women. The source claimed that dueto a decrease in the number of volunteers forwork involving heavy labour, the governmenthad introduced “labour service”, whereby anindividual could be exempted from militaryservice in return for six to seven years’ labour. 6Another source stated that all able-bodied menwho did not go to college were conscripted intothe military and that some were conscriptedimmediately after middle school, making them17 or 18 years old. According to the same source,the duration of service depended on supply anddemand and if the authorities determined therewere insufficient new conscripts those who hadalready completed their terms were required tostay on. 7A reserve military training unit, of menaged 17–45 and unmarried women aged 17–30,consisted of approximately 1.7 million personnel.Together with members of the Worker-PeasantRed Guards and Young Red Guards, the totalnumber of available reserve personnel wasestimated at 7 million. 8Military training and military schoolsAccording to North Korean media, Kim Jong-Il frequently told officials that ideologicaleducation, with its emphasis on a “military first”policy, had to take precedence over academiceducation in the nation’s schools. Foreign visitorsand academic sources reported that from an earlyage children were subjected to several hours a1 9 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

week of mandatory military training and politicalindoctrination at their schools. 9According to one source, 1.2 million male andfemale secondary-school students aged 14–16received mandatory military training as membersof the Young Red Guards, including a weeklyfour-hour drill session and an annual total of 160hours of on-campus drills and 450 hours of offcampustraining. 10In 2003, in response to a question on militarytraining of children by the UN Committee onEconomic, Cultural and Social Rights, thegovernment responded that students in theirfinal year of secondary-school had one week’smilitary camping in the summer, but emphasizedthat “this is not a military training”, although thestudents learned how to dismantle and assemblea weapon and to shoot. It was not known whethersuch training continued. 11Child recruitment and deploymentNo information was available on how manychildren were recruited annually into the armedforces, or how many were currently serving in theranks.Armed groupsThe Worker-Peasant Red Guard reportedlyconsisted of a combination of older men aged45–60, along with those males aged 17–45 andunmarried females aged 17–30 who were notincluded in the Reserve Military Training Unit.They trained for a total of 30 days a year, andone source estimated their total numbers at 4.1million. 12 There were also around 189,000 otherparamilitary security troops, including borderguards and public safety personnel. 13DevelopmentsAmong the recommendations made by the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child in its 2004consideration of North Korea’s second periodicreport were that North Korea should ratify theOptional Protocol, take all necessary measuresto avoid the early militarization of children andincrease the age of majority from 17 to 18, toensure the full protection of all persons under theage of 18. 14A three-member delegation of the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child was allowedunprecedented access to the country in April2004, when they highlighted mistreatmentof children returned from China, economicexploitation, trafficking and torture. 153 Second periodic report of the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea to UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.24, 5 November 2003.4 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to BearArms: A World Survey of Conscription andConscientious Objection to Military Service,London, War Resisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.5 Library of Congress – Federal Research Division,Country Profile: North Korea, May 2005, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ .6 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service,North Korea Military Conscription, http://ftp.fas.org.7 Confidential sources, 2007.8 Republic of Korea National Intelligence Service,North Korea Military Reserves, http://ftp.fas.org.9 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2005, March 2006, www.state.gov/ .10 North Korea Military Reserves, above note 8.11 Replies by the Government of the DemocraticPeople’s Republic of Korea to the list of issues(E/C.12/Q/Dprk/1) to be taken up in connectionwith the consideration of the second periodicreports of the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea concerning the rights referred to in Articles1–15 of the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (E/1990/6/Add .35),HR/CESCR/NONE/2003/1, 10–28 November2003.12 North Korea Military Reserves, above note 8.13 Library of Congress Country Profile, above note 5.14 Concluding observations of the Committee on theRights of the Child, Democratic People’s Republicof Korea, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.239, 4 June2004.15 Human Rights Watch, 2005 World Report, NorthKorea.K — O1 “North, South Korea pledge peace, prosperity”,Reuters, 4 October 2007; “Peace Treaty Feasiblein 5 Years”, Korea Times, 24 October 2007.2 “North Koreans Agree to Disable NuclearFacilities”, New York Times, 3 October 2007.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 1 9 9

KOREA, Republic ofRepublic of KoreaPopulation: 47.8 million (10.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 687,000Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 19 1Optional Protocol: ratified 24 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitment agewas raised from 17 to 18.ContextAlthough there was currently no armed conflictin South Korea, no peace treaty had beensigned with North Korea and the two statestechnically remained at war. In June 2007 SouthKorea announced that it would resume foodaid shipments to North Korea, which had beensuspended following a nuclear test conducted byNorth Korea in October 2006. 2 In October 2007the leaders of South and North Korea agreedmoves towards formally declaring an end to thewar, although a full peace treaty is not expectedfor years. 3GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1987 constitution states that “All citizenshave the duty of national defence under theconditions as prescribed by law. No citizenmay be treated unfavourably on account of thefulfilment of his obligation of military service”(Article 39).In its initial report in 2007 to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child on theOptional Protocol, the government stated thatthe Military Service Act, which provided the basisfor both compulsory and voluntary recruitment,had been amended in December 2004 to adjustthe minimum age for voluntary enlistment from17 to 18. With regard to conscription, the Actstated that every male would be enlisted into thefirst militia service when he attained 18 years ofage, would undergo the conscription examinationin the year that he attained 19, and would beenlisted into active service at the age of 19 or 20(Articles 8, 9 and 16). Air Force Regulation 15-1(provision on the operation of wartime education)was amended in April 2005 to delete a provisionrequiring that trainees at the Air Force AerialScience High School be made to perform wartimeduties, even if aged under 18. 4The Military Service Act also stipulated thatspecial measures could be taken in exceptionalcases, such as during wartime or emergencies, orin the event that an order of military mobilizationwas issued (Article 83). However, there was noprovision that allowed for an exception to adjustthe enlistment age to below 18. 5The military planned to reduce troop levelsfrom 680,000 to 500,000 by 2020, and to cutthe compulsory service period in stages by sixmonths. 6Military training and military schoolsThere were several military schools, includingthe Military Academy, the Third Military Academy,the Naval Academy and the Air Force Academy.In its initial report on the Optional Protocol,the government noted that under the Act onEstablishment of Military Academies and the Acton Establishment of Nursing Military Academies,persons admitted into a military academy mustbe older than 17 and younger than 21. To beadmitted into the Korea Third Military Academy,persons must be 19 or older. 7In January 2005 an army captain was arrestedand an investigation launched into all 36 initialtraining camps, following reports of brutalityagainst conscripts at a camp in Nonsan. 8Disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration (DDR)In its initial report on the Optional Protocol, thegovernment noted that it had been “voluntarilycontributing funds worth USD 2.1m annuallyto a variety of projects aimed at preventingthe involvement of children in armed conflict,including a UNICEF project to protect children inareas beset by armed hostilities such as thosein Afghanistan, Sudan, and Democratic Republicof Congo”. The government reported that ithad also pursued bilateral-level action with theintention of preventing children’s involvementin armed conflict, including a US$2.3 millionproject contribution towards building schools,purchasing computers for classes and providingvitamins to students at elementary, middleand high schools in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory. 9International standardsIn September 2004 South Korea ratified theOptional Protocol, stating in its declaration that“In accordance with paragraph 2, Article 3 of theaforementioned Protocol, the Government of theRepublic of Korea declares that the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment into the Korean nationalarmed forces is 18 years.” 10 In April 2007 SouthKorea submitted its initial report on the OptionalProtocol, which was scheduled for consideration2 0 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

y the Committee on the Rights of the Child in itsMay–June 2008 session.KUWAIT1 National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,“Parliamentary committee passes amendmentproposal to lower voting age”, 5 March 2007,http://korea.assembly.go.kr.2 “Analysis: Seoul encouraged by N. Koreaprogress”, World Peace Herald, 14 June 2007.3 “North, South Korea pledge peace, prosperity”,Reuters, 4 October 2007; “Peace Treaty Feasiblein 5 Years”, Korea Times, 24 October 2007.4 Initial report of South Korea to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KOR/1, April 2007.5 Ibid.6 “Stricter rules on substitute service planned”,Korea Times, 31 May 2007.7 Initial Report of South Korea, above note 4.8 “Army captain arrested after forcing trainees toeat feces”, Korea Times, 21 January 2005.9 Initial Report of South Korea, above note 4.10 Declaration of South Korea on ratification of theOptional Protocol, 24 September 2004, www2.ohchr.org.State of KuwaitPopulation: 2.7 million (764,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 15,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: acceded 26 August 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the government’s initial report to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child on theOptional Protocol, Article 3 of the Army Act No. 32of 1967 stipulated that, in order to be accepted asan army officer, a candidate had to have reached21 years of age. Under Article 40 of the sameAct, concerning non-commissioned officers andregular soldiers, a volunteer for military servicehad to be over 18 and under 26. 1Articles 37 and 40 of Act No. 32 of 1967stipulated that anyone who wished to volunteerfor service had to be over 18. Article 37 providedthat anyone who volunteered for service as amember of the police or as a non-commissionedofficer of the National Guard had to be over 20. 2Compulsory military service was regulatedby the Compulsory Reserve Military Service ActNo. 102 of 1980, which stated that “Compulsorymilitary service is a duty required of everyKuwaiti of over 18 and under 30 years of age. Itis a national duty dictated by the requirementsof national unity and maintenance of nationalsovereignty. Single women of over 18 and under30 years of age may be called for compulsorymilitary service, pursuant to a decree, providedthat their duties are compatible with their naturalcapacities.” However, Kuwait’s initial report onthe Optional Protocol stated that conscriptionhad been suspended in 2001 by the annulmentof the 1980 Act because of difficulties with itsimplementation, temporarily exempting Kuwaitisfrom military service for a non-specified periodof time. 3K — ODevelopmentsIn its concluding observations, the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child recommendedthat Kuwait ensure that the recruitment andinvolvement of children in hostilities wasC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 0 1

explicitly criminalized in legislation and establishextraterritorial jurisdiction for crimes regardingthe recruitment and involvement of childrenin hostilities when committed by or against aperson who was a citizen or had other links toKuwait. 4International standardsKuwait acceded to the Optional Protocol inAugust 2004. Its declaration on acceding statedthat “The Government of the State of Kuwait iscommitted to maintaining the minimum age forvoluntary service in the Kuwaiti armed forcesat 18 years of age, and to prohibiting the forcedconscription of any persons under 18.” 51 Initial report of Kuwait to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the implementationof the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KWT/1, 24 April 2007.2 Ibid.3 Ibid.4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Kuwait onthe implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, unedited version, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/KWT/CO/1, 1 February 2008.5 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.KYRGYZ STANKyrgyz RepublicPopulation: 5.3 million (2.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 12,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (men – but seetext); 19 (women); 16 (as cadets)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 13 August 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces but cadets as young as 16were considered by law to be nationalservicemen.ContextIn May 2005 hundreds of refugees fled fromUzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan after the killing ofhundreds of mainly peaceful demonstratorsin Andijon. Uzbekistan accused Kyrgyzstan ofhosting a training camp for an alleged armedgroup named Akramia which it claimed wasinvolved in the Andijan events (see Uzbekistanentry). 1 In May 2006 armed men, allegedly linkedto the armed opposition group Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan (IMU) (see Uzbekistan entry),raided a Tajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of theattackers and Tajik and Kyrgyz security forceswere killed in the ensuing fighting. 2 In July fivealleged IMU members were killed in counterterrorismoperations and in August the securityforces shot and killed two other IMU membersaccused of involvement in the May attacks,together with an imam initially accused of beingan IMU member but whom the authorities laterclaimed was being used as a human shield. 3Kyrgyzstan was a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO), established inJune 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan,the Russian Federation, Tajikistan andUzbekistan, whose goals included mutual cooperationin security matters. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1992 Compulsory Military Service Act, asamended in July 2005, provided for universalmale conscription at 18. Military service wasfor one year, and alternative service for two. 5The government stated that there were nolaws allowing any reduction in the age ofconscription. 62 0 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Men could enlist voluntarily after military oralternative service, or after completing reserveofficer training at a higher educational institution.Women could join the army voluntarily from theage of 19. 7Boys could enter the Higher Military Academyat the age of 16–17, and were by law nationalservicemen (cadets). 8 Kyrgyzstan’s declaration onaccession to the Optional Protocol in 2003 statedthat the minimum age for recruitment of malecitizens to active service was 18. 9 Subsequentlythe government stated to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child that first-year cadets werenot allowed to take part in military operations,and that in practice under-18s were thus excludedfrom conflict, although it indicated that certainfirst-year cadets could be an exception to thisrule. 10Military training and military schoolsAll school pupils in grades ten and 11 (aged15–16) took weekly classes in pre-conscriptionpreparation. In grade 11, boys had three days’training in weapons handling and girls had firstaidclasses. 11Two military educational institutions acceptedboys under 18 who had completed their ninthgrade. In 2003–5 two 13-year-olds were enrolledat the Dair Asanov Kyrgyz State Military HighSchool. In 2005–6, 556 students were aged14–17. 12 The school was transferred from thecontrol of the Ministry of Education to theMinistry of Defence in January 2006 to “increasethe effectiveness of training”. 13 In 2005–6 theKalyinur Usenbekov Higher Military College inBishkek took 26 students aged 17. 14Applications to the two military schools weremade through local conscription commissions,and the consent of the student and parentwas required. Most students went on tobecome military officers, but had the option oftransferring out of the program after two yearsand going on to higher education. 15 In responseto questions about reports of continued bullyingand “initiation rites”, the government toldthe Committee on the Rights of the Child thatmeasures had been taken, including separatingyounger from older students, establishing amonitoring committee, and allowing students tocomplain to the Ombudsman’s office and to nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs). 16Mass fighting between second- and third-yearstudents at the Dair Asanov school in April 2007reportedly broke out after second-year studentsassaulted a younger student. 17Armed groupsThe government stated that no non-governmentalarmed groups operated in Kygyzstan. 18 Pakistanimilitary sources in 2004 claimed that armedgroups operating in Pakistan were increasinglyrecruiting teenagers from Central Asia, butthese claims were disputed and could not beconfirmed. 19The recruitment, training, financing or othermaterial assisting of child soldiers, or the useof child soldiers in armed conflicts or hostilities,was a criminal offence. 20 No prosecutionswere known to have been brought under thisprovision. The Committee on the Rights of theChild expressed concern that there was no legalprovision for extraterritorial jurisdiction in caseof recruitment abroad of Kyrgyz children or otherchildren by a Kyrgyz national or a person withother links to Kyrgyzstan, and recommended thatKyrgyzstan establish extraterritorial jurisdiction inthese matters. 21DevelopmentsIn June 2006 a new Children’s Code was adoptedby parliament. 22 Article 27(2) of the Codespecified that extra state benefits would beavailable for children in zones of conflict or whohad been forcibly displaced, but it did not containany provision prohibiting the use of children assoldiers.In May 2007 the Committee on the Rightsof the Child examined the initial report ofKyrgyzstan on implementation of the OptionalProtocol. In addition to its recommendationsfor establishing extraterritorial jurisdictionon child recruitment, the Committee raisedconcerns about the export of small arms and lightweapons to countries where children took partin hostilities, and recommended that Kyrgyzstanreview its domestic legislation with a view toabolishing such exports. 23International standardsKyrgystan ratified the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention 182 in May 2004.1 Bruce Pannier, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent pointsfinger at neighbor, foreign media over Andijonviolence”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 16 September 2005, www.rferl.org.2 Dadodjan Azimov, “Are Islamic militantsregrouping in the Fergana valley?”, Institute ofWar and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December2006, www.iwpr.net; see also AmnestyInternational Report 2007.3 Amnesty International Report 2007.4 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.5 Compulsory Military Service Act , Article 10, atMinistry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, www.mil.kg; see also Initial report of Kyrgyzstan tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, CRC/C/OPAC/KGZ/1, 22 May 2006.6 Initial report, above note 5.7 Ibid.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 0 3

8 Compulsory Military Service Act, Article 11; Initialreport of Kyrgyzstan, above note 5.9 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.10 Initial report, above note 5; Statement byGovernment of Kyrgyz Republic to the Committee,29 January 2007.11 Written replies by the Government of the KyrgyzRepublic to the Committee on the Rights of theChild, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KGZ/Q/1/Add.1, 11January 2007.12 Ibid; Ministry of Defence website www.mil.kg/ru/education.13 Z. Satabaldiev, “Military Academy is transferredto the control of the Ministry of Defence of theKyrgyz Republic”, Voennyii, 19 January 2006,www.massmedia.kg/ru .kg/ru (no longer available);Press Service of President, “President KurmanbekBakiev visited the National Military Lyceumon the Day of Knowledge”, 1 September 2007,www.president.kg; see also UN press release,“Committee examines reports of Kyrgyzstan onOptional Protocols to Convention on Rights ofChild”, 29 January 2007, www.ohchr.org (mediacentre).14 Written replies, above note 11.15 Ibid.; Ministry of Defence website www.mil.kg/ru/education; UN press release, above note 13.16 UN press release, above note 13.17 See, for example, Jyldyzbek Ibraliev, “TheAdministration of the Military Lyceum ofKyrgyzstan Doesn’t Deny that a Mass Fightbetween Pupils Occurred on 6 April 2007”, 24.kg,10 April 2007, www.24.kg.18 Initial report, above note 6.19 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”,Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda usingchildren for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk(for more detail see Tajikistan entry).20 Criminal Code, Article 375, para. 3, cited in Initialreport, above note 5.21 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Kyrgyzstanon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/KGZ/CO/1, 2 May 2007.22 UNICEF, “Laying the foundation for the rights ofKyrgyz children”, 9 June 2006, www.unicef.org.23 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note21.L aosLao People’s Democratic RepublicPopulation: 5.9 million (2.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 29,100Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 20 September 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for conscription andvoluntary enlistment was given by thegovernment as 18. There continued to bereports of the use of children as soldiersby armed Hmong groups.ContextThe government continued attacks againstthousands of ethnic minority women, menand children living in scattered groups in theLao jungles and hiding from the authorities,particularly from the military. Thesepredominantly Hmong groups were a remnantof an armed faction who fought alongside theUSA in its war against the North Vietnamese,which spilled over into Laos and Cambodia. TheLao People’s Army reportedly launched an attackon 6 April 2006 in northern Vientiane provincewhich killed 26 Hmong belonging to a junglegroup, of whom 17 were reportedly children andseveral women. The Hmong groups denied beingcurrently involved in attacks on the military, andafter 2004 there were very few reports of suchattacks by anti-government groups. While reliableinformation was very hard to obtain, it appearedthat the groups no longer posed a seriousmilitary threat to the government. 1 Hmongasylum-seekers in Thailand, mostly children, whohad been forcibly returned to Laos in December2005, were detained for over a year on theirreturn to Laos. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1991 constitution states that “Lao citizenshave the obligation to defend the country, tomaintain the people’s security and to fulfilmilitary obligations as prescribed by law” (Article36). The president may authorize general orpartial military conscription and declare a state ofemergency nationwide or in a particular locality(Article 53).2 0 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

According to the government declarationon ratification of the Optional Protocol, the Lawon Obligations of National Defence Servicestipulated that “all young men of Lao nationalitybetween 18 and 28 years of age, having goodhealth conditions, shall be obliged to serve for ashort-term in national defence forces. In case ofnecessity, young women between 18 and 23 yearsof age may also be called upon to serve for ashort-term in national defence” (Article 13). Theseprovisions, however, were rarely enforced, andthere was little or no military service in practice. 3The Law on Obligations of National DefenceService also stated that, following medicalchecks, a selection process would take place atdistrict level to select voluntary recruits, withgood health, for short-term defence services,according to the recruitment number officiallyset forth on a yearly basis (Article 7). Thegovernment declaration on ratification of theOptional Protocol stated that the minimum age atwhich it would permit voluntary recruitment intoits national armed forces was 18. 4Armed groupsSporadic reports continued to be received ofthe use of children as soldiers by armed Hmonggroups. One journalist who was able to visit thegroups clandestinely in October 2006 describedand photographed boys apparently aged asyoung as 15 armed and acting as guards. 5 Itremained unclear what other military dutiessuch children performed or what training theyhad received, and whether they were involvedin any attacks on government forces or armedresistance to government attacks.use of children as soldiers had been specificallycriminalized in national legislation.Laos ratified the ILO Minimum AgeConvention 138 and the ILO Worst Forms ofChild Labour Convention 182 in June 2005. Thegovernment was preparing to ratify the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court, andhad reportedly drafted implementing legislationas a prerequisite for ratification under its ownlaws. 71 Amnesty International (AI), “Hiding in the jungle– Hmong under threat”, 23 March 2007.2 AI, “The Missing Children of Laos”, 22 March2007.3 Confidential source, March 2007.4 Declaration of Laos on acceding to the OptionalProtocol, 20 September 2006, www2.ohchr.org.5 Roger Arnold, “Laos: Still a secret war”, DigitalJournalist, October 2006, http://digitaljournalist.org.6 Declaration, above note 4.7 International Labour Organization (ILO),International Labour Standards, www.ilo.org (ilolex database); “Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court Ratification andImplementation in Asia: Some Prospects andConcerns”, International Centre for Criminal LawReform and Criminal Justice Policy, February2007, www.icclr.law.ubc.ca.K — ODevelopmentsIn October 2007 Laos endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The two documents, which werepreviously endorsed by 59 states at a February2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for the protection of and assistance tochild soldiers, following a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.International standardsLaos ratified the Optional Protocol in September2006, stating in its declaration that the minimumage for entry into the national armed forces,both voluntary and obligatory, was 18. 6 It was notknown what, if any, implementing legislation hadbeen drafted, or whether the recruitment andC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 0 5

L AT VIARepublic of LatviaPopulation: 2.3 million (448,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 5,300Compulsory recruitment age: 19 (conscriptionceased by end 2006)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 19 December 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Conscription was ended during thereporting period. There were no reports ofunder-18s in the armed forces.ContextLatvia joined NATO in 2004.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMeasures were taken towards creating a nonconscriptarmy. The final compulsory call-uptook place on 24 November 2005 and the lastsoldiers completed compulsory military serviceon 24 November 2006. As of December 2006,more than 5,000 soldiers were serving oncontracts, 170 of them former conscripts whohad transferred to service on a contractual basisat the end of their conscription. Seventeen percent of those serving on a contractual basis werewomen. On 1 January 2007 military conscriptionceased and the army became an entirely nonconscriptforce. 1 Defence service employmentcontracts were open to 18-year-olds.Military training and military schoolsIn 2007 the Ministry of Defence said that one ofits priorities was to maintain enrolment numbersin the non-conscript armed forces, partly throughsupporting the Youth Guard and by fostering “thepatriotic education of youth and the acquisitionof military skills.” 2The Youth Guard was a voluntary specialinterestorganization set up and led by theMinistry of Defence. Apart from instilling physicalfitness and patriotism, its purpose was to exciteyoung people’s interest in military service, andto cultivate motivated personnel for the allvolunteermilitary service. It had 6,500 membersin early 2004. 3 Membership was open to citizenswith a good command of the Latvian language,and training was arranged for two age groups.Juniors, aged 12–15, learned the basics of militarytraining and about the history, structure andfunctions of the armed forces. Their programincluded militarized competitions and hiking.A senior group, aged 16–18, underwent a basiccourse in national defence, similar to the onefollowed by privates in the army. This includedlessons in weaponry and shooting doctrine, drill,tactics, first aid and topography, and training innational security policy and integration in NATO.The course was designed to last three years andawarded an academic diploma that would ensurefast-track entry into the military professions.The Ministry of Defence also ran Youth Guardcourses as a voluntary option in the civilianschools’ curriculum, for those eligible to take itand with the agreement of specific institutions.Specially trained instructors were provided by theMinistry.DevelopmentsInternational standardsIn December 2005 Latvia ratified the OptionalProtocol, its declaration stating that at that timecitizens aged 19 were liable to mandatory militaryservice and that young people could enlistvoluntarily for military service from the age of 18. 4In June 2006 Latvia ratified the ILO MinimumAge Convention 138 and the Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention 182.1 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.lv.2 Ministry of Defence Policy Paper, Priority No 9.3 Ministry of Defence, Youth Guard (Jaunsardze).4 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.2 0 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

LEBANONLebanese RepublicPopulation: 3.6 million (1.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 72,100Compulsory recruitment age: None (ended in2007)Voluntary recruitment age: 17 or 18Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: signed 11 February 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Voluntary enlistment was possible forsoldiers from the age of 17, and at 18 fornon-commissioned personnel and officers.Armed groups were involved in the trainingand recruitment of children.ContextFrom 2005 Lebanon’s stability was threatened bya series of political assassinations, a 33-day warwith Israel in 2006, and increased discord amongthe country’s mostly religious-based politicalgroupings. In 2005 Syrian troops withdrew fromthe country under international pressure afterthe assassination of the former Lebanese PrimeMinister, Rafiq al-Hariri, responsibility for whichwas not claimed by any group. 1 In July 2006Israel launched an intensive military campaign inLebanon; seven Israeli children and nearly 400Lebanese children were killed in the conflict. 2Between May and September 2007 theLebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fought Fatahal-Islam, an Islamist armed group based in aPalestinian refugee camp. The violence resultedin the deaths of at least 169 soldiers, 287members of Fatah al-Islam and 47 civilians. 3 Atleast two children were killed, although exactfigures were not released. 4 They were among127,000 Palestinian children living in Lebanon’s12 official refugee camps and a number ofinformal settlements. Of these children, the UNagency mandated to respond to the needs ofPalestinian refugees, the UN Relief Works Agency(UNRWA) 5 , considered over 18,000 to be casesof particular economic hardship. 6 Up to 5,000more Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were notregistered and had no documentation. 7 Thisprevented their access to a number of servicesand made it difficult to determine the age ofchildren, who had no birth certificates. 8Israel–Hizbollah conflictIsrael launched an intensive ground and aerialassault on Lebanon in July 2006, after theabduction of two of its soldiers by Hizbollah ina cross-border attack the previous month. 9 Atotal of 1,191 Lebanese, a third of whom wereestimated to be children, were killed in the33-day conflict. 10 Around 1 million people weredisplaced. In one incident, the Israeli DefenseForces (IDF) bombed a residential building inQana, killing 27 civilians, 16 of whom werechildren. The IDF inquiry claimed that Hizbollahwas using the civilians as “human shields”. 11However, a subsequent investigation by HumanRights Watch found no evidence to support thisclaim. 12 Further attacks resulted in damage to3,000 schools and the total destruction of 40schools. The IDF use of cluster bombs, manydropped in the last 72 hours of the war, poseda lasting threat to Lebanese civilians after thewithdrawal of Israeli troops. From 14 August tothe end of September 2007, five children werekilled and 66 were injured by munitions. 13 Thisincluded 13-year-old Hadi Hattab, who waskilled an hour after the ceasefire came intoeffect after stepping on a cluster bomb outsidehis home. 14 The UN repeatedly asked the IDF togive specific information on the location of theremaining estimated 170,000 to 340,000 piecesof unexploded ordnance. 15 This had not beendisclosed by late 2007.UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)paved the way for Israel’s withdrawal and astrengthened UN Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL) of up to 15,000 troops in the south,alongside 15,000 LAF troops. Following theJuly–August 2006 crisis, UNIFIL’s remit wasextended to supporting the LAF as they deployedin southern Lebanon and helping to ensurehumanitarian access to civilian populationsand the safe return of displaced persons.The resolution recalled previous calls for thedisarmament of all armed groups. 16 However,Hizbollah continued to retain its arms and themilitary wings of other political parties werereported to be recruiting new members andrearming. 17Lebanon remained formally at war with Israel,which occupied Lebanese disputed territory.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere were no reports of child recruitment ordeployment by the Lebanese Armed Forces.Compulsory military service ended inFebruary 2007, following a government decree in2005 which was agreed by all political parties. 18Decree Number 665 of 2005 reduced the periodof service in the two-year transition period tosix months. 19 Deferrals and exemptions wereavailable on a number of grounds. From February2007 all recruitment was voluntary; officers andnon-commissioned personnel and specialistscould join from the age of 18. However, soldierswere allowed to enlist from the age of 17. 20 TheK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 0 7

Lebanese Armed Forces had said in 2004 thatunder-18s were not allowed to take part in activeservice. 21Military training and military schoolsMilitary training for recruits took place at the FlagService Camp, which ran induction courses forall soldiers. There was also a military school forofficers, the Fu’ad Shihab Command and StaffCollege, which offered further education, andspecialist schools running courses for trainedsoldiers. 22Armed groupsHizbollah was the principal Lebanese politicalparty to retain an armed wing after the end of thecivil war in 1989. However, the unstable politicalsituation led to renewed militarization by mostgroups. All armed wings of political partieswere reportedly rearming. 23 Mainly Christianparties, such as the Kataeb (Phalange) and theLebanese Forces, were reported to have openedrecruitment offices in the Beirut suburbs. 24Military training was also stepped up by partiesassociated with Lebanon’s Druze populationand Sunni Muslim groups. 25 Pro-Syrian Christiangroups, including the Free Patriotic Movement(FPM) led by General Aoun and SuleimanFranjieh’s Marada movement were reported tohave organized “youth summer camp” programs.These combined physical activities with politicalindoctrination. 26 The armed wings of other pro-Syrian forces, the Syrian Nationalist Party andmainly Shia groups, Amal and Hizbollah, werealso reported to have provided military trainingto children. 27No children were reported to haveparticipated in armed action on behalf of anyLebanese group since 2001, including duringthe conflict in 2006. Nevertheless, in 2007 theSpecial Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict warnedthat “should sectarian violence flare in thecurrent political climate … children and youthmay well become involved”. She added that theinsecurity and lack of social and economic outletsfor young people increased the attraction of the“culture of martyrdom”. 28HizbollahHizbollah was the largest armed politicalgroup in the country with a base mainly in Shiaareas. It said that it supported the country’sratification of the Optional Protocol in meetingswith government officials. 29 The group deniedany use of children in the ongoing conflict withIsrael, including the war of 2006. 30 In 2007 therewere reports that its military wing was recruitingboys aged 16–19. Hizbollah reportedly offeredone month’s basic military training and theprospect of further training and attractive salariesfor those who excelled. 31 The group also ran anumber of activities for younger children throughits youth wing, the al-Mahdi scouts. Nearly42,000 children from the age of six took part inactivities organized by the group in 2005. 32 Thesereportedly included one-month summer campswhich featured religious education, arts, culture,physical training and games. 33 These activitiesand a number of services, including hospitals,nurseries, television and radio outlets and atleast 12 schools, offered a means to extendHizbollah’s influence and ideology. 34Palestinian groupsA number of armed political groups operated inthe refugee camps, including Fatah, the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)and PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC), theDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Children reportedlyparticipated in internal Palestinian clashes,mainly to harass and intimidate members ofother groups. Children as young as ten were alsoreported to be taking part in military training. InApril 2007 militias linked to Fatah and the radicalSunni group, Asbat al-Ansar, carried out militarytraining for children in the Ain Helwah refugeecamp. 35Fatah al-IslamThis radical Sunni group was set up by a groupwho arrived at Nahr al-Barid refugee camp innorthern Lebanon at the end of 2006. The groupwas reported to have enticed Palestinian childrento attend Quranic schools with small amounts ofmoney. According to one report, they were shownvideos of events in Iraq and demonstrationsof weapons training. 36 There were reports thatchildren fought with the group in the three-monthconflict with the Lebanese army. 37 At least twochildren were killed in the violence. Many morewere affected by the panic and mass evacuationof 31,000 people from the camp. 38 The group wasdefeated by the LAF in September 2007, althoughthe return of residents was delayed by the needto rebuild the camp. 39Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Lebanese army and international expertscontinued to remove the remaining 1.2 millionunexploded ordnance left by Israeli forces. 40Mine-awareness training for children wasundertaken by the Lebanese army, UNICEF,Norwegian People’s Aid, Danchurch Aid and theRed Cross. 41 The government operated threemedical and psychological centres to supportchild victims of armed conflict in Beirut, Nabatiehand Sidon. These were overseen by a not-forprofitorganization, the Association for the Care2 0 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

of Children in War. 42 Following the 2006 conflictwith Israel, psychosocial support programs wereoffered to children by organizations includingUNICEF, Terre des hommes, Save the ChildrenSweden and the local non-governmentalorganization Naba’a. 43DevelopmentsLebanon had yet to ratify the Optional Protocolafter signing it in 2001. In March 2007 thePermanent Peace Movement launched acampaign to gather support for ratification. Itestablished a network of organizations workingon child rights to raise awareness and to put inplace measures to prevent child recruitment. 44During the April 2007 visit of the SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General onChildren in Armed Conflict, Prime Minister FouadSiniora and a parliamentary deputy, MohamedRaad, representing Hizbollah, stated thatLebanon would ratify the Optional Protocol andwould prohibit the participation of children inarmed violence. 45The International Committee for the RedCross (ICRC) provided training on internationalhumanitarian law (IHL) for the LAF and UNIFILforces. 46 In 2006 it ran its first IHL training for agroup of field commanders from the military wingof Hizbollah. 47Lebanon was listed as a situation of concernin the Secretary-General’s sixth report to theSecurity Council on Children and Armed Conflictin October 2006. 48 The UN Special Representativefor Children and Armed Conflict visited the areain April 2007. She pressed UNIFIL to appoint achild protection officer to monitor events in thearea south of the Litani river. She also urgedincreased funding for psychosocial programs forLebanese children who had been affected by theconflict with Israel, as well as for UNRWA’s workin Palestinian camps. 49* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)demanding Syrian withdrawal, UN Doc. S/RES/1559.2 The UN estimated that a third of 1,191 deaths inLebanon were minors. “Major violations on bothsides in Israel–Lebanon conflict, say UN Experts”,UN press release, 4 October 2006.3 “Rebuilding camp will be UNRWA’s largesthumanitarian project”, IRIN, 14 Nov 2007.4 “48 killed as Lebanon army battles militants”, YaLibnan, 20 May, 2007, http://yalibnan.com.5 UNRWA mandate.6 Written replies by Lebanon to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/LBN/Q/3/Add.1, 27 April 2006.7 Amnesty International, “Limitations on rights ofPalestinian refugee children”, 2006.8 Third periodic report of Lebanon to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/129/Add.7, 25 October 2005.9 “Hezbollah seizes Israel soldiers” BBC News, 12July 2006.10 “Major violations on both sides”, above note 2.11 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Completion ofinquiry into July 30th incident in Qana”, 2 August2006, www.mfa.gov.il.12 Human Rights Watch, “Why they died: civiliancasualties in Lebanon during the 2006 war”,September 2007.13 Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), SouthLebanon, “September 2007 report”, 5 October2007.14 Norwegian People’s Aid, “Survived the war, notthe peace”, 3 October 2006, www.npaid.org.15 See, e.g., UN Report, Visit of the SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflictto the Middle East, UN OSRSG/CAAC, 9–20 April2007.16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701(2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006.17 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Hizbullah andthe Lebanese crisis”, Middle East Report no 69,October 2007.18 Law 665 (4 February 2005), Lebanese Army site(Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.19 Flag Service Law 665, Article 2 (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.20 Lebanese Army site (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.21 Child Soldiers: Coalition Global Report 2004.22 Lebanese Army site, above note 20.23 ICG, above note 17.24 Thanassis Cambanis, “Christian split in Lebanonraises specter of civil war”, International HeraldTribune, 6 October 2007.25 “War of words and photos between police,Aoun’s FPM”, Naharnet, 4 October 2007,see ww.naharnet.com/; Nicholas Blanford,“Lebanon’s militias rearm before vote”, ChristianScience Monitor, 6 November 2007; ChancyChassay, “Fears of new civil war increase asLebanese political factions rearm”, Guardian, 6February 2007.26 Cambanis, above note 24.27 Child Soldiers Coalition (Coalition), “Lebanon:the vulnerability of children to armed conflict inLebanon”, briefing, September 2007.28 Visit of the Special Representative, above note15.29 Information in response to e-mail questionsby the Coalition from the Higher Council forChildhood Lebanon, Ministry of Social Affairs, 19October 2007.30 Visit of the Special Representative, above note15.31 “Hizbullah getting stronger in Lebanon”,Associated Press, 4 October 2007.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 0 9

32 See Mahdi scout website (Arabic), www.almahdiscouts.net/; Scout summer campsinformation on Bint Jbeil website, www.bintjbeil.org.33 See Mahdi scout website, above note 32.34 Hazem Saghiya, “Chapters from the Story ofLebanon’s Hizbollah (5)”, al-Hayat, 8 January2005.35 Coalition briefing, above note 27.36 Andrew England, Roula Khalaf and FerryBiedermann, “Into battle; a new threat emergesin war-scarred Lebanon”, Financial Times, 3 June2007.37 Coalition briefing, above note 27.38 UNICEF, “UNICEF Lebanon joins UNRWA responseto urgent needs of children and women caughtin El Bared camp crisis”, newsnote, 29 May2007, www.unicef.org/; Inter-Agency StandingCommittee, “Lebanon Crisis: Health Cluster 28”,4 August 2007, www.emro.who.int.39 “Fatah Al-Islam commander captured”, Al Jazeera,1 October 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net.40 International Crisis Group, “Avoiding renewedconflict”, Middle East Report No. 59.41 “National day against the use of landmines inSur”, Army and National Defence Magazine, No.261 (March 2007) (Arabic), www.lebarmy.gov.lb.42 Third periodic report, above note 8.43 Save the Children Sweden and UK, “Lebanon:war-affected children still at risk one year on”, 13July 2007, www.reliefweb.int.44 Coalition briefing, above note 27.45 Report of the UN Secretary-General to theSecurity Council on Children and ArmedConflict, 21 December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757.46 International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), “Lebanon: ICRC activities October 2007”,operation update, www.icrc.org.47 ICRC, Annual Report 2006, www.icrc.org.48 UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826, 26 October2006.49 Visit of the Special Representative, above note15.LE SOTHOKingdom of LesothoPopulation: 1.8 million (840,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 2,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 24 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the Lesotho Defence Force Act of 1996,there was no conscription. The minimum agefor voluntary recruitment into the armed forceswas 18, and recruits could enlist between theages of 18 and 24. 1 In its declaration on ratifyingthe Optional Protocol Lesotho supported the“straight-18” position. 2It was unclear how the age of volunteers wasdetermined, since birth registration remainedlow, particularly in rural areas. 3DevelopmentsWith an HIV prevalence rate of 23.2 per centamong people aged 15–49, Lesotho was thethird hardest-hit country in the world. In 2006a national policy on orphans and other childrenmade vulnerable by HIV was approved. 4 Thispolicy complemented the Children’s Protectionand Welfare Bill, which consolidated andreformed legislation related to the protectionand welfare of children. 5 It was expected to beenacted in 2008. 61 Initial report of Lesotho to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.20, 20 July 1998.2 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 UNICEF, Information by Country, Lesotho.4 UNAIDS, Lesotho Country Fact Sheet, 2006,www.unaids.org.5 “Lesotho: New policy to help orphans andvulnerable children”, IRIN, 3 January 2007.6 Confidential source, Lesotho, October 2007.2 1 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

LiberiaRepublic of LiberiaPopulation: 3.3 million (1.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 2,400Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 22 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s inthe armed forces. There were reports ofunder-18s and former child soldiers beingrecruited for use in neighbouring Guineaand Côte d’Ivoire in 2004–5. Severalthousand children underwent the officialdemobilization process, but UNICEFreported that the needs of girls werenot being met adequately. By July 2006,according to the UN, there was no knowngroup in Liberia that used or recruited childsoldiers, but there was a continuing risk ofre-recruitment. Former president CharlesTaylor went on trial in The Hague forcrimes against humanity, war crimes andother serious violations of internationallaw, including the recruitment of childsoldiers, committed in Sierra Leone.ContextFollowing Liberia’s first civil war, CharlesTaylor, leader of the National Patriotic Frontof Liberia (NPFL), became president in 1997.Conflict resumed in 2000 with two armedgroups, Liberians United for Reconciliationand Democracy (LURD) and the Movementfor Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), trying tooverthrow the government. Many members ofthese armed groups were adherents of factionsthat had participated in the first civil war. By May2003 the two armed groups had gained controlof much of the country and were threateningto seize the capital, Monrovia. A ceasefire inJune 2003 was followed by a ComprehensivePeace Agreement in August which provided forthe establishment of a Transitional NationalGovernment. 1 Charles Taylor handed over powerand negotiated his departure to exile in Nigeria.The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) establishedby UN Security Council Resolution 1509 took uppeacekeeping duties on 1 October 2003. 2The security situation remained fragile.There was frustration among unemployedformer combatants who had not benefited fromreintegration opportunities, and former membersof the armed forces who were not satisfied withtheir demobilization and retirement benefits.The Anti-terrorist Unit, an armed militia createdby former president Charles Taylor, who claimedto be entitled to benefits under security sectorreforms, threatened to cause problems in thepeace process. 3Parliamentary elections and the first round ofpresidential elections took place in October 2005.There were allegations that former presidentCharles Taylor, operating from abroad, tried toinfluence the preliminary stages of the voting. 4Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf won the second round ofthe presidential elections in November and wasinaugurated as president in January 2006.There were sporadic episodes of violence. Atthe end of October 2004, 14 people were killedand 200 injured during riots in Monrovia. 5 InApril 2006 former combatants were involved inriots in Monrovia. 6 In February 2007 there werefurther riots there by about one thousand formercombatants demanding pay and demobilizationpackages. 7 In July 2007 the regular police forceclashed with the seaport police force overinvestigations into fuel theft. 8The United States (USA) cancelled US$391million of debt in February 2007 but thehumanitarian situation remained strained. 9By mid-2007 the humanitarian situation wasimproved but the UN reported that thereremained serious challenges in meeting basicneeds such as health, education, food and waterand sanitation. 10Many aspects of the conflicts in Liberia andin Sierra Leone since the 1990s and in Côted’Ivoire since 2002 were intricately linked, withoperations across borders, including in Guinea,which bordered all three countries, and acomplex web of governments and armed groupsproviding support to factions in neighbouringcountries. 11 A migrant population of thousandsof young fighters, many of them from Liberia,including child soldiers, crossing the bordersbetween Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côted’Ivoire, saw conflict mainly as an economicopportunity. Many had first been forciblyrecruited as children in one conflict, and thenhad willingly crossed borders to take up armsin another conflict, often with a different armedgroup. A 2005 study by Human Rights Watchfound that most had been motivated by promisesof financial gain, and many could not articulatethe political objective of the group they foughtwith. The risk of re-recruitment was exacerbatedby high rates of youth unemployment andcorruption and deficiencies in the implementationof disarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs. 12 An August 2006 report by theUN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted thathigh levels of unemployment, particularly youthunemployment, across west Africa posed a riskK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1 1

to stability in the region. This was reiterated in a2007 report by the UN Secretary-General whichhighlighted also the importance of reform of thesecurity sector in countries in the region as ameans of addressing it. 13GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription in Liberia. 14The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreementcalled for the restructuring of the armed forcesand for recruits to be screened with regard to,among other things, educational qualificationsand prior history with regard to human rightsabuses. 15 It did not explicitly state a minimumage of recruitment, but according to reports theminimum age of those applying to join the newArmed Forces of Liberia was 18. 16As requested under the terms of theComprehensive Peace Agreement, the USA tookthe lead in providing technical assistance forrestructuring the armed forces. It contracted aUS-based private company, DynCorp, for thispurpose. 17 Initially the force was intended tonumber 4,000, but lack of funding compelledthe government to reduce it to 2,000. 18 Thedemobilization of the former armed forces, whichhad been plagued by shortfalls in funding, wascompleted by December 2005 and recruitment tothe new Armed Forces of Liberia commenced inJanuary 2006. 19 The first 106 recruits graduated inNovember 2006. 20Armed groupsDuring 2004 and 2005 UNMIL and theTransitional National Government reportedlyfailed to fully control forest and border areas,which left opportunities for cross-borderrecruitment of combatants. 21Large numbers of former combatantsengaged in illegal gold and diamond mining. 22Former commanders of armed groups operatedcriminal groups and organized illegal exploitationof plantations, sometimes using violence toretain control. 23 In August 2006 the governmentand UNMIL forces repossessed the Guthrieplantation in north-western Liberia, which wasbeing controlled by former armed groups. 24Recruitment of ex-combatantsand child soldiers for use inneighbouring countriesIn 2004 and 2005 there was continuedrecruitment of ex-combatants from Liberia foruse in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. 25 These includedchildren and former child soldiers by then over18.GuineaIn the period June 2004 to June 2005 therewas reportedly active recruitment of formercombatants in Monrovia and in Bong and Nimbacounties bordering Guinea for both pro- and antigovernmentgroups in Guinea. 26 In August 2004Guinean embassy officials in Monrovia asked forUNMIL to increase its border patrols followingreports of recruitment of Liberian formercombatants said to be intent on destabilizingGuinea. Those recruiting for anti-governmentgroups appeared to be supporters of formerLiberian president Charles Taylor. Around thesame time, LURD commanders were also knownto be recruiting for a force to support PresidentConté. Many of the Liberian former combatantsapproached by recruiters had previously beenrecruited as children during the conflicts in SierraLeone and Liberia. 27In May 2005 there were reports that Liberianarmed groups were operating military trainingcamps in Guinea. 28 In early 2007 the UN reportedthat there were rumours of the involvement ofLiberian former combatants in the disturbancesin Guinea at that time but this could not beconfirmed. 29Former armed group commanders werereported to have said that child recruitment wasunnecessary, given the number of experiencedcombatants – many of them former child soldiers– available. 30 However, at least 30 Liberianchildren who claimed to have been recruitedwere identified and repatriated by a Guinean nongovernmentalorganization (NGO) by July 2007. 31Côte d’IvoireScores, if not hundreds, of Liberian children whohad been reunited with their families followingtheir demobilization during the disarmamentprocess were reportedly re-recruited in Liberiabetween late 2004 and late 2005 to fight in Côted’Ivoire, both for pro-government militias andfor the opposition Forces armées des Forcesnouvelles (FAFN). 32 Liberian former combatantsrecruited in late 2004 and early 2005 to fight inCôte d’Ivoire said that one of the factors in theirdecision to join the Ivorian militia was the failuresin implementation of the education and skillstrainingelements of the Liberian DDR programin regions of Liberia close to the border. 33 In late2004 around 20 children were recruited from theNicla camp for Liberian refugees in western Côted’Ivoire by members of the Lima force supplétive,a militia operating alongside Côte d’Ivoire’sregular armed forces (Forces armées nationalesde Côte d’Ivoire, FANCI). 34 In early 2005 fivedemobilized children were among those includedin cross-border recruitment of Liberians. Theirdemobilization cards issued in the DDR process2 1 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

in Liberia were used to show recruiters that theyhad experience as fighters. 35 Recruitment intopro-government militias in Côte d’Ivoire wasreportedly intensified in March 2005, aheadof peace talks in Pretoria. 36 Liberian childrenwere again recruited in September and October2005 into pro-government militias in westernCôte d’Ivoire. 37 In Côte d’Ivoire child soldiersdemobilized from the FAFN in 2005 claimed thatthey had been trained by Liberian fighters. 38By July 2006, according to the UN, there wasno known group in Liberia that used or recruitedchild soldiers or former child soldiers. 39 However,the UN also noted the potential threats tostability in Liberia from the possible movementof armed groups from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberiaand recruitment of former Liberian combatants,including children, by Ivorian militia groups andLiberians to fight in Côte d’Ivoire. 40Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreementprovided for a program of cantonment,disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitationand reintegration (CDDRR). 41 It was run bythe National Commission on Disarmament,Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration(NCDDRR) in coordination with UNMIL andUNICEF, which co-ordinated the process forunder-18s, with input and assistance from otherUN agencies and international bodies. 42 Theprogram was launched in December 2003. 43 Itwas formally closed in November 2004. 44In May 2004 armed former combatantsrioted in Monrovia when told that they would notreceive immediate payment in return for theirweapons. 45 Weapons were reportedly passedfrom Guinea to Liberia to be “sold” as part ofthe DDR process with Liberians making severalround trips to fetch those weapons. Some formermembers of armed groups complained that theyhad not been able to benefit from the programbecause their weapons had been confiscated bytheir commanders, who had distributed themto others in exchange for a percentage of thedisarmament bonus. 46There were continued delays in providingformer combatants with integrationopportunities. This meant they were subject tomanipulation by elements seeking to disrupt the2005 elections. 47By early 2006 over 100,000 combatants hadbeen disarmed, with 37,000 still waiting to beplaced in reintegration programs. 48 By August2007, 90,000 former combatants had benefitedfrom the reintegration and rehabilitationprogram, but many of them said that it had failedto provide them with sustainable livelihoods.The majority of former combatants were stillunemployed, and thousands had regrouped forthe purpose of illegal diamond or gold mining, oron rubber plantations. 49More than 10 per cent of those demobilizedwere children. 50 At the end of hostilities inAugust 2003, before the commencement of theofficial program, children came spontaneouslyto child protection agencies to seek help to bedemobilized. 51 By October 2004 more than 10,000children, including over 2,300 girls, had beendisarmed and demobilized and more than 9,600reunited with their families. 52Some of the children demobilized fromLiberian former fighting forces were fromneighbouring countries – 120 from Sierra Leone,Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. 53 By June 2006 a totalof 55 children associated with the fighting forces(11 Ivorians, 29 Guineans and 15 Sierra Leoneans)had returned to their countries of origin. TheInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)was also repatriating Liberian children associatedwith the fighting forces from neighbouringcountries. 54Rape and other acts of grave sexual violencewere committed against girls who were recruitedor abducted by the former armed forces andother armed groups in Liberia. Approximately75 per cent of demobilized girls reportedhaving suffered some form of sexual abuse orexploitation. 55 Many girls who were under 18when they were associated with the fightingforces had difficulties resuming their lives awayfrom their commanders and their so-called“bush husbands”, especially if they had hadchildren. Those over 18 at the time of the DDRprogram reportedly received no special protectiveassistance. 56 In 2005 UNICEF reported that theneeds of girls were still not being met adequately,and that many had no access at all to theprogram. 57A particular element of the program was thepayment of a US$300 safety-net (demobilization)allowance by UNMIL and the NCDDRR to allformer combatants, including children. A UNICEFevaluation of the program indicated that thishad a significantly negative impact on children,by exposing them to exploitation by theircommanders and impairing their reintegrationinto their communities. 58According to local child protection agencies,the rapid demobilization failed to break thestrong links between former child soldiersand their commanders. The disappointmentand frustration experienced by children andcommunities during the reintegration periodled many to seek to re-establish links with theirformer commanders – not necessarily in anattempt to become soldiers again, but rather toreturn to the last person who had provided themwith food, shelter and protection. 59During 2005 it was reported that commandersexpelled children under their “protection”because they were no longer in a position to carefor them. This led to an increase in the number ofK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1 3

street children and their migration to the cities. 60Child protection agencies highlighted the risks ofre-recruitment of children in Monrovia, becauseof the high concentration of military commandersstill active there and the lack of financial andsocial alternatives for children. 61By March 2007 reintegration opportunitieshad been provided to over 9,700 of the 11,000child beneficiaries. About half of these hadgraduated from or were participating in theeducation program and about half wereundergoing or had graduated from vocationaltraining. 62DevelopmentsIn June 2006 the UN Security Council lifted thearms embargo to the extent of enabling theprocurement of arms for the Liberian police andsecurity forces. 63Exploitation of children as labourers wasreported, particularly in the north, which washardest hit by the armed conflict. 64Sexual and gender-based violence,particularly rape of children, continued to bereported. 65 In May 2006 it was reported that 12-year-old girls, and in some cases girls as young aseight, were involved in transactional sex in campsfor internally displaced people and after beingresettled in their communities. Abusers allegedlyincluded camp officials, humanitarian workers,businessmen, peacekeepers, governmentemployees and teachers. 66 The UN noted theallegations in the report and stated that 45 casesof sexual exploitation involving UNMIL personnelwere investigated in 2005 and around 40 in2006. 67 In January 2007 UNMIL publicly called foran internal UN investigation. 68In October 2004 the UN refugee agency(UNHCR) began its repatriation of refugees fromSierra Leone and Guinea. The return of internallydisplaced persons began in November. 69 TheUNHCR repatriation program ended in June2007 after some 105,000 refugees had beenrepatriated. About 80,000 Liberian refugeesremained in neighbouring countries. 70A key element in rebuilding the economywas for the government to regain control of thecountry’s natural resources including rubber,diamonds, gold and timber, illicit trade in which,particularly in diamonds, had done much tofuel conflict. 71 A joint government–UN task forceestablished to assess the situation on rubberplantations reported to the president in May2006 making recommendations for measuresto stop the use of forced and child labour andillegal trafficking in raw rubber. 72 The UN SecurityCouncil lifted its embargos on the export oftimber in June 2006 and of diamonds in April2007. 73 In May 2007 Liberia was admitted to theKimberley Process Certification Scheme and inJuly the government removed the self-imposedban on diamond mining, paving the way for theofficial export of diamonds. 74At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Liberia and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.Truth and Reconciliation CommissionThe 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreementprovided for the establishment of a Truthand Reconciliation Commission, which wasestablished by an act of the Liberian parliamentin June 2005. The nine-member commissionbegan its work in June 2006, having beeninaugurated the previous February. It wasmandated to investigate gross human rightsviolations and violations of internationalhumanitarian law as well as other grave abusesthat occurred from January 1979 to 14 October2003. It was to pay “particular attention togender-based violations, as well as to the issueof child soldiers, providing opportunities for themto relate their experiences, addressing concernsand recommending measures to be taken forthe rehabilitation of victims of human rightsviolations in the spirit of national reconciliationand healing”. The Commission, which was due tocomplete its work in 2008, was mandated undercertain conditions to recommend amnesties andto refer to the head of state individual cases forprosecution. 75Indictment of Charles TaylorIn March 2006, following a formal requestby President Johnson-Sirleaf, the Nigerianauthorities apprehended Charles Taylor and hewas transferred to the authority of the SpecialCourt for Sierra Leone where he was charged withwar crimes, crimes against humanity and otherserious violations of international humanitarianlaw, including the use of child soldiers duringhis alleged involvement in Sierra Leone’s conflictsupporting the Revolutionary United Front(RUF). 76 In June, in order to protect stabilityin Liberia and the sub-region, which might bedisrupted if he were to be put on trial in westAfrica, he was transferred to The Hague to betried by a trial chamber of the Special Court. 77He first appeared before the Special Court in TheHague on 4 June 2007. His trial was adjourneduntil January 2008 to allow time for his newdefence team to prepare for trial. 782 1 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between theGovernment of Liberia and the Liberians Unitedfor Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and theMovement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) andPolitical Parties, Accra, 18 August 2003, at www.usip.org.2 Report of the UN Secretary-General to theSecurity Council on Liberia, UN Doc. S/2003/875,11 September 2003; UN Mission in Liberia, www.unmil.org.3 Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2005/764, 7December 2005.4 Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2005/391, 16 June 2005.5 “Mass arrests after Liberia riots”, BBC News, 1November 2004.6 “Liberia: Stone throwing ex-soldiers paralysecapital”, IRIN, 25 April 2006.7 “Liberia: Ex-combatants riot”, IRIN, 9 February2007.8 “Rival Liberia police forces clash”, BBC News, 9July 2007.9 “US cancels Liberia’s $391 million debt”, BBCNews, 13 February 2007; Kate Thomas, “AfterLiberia’s war: ‘Sometimes you wonder if peace isworthwhile’”, Independent, 24 May 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk.10 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2007/479, 8 August 2007.11 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and SierraLeone in this volume.12 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Povertyand Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’sRegional Warriors, March 2005; Report of theSecretary-General on ways to combat subregionaland cross-border problems in WestAfrica, UN Doc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004;Report of the Secretary-General on inter-missioncooperation and possible cross-border operationsbetween the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UNMission in Liberia, and the UN Operation in Côted’Ivoire, UN Doc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005.13 UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), YouthUnemployment and Regional Insecurity inWest Africa, 2nd edn, August 2006, www.un.org/unowa; Report of the Secretary-Generalon cross-border issues in West Africa, UN Doc.S/2007/143, 13 March 2007.14 Report of the Secretary-General to the UNCommission on Human Rights on conscientiousobjection to military service, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/55, 17 December 1999.15 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note1, Article VII: Disbandment of irregular forces,reforming and restructuring of the Liberian armedforces.16 “Liberia: Recruitment drive for new armykicks off”, IRIN, 18 January 2006. (One of therecommendations in the HRW report, How toFight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia,February 2004, was that the Liberian governmentshould enact national legislation making 18 theminimum age for recruitment to the newly formednational army.)17 Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2005/177,17 March 2005.18 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2005/560, 1 September 2005; “Liberia: newnational army to have 2,000 troops, half as manyas expected”, IRIN, 29 June 2005.19 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2006/159,14 March 2006.20 “First unit of Liberia’s new post-war armygraduates”, Reuters AlertNet, 4 November 2006,www.alertnet.org.21 Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia tothe Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/752, 24September 2004; Global Witness, An architectureof instability: How the critical link betweennatural resources and conflict remains unbroken,December 2005, www.globalwitness.org.22 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 19.23 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 18; Eleventh progress report of theSecretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia,UN Doc. S/2006/376, 9 June 2006.24 “Liberia secures rubber plantation”, BBC News,15 August 2006.25 See also entries on Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire inthis volume.26 International Crisis Group (ICG), StoppingGuinea’s Slide, Africa Report No. 94, 14 June2005; Report of the Panel of Experts on Liberiato the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2005/360, 13June 2005.27 HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 12.28 Coalition interview with humanitarian agencies ineastern Guinea, July 2005.29 Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2007/151, 15 March 2007.30 Information from HRW, May 2007.31 Coalition interview with confidential source inConakry, Guinea, September 2007.32 HRW, Youth, Poverty and Blood, above note 12.33 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: ex-child soldiers recruitedfor war”, press release, 31 March 2005.34 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9February 2005.35 Report of the Panel of Experts, June 2005, abovenote 26.36 HRW, “Cote d’Ivoire: ex-child soldiers recruitedfor war”, above note 33.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1 5

37 HRW, “Côte d’Ivoire: Government recruits childsoldiers in Liberia”, press release, 28 October2005.38 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Doc.S/2006/835, 25 October 2006.39 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,26 October 2006.40 See, for example, Thirteenth progress reportof the Secretary-General on the UN Mission inLiberia, UN Doc. S/2006/958, 11 December 2006.41 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, abovenote 1, Article VI: Cantonment, Disarmament,Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration(CDDRR).42 Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/972,17 December 2004.43 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, February 2005, above note 34.44 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 19.45 “Liberians riot over disarmament”, BBC News, 18May 2004.46 Report of the Panel of Experts, June 2005, abovenote 26.47 Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 18.48 Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General,above note 19.49 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 10.50 UNICEF, Evaluation of the Disarmament andDemobilisation Programme for ChildrenAssociated with the Fighting Forces in Liberia,2005 (electronic copy with the Coalition).51 Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers andDisarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation andReintegration in West Africa, November 2006.52 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 34.53 Ibid.54 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 39.55 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 34.56 Irma Specht, Red Shoes, Experiences of girlcombatantsin Liberia, ILO, UNICEF and UNDP,2006, at www.transitioninternational.com.57 UNICEF, above note 50.58 Ibid.59 Coalition meetings with child protection agencies,Monrovia, July–August 2005, cited in ChildSoldiers Coalition, above note 51.60 Coalition meeting with UN agencies, Lofa county,Liberia, August 2005, cited in Child SoldiersCoalition, above note 51.61 Child Soldiers Coalition, above note 51.62 Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 29.63 “Liberia: Security Council draws back on armsembargo”, IRIN, 14 June 2006. See also UNSecurity Council Resolution 1683 (2006).64 “Liberia: 15,000 child labourers to be sent back toschool”, IRIN, 1 August 2006.65 UNMIL, Quarterly Report on the Human RightsSituation in Liberia, May 2007, http://unmil.org.66 Save the Children UK, “From camp to community:Liberia study on exploitation of children”,discussion paper, JENdA, Issue 8, May 2006,www.jendajournal.com.67 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 23; Thirteenth progressreport of the Secretary-General, above note 40.68 “UN’s Liberia mission calls for immediateinvestigation into possible sexual abuse”, UNNews Centre, 19 January 2007.69 “Liberia refugees return home”, BBC News, 1October 2004; “Liberians begin journey home”,BBC News, 9 November 2004.70 UNHCR, “UNHCR ends Liberian operation afterhelping more than 100,000 go home”, pressrelease, 2 July 2007, www.unhcr.org.71 Following a report by the Sierra Leone Panelof Experts on the involvement of the Liberiangovernment in the illicit trade in diamonds fromSierra Leone, UN Security Council Resolution1343 (2001) mandated states to take measuresto prevent the direct or indirect import of roughdiamonds from Liberia. See UN page on “Conflictdiamonds”, www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html.72 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 23; “Liberia: RubberPlantations ‘lawless’ says UN”, IRIN, 11 May2006.73 “Liberia: Lifting of UN timber ban gives hope foreconomic revival”, IRIN, 21 June 2006; “Liberiarelaunches diamond trade after embargo ends”,Reuters AlertNet, 1 May 2007. See also UNSecurity Council Resolutions 1689 (2006) and1753 (2007) respectively.74 Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 10. The Kimberley Processwas a joint initiative of governments, industry andcivil society to stem the flow of conflict diamonds.Its certification scheme imposed requirements onits members to enable them to certify shipmentsof rough diamonds as “conflict-free”; www.kimberleyprocess.com.75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia,TRC Mandate, Article IV, Mandate, Section 4, andArticle VII, Functions and powers, Section 26,https://www.trcofliberia.org. For a comment onthe limitations to amnesties under internationallaw, see Amnesty International (AI), Liberia: Truth,Justice and Reparation: Memorandum on theTruth and Reconciliation Commission Act (AFR34/005/2006), 22 June 2006.76 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General, above note 23; Special Court for SierraLeone, Summary of charges against CharlesTaylor, www.sc-sl.org/Taylorcasesummary.html.2 1 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

77 Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2006/743, 12 September 2006.78 “Taylor trial delayed until 2008”, BBC News, 20August 2007.LIBYASocialist People’s Libyan Arab JamahiriyaPopulation: 5.9 million (2.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 76,000Compulsory recruitment age: 17Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: acceded 29 October 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCAlthough the government stated that theminimum voluntary recruitment age was18, no amendments to legislation hadbeen made to reflect this. Under-18s werereportedly recruited into militias.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeOn accession to the Optional Protocol in October2004, Libya declared that the required legal agefor volunteering to serve in the armed forces was18. 2 This followed concern expressed in 2003by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Childover the Mobilization Act No. 21 of 1991, which“allows for persons of 17 years to, among otherthings, engage in combat” and the Committee’scall for the law to be amended so that under-18s were not deployed as active combatants inwartime. 3 However, amendments to the 1991 Actto raise the age of conscription from 17 to 18 werenot believed to have been made. 4 According toLibya’s Second Periodic Report to the Committee,national service was compulsory for “medicallyfit” men aged between 18 and 35. 5Little information was available about militarytraining and schools. There was a militaryacademy in Tripoli. 6K — OArmed groupsChildren as young as 14 were reportedly recruitedinto government-sponsored militias includingthe Revolutionary Guard and the revolutionarycommittees. This took place mostly in ruralareas. 7DevelopmentsAmnesty International on several occasionsexpressed concern over the detention andill-treatment of hundreds of Eritrean nationals,several of them children, by the authorities. 8 InFebruary 2006 Human Rights Watch reportedthat girls who had been detained for “socialC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1 7

ehabilitation” at the Benghazi Home forJuvenile Girls were held indefinitely, providedwith no education and sometimes put in solitaryconfinement. Many of them were reportedlyvictims rather than perpetrators of crimes. 9Libya brokered a peace agreement betweenfour Chadian armed groups and the governmentof Chad, signed in Sirte, Libya, on 25 October2007. 10 The accord foresaw an immediateceasefire and the setting up of a committeewhich would decide on the integration ofmembers of the armed groups into Chadian statestructures, although there was no mention of thedemobilization and integration of child soldiers. 11The UN refugee agency UNHCR reported asignificant increase since 2004 in the numbersof asylum-seekers, especially from Sudan andSomalia, requesting refugee status in Libya. Thiswas expected to continue through late 2007. 121 System of indirect voting for the 468 membersof the General People’s Congress. Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org.2 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by the LibyanArab Jamahiriya, Concluding observations, UNDoc. CRC/C/15/Add.209, 4 July 2003.4 Confidential source, November 2007.5 Second periodic report of Libya to the Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/93/Add.1, 19 September 2002.6 Global Security, “Libyan Army”,www.globalsecurity.org.7 Confidential source, June 2007.8 Amnesty International, “Libya: Forcible return/torture and ill-treatment”, Urgent Action, 8February 2007, AI Index MDE 19/004/2007.9 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: a threat to society?Arbitrary detention of women and girls for ‘socialrehabilitation’”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 18, No.2 (E), February 2006.10 “Libya seals peace deal for Chad”, BBC News, 26October 2007.11 “Chad rebels sign peace accord”, Al-Jazeera, 25October 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net.12 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNCHRCountry Operations Plan 2007, Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 1 September 2006, www.unhcr.org.LIECHTENSTEINPrincipality of LiechtensteinPopulation: 35,000 (7,000 under 18)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 4 February 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICCThere were no standing armed forces.Conscription was provided for in timesof war or emergency, but there was noinformation on the minimum age orrecruitment in such instances.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeLiechtenstein had no armed forces, although the1921 Constitution (amended in 2003) providedthe basis for conscription to be introduced in atime of war or other emergency. 1 The defenceof the principality was the responsibility ofneighbouring Switzerland. 2 Liechtenstein ratifiedthe Optional Protocol on 4 February 2005, andincluded in its declaration the statement that“the Principality of Liechtenstein has no nationalarmed forces and hence no legislation on aminimum age for the recruitment of persons intothe armed forces and for taking part in hostilitiesexists”. 3DevelopmentsIn November 2006 Liechtenstein welcomed theadoption of UN Security Council Resolution1612, which created the Monitoring andReporting Mechanism (MRM) as a basis for theactivities of the Security Council Working Groupfor Children and Armed Conflict. But it alsounderlined “a need for clarifying the intendeduse of information gathered through the MRM, inparticular by identifying how the MRM can servicethe information needs of different destinationsfor action in an efficient and effective way. Thisincludes the gathering of information for keydestinations that advance the end of impunityas well as in the area of child protection andvictim assistance.” In June 2007 Liechtensteinwelcomed the first convictions by the SpecialCourt for Sierra Leone for the recruitment anduse of child soldiers, calling this “one of the mostimportant developments in international relationsover the past two decades”. 4 In its Initial Report2 1 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

on the Optional Protocol to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, the government statedthat it contributed inter alia to the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) disarmament,demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programin relation to children. 51 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.2 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfiles: Liechtenstein, www.fco.gov.uk.3 Second periodic report of Liechtenstein to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/136/Add.2, 14 July 2005.4 Open Debate of the Security Council: Childrenand Armed Conflict, Statement by Mr PatrickRitter, Deputy Permanent Representative ofthe Principality of Liechtenstein to the UnitedNations, 28 November 2006; Open Debate of theSecurity Council: Children and Armed Conflict,Statement by Mr Patrick Ritter, Deputy PermanentRepresentative of the Principality of Liechtensteinto the United Nations, 22 June 2007, both atwww.iccnow.org.5 Initial report of Liechtenstein to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LIE/1, 11December 2007.LITHUANIARepublic of LithuaniaPopulation: 3.4 million (745,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 12,000Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Under-18s who joined astate-supported paramilitary organizationcould be involved in training whichincluded military activities.ContextLithuania joined NATO in 2004.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeService in the armed forces, or in alternativeunarmed units, was the constitutional duty of allmale citizens aged 18 years and over. 1 Lithuania’sdeclaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol in 2003 stated that the minimum agesfor voluntary and compulsory service in thearmed forces were 18 and 19 respectively. 2The Law on National Conscription regulatedmilitary call-up. Military service had three stages:registration, conscription and post-conscriptionin the reserves. At 16, all male citizens had toregister for the draft at their nearest municipalmilitary office. They could be conscripted intocompulsory military service for a one-year periodbetween the ages of 19 and 26 (Article 17). At19, they were obliged to appear in person atthe office within a 45-day period starting 30days before their 19th birthday. 3 Those selectedfor conscription were put on the records ofthe Conscription Administration Service ofthe Ministry of National Defence. It was theresponsibility of the Ministry of Interior toprovide municipal military offices with updatedinformation on potential conscripts.Volunteers could start their military serviceearlier, at the age of 18, by written request to aSelective Recruitment Commission or regionalmilitary conscription centre.A Commission for the Implementation ofInternational Humanitarian Law, established in2001, had the task of supervising the MinistryK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 1 9

of National Defence in meeting its internationalhumanitarian law obligations. 4In May 2003 a new Article 105 was introducedinto the Criminal Code giving effect to Lithuania’sobligations under Article 4 of the OptionalProtocol. The recruitment of under-18s into armedgroups and their use in hostilities was madepunishable by up to 12 years’ imprisonment.Also newly criminalized and made punishable byup to ten years’ imprisonment was “forced useof civilians and prisoners of war in the armedforces of an enemy” in times of internationalarmed conflict, occupation or annexation.This prohibited the use of civilians as “humanshields”, and the recruitment or use of children inarmed groups or hostilities. This amendment tothe Criminal Code had retroactive effect and wasnot bound by the statute of limitations. 5 Criminalliability for conscripting or enlisting children wassubject to universal jurisdiction. 6Military training and military schoolsThe General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy inVilnius offered in-service officer training underthe Ministry of National Defence, and five civiliandegree courses, for students aged 18 years andover. In 2006, 8.5 per cent of students werewomen. 7 International humanitarian law was acompulsory part of the officers’ course.The Riflemen’s Union, a voluntary statesupportedparamilitary organization, providedvolunteers under 18 with training in shooting,military history and fitness, for two hours weeklyand at summer camp. 8 The UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child expressed concern thatthis might involve the engagement of children asyoung as 12 in military activities. 91 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Article139(2).2 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 Law on National Conscription, No. 106-2472 of1996.4 Initial report of Lithuania to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LTU/1,29 June 2006.5 Ibid., referring in particular to revision of 1 May2003 to the Criminal Code, Article 105.6 Additional information from the Governmentof Lithuania to the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child in connection with consideration ofinitial report on implementation of the OptionalProtocol, 22 August 2007.7 Initial report, above note 4.8 Riflemen’s Union, www.sauliusajunga.lt.9 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Lithuaniaon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LTU/CO/1, 5 October 2007 (unedited version).10 Additional information, above note 6.11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above note9.DevelopmentsThe government reported that 80 per cent ofchildren in refugee reception centres camefrom areas affected by armed conflict, and thatprograms and services were provided for them. 10The Committee on the Rights of the Child urgedLithuania to further strengthen its work on thisin particular with regard to early identificationof those who had been recruited or used inhostilities and providing specialist psychologicaland other assistance. 11At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Lithuania and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.2 2 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

LUXEMBOURGsupport to a UNICEF project working with childsoldiers in Burundi. 2Grand Duchy of LuxembourgPopulation: 465,000 (104,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 900Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 4 August 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for recruitment was 17,and those under 18 were prohibited fromparticipating in any military operation.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeCompulsory military service was abolished in1967. The amended Grand Ducal Regulation of22 September 1967 established a minimum ageof 17 for voluntary military service, and 17-yearoldsentering the armed forces required thewritten consent of parents or a legal guardian.Approximately 20 per cent of those applying forvoluntary military service were 17. The amendedMilitary Act of 2 August 1997 stipulated thatrecruitment for peacekeeping operations wouldbe on an exclusively voluntary basis, and limitedparticipation in peacekeeping missions strictlyto those who were 18 or older. Under the termsof the Act of 20 December 2002 (which amendedthe Military Organization Act), volunteer soldiersunder 18 were prohibited from participating inany military operation. The prohibition appliedto national defence as well as to participation in“operations of collective or common defence orin peacekeeping operations”. All of the aboveprovisions were also included in the declarationmade by Luxembourg on ratifying the OptionalProtocol in August 2004. The declaration statedthat full information about military duties wouldbe given to recruits prior to their recruitment intothe armed forces, and that all voluntary recruitswere permitted to leave the armed forces at anytime. 1DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Luxembourg and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial Report of Luxembourg to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/LUX/1, 6 November 2006.2 Ibid.K — ODisarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Luxembourg continued to make an annualcontribution of €25,000 to the funding ofthe Office of the United Nations SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Conflict. It had also givenC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 2 1

MACEDONIAThe Former Yugoslav Republic of MacedoniaPopulation: 2.0 million (494,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 10,900Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription(abolished 2006)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 12 January 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.task was to educate, train and provide furtherdevelopment for officer personnel for the army,and to engage them in research in the field ofdefence. Entrants had to have completed at leastfour years of secondary education and be at least18 years old, but not older than 21. 41 International Relations and Security Network,“Macedonia announces end to conscription”, ISNSecurity Watch, 11 April 2006, www.isn.ethz.ch.2 Amnesty International, Europe and Central Asia:Summary of Amnesty International’s concerns inthe region, January–June 2006, 1 December 2006.3 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Republic of Macedonia Military Academy, http://va.morm.gov.mk.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn April 2006 the Ministry of Defence announcedthat military conscription would end and the armywould comprise only volunteers by the beginningof 2007. Officials said that the new army wouldhave around 7,000 regular soldiers and 2,500reserve troops. New soldiers would be recruitedon a voluntary basis for an initial three-monthtraining period, after which they would join theregular armed forces. 1 In May 2006 parliamentvoted to abolish compulsory military service. 2Conscription was previously provided for inthe constitution, which stated, “The defence ofthe Republic of Macedonia is the right and dutyof every citizen” (Article 28). Under the DefenceLaw, all male citizens aged 17 to 55 were requiredto fulfil their military obligations (Article 3),including registration for conscription before theage of 18 (Article 51). Recruits had to be 18 yearsof age before recruitment (Article 54). To ensurethat children did not join the armed forces,call-up notices were not sent to individuals untilthey were 19 years old. Those who volunteeredto begin service earlier were allowed to startthree months after their application, providedthey had reached the age of 18. In a state of waror national emergency, the minimum age formembership of the Civil Protection Forces was 18for both men and women, with military service inthe armed forces subject to the same regulationsas in peacetime (Articles 11–13).In its declaration on signing the OptionalProtocol in July 2001, Macedonia stated that theDefence Law did not allow under-18s to serve inthe armed forces. 3Military training and military schoolsThe Military Academy was the only tertiarylevelmilitary educational institution. Its main2 2 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

MADAGA SC ARRepublic of MadagascarPopulation: 18.6 million (9.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 13,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 22 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.3 See List of Countries Which Have Signed,Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Conventionon African Charter on the Rights and Welfare ofthe Child, www.africa-union.org.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no compulsory military recruitment.Provision was made for military service underthe constitution, which stated that “Nationalservice shall be an honourable duty”. Althoughit was obligatory to present oneself for militaryservice at 18, the service itself was not. Recruitspresenting themselves to the police force hadto produce a copy of their birth certificate andidentity card as proof of age and identity. Amedical examination was carried out if there wasdoubt over the age of the recruit. 1In its declaration on ratification of theOptional Protocol, Madagascar stated that“young men and women aged 18 years or moremay request to be recruited into the ArmedForces or outside the Armed Forces before youngmen and women of their age-group. In order topreserve his or her contractual liberty, the personrequesting voluntary enlistment shall submit arequest approved by his or her parents or legalguardian. Offences against the requirementsof these provisions shall be prosecuted andpenalized under the Code of Justice on NationalService or the Penal Code.” 2K — ODevelopmentsInternational standardsMadagascar ratified the Optional Protocol on22 September 2004, and the African Charter onthe Rights and Welfare of the Child on 30 March2005. 31 Confidential sources, March 2007.2 Madagascar, Declaration on Ratification of theOptional Protocol to the Convention on the Rightsof the Child, 22 September 2004, www2.ohchr.org.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 2 3

MAL AWIRepublic of MalawiPopulation: 12.9 million (6.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 5,300Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeA new Defence Force Act came into force inSeptember 2004, replacing the earlier Army Actand incorporating amendments proposed bythe Malawi Law Commission which removed anypossibility of under-18s serving in the DefenceForce (previously the Malawi Army). The Actprovided that the Defence Force had threecomponents: the regular Defence Force, theDefence Force reserve and the militia. The militiawas defined as comprising persons other thanmembers of the regular force or reserve forcestrained for military purposes and called to serveonly in emergencies. No person under the age of18 could be recruited to or be members of any ofthese forces. 1 While the academic qualificationsof recruits were checked with the aim of ensuringthat no under-18s were recruited, 2 lack of a birthregistration system meant that the age of recruitscould not be definitively verified. 3Under-18s could previously apply to berecruited with the consent of a parent or legalguardian or, when the parents or guardianwere dead or unknown, with the consent of thechairman of the local court of the area in whichthey resided. 4There was no conscription, 5 but the NationalService Act provided that in case of a publicemergency every citizen between the ages of 18and 60 could be called for national service. 6 In aletter to the Child Soldiers Coalition, the MalawiHigh Commission stated that the National ServiceAct did not exist; other sources stated that theAct remained in force as it had been neitherdeclared unconstitutional nor repealed by an actof parliament. 7In June 2004 the government reportedto the UN Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women that since 1999the policy of the Ministry of Defence had been torecruit women in the armed forces. By 2004, 130women had been trained. 81 Confidential sources, Malawi, August 2007.2 Information provided by the Malawi HighCommission, August 2007.3 UNICEF, Draft Country Programme Document forMalawi.4 Confidential sources, above note 1.5 Malawi High Commission, above note 2.6 Confidential sources, above note 1.7 Malawi High Commission, above note 2;confidential sources, above note 1.8 Combined second, third, fourth and fifth periodicreports of Malawi to the Committee on theElimination of Discrimination against Women, UNDoc. CEDAW/C/MWI/2-5, 28 June 2004.2 2 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

MAL AYSIAMalaysiaPopulation: 25.3 million (9.6 million under 18)Government armed forces: 109,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 and a half;younger with parental consentVoting age: 21Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182Although voluntary enlistment waspermitted at 17 and a half , only those aged18 and above were in practice recruitedinto the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Armed Forces Act of 1972 prohibited thevoluntary enlistment of any person below the ageof 17 and a half without the written consent ofparents and the production of a “certified copy ofan entry in the register of births or by any otherevidence appearing to him to be sufficient”. 1According to the government, in practice onlythose aged 18 and above were recruited into thearmed forces. 2There were reports of bullying of recruits. InOctober 2007 two recruits complained of abuseby their seniors and officers. One alleged that hehad been forced to drink weapons-cleaning fluidand another alleged that his arm had been cutwith a knife. 3Under the National Service Training Act of2003, all citizens of Malaysia between the agesof 16 and 35 years of age were required to beavailable to undergo national service trainingof up to 90 days. Failure to attend, either astrainees or trainers, was an offence and liable toboth a fine and imprisonment. Participants wereselected randomly via a government computerdatabase system. A total of 95,000 people werechosen to participate in 2006; the figure for 2007was expected to be 100,000. 4The stated aim of national service trainingwas to prepare “Malaysian youths for nationalservice under the National Service Act 1952”and to create “a nation which is patrioticand resilient and imbued with the spirit ofvolunteerism”. 5 Training consisted of “characterbuilding”,“nation-building”, physical trainingand “community services modules”. Accordingto a presentation given by a representative ofthe Ministry of Defence, there were additionalcomponents consisting of cultural and religiousactivities, national integration and firearmstraining. 6The Child Act 2001 defined as children thoseunder 18, and aimed to provide children withprotection and assistance, including thosewho were at risk or were victims of physicaland sexual abuse, neglect and abandonment,and those who had committed criminaloffences. However, the law did not containspecific provisions guaranteeing the protectionof children affected by armed conflict or insituations of armed violence. 7Military training and military schoolsThe Malaysian Military Academy (AkademiTentara Malaysia, ATMA) was replaced bythe National Defence University of Malaysia(University Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia,UPNM), which opened in mid-2007. The newuniversity operated under the Defence Ministryand accepted both military cadets and officersand civilians. Members of the military graduatingfrom ATMA were contracted to serve the armedforces for at least ten years after completing theirstudies. Graduates from the UPNM were requiredto serve for “a period of time”, the exact lengthof which was unclear. Civilian graduates wererequired to become members of the ReserveOfficers Training Unit (ROTU). 8The Royal Military College, a Ministry ofDefence-supported secondary school, acceptedselected boys for entry into Form 4, or childrenfrom the ages of 15 to 17. Students at the collegereceived a secondary school education as well asmilitary training. Graduates were not required topursue a military career on completion of theirstudies. 9DevelopmentsMalaysia’s initial report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child was considered inJanuary 2007. The Committee recommended thatMalaysia ratify the Optional Protocol and thatthe birth registration system for non-Malaysianchildren born in Malaysia be improved. 101 Armed Forces Act (1972), Article 18(3) and (4).2 Initial report of Malaysia to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/MYS/1, 22December 2006.3 “Malaysia’s army: Only tough guys need apply”,Washington Post, 16 October 2007.4 Presentation of Lee Soon Hoe, Director of UnitPlanning and Customer Service, Ministry ofDefense, Malaysia, International Workshop onYouth Values Development, 18–25 March 2007.5 National Service Training Act, Article 2.6 Presentation of Lee Soon Hoe, above note 4.7 Child Act 2001 (Act 611).K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 2 5

8 “UPNM begins operations in mid-year 2007”,Malaysian National News Agency, 13 September2006, www.bernama.com.my/ .9 Profile of the Royal Military College, www.rmc.edu.my.10 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of reports submitted by stateparties under Article 44 of the Convention,Concluding observations: Malaysia, UN Doc.CRC/C/MYS/CO/1, 2 February 2007.MALDIVESRepublic of MaldivesPopulation: 329,000 (158,000 under 18)Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: ratified 29 December 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThe minimum age of recruitment to thereorganized defence forces was 18.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn April 2006 the National Security Service (NSS)was reorganized and renamed as the MaldivianNational Defence Force (MNDF). It was alsoredefined as a self-defence force rather than aparamilitary force as hitherto. 2 A separate policeforce had been formed under the Home Ministryin 2004, to differentiate the military duties ofthe NSS from what had been its domestic lawenforcement duties. According to the MNDFwebsite, the age range for recruitment to theforce was 18 to 28. 3 There was no conscription.Military training and military schoolsThe Defence Institute for Training and Educationwas the officiating unit of the MNDF responsiblefor training. 4DevelopmentsInternational standardsThe Optional Protocol was ratified in December2004. In its declaration, the governmentconfirmed that the minimum age for recruitmentto the National Security Service and Police was 18and that all applicants were required to presentproof of a birth date. 5 In its Initial Report on theOptional Protocol to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child the government stated thatthe ages of applicants to the armed forces wereverified through the national registration cardand birth registration. The report also stated thatLaw No. 9/91, Law on the Protection of the Rightsof the Child, was amended in November 2002to raise the age for recruitment into the armedforces from 16 to 18 years. 61 Maldives High Commission, “Modest presenceto monitor referendum”, News, 1 August 2007,www.maldiveshighcommission.org.2 2 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2 Maldives National Defence Force, www.mndf.gov.mv.3 Maldives National Defence Force, above note 2,Recruitment.4 Maldives National Defence Force, above note 2.5 Maldives declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.6 Initial reports of States parties due in 2007,Maldives, UN Doc. CRC/OPAC/MDV/1, 23 October2007.MALIRepublic of MaliPopulation: 13.5 million (7.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 7,400Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 16 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextAt least 11 people were reported to have beenkilled, some by landmines, following attacks innorthern Mali in August 2007 attributed to armedmilitias led by a leader of a former armed Touareggroup. 1 A number of soldiers as well as a teamconducting a survey of the incidence of locusts inthe area were kidnapped. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution stated that “Defence of thecountry is a duty of every citizen” (Article 22).There was no evidence of under-18s in the armedforces. Mali’s declaration on ratification of theOptional Protocol in June 2002 stated that no oneunder 18 could be recruited, even voluntarily, orenrolled as a member of the armed forces, thatthe criminal law would be applied against anyonebreaching this provision, and that childrenunlawfully recruited into the armed forces could,depending on their individual circumstances,receive support for their economic and socialrehabilitation and reintegration. 3 In 2006 thegovernment stated to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child that the minimum age forvoluntary enrolment in the armed forces and forconscription was 18, and that under Article 17of the Child Protection Code it was forbidden tocause under-18s to participate in or to involvethem in armed conflicts or to enrol them in thearmed forces or groups. 4K — ODevelopmentsThe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childcalled for the necessary measures to be put inplace to implement fully ILO Conventions 138 and182, and for the Child Protection Code to be fullyimplemented. 5C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 2 7

At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Mali and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 “Mali: Indignation dominates reaction as attacksin north escalate”, IRIN, 31 August 2007, www.irinnews.org.2 “Mali-Niger: insecurity halts locust monitoringbut threat deemed low – FAO”, IRIN, 17September 2007.3 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Second periodic report of Mali to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/MLI/2, 11 April 2006.5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Mali,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/MLI/CO/2, 2 February 2007.MALTARepublic of MaltaPopulation: 402,000 (88,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,600Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 years and6 months; under 17 years and 6 months withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 9 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There was no evidence of under-18s beingrecruited into the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no compulsory military service inMalta, and the Malta Armed Forces Act set aminimum age of 17 years and 6 months forvoluntary recruitment. 1 In its declaration onratification of the Optional Protocol in May 2002,the government prohibited the enlistment ofanyone under the age of 17 years and 6 months,and ruled out the participation in hostilities ofanyone under the age of 18. The Declaration alsoincluded the provision that “a person under 18years may not be enlisted unless consent to theenlistment is given in writing by the father ofsuch person or, if such person is not subject topaternal authority, by the mother or by anotherperson in whose care the person offering to enlistmay be”. 2 In its November 2005 Initial Report tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, Maltastated that this requirement also applied topersons “under the appropriate minimum age”,apparently contradicting the declaration’s ban onrecruitment of any individual under the age of 17years and 6 months. 3 In response, the Committeeexpressed its regret that the government hadgiven “no indication of a minimum age underwhich it would not be possible to recruit childrenunder any circumstance, i.e. even with parental orother legal guardians’ consent”. The Committeetherefore recommended the enactment of a lawestablishing an absolute minimum age withoutexception for voluntary recruitment. 4All individuals of any age seeking to enlistwere required by law to be fully informed of thegeneral conditions of engagement in the forces,and “the recruiting officer shall not enlist anyperson in the regular force unless satisfied bythat person that he has been given such a notice,2 2 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

understands it and wishes to be enlisted”. Thoseenlisting under the age of 18 had to renew theirenlistment on reaching their 18th birthday. Inpractice, the Maltese armed forces had notrecruited anyone under 18 since 1970, whichwas confirmed in a letter from the governmentto the Child Soldiers Coalition in January 2008.Although the Armed Forces Act established aJunior Leaders Scheme allowing for recruitmentfor training of individuals under the age of 17years and 6 months, no recruitment of this kindhad taken place since 1970. 5DevelopmentsIn September 2006 the Committee on the Rightsof the Child expressed concern at the absence oflegislation explicitly criminalizing the recruitmentof children under the age of 15 into armed forcesor armed groups and their direct participationin hostilities. The Committee also called onthe government to establish extraterritorialjurisdiction for such crimes. 6At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Malta and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial Report of Malta to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MLT/1,10 November 2005.2 Declaration of Malta on ratification of theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 Initial Report, above note 1.4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Malta,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MLT/CO/1, 17 October 2006.5 Initial Report, above note 1; letter to the ChildSoldiers Coalition from the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, 28 January 2008.6 Concluding observations, above note 4.MAURITANIAIslamic Republic of MauritaniaPopulation: 3.1 million (1.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 15,900Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCAlthough the government stated that alltexts governing recruitment to the armedforces and police prohibited recruitment ofunder-18s, it was unclear whether the 1962law providing for voluntary enlistmentat 16 with parental consent had beenabrogated.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1991 constitution stated that “Every citizenhas the duty of protecting and safeguarding theindependence of the country, its sovereigntyand integrity of its territory” (Article 18). In itsinitial report to the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child, the government had stated that alltexts governing recruitment to the armed forcesand police prohibited recruitment of under-18s. 1However, the government did not identify thelaws and regulations that prohibited recruitmentunder the age of 18, and it remained unclearwhether the 1962 Law on the Recruitmentfor the Army, which provided for two years’compulsory service, was still in force or had everbeen applied. It required every citizen aged 17to register for military service and be medicallyexamined and to have their cases considered bya review body, and provided that those aged 16could enlist voluntarily with parental consent. 2DevelopmentsIn its concluding observations the Committeeon the Rights of the Child urged Mauritania toratify the Optional Protocol on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflict. 3In October 2007 Mauritania endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The two documents,which were previously endorsed by 59 statesat a February 2007 ministerial meeting inK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 2 9

Paris, reaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for the protection of andassistance to child soldiers, following a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsored bythe French government and UNICEF.International standardsMauritania ratified the African Charter on theRights and Welfare of the Child on 21 September2005. 41 Initial report of Mauritania to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.42, 18 January 2000.2 Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, Children:The Invisible Soldiers, Rädda Barnen (Save theChildren – Sweden), Stockholm, 1998.3 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Mauritania,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.159, 6 November 2001.4 African Union, List of Countries Which HaveSigned, Ratified/Acceded to the African UnionConvention on African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child, www.africa-union.org.MAURITIUSRepublic of MauritiusPopulation: 1.3 million (0.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: noneCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: 18 (for securityforces)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 11 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, IL0 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thesecurity forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMauritius did not have a standing army; allmilitary, police and security functions werecarried out by the Mauritius Police Force, whichincorporated an air wing, a paramilitary SpecialMobile Force and the National Coast Guard. 1 Theminimum age of recruitment was 18 for all theseforces.Mauritius developed a National Children’sPolicy (2003) and a National Plan of Action(2004), and adopted the Child ProtectionAmendment Act (2005) which criminalized childabuse and exploitation, abduction and childtrafficking. 2 The maximum penalty for childtrafficking was 15 years’ imprisonment. 3 TheOffice of the Ombudsperson for Children wasestablished in 2003 to promote and safeguardchildren’s rights. A Children’s Act to implementthe provisions of the UN Convention on theRights of the Child was in draft form. 41 Mauritius Police Force, http://police.gov.mu.2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Mauritius,Summary record, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1105,27 January 2006.3 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices: Mauritius, www.state.gov.4 African Commission on Human and People’sRights, Report of the Promotional Mission toMauritius, August 2006, www.achpr.org.2 3 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

MEXICOUnited Mexican StatesPopulation: 107.0 million (39.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 237,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 16 (training or earlyenlistment – see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 15 March 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I, ICC, ILO 182With parental consent, 16-year-olds couldvolunteer for early military service. Noinformation was available on the use ofunder-18s in armed groups.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll Mexican men had to do military service in thearmy or the navy. In case of international armedconflict, service was compulsory for nationals ofallied countries in the armed conflict who wereresident in Mexico. Young men had to registerwith the military authorities between July andDecember of the year they turned 18. The Ministryof National Defence determined the numberof conscripts needed each year, and the navyselected the conscripts it required from thosechosen by lottery to undertake active service.Recruits chosen by lottery started active servicein January or July of the following year. One yearof active service was followed by membership ofthe reserve until the age of 40 and of the NationalGuard until the age of 45. All men of military agereceived an identification card indicating whetherthey had fulfilled their military obligations. 1Volunteers for military service had to beaged 18–30, but under-18s could volunteer withparental consent in signal units for training astechnicians under contracts for no more thanfive years. 2 Sixteen-year-olds who would beabroad or studying when they would normally dotheir military service could enlist with parentalconsent. 3Military service could be carried out eitherwhen required by the Ministry of Defence or ata training centre every Saturday from Februaryto December. From 2006 conscripts undertookmilitary instruction only; previously they hadalso worked with disadvantaged people ineducational, sporting, cultural and socialactivities. Women could volunteer to join thearmed forces from the age of 18. They undertookactivities related to the promotion of health andeducation. 4There were over 1,660 federal, state andmunicipal police forces. 5 Candidates for theFederal Preventive Police had to be 18 yearsof age and to have completed their secondaryeducation. 6 Many military officials in recent yearswere transferred as active members of the armedforces to this police force, raising concerns thattheir policing functions were not clearly subjectto civilian oversight. 7Military training and military schoolsArmed forces schools were divided intosuperior, technical superior, secondary highand technical schools. Diplomas and degreesobtained in military schools were equivalentto those obtained in civilian colleges. 8 In timesof armed conflict, students at military schoolswere subject to military jurisdiction (fuero deguerra). Foreign or national scholars studying atmilitary institutions were not subject to militaryjurisdiction, but had to follow the appropriateregulations. 9Superior schools included the Military HealthGraduates School, Naval Medical School, MilitaryDentistry School and Military Engineers School.Civilian defence personnel were trained at theNaval Studies Superior Centre and the NationalDefence College. Naval recruits and officers couldobtain degrees in naval sciences, engineering,medicine and communications at naval superiorschools. 10 These admitted young men and womenaged 17–21, with parental consent. 11Generally, technical superior schools, whichincluded the Heroico Colegio Militar (army) andthe Heroica Escuela Naval Militar (navy), admittedcandidates between 15 and 18 years of age, withparental consent certified by a lawyer. Graduatesfrom the Heroico Colegio Militar were given therank of second lieutenant on completing threeyears of studies. 12 After 18 months’ training at theAir Force Specialist Troop Military School, cadetsbecame second sergeants. Training at othertechnical superior schools was for only one year,in theory allowing a 16-year-old to become a noncommissionedofficer just 12 months after beingadmitted to the school. 13Armed groupsParamilitariesParamilitary groups, with strong links topoliticians, the military and powerful economicsectors operated in Chiapas and other southernstates, taking advantage of local conflicts basedon ethnic, religious and political differencesand disputes over the use of natural resourcesand access to land. 14 Many of these groupswere registered officially, such as Peace andJustice (Paz y Justicia), which according to nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) had issuedK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3 1

threats against political opponents and carriedout enforced disappearances. Armed forcescommanders reportedly trained members ofthese forces. 15 In June 2005 several families wereforced to flee their homes in Sabanilla, Chiapas,after reported threats from members of Peaceand Justice. 16The Rural Defence Corps consisted of armedunits made up of volunteers who supported thearmed forces when required, including in caseof armed conflict. They were reported to have astrength of around 14,000. 17In October 2006 unidentified armed groups,believed to include officers of state and municipalpolice in plain clothes, made scores of arrestswithout identifying themselves. The arreststook place in the city of Oaxaca during violencethat followed a demonstration by supporters ofthe Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxacaagainst the presence of the Federal PreventivePolice in the city. The officers reportedlytortured and ill-treated detainees, who wereheld incommunicado over several days. 18 InNovember 2006 an indigenous communityin Chiapas was attacked by over 200 armedindividuals, reportedly wearing clothes used bystate police and armed with machetes and highcalibrefirearms. Four people died and four weresubjected to enforced disappearance. 19Little was known about the structureof paramilitary groups, and there was noinformation on whether their members includedunder-18s.Armed opposition groupsIn November 2006 there were estimated tobe more than 30 armed opposition groupsin Mexico. 20 One of the largest, the PopularRevolutionary Army (Ejército PopularRevolucionario, EPR), which emerged in thestate of Guerrero in 1996, had a presence innearly 20 states including Chiapas. The ZapatistaNational Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista deLiberación Nacional, EZLN), present in Chiapassince 1994, had spread to several other Mexicanstates, although not Guerrero. 21 No informationwas available on the number of members of eachorganization.In July 2005 the EZLN announced plans toinitiate alternative political activism in Chiapas. 22The leader of the EZLN, Subcomandante Marcos,denied links between the EZLN and otherarmed opposition groups, saying that the groupwas seeking a peaceful solution and peacenegotiations. 23Smaller groups such as the DemocraticRevolutionary Trend–People’s Army (TendenciaDemocrática Revolucionaria–Ejército del Pueblo,TDR–EP) continued to be active and claimedresponsibility for attacks with explosives inMorelos and Mexico state in 2004 and 2005 andin Mexico City in November 2006. 24There was no information on the presence ofunder-18s in any of these groups.DevelopmentsIn March 2006 a constitutional amendmentcreated a separate juvenile justice system forchildren aged 12–18, where judges had to applythe principles of the best interests of the child. 25The UN Committee on the Rights of the Childnoted that the implementation of the systemwould require laws in each state to be draftedand implemented, as well as additional financialand human resources, and urged Mexico totake steps to ensure that states implement therevision as a matter of priority. 261 1942 Ley del Servicio Militar Nacional, amended1998.2 1942 Ley del Servicio Militar Nacional.3 1942 Reglamento de la Ley del Servicio Militar.4 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Mexico, November2006, www.flacso.cl.5 Ibid.6 Secretaría de Seguridad Pública del DistritoFederal, Instituto Técnico de Formación Policial,http://portal.ssp.df.gob.mx.7 Amnesty International (AI), Mexico: Laws withoutjustice – Human rights violations and impunityin the public security and criminal justice system(AMR 41/002/2007), 7 February 2007.8 2005 Ley de Educación Militar del Ejército yFuerza Aérea Mexicanos.9 1986 Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza AéreaMexicanos, amended 1998.10 FLACSO, above note 4.11 See, for example, Escuela Médico Naval,Requisitos de Ingreso, at http://ec.digaden.edu.mx.12 Heroico Colegio Militar, www.sedena.gob.mx; Heroica Escuela Naval de México, http://ec.digaden.edu.mx.13 Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA),Admisión 2007, Personal Civil y Militarcon secundaria.14 Observatorio Ciudadano de Políticas de Niñez,Adolescencia y Familia, Unfulfilled Rights, LimitedFutures: Public Policies and the Rights of Childrenand Adolescents in Mexico, 1 January 2006, www.crin.org.15 “La PGR debe investigar a los grupos armados ysus nexos con militares”, La Jornada, 10 February2005, www.jornada.unam.mx.16 Amnesty International Report 2006.17 Marcos Pablo Moloeznik, “La naturaleza de uninstrumento militar atípico: las fuerzas armadasmexicanas”, Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad,Year 19, No. 1, 2005, www.fasoc.cl.2 3 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

18 AI, “Mexico: Fear of torture or ill-treatment/incommunicado detention” (AMR 41/055/2006),28 November 2006.19 AI, “Mexico: Further information on fear forsafety/fear of ill-treatment/arbitrary detention”(AMR 41/008/2007), 20 February 2007.20 “Estiman que hay más de 30 grupos armadas”, ElUniversal, 10 November 2006, www.eluniversal.com.mx.21 Patricia de los Santos, “Grupos Armados enMexico”, Rebelión, 3 April 2005, www.rebelion.org.22 Amnesty International Report 2006.23 “El EZLN no tiene nexos con grupos armados:‘Marcos’ ”, El Sol de Cuautla, 13 December 2006,www.oem.com.mx.24 “Estiman que hay más de 30 grupos armadas”, ElUniversal, 10 November 2006.25 Intervención del Secretario Técnico delConsejo de Menores, Lic. José Antonio Aguilar,Consideration of third periodic report of Mexicoto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,23 May 2006.26 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of third periodic report submittedby Mexico, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/MEX/CO/3, 2 June 2006.MOLDOVARepublic of MoldovaPopulation: 4.2 million (1.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 6,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17, training onlyVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 7 April 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Officer trainees entering military trainingat 17 were required to sign a militaryservice contract at 18 to be fulfilled oncompleting their education at 23.ContextSecurity was a major concern. The status of theterritory of Transdniestr remained unresolved. Itcontrolled Moldova’s main energy sources andhosted Russian Federation troops that had defiedinternational commitments to withdraw by 1999.People and trade passed unregulated throughits long border with Ukraine, although securityimproved after Ukraine introduced a customsmechanism in 2006. Isolated armed skirmishesbetween Moldova and Transdniestr were reportedat ports and installations in 2007.K — OGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll male citizens, including men with dualcitizenship, had to register for conscriptionwith their local military authority at the age of16, at which time they acquired the status ofrecruits. Between 18 and 27 they were liable forconscription. 1 The term of service was 12 months,three for conscripts with higher education. 2Alternative civilian service of 24 months wasavailable for conscientious objectors. 3 In theevent of war, all young people could be mobilizedas soon as they were 18.The Law on the Status of People doingMilitary Service regulated the situation of nonconscriptsoldiers. Contracts of up to five years’service were open to all 18-year-old citizens(people with dual citizenship were ineligible).Troops were forbidden to obey unlawfulorders that contravened internationalhumanitarian law or Moldova’s internationaltreaty obligations. 4 Such contraventions couldincur imprisonment of between 16 and 25 yearsunder an amendment to the 2002 Criminal Code(Article 391).C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3 3

Other amendments to the Criminal Codebrought Moldova more closely into line with theOptional Protocol. The use of trafficked childrenin armed conflict was made punishable bybetween ten and 25 years’ imprisonment (Article206), and knowingly taking a child hostagewas punishable by between 12 and 20 years’imprisonment (Article 280).Military training and military schoolsMilitary education was available to young peoplewho were citizens of Moldova and not doingmilitary service. Under the Law on the Statusof People doing Military Service, those whoentered a Military Education Institute at 17 wererequired to sign a military service contract at18, which they carried out on completing theircourse of education at 23. Students who wereexpelled from a military institute for academic ordisciplinary shortcomings were to be immediatelyconscripted, whatever their age (Article 29).4 Law on the Status of People doing MilitaryService, above note 1, Article 37.5 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.6 Lenta.ru website, 23 March 2007, www.lenta.ru.DevelopmentsInternational standardsMoldova ratified the Optional Protocol in April2004. Its declaration stated that the minimumage for conscription was 18 but made no explicitstatement with regard to voluntary enlistment. 5TransdniestrThe self-proclaimed state had its own lawsand structures, but was not internationallyrecognized. In 2007 Transdniestr had 7,500 mendoing military service in its border guards orinternal forces controlled by its Interior Ministryand State Security Committee. It also had anarmed People’s Guard which foreign volunteerscould join.According to Transdniestr’s 2005 conscriptionlaw, male residents were liable to call-upbetween 18 and 27 years, and those with a highereducation up to the age of 30. Conscription wasfor 18 months, 12 for men with higher education.Professional contracts were also open tovolunteers aged 18 and over, including foreigners.In time of war, soldiers were to be mobilized fromthe reserve.In the second half of 2006 only 22 per centof the conscription quota was met, accordingto local reports. 6 Many recruits failed medicalrequirements, and others reportedly migratedto Ukraine or elsewhere in Moldova whereconscription terms were shorter.1 Law on the Status of People doing MilitaryService, No. 162-XVI, 22 July 2005, Article 38(1).2 Law on the Training of Citizens for the Defence ofthe Motherland, No. 1245-XV of 2002.3 Law on Alternative Service, No. 534-XIV of 1999.2 3 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

MONACOPrincipality of MonacoPopulation: 35,000 (7,000 under 18)Government armed forces: noneCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: 21 (to security forces)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 13 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIMonaco had no armed forces.1 Initial report of Monaco to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MCO/1,1 March 2006.2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Monacoon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/MCO/CO/1, 8 June 2007.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Franco-Monegasque Treaty of 17 July 1918established the responsibility of France for thedefence of the territorial integrity of Monaco.There were no armed forces; the only securityforces within Monaco were the Prince’s Guard andthe fire brigade. Volunteers for these forces hadto be at least 21 years of age, in keeping with theprovisions of Sovereign Ordinance Number 8017of 1 June 1984, and with Monaco’s declaration onratification of the Optional Protocol in November2001. 1DevelopmentsIn June 2007 the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child recommended that Monaco “considerestablishing extra-territorial jurisdiction over warcrimes which involve conscripting or enlistingchildren under the age of fifteen into the armedforces, or using them to participate actively inhostilities, if such crimes are committed by oragainst a Monegasque national or a person whootherwise has a close link with the State Party”.The Committee urged that “given the potentialconnection between the sale of children andtheir recruitment into armed groups … the StateParty proceed to ratify the Optional Protocol onthe Sale of Children, which it signed on 26 June2000”. 2At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Monaco and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3 5

MONGOLIAMongoliaPopulation: 2.6 million (998,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 8,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: unclearVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 6 October 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no records or monitoring ofthe age of recruits in the armed forces,which were largely conscripted. Nationallegislation did not explicitly specifyminimum ages for recruitment on avoluntary basis or in armed conflict.ContextIn its report to the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child in 2004 the government said it attached“special importance” to prompt assistance tochildren in difficult circumstances, which, underthe Law on Protection of Child Rights, includedthose affected by armed conflict. 1The parliamentary National Human RightsCommission of Mongolia had a special brief tomonitor children’s rights, but the internationalhuman rights standards on its website did notinclude the Convention on the Rights of theChild or its Optional Protocol. Its annual reportsmonitored numerous Mongolian institutions butnot the armed forces. No reason for this wasgiven. As the procedure for raising an individualcase with the Commission did not guaranteeautomatic and confidential transmission ofcomplaints, complainants in closed institutionssuch as the military could have been deterredfrom registering complaints.In its annual report for 2003 the NationalHuman Rights Commission noted that in fiveout of six cases, Mongolia’s reports to UN treatybodies were overdue, and urged that draftingresponsibilities be added to job descriptions inministries. It found that national legislation wasinconsistent with Mongolia’s obligations underinternational treaties and that those obligationswere only partially fulfilled. It singled out theCriminal Code, which still provided for use ofthe death penalty, which was outlawed by theRome Statute of the International Criminal Court,ratified by Mongolia in 2002. The Commissionfound that an “enormous volume” of executiveorders and decrees were not centrally registered,let alone compiled and published. Many wereinconsistent with national laws and internationalhuman rights principles. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeLess than three per cent of the armed forceswere estimated to be volunteers. 3 According toMongolia’s 2004 report to the Committee on theRights of the Child, men aged 18–25 years wereliable to compulsory military service of one year,under the Law on Citizens’ Military Obligationsand the Legal Status of the Military (Article 9),which set no minimum age for mobilization intime of conflict. There was no minimum legalage for joining the armed forces as a volunteer. 4However, Mongolia’s declaration on ratificationof the Optional Protocol stated that the minimumage for recruitment into military service was18. 5 It was not clear if that was a statement ofaccepted practice or if new legislation had beenintroduced to set a minimum age in law.The use of minors as foreign mercenaries inarmed conflicts was punishable by 10–15 years’imprisonment, as was training, financing orotherwise supporting them. 6Military training and military schoolsThere were reportedly no military schools forunder-18s or any explicitly military patriotictraining in the main education system. However,under-18s were permitted, at their own requestand with parental permission, to study in themusic school of the Military Academy, wherein 2007 there were 18 children aged 15–17reportedly enrolled. 7DevelopmentsInternational standardsMongolia ratified the Optional Protocol inOctober 2004, stating in its declaration that theminimum age for recruitment into military servicewas 18, that male citizens were obliged to domilitary service, but those with religious or moralobjections could do alternative service.1 Second periodic report of Mongolia to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/65/Add.32, 15 November 2004.2 Ibid.3 CIA, World Factbook 2007.4 Second periodic report, above note 1.5 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.6 Criminal Code, Article 303(2).7 Confidential source.2 3 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

MONTENEGRORepublic of MontenegroPopulation: 601,000 (145,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 7,300Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription(abolished 2006)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 2 May 2007 bysuccessionOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.2 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfile: Montenegro, www.fco.gov.uk.3 CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov.4 Optional Protocol, reservations and declarations,www2.ohchr.org.ContextA referendum in Montenegro on 21 May 2006,observed by the European Union and the Councilof Europe, narrowly favoured Montenegro’sindependence from Serbia by a vote of over 55per cent. The state of Serbia and Montenegrohad been a loose union of two semi-independentrepublics created in 2003 following the break-upof the former Yugoslavia. Montenegro formallydeclared independence on 3 June 2006, and wasrecognized as a member state of the UN on 28June. Serbia and Montenegro both subsequentlyappointed ministers to carry out previously statelevelfunctions, including for defence and foreignrelations. 1K — OGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn 2007 a draft Defence Law provided a legalbasis for the creation and authority of a ministryof defence. Following the split with Serbia, somearmed forces personnel in Montenegro choseto serve in the Serbian armed forces and somein Serbia chose to serve in Montenegro. Initialreforms of the armed forces in Montenegroincluded ending conscription and compulsoryarmed service. 2 Conscription was abolished inAugust 2006. 3In its declaration on succession to theOptional Protocol, the government stated thatthere was no mandatory military service and thatthe minimum age for voluntary recruitment was18. 41 Amnesty International, Europe and Central Asia:Summary of Amnesty International’s concerns inthe region, January–June 2006, 1 December 2006.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3 7

Morocco andWe stern Sahar aKingdom of MoroccoPopulation: 31.5 million (11.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 200,800Compulsory recruitment age: conscriptionabolishedVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 22 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.ContextThe ongoing dispute between Morocco and thePolisario Front (the pro-independence Sahrawimovement) over control of Western Sahararemained deadlocked more than 30 years afterthe conflict had begun. The Polisario Front calledfor an independent state of Western Saharaand ran a self-proclaimed government-in-exilein refugee camps in south-western Algeria.Demonstrations by Sahrawis against Moroccanrule continued into 2006 and hundreds of peoplewere reportedly arrested. 1 In April 2007 thePolisario Front rejected a Moroccan proposal forenhanced autonomy for the region, since it failedto include a referendum on independence. 2 InApril 2007 the UN Security Council renewed themandate of the UN Mission for the Referendumin Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October2007. 3 The same month a leaked UN missionreport voiced serious concerns over the humanrights situation in Western Sahara. 4Between 2006 and the end of 2007 some 700suspected members of armed Islamist groupswere arrested by Moroccan security forces. 5Over 500 members of the unauthorized Islamistgroup Al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) werecharged with offences such as belonging to anunauthorized association after the group hadlaunched a recruitment campaign. 6 In March2007, 18 people were arrested in connectionwith a suicide bomb attack in the Sidi Moumendistrict. 7 In April 2007 suicide bomb attacks weremade close to the US consulate in Casablanca.The renewed attacks in Morocco coincided withbomb attacks in Algeria. 8GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1996 constitution stated that “All citizensshall contribute to the defence of the country”(Article 16). The minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment in the armed forces had been set at18 by the Royal Decree of 9 June 1996. 9Morocco reportedly moved to abolishcompulsory military service in 2006 as a resultof fears that the army was being infiltrated bymembers of armed Islamist opposition groups.Morocco’s junior defence minister was quotedby news agencies as saying that “This text oflaw came to abolish the obligatory militaryservice with immediate effect, according to theinstructions of his Majesty King Mohammed, thecommander-in-chief and the chief of staff of theroyal armed forces.” 10There was no evidence of under-agerecruitment in the Moroccan armed forces.Military training and military schoolsThere were two military schools, in Kenitra andMeknes. According to the government, studentswho attended military schools did so voluntarily,and those under 18 followed the same nationalcurriculum as those in ordinary state schools. 11Armed groupsPolisario maintained that recruitment to thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA, their armedwing) was voluntary and that the minimumage, including for military training, was 18. ThePolisario’s UK representative stated that “NoSahrawi in the Sahrawi refugee camps in southwestAlgeria who is under the age of 18 years,receives any military training, or participatesactively in situations of armed conflict.” 12 Itwas not possible to verify independently therecruitment and use of under-18s in the PLA.DevelopmentsIn October 2007 Morocco endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The two documents, which werepreviously endorsed by 59 states at a February2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for the protection of and assistance tochild soldiers, following a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.2 3 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

1 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, AmnestyInternational Report 2007.2 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, Human Rights WatchWorld Report 2008.3 UN Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007), UNDoc. S/RES/1754 (2007), 30 April 2007.4 “Leak Shows UN Concern for Western Sahara”,Financial Times, 17 April 2007, www.ft.com.5 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, above notes 1, 2.6 “Morocco/Western Sahara”, above note 1.7 “Morocco arrests 18 people after explosion:minister”, Reuters, 15 March 2007.8 “New suicide attacks hit Morocco”, BBC News,14 April 2007.9 Report of Morocco to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.1, 19August 1995.10 “Morocco to do away with compulsory armyservice”, Reuters, 2 December 2006; OlivierGuitta, “The Islamisation of Morocco”,Weekly Standard, 2 December 2006, www.weeklystandard.com.11 Report, above note 9.12 Communication from Acting Representative of thePolisario Front to the United Kingdom (UK) andIreland, 17 April 2007.MOZAMBIQUERepublic of MozambiquePopulation: 19.8 million (10.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 11,200Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 19 October 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces. The minimum age forvoluntary and compulsory recruitment was18, but it could be lowered in times of war.GovernmentNational recruitment and legislationAccording to the constitution, “participatingin the defence of national independence andsovereignty and territorial integrity are anhonour and the sacred duty of all Mozambicans”.The constitution also allows civilian service tosubstitute for or complement military service forthose not subject to military duties, includingconscientious objectors. 1Under the Law on Military Service allMozambican citizens were obliged to registerfor two years’ military service at 18, and wereliable for service until the age of 35. However,age limits could be altered in time of war. Actualincorporation into the armed forces took placein the year the recruit reached 20 years of age.Eighteen was also the minimum age for specialrecruitment, a category that included voluntarymilitary service. 2There was no evidence of under-agerecruitment, and the law provided for exemptionsfrom military service for the sons or brothers ofsoldiers who died in service and young peoplewho were head of the household or the familybreadwinner. Although those who failed toregister for the call-up were supposedly subjectto sanctions, these were not specified and therewere no legal mechanisms to make young peopleregister for military service. 3 As a result, fewpeople had registered for military service andevery year over 90 per cent of 18-year-olds hadrefused to do so. However, in 2006 penalties wereintroduced for failing to register, and registrationbecame a precondition for obtaining or renewingpassports and for accessing employment in thecivil service. As a result, the number registeringfor military service soared to 167,000, wellbeyond the government’s target of 59,000. Mostof those who registered were over 18 and theK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 3 9

majority of 18-year-olds still did not do so, ashappened in the registration exercise of 2007. 4Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The proliferation of small arms, a continuinglegacy of 16 years of civil war, remained aproblem. In August 2005 the UN DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) provided US$550,000 to assistthe government in the implementation of a twoyearproject to collect and destroy illegal arms. 5Thousands of illegal arms and weapons of war,including rockets and landmines, were destroyedin October 2006, when it was estimated thatsome 42,000 firearms and over 260 millionrounds of ammunition had been recovered since1994. 6 Despite these efforts tons of obsoleteweaponry and munitions continued to be keptin poorly maintained arsenals, and in 2007 onesuch dump on the outskirts of Maputo exploded,killing more than 100 people and injuringhundreds more civilians and soldiers. 7DevelopmentsInternational standardsMozambique acceded to the Optional Protocolon the involvement of children in armed conflicton 19 October 2004. In its declaration thegovernment stated that the minimum age ofenlistment was 18, that “incorporation” started atage 20, and that in case of war the age of militaryservice could be modified. 81 Constitution, Article 267.2 Law on Military Service, 24/97 of 23 December1997.3 Ibid.4 “Registration for military service soars”,Mozambique News Agency, 31 May 2006;“Regularização do SMO como condicionalismopara benefícios”, Vertical, 12 January 2007.5 “PNUD reforca controlo das armas ilegais nopais”, Notícias, 26 August 2005.6 “Illegal arms, mines to be destroyed inMozambique”, Agence France-Presse, 16 October2006.7 Mozambique News Agency, “Over a hundreddead as military arsenal explodes”, AIM ReportNo. 338, www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news.8 Declaration of Mozambique on accession to theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.MYANMARUnion of MyanmarPopulation: 50.5 million (18 million under 18)Government armed forces: 375,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscription inlawVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRCThousands of children continued to berecruited and used in the Tatmadaw Kyi(army) and in armed political groups, asthe army continued its expansion driveand internal armed conflict persistedin some areas of the country. Althoughthe government took some steps toaddress the issue, a formal disarmament,demobilization and reintegration (DDR)program was not in place.ContextThe State Peace and Development Council(SPDC, the military government, headed bySenior General Than Shwe) continued to ruleby decree in the absence of a constitution. TheSPDC-controlled National Convention ended inSeptember 2007, after drawing up principles fora new constitution 2 which were to be put to areferendum at an unspecified date.In August 2007 prominent activists werearrested during demonstrations that broke outin Yangon and other towns in protest at thelarge increase in the price of fuel imposed bythe SPDC. In September Buddhist monks ledmass protests in Yangon, Mandalay and othertowns, during which tens of thousands of peoplepeacefully demonstrated in the streets andtemples. The demonstrations were violentlysuppressed by the security forces, who beat andshot at demonstrators. An unknown number ofpeople, including monks and children, were killedor injured. Almost 3,000 people were arrested;although many were released, hundreds of othersremained in detention. 3In response to the crisis, the UN Secretary-General dispatched his Special Advisor, IbrahimGambari, to Myanmar for talks with the SPDCand opposition leaders. On 11 October the UNSecurity Council issued a presidential statementcalling for the release of all political prisoners andfor SPDC dialogue with “all concerned parties”,and deploring the SPDC’s use of violence. 4 On2 October a similar resolution adopted by the2 4 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

UN Human Rights Council had urged the SPDC toco-operate fully with humanitarian organizations,and requested Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the SpecialRapporteur on the situation of human rights inMyanmar, to seek a visit to the country. 5 The visitwas scheduled for November 2007.Ceasefire agreements between the SPDCand a number of ethnic-minority-based armedgroups remained in force. The ceasefire groupswere not formally demobilized and continuedto exert partial control over limited territory andto engage in business activities. However, theTatmadaw Kyi and several ethnic-minority armedgroups, notably the Shan State Army-South(SSA-South), the Karen National Union (KNU) andthe Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)continued to fight sporadically in the easternpart of the country. Fighting between the KarenNational Liberation Army (KNLA, the KNU’s armedwing) and the military escalated during 2006 innorthern Kayin state and Bago division, amidwidespread Tatmadaw abuses against civilians,including extrajudicial executions, forced labour,torture, destruction of crops and houses, internaldisplacement and collective punishments duringcounter-insurgency operations. 6 The Tatmadawcontinued to attack villages in northern Kayinstate and in eastern Shan state in mid-2007. 7Four parties in Myanmar were identifiedas using child soldiers in the 26 October 2006UN Secretary-General’s Report to the SecurityCouncil on children and armed conflict: theTatmadaw, the KNLA, the Karenni Army (KA, theKNPP’s armed wing) and the United Wa StateArmy (UWSA, a ceasefire group). 8 Ten partieswere identified as recruiting or using childsoldiers in the Secretary-General’s December2007 Report to the Security Council on childrenand armed conflict. 9GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the provisions of Directive No 13/73 (1974)of the Myanmar Defence Services and War OfficeCouncil, under-18s were not permitted to berecruited into the armed forces. 10Under the 1993 Child Law, a child wasanyone under the age of 16 and a youth wasanyone over 16 and below 18. The law definedpenalties for offences including the abuse andtorture of children, and stated that “employingor permitting a child to perform work which ishazardous to the life of the child or which maycause disease to the child or which is harmful tothe child’s moral character” was punishable byimprisonment of up to six months or a fine, orboth (Section 65). 11A 21 September 2007 letter to the ChildSoldiers Coalition from the Permanent Missionof Myanmar in Geneva stated that the MyanmarDefence Services Act and the War Office CouncilDirective did not allow a person under 18 to beenlisted. The letter further stated that forcedconscription or compulsory recruitment wasprohibited, and that determining the minimumage requirement for compulsory recruitment wastherefore unnecessary. 12 However, in practicethe Tatmadaw forcibly recruited both adultsand children through intimidation, coercion andviolence. 13Military training and military schoolsInformation about military training and militaryschools was limited. The Defence Services(Army) Officers’ Training School in Bahtoo andthe tri-services Defence Services Academy (DSA)in Maymyo were the two main officer trainingschools, the latter accepting high-school leaversbetween 16 and 19 years of age for a four-yearcourse. 14Basic training for recruits, includingunder-18s, reportedly lasted for 18 weeks andtook place at over 20 training camps. Recruitsunderwent physical and combat training, whichreportedly proved particularly difficult for theyounger children. They also had to work on farmsor at other business ventures of officers. 15 ASeptember 2006 report found that conditions inmilitary training centres were harsh for under-18s,characterized by overcrowding and poor nutritionand medical care. 16Child recruitment and deploymentAlthough the SPDC stated repeatedly that itwas against their policy to recruit under-18s, 17boys continued to be forcibly recruited in largenumbers into the army in order to increase trooplevels. From 1988 the army expanded rapidly; atthe same time desertions reportedly increasedand volunteers decreased. 18 Both military andcivilian recruiters seized or coerced streetchildren and children at bus and train stationsand other public places. A system of incentivesand punishments was in place to encouragerecruiters to fill their quotas. 19 Some localauthorities were reportedly pressured by themilitary to produce a certain number of recruitsper village, some of them children. Some childrenwere threatened with jail if they did not agreeto join the army. 20 Once in the army, their ageswere recorded as at least 18. 21 Anecdotal reportsindicate that some children from vulnerablefamilies were taken to army bases, but notofficially recruited. They were reportedly used innon-combat activities and were enlisted whenthey reached 18 years of age. 22After training, children were used as guardsat checkpoints, porters, cleaners and spies,and in active combat. Once deployed, they wereat risk of attack, malnutrition and disease. 23The younger boys were sometimes kept at thebase and acted as officers’ servants, sentries orK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 4 1

clerks. Child soldiers witnessed or participatedin counter-insurgency activities such as thedestruction of villages and crops. 24An unknown number of children whoattempted to escape from the Tatmadaw weresentenced to one to two years’ imprisonment,possibly longer, for “desertion”. 25 They werereportedly held in Insein, Mawlamyine andBassein prisons. 26 Other under-18s who wererecaptured after attempting to escape weredetained at their battalion camp and thenforced to resume their duties as soldiers. Somechild soldiers who escaped in conflict areassurrendered to armed groups. 27Armed groupsSeveral armed groups, some still fightingagainst the Tatmadaw, and some in alliance withthem, recruited and used child soldiers, butthe numbers were much lower than those childsoldiers recruited and used by the Tatmadaw.Ceasefire groups and armed groupsallied to the SPDCSeveral ceasefire groups and armed groupsallied to the SPDC were reported to recruitand use child soldiers, including the KarenNational Union-Karen National Liberation Army– Peace Council (KNU-KNLA PC), the UWSA, theDemocratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), theKachin Independence Army (KIA), and the KarenniNationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF).The former KNU 7th Brigade commander, whohad been dismissed from the KNU, formed theKNU-KNLA PC in January 2007 and signed apeace agreement with the SPDC in February2007. Subsequently several boys from the MaeLa refugee camp in Thailand and other areas inThailand and Myanmar were reportedly forciblyrecruited by the KNU-KNLA PC. 28 Previously,under the same commander, the KNU 7th Brigadehad recruited and used child soldiers on a regularbasis. 29The recruitment and use of boys as youngas 12 by the UWSA had been reported in 2002,and some witness accounts suggested thatthese practices continued, although no furtherinformation was available. The KIA, anotherceasefire group, stated that they did not recruitunder-18s, but if under-18s asked to join theywere housed in the army compound, attendedschool or worked around the camp. One KIAsoldier estimated that there were approximately300 under-18-year-olds in the KIA. The KPNLF,a ceasefire group in northern Kayah state, alsorecruited and used child soldiers, some as youngas 12, although they denied this to Human RightsWatch. 30The DKBA, a KNLA breakaway group whichbecame allied to the SPDC in late 1994, recruitedand used child soldiers. The DKBA reportedlyoperated a quota system for recruitment invillage tracts under its control and also relied onvoluntary recruitment. Under-18s were accepted,and reportedly received the same treatment asadult soldiers. 31Armed opposition groupsThe SSA-South stated that it was against theirpolicy to use child soldiers, and that theyprovided care at their bases for hundreds ofunder-18s who had been internally displacedor orphaned. 32 However, restrictions on accessmade it very difficult to obtain independentinformation.The KA and KNLA engaged in initialdiscussions with UN agencies on action plansto stop the recruitment and use of children. InMarch and April 2007 respectively the KNLA andKA signed Deeds of Commitment, committingthemselves not to recruit or use child soldiersand to facilitate the disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) of children releasedfrom their ranks. 33 During the June 2007 visitto Myanmar by the Special Representative forthe Secretary-General for Children and Armedconflict (SRSG), the government agreed to furtherdiscussions to finalize arrangements for the UNcountry team to engage the KNU and KNPP onaction plans. 34The KA stated that it had demobilized under-18s in its ranks. The KNLA continued to usechild soldiers, but their numbers had reportedlydeclined since 2002. Its official policy was notto recruit or use anyone under 18; however,witnesses reported the presence of childsoldiers in KNLA camps, at checkpoints and inoperations. 35Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)At a UN Security Council meeting on 24 July2006 the Myanmar government delegationstated that the government had drawn up “anaction plan that included protection of children’srights, prevention measures, promoting publicawareness and coordinating with UNICEF”. 36The plan reportedly outlined procedures fordischarging soldiers found to be under 18;vocational training, other educational optionsand income support for them; public-awarenessraising; punishment of recruiters; and cooperationwith international agencies. 37In September 2007 the SPDC stated thatthe Committee for the Prevention of MilitaryRecruitment of Under-age Children, establishedin 2004 to prevent the forced recruitment ofchildren, undertook extensive field trips and“launched a campaign to promote awareness andstricter enforcement of laws and regulations onrecruitments among the military establishmentsand training institutions”. 38 The number of2 4 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

children who were released from the armedforces was not known and was not possible toverify. The SPDC provided very few details aboutpunishments for recruiters. 39 There was no formalDDR program. 40DevelopmentsIn June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child expressed deep concern about thedirect and indirect impact of armed conflictsand forced labour on children in Myanmar. TheCommittee recommended that all combatantsunder 18 be demobilized and reintegrated, thatthe army ensure that recruits were 18, and thatthe SPDC ratify the Optional Protocol and ILOConventions 138 and 182. 41In October 2006 the SPDC gave theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)a list of 17 complaints of child recruitment that itsaid had been resolved. 42 In June 2007 the ICRC“strongly denounced violations of internationalhumanitarian law committed against civiliansand detainees” and expressed grave concernat “the persistent use of detainees as porters”by the SPDC. The ICRC’s operations to deliveraid to conflict-affected areas were hamperedby severely increased restrictions imposedby the SPDC. From late 2005 onwards, theSPDC prevented the ICRC from conductingprivate interviews with detainees, leading tothe ICRC’s withdrawal from prison visits. 43 TheSPDC denied access to conflict areas to UNagencies and international non-governmental aidorganizations.In March 2007 the UN General Assemblyadopted a resolution on Myanmar, expressinggrave concern at “the continuing recruitment anduse of child soldiers” and strongly urging theSPDC to put an immediate end to the practice, inco-operation with the UN, particularly UNICEF. 44In February 2007 a SupplementaryUnderstanding was signed by the SPDC andthe International Labour Organization (ILO). Itprovided for a complaints mechanism underwhich individuals could bring cases of forcedlabour under ILO Convention 29 ConcerningForced Labour, which included forced and underagerecruitment, to the ILO liaison officer inYangon. The Supplementary Understanding waseffective immediately and was to be implementedon a trial basis for 12 months. 45 The ILO reportedin March 2007 that one complaint concernedthe recruitment of a child into the Tatmadaw.The case was forwarded to the SPDC WorkingGroup, and the child was subsequently releasedand returned safely to his family, and actionwas taken against those responsible. 46 The UNSecretary-General reported in late 2007 thatseven cases of the recruitment of boys betweenthe ages of 12 and 16 were brought to the ILOafter the Supplementary Understanding becameoperational. He noted that the number did notreflect the scale of the problem. 47In April 2007 the Security Council workinggroup on children and armed conflict placed thesituation of children affected by armed conflictin Myanmar on its agenda. The SRSG visitedMyanmar in June 2007 and met high-rankinggovernment officials, the Government Committeefor the Prevention of Military Recruitment ofUnder-age Children and the UWSA. The purposeof the visit was to establish a UN task forceon children and armed conflict and to discussmodalities of the monitoring and reportingmechanism, established under UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1612, undertaken by the UNcountry team in co-operation with the SPDC.The SRSG recommended inter alia that the SPDCestablish a transparent complaints procedurefor under-age recruitment, disciplinary actionfor those responsible and full co-operation withthe UN country team. The Committee for thePrevention of Military Recruitment of UnderageChildren agreed in principle to establisha subcommittee to deal with reintegration offormer child soldiers. 48 The UN Security Councilworking group on children and armed conflictwas expected to examine the Secretary-General’sreport on children and armed conflict in Myanmarin late 2007.In September 2007 the SPDC establisheda Working Group for the Prevention of MilitaryRecruitment of Underage Children, whichengaged at a working level with the Country TaskForce on Monitoring and Reporting (establishedby the UN country team). In addition, twogovernment task forces were set up to addressmonitoring and reporting and the rehabilitationand reintegration of children released from thearmed forces. 49An unknown number of former child soldierscontinued to flee to Thailand after escaping fromthe Tatmadaw. Some were in refugee campsand some joined the Burmese migrant workercommunity (see Thailand entry). 501 CIA World Factbook 2007, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.2 “Lt-Gen Thein Sein delivers concluding speechat plenary session of National Convention”, NewLight of Myanmar, 3 September 2007.3 “2,459 released on pledge up to date”, New Lightof Myanmar, 16 October 2007.4 UN Security Council, “Security Council callsfor ‘genuine’ dialogue in Myanmar to achievereconciliation”, press document, 11 October 2007,UN Doc. SC/9139.5 UN Human Rights Council, “Situation of HumanRights in Myanmar”, 2 October 2007, UN Doc.A/HRC/S-5/L.1/Rev.1.6 Amnesty International Report 2007, Myanmarentry.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 4 3

7 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: army attacksdisplace hundreds of thousands, grave abuses inethnic minority areas fuel growing humanitariancrisis”, 25 October 2007.8 Children and Armed Conflict, Report ofthe Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/61/529S2006/826.9 Report of the Secretary-General on Children andarmed conflict to the UN Security Council, 21December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757.10 Myanmar Digest, “Secretary-1 briefs foreigndiplomats on activities of Committee forPrevention of Recruiting Child Soldiers, AllMyanmar armed forces including army are formedwith those who join them of their own volition”, 7February 2007, www.myanmardigest.com/eng_md/Feb08.html.11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of reports submitted by statesparties under Article 44 of the Convention,Second periodic reports of states parties due in1998, Myanmar, 11 June 2002, UN Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.21, 5 November 2003.12 Letter to the Child Soldiers Coalition from thePermanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar tothe United Nations Office and Other InternationalOrganizations, Geneva, 21 September 2007.13 “Sold to be soldiers: the recruitment and use ofchild soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch,Vol. 19, No. 15(C), October 2007.14 Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Powerwithout Glory, Eastbridge Signature Books,Norwalk, CT, 2002.15 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.16 Despite Promises: Child Soldiers in Burma’s SPDCArmed Forces, Human Rights Education Instituteof Burma (HREIB), September 2006, www.childsoldiers.org.17 Associated Press, “Myanmar junta says Westernallegations of child soldiers are untrue”,2 February 2007.18 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.19 Confidential source, Bangkok, February 2007.20 Despite Promises, above note 16.21 Confidential source, July 2007.22 Confidential source, November 2007.23 Despite Promises, above note 16.24 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.25 Confidential source, May 2007.26 Confidential source, July 2007.27 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.28 Karen Human Rights Group, “Child soldiersrecruited to support expansion of the KNU-KNLAPeace Council”, May 2007, www.khrg.org; “Soldto be soldiers”, above note 13.29 Confidential source, May 2007.30 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.31 Ibid.32 SSA-South correspondence with the Coalition,1 September 2007, by email.33 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.34 Office of the Special Representative for theSecretary-General for Children and Armedconflict (SRSG), Report: Visit of the SpecialRepresentative for the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed conflict to Myanmar, 25–29June 2007, UN Doc. OSRSG/CAAC, July 2007.35 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.36 UN Security Council, “Security Council reiteratescommitment to address impact of armedconflict on children, determination to implementLandmark 2005 Resolution 1612”, 24 July 2006,UN Doc. SC/8784.37 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.38 Letter to the Coalition from the MyanmarPermanent Mission in Geneva, 21 September2007.39 “Sold to be soldiers”, above note 13.40 Confidential source, November 2007.41 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,Committee on the Rights of the Child, Thirty-sixthsession, Consideration of reports submitted bystates parties under Article 44 of the Convention,Concluding observations, Myanmar, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.237, 30 June 2004.42 US Department of State, Burma: Country Reportson Human Rights Practices – 2006, March 6,2007, www.state.gov.43 ICRC, “Myanmar: ICRC denounces major andrepeated violations of international humanitarianlaw”, press release, 29 June 2007.44 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by theGeneral Assembly, Situation of human rights inMyanmar, Sixty-first session, Agenda item 67(c),13 March 2007, UN Doc. A/RES/61/232.45 International Labour Office (ILO), GoverningBody, GB.298/5/1, 298th Session, Geneva, March2007, Fifth Item on the Agenda, Developmentsconcerning the question of the observanceby the Government of Myanmar of the ForcedLabour Convention, 1930 (No. 29, Appendix,Supplementary Understanding, III) Time frameand trial period, 10.46 Ibid.47 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in Myanmar to theSecurity Council, 16 November 2007, UN Doc.S/2007/666.48 SRSG Report, above note 34.49 Confidential source, November 2007.50 Confidential source, July 2007.2 4 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

NAMIBIARepublic of NamibiaPopulation: 2.0 million (993,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 9,200Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 16 April 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the declaration made by Namibiawhen it ratified the Optional Protocol in April2002, Namibia did not carry out conscription orimpose any form of forced obligatory service. Thedeclaration also confirmed Namibia’s adherenceto the “straight-18” position. Applicants to thearmed forces were required to show certifiedcopies of identity documents and birthcertificates. 1Armed groupsThe Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) did not appearto be active, and no information was available onits recruitment of under-18s. 2The trial which had begun in 2004, of 119people charged with involvement in the 1999separatist attacks launched by the CLA in theCaprivi region, was ongoing in August 2007. Thetrial on treason charges of 12 other men, arrestedin November 2004 following further clashes,ended in mid-2007. Ten defendants receivedlong prison sentences, while the other two wereacquitted. 3In September 2006 the government outlawedthe CLA’s political wing, the United DemocraticParty. 4As of November 2006, 1,100 Namibians whohad fled to Botswana following the 1999 CLAattacks remained there. One Namibian, who hadbeen in detention for five years in Botswana oncharges relating to his alleged participation in theCLA, returned to Namibia in November 2006, afterbeing told by the Namibian authorities that hewould not face charges on his return. 5 Over 700refugees had been repatriated to Namibia since2003, 50 of whom were reportedly subsequentlycharged with treason and involvement in the CLAattacks. 6DevelopmentsInternational standardsNamibia ratified the African Charter on the Rightsand Welfare of the Child in July 2004. 71 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.2 Confidential information, Namibia, August 2007.3 Confidential information, Windhoek, August2007.4 Amnesty International Report 2007.5 Confidential information, September 2007.6 “Botswana–Namibia: Caprivians reluctant toreturn home”, IRIN, 29 November 2006.7 African Union, List of countries which havesigned, ratified/acceded to the African UnionConvention on African Charter on the Rights andWelfare of the Child, www.africa-union.org.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 4 5

NEPALNepalPopulation: 27.1 million (12.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 69,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: ratified 3 January 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182Under the 2006 Comprehensive PeaceAgreement (CPA) parties were committednot to use or enlist children in anymilitary force and to release under-18simmediately. There were no further reportsof government forces using children, butMaoist recruitment of children continuedafter the April 2006 ceasefire and therewere delays in the registration and releaseof under-18 Maoist personnel cantonedunder the CPA.ContextA ceasefire in April 2006 brought to an end the10-year armed conflict between the securityforces and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)(Maoist). King Gyanendra had been forced torelinquish power following mass demonstrationsorganized by an alliance of the seven mainstreampolitical parties (the Seven-Party Alliance,SPA) and supported by the Maoists. 2 A Code ofConduct agreed between the SPA and the CPN(Maoist) on 25 May 2006 provided for a freeze onnew recruitment by either side, but there wereno provisions relating to children already in theCPN (Maoist). A Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA), finalized in November 2006, includedprovisions committing the parties not to use orenlist children in any military force and to rescueand rehabilitate such children immediately. 3 Thiswas the first time the issue was considered in thepeace process.In January 2007 a newly set up United NationsMission in Nepal (UNMIN), with the assistanceof other UN agencies, embarked on a programof registration and verification of Maoist armycombatants, the first phase of which endedin mid-February 2007. The start of the secondphase, which among other things specificallyaimed at the identification of minors, began inJune 2007 but was subject to delays and notcompleted until December (see below). 4There were concerns about the involvementof children in political activities, includingdemonstrations, and their ensuing vulnerabilityto manipulation, indoctrination, injury anddeath. During the protests in April 2006, 18demonstrators were killed and more than 4,000were reportedly injured by the security forces,many of them children. 5Incidents of excessive use of force continuedto be reported, especially in the context ofprotests by members of the Madhesi communityof southern Nepal, who were demandingautonomy and an end to discrimination. Fivechildren were killed between December 2006 andearly February 2007, four of them by police. InDecember 2006 a 17-year-old boy was killed bya police officer in Nepalgunj when police openedfire at a crowd of demonstrators during curfewtime. On 22 January 2007 the police and theArmed Police Force (APF) fired live ammunitiondirectly at demonstrators, resulting in a totalof four deaths, including that of a 15-year-oldboy, and several injuries caused by gunshots,including to two boys aged 13 and 14. On 1February, two 15-year-old boys died of gunshotinjuries when the police and the APF fired liveammunition during a demonstration in Inaruwa,Sunsari district. 6In March 2007 UNICEF and the Office of theHigh Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)called on all political parties to develop codes ofconduct to prevent the misuse and manipulationof children during political activity. 7 As of October2007, no political party was known to havedeveloped one.During the period between August 2005 andSeptember 2006 there were 63 documentedincidents related to explosive devices whichkilled 29 children and injured 70 others.According to a survey carried out during thefirst six months of 2006 by the UNICEF MineAction Unit, the number of such incidents wasmuch larger, with children far more affected thanadults and representing 78 per cent of reportedcasualties. Most of the incidents involvedimprovised explosive devices left by the People’sLiberation Army (PLA, the armed wing of the CPN(Maoist)). Casualties from incidents involvingimprovised explosive devices were reducedduring the post-ceasefire period. 8The British army took Nepalese recruits in itsBrigade of Gurkhas. Applicants had to be at least17 years and 6 months at the beginning of theyear they began their training. 9 As of April 2007there were around 3,500 members of the Brigadeof Gurkhas in the UK army. 10GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAs part of a wider program of political andlegal reform, a new Army Act came into force in2006. The army was made accountable to thegovernment rather than to the crown, and was2 4 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

enamed the Nepalese Army. The new Act didnot include provisions for the minimum age ofrecruitment which continued to be governed bythe 1962 Royal Army New Recruitment Rules;these required recruits to be at least 18 years old.The 1971 Young Boy’s Recruitment and Conditionsof Service Rules, which stated that recruits hadto be between 15 and 18, was declared null andvoid by a Supreme Court ruling in 2005, on thegrounds that recruiting under-18s contravenedthe constitution. 11 In its declaration on ratifyingthe Optional Protocol, the government stated that18 was the minimum age of recruitment, and thatrecruitment into the army was voluntary. 12Child recruitment and deploymentRecruitment of children into the security forceswas rare, although there were reports of the useof children by the security forces as messengers,spies or informants. 13 Such practices stoppedafter May 2007, when the army was confined tobarracks.Many children who surrendered to thesecurity forces or who were captured weresubjected to threats, ill-treatment or tortureby army personnel in order to force them todisclose information about their activities withthe Maoists, or to provide sensitive informationabout and sometimes guide the security forcesto the locations of Maoist camps. It was commonfor children who were arrested, sometimes afterhaving escaped from the Maoists, to be detainedunlawfully in locations such as army barracks.They were denied access to lawyers and to theirfamilies. Some were detained under anti-terroristlegislation. 14 At least four people who werechildren at the time of their arrest reportedlyremained imprisoned in mid-2007, somereportedly charged with murder. 15Armed groupsDespite widespread evidence to the contrary,the CPN (Maoist) consistently denied that itrecruited or used children for military activity.The party’s publicly stated policy was that it didnot allow anyone younger than 18 to join eitherthe People’s Liberation Army or the “people’smilitias”. 16During the conflict, the recruitment by theMaoists of children, both boys and girls, mostlybetween ten and 16 (although the youngestknown was eight), took three main forms:through special recruitment campaigns such as“one family, one member for the Party”, wherechildren were recruited forcibly or voluntarily;through the community activities of Maoistcultural groups, full or part-time militias andassociated organizations, such as the students’and women’s organizations, or directly by thePLA; and through the widespread practice ofmass abductions and forced participation in massmeetings and cultural events in rural areas. 17Children from all the Maoist organizationsperformed a range of support tasks, includingfund-raising, “mobilizing” communities andacting as messengers, spies or providers of foodor shelter. Children were also used as sentries,bodyguards, logistics assistants and combatantsby the PLA. According to OHCHR children wereused by PLA as combatants during clashes inPalpa district in January 2006, and a significantnumber of children were used as porters during aPLA attack in Panauti, Kavre district, in February2006 and during a clash in Khidim, Arghakanchidistrict, in the same month. 18Children between the ages of ten and 16were generally first recruited into the militia ona part-time basis. They carried out propagandaactivities, distributed Maoist newspapers orserved as spies and messengers. Anecdotalevidence suggests that some were unarmed,while others had crude weapons. 19 Only childrenover 16 were officially able to join the “wholetimers”,although many were in fact muchyounger. “Whole-timers” were given one month’straining on personal security, military tactics andpolitical ideology and were equipped with crudeweapons such as home-made guns and pressurecookerbombs. They were usually deployed inareas away from their homes and family and nolonger attended school. 20Being a “whole-timer” typically led to joiningthe PLA. The general practice of the PLA wasto enrol children above the age of 16 after aninitial period as members of the Maoist militia.However, children who were allegedly particularlykeen to join were integrated directly into the PLA.Children continued to be actively recruitedby the Maoists after the April 2006 ceasefire.From May to September 2006 a total of 154 newincidents of recruitment of children in all fiveregions were documented by local organizationsand OHCHR, of which 72 involved recruitmentsinto the PLA (the youngest being 12 years old)and 82 into other Maoist-affiliated organizations,including militias. 21 In the Eastern Region, theOffice of OHCHR confirmed the abduction bythe PLA after April 2006 of five boys betweenthe ages of 13 and 17 from the BhanubhaktaSecondary-school, Mangalbare, Ilam district. Thechildren’s parents maintained that the childrenwere forcibly taken. 22At the end of February 2007, members of theMonitoring and Reporting Mechanism Task Force,set up in 2005 to monitor and report to the UNSecurity Council on children in armed conflict,had documented some 1,995 children associatedwith the parties to the conflict. The vast majoritywere with the CPN (Maoist) and its affiliatedorganizations. Among the 1,995 documentedcases, 475 children were below the age of 15 atthe time of recruitment. A total of 1,576 wererecruited after the April 2006 ceasefire, 896K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 4 7

of them in November 2006 alone – while 527children escaped or were released, the lattermostly due to family efforts or child protectionagencies’ interventions. Of the children recruitedbetween October and December 2006, some 30per cent were released after a few days spent inthe Maoist cantonments. Some were releasedby their commanders as being “too young”,while others were instructed to take part in otherMaoist-affiliated organizations, but not the PLA. 23Most of these children were enrolled inschools at the time of their recruitment. Manyof those recruited into the PLA were promisedmoney by the Maoist recruiters and/oremployment in the new national army to beformed under the CPA.After December 2006 there were increasedconcerns about the enrolment of children intothe Young Communist League (YCL) – the youthwing of the CPN (Maoist) – which attractedcriticism for its use of violence and intimidationthat overshadowed its legitimate activities. 24Nine cases of children active in the YCL weredocumented in the first two months of 2007.The documentation collected on these few casesoffered evidence that children, as part of largergroups, were given physical training and drillingin military fashion (lining up and marching) suchas in Palpa and Morang districts. Most were partof regular Maoist indoctrination sessions. Four ofthe nine children were previously associated withthe Maoist army; one of them testified that hewas simply redeployed with the YCL. 25Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Under the CPA both parties agreed to “protectthe rights of women and children in a specialway, to immediately put a halt on all types ofviolent activities including any kind of sexualexploitation and abuse against women and onchild labour and to not use or enlist children of18 years or below in any military force”. The CPAfurther provided that children recruited and usedin armed groups should be “immediately rescuedand necessary and proper cooperation should beprovided for their rehabilitation”. 26 Of the morethan 30,000 Maoist cadres originally registeredin cantonment sites created under the CPA,2,973 were assessed to be under-age, althoughother children were believed to have left thecantonments before the verification process wascompleted. 27In October 2007 UNMIN expressed concernabout delays in the discharge of Maoistpersonnel, specifically minors, from thecantonments and insisted that the dischargeof the latter should be treated as an urgentpriority. 28 The lack of progress related to broaderdifficulties with UNMIN’s monitoring of theMaoist army in accordance with the 8 December2006 Agreement on the Monitoring of theManagement of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). 29Both registration and discharge of under-18s weredelayed because of the failure by the governmentand CPN (Maoist) to reach agreement on variousissues, in particular the payment of allowancesto cantoned Maoist cadres. By October 2007UNMIN, together with UNICEF, were preparingto monitor the release of “substantial numbers”of under-18s who had been identified duringverification in the first three cantonment sites.It was noted, however, that girls could faceparticular challenges in returning home andthat generally there was a lack of economicopportunities in rural Nepal for returning youngpeople. 30DevelopmentsThe situation in Nepal was the first to beconsidered by the UN Security Council WorkingGroup on Children and Armed Conflict. Nepalfeatured in four consecutive reports by the UNSecretary-General to the Security Council asviolating international standards prohibiting therecruitment and use of children.The National Human Rights Commission(NHRC), mandated to promote and protecthuman rights, including children’s rights, cameunder heavy criticism after new commissionerswere appointed by the king in May 2005. Thechairman and the new commissioners eventuallyresigned in July 2006; new members wereappointed in September 2007. 31In a December 2006 report to the SecurityCouncil, the UN Secretary-General recommendedthat the government invite the SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflictto undertake a mission to Nepal in the nearfuture to help to draw attention to and highlightthe need to mainstream child protection issuesinto the transition and post-transition prioritiesof the government and its UN and civil societypartners. 32 The visit was scheduled to take placein August 2007 but was postponed; it had nottaken place by the end of October.In June 2005 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child, after consideration of Nepal’sSecond Periodic Report, recommended that thegovernment “criminalize abduction, recruitmentand use of children for military purposes by anyarmed forces or armed group”. 33 As of October2007 this recommendation was not believed tohave been implemented.At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Nepal and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assisting2 4 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.International standardsNepal ratified the Optional Protocol in January2007. 341 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, Part8, Article 45(6).2 Report of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights on the human rights situation and theactivities of her office, including technicalco-operation, in Nepal, UN Doc. A/61/374, 22September 2006.3 Comprehensive Peace Accord Concluded betweenthe Government of Nepal and the CommunistParty of Nepal (Maoist), under 7.6, www.peace.gov.np.4 “Registration of arms complete in Shaktikhor”,Nepalnews.com, 29 January 2007; “Registrationof arms over; UN team submits report”,Nepalnews.com, 19 February 2007; “Secondphase PLA verification resumes”, Nepalnews.com, 14 August 2007; all at www.nepalnews.com.5 Report of the High Commissioner, above note 2;Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN),Children Affected in the Course of Suppressingthe Janaandolan, Nepal, June 2006.6 Confidential report on file at the Coalition.7 UNICEF/OHCHR, “Protection of children withregards to political activities”, position paper,Kathmandu, March 2007, http://nepal.ohchr.org.8 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Nepal, UN Doc. S/2006/1007,20 December 2006.9 See British Gurkhas Nepal, www.army.mod.uk.10 UK Armed Forces Trained Strengths &Requirements, 1 April 2007, www.dasa.mod.uk.11 Legal News from Nepal, “SC rules againstrecruiting minors in police and army,” 16December 2005, http://nepallaw.blogspot.com.12 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.13 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 8.14 Ibid.15 Coalition communication with confidentialsource, 29 August 2007.16 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Children in theranks: the Maoists’ use of child soldiers inNepal”, February 2007.17 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 8.18 Ibid.19 Confidential source, October 2007.20 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 8.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Internal Task Force report, on file at the Coalition.24 Report of the Secretary-General to UN SecurityCouncil on the request of Nepal for UnitedNations assistance in support of its peaceprocess, UN Doc. S/2007/442, 18 July 2007.25 Internal Task Force report, above note 23.26 See Comprehensive Peace Agreement, www.peace.gov.np.27 UNMIN press statement, 27 December 2007,www.unmin.org.np.28 Report of the Secretary-General on the requestof Nepal for United Nations assistance in supportof its peace process, UN Doc. S/2007/612, 18October 2007.29 AMMAA, www.peace.gov.np.30 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 28.31 OHCHR, “NHRC appointments an importantdevelopment”, 18 September 2007.32 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 8.33 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Nepal,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.261, 21 September 2005.34 See www2.ohchr.org.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 4 9

NETHERL ANDSKingdom of the NetherlandsPopulation: 16.3 million (3.6 million under 18)Government armed forces: 53,100Compulsory recruitment age: conscriptionsuspendedVoluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 17 and, although conscription wassuspended, all males continued to berequired to register for military service at17.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAlthough conscription was suspended in 1997with the introduction of fully volunteer armedforces, the Dutch constitution of 1989 stated that“All Dutch nationals who are capable of doing soshall have a duty to co-operate in maintainingthe independence of the state and defendingits territory … This duty may also be imposedon residents of the Netherlands who are notDutch nationals” (Article 97). The constitutionemphasized that “To protect its interests, theState shall maintain Armed Forces consisting ofvolunteers and conscripts … Compulsory servicein the armed forces shall be regulated by Act ofParliament” (Article 98). Under the terms of the1997 Law on Conscription, all men continuedto register for military service at the age of17, although this did not involve any medicalexamination or actual military service. Theregistration procedure did not allow an individualto indicate a conscientious objection to militaryservice. In a time of war or other emergency, thelaw allowed for the reintroduction of conscriptionand the possible compulsory recruitment of allthose registered up to the age of 45. 1 Under theMilitary Personnel Law the current minimum agefor voluntary recruitment to the armed forces was17. Seventeen-year-old recruits were required tohave the consent of a parent or guardian beforeenlistment, and were excluded from all activecombat operations or direct involvement inhostilities. There were also restrictions on the useof weapons by 17-year-old volunteers. 2 In 2005there were 4,038 applicants for enrolment in thearmed forces by 17-year-olds, and 997 men andwomen aged 17 actually enlisted. 3Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In its 2007 report to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, the government recorded itsfinancial contributions to several internationalprojects working with war-affected children,including a UNICEF vocational training project indisplaced persons camps in Uganda, a projectdealing with children who had disappeared in ElSalvador and a demobilization and reintegrationproject in Colombia. The Netherlands alsocontributed specifically to the UN SpecialRepresentative for Children and Armed Conflict. 4DevelopmentsThe Netherlands signed the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2000, but had not yet ratified it. In its2007 report to the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child, the Dutch government stated that “theprocess of ratifying the Optional Protocol (OP)on the involvement of children in armed conflictis almost complete. The OP is currently beforethe Senate, and the ratification process will berounded off in the near future. The OP raises theminimum age for forced recruitment [sic] from15 to 18. The Dutch government will thereby beobliged to take all possible measures to preventthe involvement of minors in armed conflicts aspart of the armed forces.” 5At a February 2007 ministerial meetingin Paris, the Netherlands and 58 other statesendorsed the Paris Commitments to protectchildren from unlawful recruitment or use byarmed forces or armed groups and the ParisPrinciples and guidelines on children associatedwith armed forces or armed groups. Thedocuments reaffirmed international standardsand operational principles for protecting andassisting child soldiers and followed a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsored bythe French government and UNICEF.1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005, www.quaker.org.2 Confidential sources, September 2007.3 Information from the defence and naval attaché,embassy of the Netherlands, London, October2007.4 Third periodic report of the Netherlands onimplementation of the United Nations Conventionon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. AVT07/BZ85984 A, 2007.5 Ibid.2 5 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

NEW ZEAL ANDNew ZealandPopulation: 4.0 million (1.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 9,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 12 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitment agewas 17. As of August 2007 some 120 under-18s were members of the regular forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeNew Zealand’s declaration on ratifying theOptional Protocol stated that the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment into its national forceswas 17. 1 The 1990 Defence Act set out the basisfor voluntary recruitment, and was amendedin 2001 to implement the Optional Protocol,stating that “No person who is under 17 yearsmay be appointed to, or enlisted or engaged in,the Navy, the Army, or the Air Force” (Article 33).The amended Defence Act further stated that“no person serving in the Armed Forces who isunder 18 years shall be liable for active service”(Article 37). Defence Force Orders for PersonnelAdministration were also amended, to make itclear that deploying personnel under 18 yearsof age on “active service”, whether overseasor in New Zealand, was prohibited. 2 Humanrights organizations expressed concern that theDefence Act did not define “active service” andhence was unclear whether this would includepeacekeeping or rebuilding missions. 3In its initial report on the Optional Protocol,the government stated that “The Defence Act1990 does not currently set a minimum agefor voluntary recruitment”, indicating lack ofawareness of the 2001 amendment. 4 Humanrights organizations were concerned that, sincethe minimum recruitment age was set by DefenceOrders and not by the Defence Act, there wasno legislative barrier to the age of recruitmentbeing lowered. 5 However, the New ZealandDefence Force subsequently agreed that theterm “enlistment” in section 33 of the amendedDefence Act covered voluntary recruitment,as contemplated by Article 3 of the OptionalProtocol, thereby confirming 17 as the minimumage of recruitment. 6In its initial report on the Optional Protocol,New Zealand stated that reasons for retaining 17as the minimum age for voluntary recruitmentincluded the “inverse relationship between theage of enlistment and retention after five yearsof service”. The government said that raisingthe minimum recruitment age might increasethe difficulty in attracting recruits to technicalpositions, and that an environment in whichall recruits started on an equal footing hadtraditionally offered opportunities of successto recruits from lower socio-economic groups,particularly those who left school at 17. 7 Thegovernment planned to review its position on thevoluntary age of recruitment in 2007 as part ofits preparation of the 2008 periodic report. 8 InSeptember 2007, however, it informed the ChildSoldiers Coalition that raising the recruitment agewas still not considered to be a “viable option”,since, given the number of 17-year-olds currentlyenlisting, this would prevent an annual averageof 24 per cent of potential enlistees from joiningthe armed forces. 9There was no legislation in New Zealandproviding for compulsory recruitment orconscription. In its initial report under theOptional Protocol, the government noted thatwere conscription to be introduced in any form,specific legislation would be required. Theminimum age of 17 for voluntary recruitment intothe Defence Force would not be affected, and anyfuture legislation establishing conscription wouldneed to comply with New Zealand’s internationallegal commitments, including Article 1 of theOptional Protocol relating to direct participationin hostilities. 10Military training and military schoolsThere were no military schools run by the armedforces. 11 The New Zealand Cadet Force was“a voluntary, disciplined, uniformed trainingorganization” for young people aged between13 and 18, according to the 1990 Defence Act. Itaimed to promote training programs or coursessimilar to those undertaken by the armed forces,appreciation among cadets of the functionand operations of the armed forces, and thedevelopment of good citizenship (Section 77).Although the Cadet Force was administeredby the New Zealand military, cadets were notmembers of the armed forces (Section 2). 12 As ofJune 2007 there were approximately 3,800 cadetsenrolled. 13Child recruitment and deploymentAs of 1 August 2007 the total number of regularforces members under 18 was 120, or 1.3 per centof the total number of service members. 14K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5 1

Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Since 2004, 13 former child soldiers fromMyanmar had been granted refugee status inNew Zealand as unaccompanied minors. 151 Optional Protocol, signatures, ratifications anddeclarations, www2.ohchr.org.2 Office of the Minister of Youth Affairs, AnnualProgress Report on the Uncroc Five-Year WorkProgramme for 2004/2005, www.myd.govt.nz.3 Robert Ludbrook, “Children’s Law since 2004”,Working Paper No. 2, Action for Children andYouth Aotearoa, August 2007, www.acya.org.nz.4 Initial report of New Zealand to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on the OptionalProtocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/NZL/1, July 2003.5 Action for Children and Youth Aotearoa, Responseto the New Zealand government’s report oncompliance with the Optional Protocol on childreninvolved in armed conflict, September 2003,www.acya.org.nz.6 Ministry of Youth Development, United NationsConvention on the Rights of the Child, Five-YearWork Programme 2004 to 2008, September 2004,www.myd.govt.nz.7 Initial report of New Zealand, above note 4.8 Five-Year Work Programme, above note 6.9 Child Soldiers Coalition correspondence withMinistry of Defence, September 2007.10 Initial Report of New Zealand, above note 4.11 Ibid.12 Defence Act (1990).13 Coalition correspondence with New ZealandCadet Force, June 2007.14 Coalition correspondence, above note 9.15 Ibid.Nic ar aguaRepublic of NicaraguaPopulation: 5.5 million (2.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 14,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 16Optional Protocol: acceded 17 March 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextPublic perceptions about increased insecurityand the resulting stigmatization of childrenand young people seemed unrelated to actualcrime statistics. It was estimated that only eightper cent of criminal suspects were under 18. 1 InSeptember 2005 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that the governmentcarry out a full study on the scope, nature andcauses of youth gangs in order to develop acomprehensive policy for their prevention andreduction. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the constitution military service was notcompulsory and all forced recruitment to thearmed forces or police was prohibited. 3 Theminimum age for participation in hostilities was18. 4 Those volunteering for military service hadto be over 18 and have parental authorizationcertified by a lawyer. 5 They signed up to anannual, renewable contract. 6Under the 1998 Code on Children and YoungPersons (Chapter II) it was illegal to incitechildren or young people to participate in armedconflicts or armed activities of any kind. The Codealso provided special protection for children andyoung people who had taken refuge in Nicaraguaor were victims of armed conflicts. 7Military training and military schoolsMilitary schools formed part of the nationaleducation system and qualifications obtainedwere equivalent to civilian educationalqualifications. 8Soldiers received training at the BasicInstruction National School, and noncommissionedofficers at the Sergeants’ NationalSchool. Master’s degree courses were offered at2 5 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the General Benjamín Zeledón Rodriguez StaffSuperior School. Students from the General JoséDolores Estrada Vado Superior Centre of MilitaryStudies were considered to be still in training onjoining the armed forces. 9 Graduates obtained adegree in tactical command, engineering, artilleryor medicine, and a guaranteed post in the armedforces for 30 years. 10DevelopmentsInternational standardsNicaragua acceded to the Optional Protocolin March 2005. Its declaration stated that theminimum age for entry to the armed forces was18, and that the requirement for applicantsfor military service to submit legally certifiedparental authorization was in order to preventrecruitment by force or coercion. 111 Federación Coordinadora Nicaragüense de ONGsque trabajan con la Niñez y la Adolescencia(CODENI), III Complementary Report onCompliance with the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 16 May 2005, www.crin.org.2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of third periodic report submittedby Nicaragua, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.265, 21 September 2005.3 Constitución Política de la República deNicaragua, Artículo 96, www.asamblea.gob.ni.4 Third periodic report of Nicaragua to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/125/Add.3, 15 October 2004.5 “Tatuados no pueden ser oficiales del Ejército”,El Nuevo Diario, 13 October 2006, www.elnuevodiario.com.ni; Declaration of Nicaraguaon acceding to the Optional Protocol, 17 March2005, www2.ohchr.org.6 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Nicaragua, August2006, www.flacso.cl.7 Third periodic report, above note 4.8 FLACSO, above note 6.9 Ministerio de Defensa, Libro de la DefensaNacional de Nicaragua, www.midef.gob.ni.10 “Hacer carrera militar no es para cualquiera”, LaPrensa, 18 July 2005.11 Declaration, above note 5.NIGERRepublic of the NigerPopulation: 14.0 million (7.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 5,300Compulsory recruitment: age not specified in lawVoluntary recruitment: age not specified in lawVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Some pupils at the militaryschool received firearms training from asyoung as 13. No information was availableon the use of under-18s by armed groups.ContextThe Movement of Nigeriens for Justice(Mouvement des nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ),a new Tuareg armed group, claimed responsibilityfor an attack on an army base in northern Nigerin February 2007. 1 As of October 2007, reportsindicated that attacks led by ethnic Touareghad killed at least 45 government soldiers sinceFebruary. 2 The MNJ’s stated objectives includedfull implementation of past peace agreements,measures to address development and politicalrepresentation issues in northern regions, andthe holding of a national forum to debate politicalreform. 3The final stage of implementation of a socioeconomicreintegration program for some 4,000former combatants from armed groups, providedfor by three peace agreements signed betweenApril 1995 and August 1998, was ongoing in2007 following the late release of funds for theimplementation of the program targeting over3,000 former combatants in the Aïr-Azawakregion. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution stated that it was the dutyof every citizen to defend the nation andterritorial integrity, and that military servicewas compulsory under the conditions setdown by law. In 2001 Niger had reported to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child thatmilitary service was governed by OrdinanceNo. 96-033 (1996), obligatory except for thosewho were unfit or exempt, and could “take theform of military service, national civil serviceor national participatory service”. 5 In practice,K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5 3

military service was currently not enforced due tofinancial and material constraints. 6There was no minimum age for voluntaryor compulsory recruitment. Recruits had to beof Nigerien nationality and be unmarried andphysically able. There was no evidence, however,of under-18s in the armed forces. 7Military training and military schoolsThere was one military school, the Prytanéemilitaire de Niamey, governed by Decree No. 97-459/PRN/MDN. Sixty pupils, including ten pupilsfrom neighbouring countries, enrolled in theschool each year. No minimum age was specifiedfor entry, but admission was open to boys at theage at which they would enter secondary-school(approximately 10–12 years old). Admission wasthrough examination (concours) and applicantshad to be no more than 13 years old at the time ofthe examination. 8Pupils were given both academic and militaryinstruction. In the third year of study at theschool, at the age of approximately 13–15, pupilswere taught basic handling of firearms, and inthe sixth year, at the age of 16–18, further militaryweapons training was provided, as was physicaltraining during a month in military camps. Aftercompleting the school, pupils could enter amilitary training school for officers (école desofficiers). Around 70 per cent of pupils werereported to enter the armed forces. 95 Initial report of Niger to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.29/Rev.1, 17 October 2001.6 ANDDH, above note 4.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.Armed groupsNo information was available on the use of childsoldiers by armed groups.DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Niger and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 “Niger: Touareg attack army in the north”, IRIN,9 February 2007, www.irinnews.org.2 “Niger: Humanitarian crisis feared in the North”,IRIN, 22 October 2007.3 Programme des revendications du Mouvementdes nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ), 9 April 2007,www.temoust.org/spip.php?article1958.4 Information from Association nigérien pour ladéfense des droits de l’homme (ANDDH), April2007.2 5 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

NigeriaFederal Republic of NigeriaPopulation: 131.5 million (67.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 85,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 8 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere was no evidence of under-18s beingused in the armed forces. There werereports of children being recruited andused by armed groups and armed vigilantegroups and involved in intercommunalviolence and criminal gangs.ContextThroughout 2006 and up to the elections in April2007 politically motivated violence by gangsand militia groups allied to politicians and youthwings of political parties had taken place, andsome 300 people were killed. 1 The EU ElectionObserver Mission found that the elections fellfar short of basic international standards, 2 butin spite of the demand by the opposition forthe rejection of the results, the ruling party’scandidate, Umaru Yar’Adua, was sworn in aspresident on 29 May 2007.The Nigerian government agreed to theextradition of Charles Taylor following intenseinternational pressure. He was wanted by theSpecial Court for Sierra Leone for trial on chargesof crimes against humanity, war crimes and otherserious violations of international humanitarianlaw, including the recruitment and use of childsoldiers. He was arrested on the border withCameroon on 29 March 2006 and transferred tothe Special Court of Sierra Leone on request byLiberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. His trialin The Hague was adjourned until January 2008. 3Violence was reported between Christianand Muslim youths, some under 18. In May2005 Human Rights Watch estimated thatapproximately 700 Muslims were killed inattacks by Christians on Yelwa, a market townlocated in the southern part of Plateau state.The number of Christians killed was unknown,one estimate being 70. There were also reportsof the abduction of hundreds of women andchildren during the attacks, most, but not all, ofwhom were able to return to their families in thefollowing weeks. 4In February 2006, 150 people were killedand thousands were displaced due to sectarianviolence following protests over the internationalpublication of cartoons depicting the ProphetMohammed. 5 In September 2006 further violencewas reported between Christian and Muslimyouths in Dutse, the state capital of Jigawa. 6There were continued concerns about theproliferation of small arms, a major destabilizingfactor in the country. 7GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAlthough the 1999 constitution allowed for thepossibility of conscription, stating that it wasthe duty of every citizen to “defend Nigeria andrender such national service as may be required”(Article 24(b)), no legislation provided for it.There was no conscription. 8 The 2003 ChildRights Act (Section 34) stated that the minimumage for voluntary recruitment or conscription intothe armed forces was 18. 9Military training and military schoolsThere were several military high schools,including the Nigerian Military School, Zaria; theAir Force Military School, Jos; and the NigerianNavy Secondary-schools in Ojo and Abeokuta. 10According to the government, the various branchesof the military have schools where under-18s areadmitted; however, there is no “military activity”beyond parade and disciplinary training. 11Armed groupsArmed groups in the Delta regionViolence in the Niger Delta region between armedgroups and the security forces continued, witharmed groups’ demands ranging from resourcecontrolconcessions and amenities and jobs forrural communities, and several oil concessionsfor faction leaders, to independence. 12 InSeptember 2004 the leader of the armed groupNiger Delta People’s Volunteer Force threatenedto launch an “all-out war” in the region. InSeptember 2005 he was arrested on charges oftreason following a failed amnesty deal and wasreleased in June 2007 on health grounds. 13 Newarmed groups came to the fore following thisdeclaration, the most prominent of which wasthe Movement for the Emancipation of the NigerDelta (MEND). MEND claimed responsibility fora number of hostage-takings and violent clasheswith security forces from December 2005. 14Armed groups in the Niger Delta were thoughtto comprise mainly youths, some of whom weresuspected to be under 18. MEND in particular wasregarded as a group with a predominantly youngmembership. 15 In a presentation on children inarmed conflict to the UN Security Council in July2006, a spokesperson for the UN DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) stressed that UNDP’s mainK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5 5

programs in the Niger Delta region aimed at givingyouths an alternative to armed violence. 16Vigilante groupsIllegal armed vigilante groups, in operationin several states, sometimes with the tacitendorsement of state governors, continued tobe responsible for unlawful killings. There werereports of under-18s being members of theBakassi Boys in the east. 17The Egbesu Boys, in the Niger Delta, allegedlyrecruited children under 16. The O’odua People’sCongress (OPC), of the Yoruba ethnic group,continued to recruit under-18s through its GaniAdams’ faction, the Eso group, where the majorityof its members were reportedly under 18. 18Criminal gangsThere was a proliferation in the number ofyouths (some reportedly under 18) in armedgangs who lived mainly through extortion androbbery, frequently using violence or the threatof violence. 19 The most well-known group was theso-called Area Boys, operating in Lagos. Therewere clashes between the armed forces and thisgroup in May 2005, and some attempts werebeing made to rehabilitate the members of thesegangs, apparently with little effect. 20 Attacks byarmed gangs that were part of university studentcults also contributed to increased violence. 21DevelopmentsIn April 2005 the UN Committee on theRights of the Child expressed concern aboutintercommunal violence and, in particular, thekilling of children arising from such conflicts, aswell as the “severe physical and psychologicaltrauma” inflicted on children, including childcombatants. The Committee was concernedabout the vulnerability of refugee children fromChad, Sierra Leone and Liberia, especially girls,to sexual exploitation and forced prostitution,and the problems of drug abuse and economicexploitation were also raised. 22 In November2005 the National Agency for Prohibition andTrafficking in Persons and Other Related Mattersindicated that 15 million Nigerian children werebeing taken from rural to urban situations forchild labour or slavery purposes. 231 International Crisis Group (ICG), Fuelling theNiger Delta Crisis, Africa Report No. 118, 28September 2006; Christopher Albin-Lackey andBen Rawlence, “Nigerian Nightmare”, Prospect,May 2007, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk.2 European Union Election Observation Mission,Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Elections fail tomeet hopes and expectations of the Nigerianpeople and fall far short of basic internationalstandards”, press release, 23 April 2007, http://eueom-ng.org.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone, www.sc-sl.org.4 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Revenge in thename of religion: The cycle of violence in Plateauand Kano States”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 17,No. 8 (A) (May 2005).5 Christian Allen Purefoy, “Five days of violenceby Nigerian Christians and Muslims kill 150”,Independent, 24 February 2006.6 “Arrests after Nigerian Violence”, BBC News, 22September 2006.7 Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (eds.),“Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, andHuman Security in the ECOWAS Region”, SmallArms Survey, April 2005, www.smallarmssurvey.org.8 B. Horeman and M. Stolwijk, Refusing to BearArms: A World Survey of Conscription andConscientious Objection to Military Services, WarResisters International, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.9 Second periodic report of Nigeria to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70.Add.24, 17 September 2004.10 Nigerian Military Secondary-schools, http://members.tripod.com/cdssikeja/links.html.11 Second periodic report, above note 9.12 ICG, above note 1.13 “Army recaptures Nigerian oil base”, BBC News,21 June 2007.14 Chris McGreal, “Delta Force”, Guardian, 10 May2007, www.guardian.co.uk.15 ICG, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, AfricaReport No. 113, 19 July 2006.16 UNDP, Speech by Ad Melkert, UNDP AssociateAdministrator, on children and armed conflict, toUN Security Council, 24 July 2006.17 Vincent Ujumadu, “21 die in Bakassi Boys’ cell”,Vanguard, 6 August 2005, www.vanguardngr.com.18 Mohamed Ibrahim, Empirical Survey of Childrenand Youth in Organised Armed Violence inNigeria: Egbesu Boys, OPC and Bakassi Boys asa Case Study, Children in Organised and ArmedViolence, 7 May 2005, www.coav.org.br.19 HRW, Rivers and Blood: Guns, Power and Oil inNigeria’s Rivers States, briefing paper, February2005.20 “Nigeria: Area Boys – a growing menace on thestreets of Lagos”, IRIN, 15 July 2005.21 “Nigeria: Gangs sowing terror on campus”, IRIN,22 February 2007.22 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Nigeria,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.257, 13 April 2005.23 CRIN, “Nigeria: 15 Million Children Toil inSlavery”, 22 November 2005, www.crin.org.2 5 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

NorwayKingdom of NorwayPopulation: 4.6 million (1.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 23,400Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no under-18s serving in thearmed forces, but the Home Guard Youthwas open to volunteers from the age of 16.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 109 of the Norwegian constitution statedthat “as a general rule every citizen of the Stateis equally bound to serve in the defence of theCountry for a specific period, irrespective of birthor fortune”. Compulsory military service of 12months (eight or nine months in practice) wasregulated by the General Compulsory Service Actof 1953. The minimum age for voluntary militaryservice in the Norwegian military was 18. 1 Whileall men aged 18 to 44 were eligible for call-up,they were rarely conscripted after the age of 30.Conscripts to the National Guard served for sixmonths, and were obliged to perform two weeksof reservist training each year until the age of 44. 2According to the Ministry of Defence,“conscription will be oriented towards the bestqualified and motivated young people. To makesure the same information about military serviceis given to all regardless of gender, young womenare being invited to attend a voluntary initialinterview as from 2006.” 3Military training and military schoolsThe Home Guard Youth was an entirely voluntaryorganization for young persons, providing“outdoor recreation and other physical andsporting activities with a military element”, tobe pursued in the young person’s free time andwithout any liability for enrolment in the armedforces. The Home Guard Youth was open tovolunteers from the age of 16. While formallya component of the Norwegian armed forces,according to the government “the Home GuardYouth cannot be considered to be recruitedto the Norwegian Armed Forces within themeaning of the [Optional] Protocol because itis presumed that a person is not considered tohave been recruited before she has formally orde facto become a member of the armed forceswith the rights and obligations that this entails.Members of the Home Guard are not to receiveany practical training in or take part in any otherway in war-related activities and they are to beexempt from service in situations in which thearmed forces could be involved in hostilities… Furthermore the Home Guard Youth are notsubject to military disciplinary authority or tothe military penal code.” Nevertheless, in July2007 the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild stated that “despite the aforementionedsafeguards of the Home Guard Act, theCommittee is of the view that these kinds ofactivities with a ‘military element’ for childrenare not in full conformity with the spirit of theOptional Protocol”. The Committee urged Norway“to raise the minimum age of volunteers joiningthe Home Guard from 16 years to 18 years inorder to fully respect the spirit of the OptionalProtocol and to provide full protection forchildren in all circumstances”. 4DevelopmentsIn a November 2006 statement to the UNSecurity Council, the Norwegian ambassadorwelcomed the commitment of the WorkingGroup on Children and Armed Conflict to a workplan “that includes consideration of specificsituations and regular review of all situationsof concern”. Emphasizing the need for “regularand substantive reports by the country level taskforces … followed up by adequate responses andresources”, the ambassador noted that “Norwayhas already provided support to the reportingand monitoring system through UNICEF”. 5In July 2007 the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child welcomed the proposed reform of thePenal Code which would “introduce as separatecriminal offences those crimes which are listedin articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, in particulararticle 8 … which criminalizes conscriptingor enlisting children under the age of fifteenyears into the national armed forces or usingthem to participate actively in hostilities as awar crime”. The Committee noted particularlythat in criminalizing conscripting or enlistingchildren under the age of 18 for such purposes,the proposed new Penal Code would actually“introduce a higher standard than in the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court”. 6At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Norway and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalK — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5 7

consultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Norway to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/NOR/1,January 2006.2 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.3 Ministry of Defence, “Norwegian Defence 2006”,www.mod.no.4 Initial report, above note 1; UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, Consideration of reportsubmitted Norway, Concluding observations, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/NOR/CO/1, 6 July 2007.5 “Children Deserve Protection”, NorwegianStatements at the United Nations, 30 November2006, www.norway-un.org.6 Concluding observations, above note 4.OccupiedPale stinianTerritoryOccupied Palestinian TerritoryPopulation: 3.7 million (1.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: not applicableCompulsory recruitment age: noneVoluntary recruitment age: 18 (security forces)Voting age: 18Treaties ratified: not applicableThe Palestinian Authority did not havea system of conscription for the securityforces under its control. It officiallysupported a “straight-18” position forrecruitment. Children were reported tohave been offered military training byarmed Palestinian groups. Older childrenparticipated in operations for IslamicJihad, Fatah and Hamas. No under-18swere known to have participated in suicidebombings from late 2004 to November2007.ContextIsraeli forces and settlers officially withdrewfrom the Gaza Strip in August–September 2005,although effective control remained in Israelihands. Israel’s occupation and confiscation ofPalestinian land in the West Bank continued,with 38 per cent of the area out of bounds forthe Palestinian population. 1 Hamas won theJanuary 2006 parliamentary elections, but thenew government was boycotted by much of theinternational community, increasing economicand political pressures. Hamas’s victory stokedfighting between the military wings of Fatahand Hamas. On 15 June 2007 Hamas effectivelytook control of Gaza. Palestinian president andPalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairmanMahmoud Abbas then moved to dissolve theHamas-led government and established an“emergency” government in the West Bank.This effectively created two Palestinian politicalentities, one in Gaza led by Hamas and one in theWest Bank led by Fatah and the PLO. 2 Efforts wereunder way to reunite the entities in late 2007.Sanctions against the Hamas-led government inGaza by Israel, the European Union (EU) and theUnited States (USA) further reduced an alreadylow standard of living. 32 5 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Israeli Security ForcesMilitary training and military schoolsTraining for new recruits to PA forces remainedFrom the start of the intifada (uprising) to earlyad hoc. Funding for a new officer training facilityNovember 2007, Israeli forces were documentedand three other training camps in Jericho wasas having killed 889 Palestinian children. 4 Onereceived from international donors in 2007. 19hundred and twenty-four children were killedThere were no reports of military training in thein 2006, mainly during Israel Defense Forcesschool system.(IDF) operations “Summer Rains” and “AutumnClouds” in Gaza. 5 This followed an IDF decision Child recruitment and deploymentto reduce the “safety zone” for artillery batteriesto 100 metres away from civilian areas. TheThe PA condemned the use of under-18s indecision left no room for error, based on a shellarmed conflict on a number of occasions. 20 Somefragmentation range of the same distance. 6 InPA forces were previously understood to havetwo incidents in August 2007 the IDF shot andrecruited children as young as 16, but no newkilled five children under 12 in Gaza. 7 It initiallyreports were available. 21 In 2007 the Palestinianclaimed that the children were collecting rocketChild Planning Unit at the Ministry of Planninglaunchers for a militant group. 8 A subsequent IDFtold the Child Soldiers Coalition that “there isinquiry revealed that two of the children werea strong legal framework prohibiting the use ofcollecting carob fruit and the second group werechild soldiers. However, there is no monitoringplaying tag. 9of these laws nor ability to enforce them.” 22 TheCurfews and checkpoint closures disruptedeffective establishment of two rival governmentchildren’s access to education. Poor schoolinstitutions with two separate security services inperformance was a key factor in encouragingGaza and the West Bank in 2007 led to a lack ofyoung people to join militant factions, accordingclarity as to which legal system applied in Gaza.to UNICEF. 10 Children were also frequentlydetained; in early November 2007 an estimated Armed groups317 children were held in Israeli prisons. Figuresfor 2006 showed that 64 per cent of sentencesPolitical groups provided parallel services forhanded down to under-18s were on charges ofthe Palestinian civilian population. Hamas ranstone-throwing. 11 The Special Representativea number of schools, nurseries and clinics forof the UN Secretary-General for Children andchildren. These activities were understood toArmed Conflict stated that stone-throwing andinclude a component of propaganda. 23 Hamasmembership of a banned organization (19 perand Fatah controlled television stations featuringcent of cases) should not lead to incarceration. 12 children’s programs. These included politicalOn occasion, IDF soldiers were reportedcontent and some glorification of “martyrdom”. 24to have stood by, or tacitly encouraged IsraeliFatah and Hamas ran voluntary summerchildren to engage in hostile behaviour towardscamps for children in Gaza involving ideologicalPalestinians. 13 As well as recruiting Israelitraining. The convenor of one of the Hamaschildren (see Israel entry), settlers frequentlycamps in Maghazi refugee camp denied thatattacked Palestinian children. Ten children hadmilitary training was included. 25 However,been killed by settlers since 2000, but no deathsanecdotal reports indicated that militaryhad been reported since 2004. 14 Abductions andtraining took place during some summernon-fatal attacks continued. In 2007 a 13-yearoldboy was abducted, beaten and stripped byprograms in 2007. 26 There was a report that anunnamed group had attempted to enlist oldersettlers around Nablus before being dumped. 15 children outside schools in Gaza to take part inparamilitary training. 27All the Palestinian armed groups condemnedPalestinian Authoritychild recruitment in military conflict, mostnotably in the verbal “code of conduct” of 2002.National recruitment legislation and28However, some recruitment had been notedpracticesince then, which the groups said was due toThe Palestinian Authority (PA) did not have amistakes by individuals. 29 Documentation onsystem of universal conscription for its securitychild recruitment remained limited. The bestservices, which included the Presidentialavailable indicator was the record of child deathsGuard (Force 17), the Preventive Security Forceas a result of direct involvement in the conflict.associated with Fatah and the Executive SecurityThis figure fell from a high of 22 incidentsForce associated with Hamas. 16 Recruitment forrecorded in 2004 by Defence for Childrenall government service was on a voluntary basisInternational-Palestine Section (DCI-Palestine),from the age of 18. 17 Article 46 of the Palestiniana non-governmental organization (NGO), toChild Law of 2004 prohibited the use of childrenthree incidents in 2005. In 2006 there were twoin armed conflicts. The amended Basic Law ofincidents, both involving children killed while2005 also prohibited the abuse of children. 18 participating in armed clashes. From January toOctober 2007 there were no deaths of under-K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 5 9

18s during clashes, although there were threecases where children without any armed groupaffiliation were killed trying to get across theIsraeli border. From 2005 children who wereinvolved in violence on behalf of armed groupswere between the ages of 16 and 18. There wasno documented evidence of child involvement insuicide bombings after 2004. 30From January to July 2007, 28 Palestinianchildren were killed by Palestinian forces,including in interfactional clashes and misuse ofweapons. A further 217 were injured during thesame period, compared with 27 deaths and 260injuries in 2006. 31 After a misfired rocket killedtwo siblings aged nine and six in August 2007, aHamas spokesman urged “resistance factions totake all the necessary measures to avoid causingany harm to civilians”. 32Hamas – Izz al-Din al-QassamBrigadesFollowing strong public declarations in 2002,Hamas leaders reiterated their opposition tothe recruitment of children during contacts withthe Coalition in 2005 and 2006. 33 A Hebron MP,Dr Samir al-Qadi, said, “We need to respectchildren’s rights and the right to childhood.Children are sacred to us – bodily, mentally,spiritually”. 34 However, this message was notconsistently applied by its military wing, the Izzal-Din al-Qassam Brigades.In 2005 one older child was reported to havebeen killed participating in armed action claimedby Hamas, but there had been no documentedincidents since that time. 35 However, limitedinvolvement by older children was recorded onthe group’s website. It listed six members killedfrom January 2006 to mid-November 2007 whowere aged 15–17 when they joined the armedwing from 2000 to 2004. All were over 18 whenthey died. 36 In 2007 a local NGO reported that a13-year-old in Gaza had been assigned to monitorthe streets for the group. He said that he wassupposed to gather information on drug dealersand collaborators from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. 37Fatah – Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades andaffiliatesFatah condemned the use of children by armedgroups. 38 Nevertheless, in 2005 there wasdocumented evidence that one older childaffiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigadeswas killed in clashes with the Israeli army. 39 Noincidents had been recorded on group websitessince then, although the fragmentation ofFatah made monitoring difficult. 40 There wereunconfirmed media reports that the FatahaffiliatedTanzim had attempted to recruitchildren, including an alleged attempt to coercea 14-year-old in Nablus into a suicide bombing,when he was forced to write his own will. 41Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine (PFLP) – Abu Ali MustafaBrigadesThe PFLP claimed one suicide bombingperpetrated by 16-year-old Umar Abdullah al-Fa’r,in late 2004. 42 Another 16-year-old, Sa’id al-Majdlawi, joined the armed wing and was killedthe same year, according to the PFLP’s website. 43No other cases of child involvement had beenrecorded since then.Islamic Jihad – Al-Quds BrigadesIslamic Jihad also criticized the participationof children in armed conflict. 44 However, incontacts with a Coalition member, Islamic Jihadmembers suggested that children over theage of 15 and a half were adults. 45 In 2005 thegroup claimed responsibility for an attack on anIsraeli settlement during which an older childwas killed. 46 Group websites indicated that twoadult members of the group killed from January2006 to mid-November 2007 had been able tojoin at the age of 15 in 2001. Both were initiallyinvolved in lookout and surveillance work. 47 Theal-Quds Brigades took part in most of the suicidebombings and rocket attacks on Israel after 2005,during which Israeli and Palestinian children werekilled (see also Israel entry). 48Popular Resistance Committees (PRC)– Al-Nasser Salah al-Din BrigadesThe PRC was primarily made up of formermembers of other groups. 49 It launched rocketand other attacks on Israeli military targetsin recent years. No children were reported tohave participated in its operations. However,obituaries on its official website suggest that fouradult members who were killed in action fromJanuary 2006 to mid-November 2007 had joinedthe group when they were 17, 50 and anothermember joined at 15 in 2000. 51Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There were a number of psychological supportprograms for Palestinian children affected bythe conflict. UNICEF had 14 active teams in2007 carrying out home visits and training,counselling and playground activities. 52 DCI-Palestine, the Gaza Community Mental HealthProgram and Save the Children-US also ranpsychosocial programs. The government didnot have rehabilitative services for childrenwho had participated in the conflict. 53 TheInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)ran international humanitarian law trainingcourses for members of militant groups in Gaza inOctober–November 2007. 542 6 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsIsrael and the Occupied Palestinian Territorywere noted as situations of concern in the UNSecretary-General’s reports to the SecurityCouncil on Children and Armed Conflict inFebruary 2005 and October 2006. In 2006 heremarked that the “plight of Palestinian childrenin the Occupied Palestinian Territory, includingEast Jerusalem, has become more precarioussince the previous reporting period, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict intensified”. 55The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict visitedIsrael and the Palestinian Territory in April 2007.She urged the need for proper respect of thecivilian/combatant distinction in Israeli militaryactions in the territory. She highlighted settlerattacks on Palestinian children in Hebron and al-Tuwami. She also suggested the establishment ofindependent investigation mechanisms to followup alleged violations of children’s rights. 56During the visit President Abbas and the thenforeign minister, Abu Amr, agreed “to revive thecode of conduct among Palestinian groups notto involve children in political violence, and toengage with UNICEF to devise a plan of action toprevent the use of children in such violence”. 57* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 UN Office for Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs, “The Humanitarian Impact on Palestiniansof Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure inthe West Bank”, July 2007, www.ochaopt.org.2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “After Gaza”,Middle East Report No. 68, 2 August 2007.3 Colin Urquhart, “Gaza goes hungry as Israelisanctions bite”, Guardian, 12 October 2007.4 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 28 September2000 to 5 November 2007.5 UN Report, Visit of the Special Representative forChildren and Armed Conflict to the Middle East,UN Doc. OSRSG/CAAC, 9–20 April 2007.6 Amos Harel, “Lull in Gaza but IDF says Qassamfight to go on”, Ha’aretz, 11 April 2006.7 OCHA/DCI information, July–August 2007.8 “IDF: Palestinians use kids to collect Qassamlaunchers”, Ha’aretz, 22 August 2007.9 Gideon Levy, “Children of war”, Ha’aretz, 2September 2007.10 UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update, 21September 2007, www.unicef.org.11 DCI-Palestine, 5 November 2007, www.dci-pal.org.12 UN Report, above note 5.13 See numerous case studies in Yesh Din, “Asemblance of law”, June 2006.14 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 20 October2007.15 Yesh Din, “The fifth attack on a Palestinianpasserby in the last two months”, 26 July 2007,www.yesh-din.org.16 “After Gaza”, above note 2.17 Article 24, chapter 2 of the Civil Service Law;letter from Dr Ahmed al-Yaziji, General Secretaryof the Palestinian High Council for Childhood andMotherhood, in response to Coalition questions,21 March 2004.18 Information from Child Planning Unit, PalestinianMinistry of Planning, 8 November 2007, inresponse to Coalition questions.19 “Palestinian officers’ school opened”, AssociatedPress, 31 October 2007.20 See for instance Saeb Erakat’s comments after anincident in 2004: Ali Daraghmeh, “Palestiniansoutraged by recruiting of children for attacks onIsraelis”, Associated Press, 29 February 2004.21 DCI-Palestine, report, March 2004.22 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note18.23 Forum on Armed Groups, background paper onHamas, 4–7 July 2006, at www.child-soldiers.org.24 See, e.g., “Farfour mouse dies in last episode”,Associated Press, 29 June 2007.25 “Rival Gaza children’s camps mix fun withpolitics”, Reuters, 22 August 2007.26 Interview with confidential source, 9 September2007.27 UN Report, above note 5.28 Workshop funded by the Quakers; seebackground paper on Hamas, above note 23.29 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note18.30 Information from DCI-Palestine, 20 October 2007.31 Documentation from Mezan Centre for HumanRights, www.mezan.org.32 “Palestinian rocket kills 2 Gaza children: medics”,Reuters, 7 August 2007.33 Background paper on Hamas, above note 23.34 Interview with Dr Samir al-Qadi, Hamas MP,Hebron, February 2006.35 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, 20 October2007.36 Hamas official website, www.palestine-info.info/(Arabic).37 Information from Child Protection Agenciesworking in the OPT, July–August 2007.38 Arnon Regular, “Palestinian groups condemn useof children in terror attacks”, Ha’aretz, 26 March2004.39 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, above note35.40 Interview with DCI-Palestine, 6 January 2006. Seealso incomplete Fatah official website “martyrs”list, http://kataebaqsa.org.41 Efrat Weiss, “Boy pressed to carry out attack”,Ynet News, 12 October 2005, www.ynetnews.com.K — OC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 6 1

42 See PFLP website, www.pflp.ps/; Israeli Ministryof Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il.43 See PFLP website, above note 42.44 Cited in Human Rights Watch, “Erased in amoment: suicide bombing attacks against Israelicivilians”, October 2002.45 Interview with DCI-Palestine, above note 40.46 Documentation from DCI-Palestine, above note35.47 Obituaries of Muhammad al-Saksak and Ahmedal-Bal’awi, www.qudsway.com and www.qudsnews.net (Arabic).48 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The PalestinianIslamic Jihad terror organization in 2006”, 15March 2007, www.mfa.gov.il.49 Lt. Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, “The PopularResistance Committees: Hamas’ new partners?”,Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 17 May 2006 .50 www.moqawmh.com/ (Arabic).51 “Yasser Abu Libda, born 1985”, www.moqawmh.com.52 UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Update, 21September 2007.53 Information from Child Planning Unit, above note18.54 “ICRC activities in Israel and the occupied andautonomous territories: operational update,October 2007”, www.icrc.org.55 UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9 February 2005;UN Doc. A/61/529–S/2006/826, 26 October2006.56 UN Report, above note 5.57 Report of the UN Secretary-General to theSecurity Council on Children and ArmedConflict, 21 December 2007, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757.OMANSultanate of OmanPopulation: 2.6 million (1.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 41,700Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 15 or 18 (see text)Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: acceded 17 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed services.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Basic Law (constitution) of Oman stated that“No institution or group may set up military orparamilitary organizations. The Law regulatesmilitary services, general or partial mobilizationand the rights, duties and disciplinary rulesof the Armed Forces, the public securityorganizations and any other forces the Statedecides to establish” (Article 14). Oman statedin its declaration to the Optional Protocol that“the minimum legal age for enlistment in theMinistry of Defence and the Sultan’s armedforces is eighteen years; that a birth certificateor a certificate of ascertainment of age fromthe competent governmental authoritiesconstitutes the precautionary measure forensuring compliance with that requirement; andthat enlistment is optional, not compulsory”. 1However, this appeared to be at variance withOman’s May 2006 Second Periodic Report on theConvention on the Rights of the Child, in whichthe government stated that children betweenthe ages of 15 and 18 could volunteer for thearmed forces. The report said that preference wasusually given to those who were oldest, who wereconsidered for “an extremely limited number ofbranches of the armed forces”. The report furtherstated that “the current law does not permit thedirect involvement of children under 15 years ofage in any war”. 21 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.2 Second periodic report of Oman to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/OMN/2, 8 May 2006.2 6 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

PACIFIC ISL ANDSRepublics of Kiribati and Nauru; Cook Islands,Niue, Independent State of Samoa; Republicof the Marshall Islands, Federated States ofMicronesia, Republic of Palau; Tuvalu andRepublic of Vanuatu (see individual entries forSolomon Islands, Fiji and Tonga)Many of the Pacific Islands had no armedforces. Australia, New Zealand or the USAwere responsible for defence assistancefor eight of them, while Tuvalu and Vanuatuhad no such defence arrangements withany state.REPUBLICS OFKIRIBATI AND NAURUPopulation: 113,000 (aggregate)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: Kiribati: 18; Nauru: 20Optional Protocol:Kiribati: not signedNauru: signed 8 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):Kiribati: CRCNauru: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICCNo armed forces were maintained by thegovernments of Kiribati or Nauru.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAustralia and New Zealand provided defenceassistance to Kiribati. Kiribati nationalsvolunteered in the past to join the UK armedforces, where the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment is 16 (see UK entry). Australia wasresponsible, under an informal agreement, for thedefence of Nauru. 1 There was no specific nationallegislation on children and armed conflict.DevelopmentsInternational standardsKiribati presented its Initial report to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child in August2005, and the Committee recommended inSeptember 2006 that the government ratify theOptional Protocol. 2 Nauru ratified the AdditionalProtocols to the Geneva Conventions in 2006, buthad not moved on the ratification of the OptionalProtocol.COOK ISLANDS, NIUE, SAMOAPopulation: Cook Islands and Samoa 203,000(aggregate); Niue 1,000Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: Cook Islands and Niue: 18; Samoa: 21Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):Cook Islands: CRC, GC AP I and IINiue: CRCSamoa: CRC, GC AP I and II, ICCNo armed forces were maintained by thegovernments of Cook Islands, Niue andSamoa. Defence was provided by NewZealand.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeNew Zealand defined the relationship with theCook Islands in August 1965 as “a form of fullself-government in free association with NewZealand”, New Zealand having responsibilitiesfor external affairs and defence in consultationwith them. 3 The Niue Constitution Act 1974 statedthat New Zealand was responsible for externalaffairs and defence. 4 New Zealand’s 1962 Treatyof Friendship with Samoa brought with it anobligation to consider sympathetically requestsfor defence assistance. 5The New Zealand armed forces administereda Mutual Assistance Programme, which aimed tosupport the Pacific Patrol Boat operations andthe police of several island states in the Pacific,including training in using and securing smallarms. 6 Training support was provided to the CookIslands and Samoan police forces. 7DevelopmentsSamoa presented its Initial report to theUN Committee on the Rights of the Child inNovember 2005, stating that the governmenthad continuously supported UN resolutionson children in armed conflict. 8 The Committeerecommended that Samoa ratify the OptionalProtocol. 9P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 6 3

REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALLISLANDS, FEDERATED STATESOF MICRONESIA, REPUBLICOF PALAUPopulation: 192,000 (aggregate)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicable; noconscription in Marshall Islands during peacetimeVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol:Marshall Islands, Palau: not signedMicronesia: signed 8 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):Marshall Islands: CRC, ICCMicronesia, Palau: CRC, GC AP I and IINo armed forces were maintained by thegovernments of the Marshall Islands,Micronesia and Palau. Defence wasprovided by the USA.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe USA maintained a separate Compact ofFree Association (COFA) with each state, underwhich the US government had full authority andresponsibility for security and defence in relationto the islands. 10The constitution of the Marshall Islandsstates, “No person shall be conscripted to servein the armed forces of the Marshall Islands exceptin time of war or imminent danger of war ascertified by the Cabinet, and no person shall beconscripted if … he has established that he is aconscientious objector to participation in war”(Section 11).According to the COFA between the USA andthe Marshall Islands, no Marshallese citizen wassubject to “involuntary induction into militaryservice of the United States as long as suchperson has resided in the United States for aperiod of less than one year” (Section 341). 11A similar provision was made in the USA’sagreement with Micronesia. 12It was estimated that hundreds of citizensfrom the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palaucontinued to serve in all five branches of the USarmed forces. 13 At least five soldiers from theMarshall Islands and Palau were killed in combatin Iraq. 14No specific legislation on children in armedconflict had been enacted.DevelopmentsThe Marshall Islands presented its Secondperiodic report to the Committee on the Rights ofthe Child in December 2004, but failed to appeartwice at Committee sessions where the reportwas to be reviewed. 15TUVALU AND VANUATUPopulation: 221,000 (aggregate)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol:Tuvalu: not signedVanuatu: ratified 27 September 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):Tuvalu: CRCVanuatu: CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182No armed forces were maintained bythe governments of Tuvalu or Vanuatu.There were no reports of under-18s in thesecurity or paramilitary forces in Vanuatu.ContextOn 3 March 2007 serious violence erupted inthe outskirts of Port Vila, Vanuatu, involvingmembers of the communities of Tanna andAmbrym Islands living in the capital. Accordingto reports, the violence broke out after residentsof Tanna Island claimed that a sorcerer fromAmbrym Island had cast a spell that killed aTanna woman. 16 The government declared a stateof emergency on 5 March and scores of Ambrymcommunity members took refuge at the VanuatuMobile Force (VMF) camp in Port Vila. 17In November 2006, members of the Papuanarmed opposition group, the West PapuanNational Liberation Army (TPN-PB), appeared tobe operating from Port Vila, the Vanuatu capital,where the group’s first national congress washeld. 18GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere were no regular military forces in Vanuatu,and members of the other security forces hadto be at least 18 years old. The police force hadapproximately 500 officers, including a policemaritime wing and the paramilitary VanuatuMobile Force (VMF). 19The police were the only security force inTuvalu.2 6 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

There were no specific laws on children inarmed conflict.DevelopmentsInternational standardsVanuatu ratified the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2007 and in 2006 ratified ILOConvention 182 on the Worst Forms of ChildLabour. Its Declaration to the Optional Protocolstated that the minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment is 18.17 “Displaced Ni-Vanuatu get help from France”,Pacific Islands Report, 20 March 2007, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org.18 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Protest andPunishment: Political Prisoners in Papua”, HumanRights Watch, Vol. 19, No. 4(C), February 2007.19 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006, Vanuatu, 6 March2007, www.state.gov.1 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs andTrade, Nauru-Country Information Paper, www.mfat.govt.nz.2 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Kiribati,Concluding observation, UN Doc. CRC/C/KIR/CO/1, 29 September 2006.3 Government of the Cook Islands, Definitions ofthe Constitution, Special Relationship with NewZealand, www.ck/govt.htm.4 Niue Constitution Act 1974, Analysis, Article 6:External Affairs and Defence, www.paclii.org.5 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, DefencePortfolio: Briefing to the Incoming Government2005, www.defence.govt.nz.6 New Zealand Ministry of Defence, Annual Report2006, Part 1 – Overview, www.defence.govt.nz.7 Ibid.8 Initial report of Samoa to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/WSM/1, 16February 2006.9 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Samoa,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/WSM/CO/1, 16 October 2006.10 See www.fm/jcn/ (Marshall Islands); USDepartment of State, Background note:Micronesia, www.state.gov/; and US Departmentof State, Background note: Palau, www.state.gov.11 Republic of the Marshall Islands, Public Law 108-188, 17 December 2003, www.rmiembassyus.org.12 Joint Committee on Compact EconomicNegotiations (ICN), Compilation of Agreementsbetween the Government of the Federated Statesof Micronesia and the Government of the UnitedStates related to the Compact of Free Association,Washington, DC, 2002, www.fm.13 US Department of the Interior, Office of InsularAffairs, www.doi.gov/ “Islanders in the Military”(Military Highlights).14 Ibid., “Islanders in the Military” (Insular Heroes).15 “Marshall Islands a No-Show at Committee on theRights of Child Review”, Yokwe Online, 24 January2007, www.yokwe.net.16 “Vanuatu chiefs to meet over riots”, National NineNews (Australia), 6 March 2007, http://news.ninemsn.com.au.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 6 5

PakistanIslamic Republic of PakistanPopulation: 157.9 million (71.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 619,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: signed 26 September 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum voluntary recruitment agewas 17, but training requirements meantthat under-18s did not take part in activeservice. In a situation of continuingviolence and unrest, armed groups,including those carrying out suicideattacks in Afghanistan, continued to recruitand use children.ContextThere were increasing calls for the restorationof democracy and the rule of law and forthe withdrawal of the military from politics,particularly following President Musharraf’sfailed attempt to remove the chief justice of theSupreme Court in March 2007. The governmentremained reliant on political support from theIslamist political parties. 2There was an escalation in violence andunrest in the Federally Administered TribalAreas (FATA), in the province of Balochistan andin Gilgit-Baltistan, while violence continuedin parts of Sindh, Punjab and North WestFrontier province (NWFP). 3 In some tribal areas– South and North Waziristan in particular – thegovernment reached “peace” agreements withpro-Taleban insurgents which effectively allowedthem sanctuary and to set up quasi-governmentalstructures, collect taxes, impose their “penalcode” and exercise quasi-judicial functions. 4Armed groups seeking secession of partsof Jammu and Kashmir from India to Pakistancontinued to be active in Pakistan-administeredKashmir (known as Azad Kashmir), although lessovertly and in fewer numbers. 5The government took some steps to addressreligious radicalism, particularly after bombattacks in the United Kingdom in July 2005 bybombers, some of whom had spent time inPakistani madrasas (Islamic religious schools).Hundreds of members of religious groups andreligious school students were arrested, and thegovernment announced that all foreign studentsat religious schools would be expelled and thatsuch schools needed to register. However, afterprotests by religious groups these directionswere not fully implemented. 6 In July 2007government forces stormed the Lal Masjid (RedMosque) madrasa complex in Islamabad whichhad been taken over by militants seeking toimpose sharia law in the city. 7GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1952 Pakistan Army Act allowed compulsorymilitary service to be introduced in times ofemergency, but this provision had not beenused. Under Article 39 of the 1973 constitution,“The State shall enable people from all partsof Pakistan to participate in the Armed Forcesof Pakistan.” The Pakistan National ServiceOrdinance of 1970 stated that officers and jawans(soldiers) could be recruited between the agesof 17 and 23, and had to have at least a year’straining before taking part in active service. 8Candidates for a regular commission in thePakistan Army could apply from the age of 17.Officer recruits received two years’ training at thePakistan Military Academy (PMA) in Abbotabad,while ordinary soldiers received around oneyear’s training. Recruitment informationindicated that the authorities would lower theminimum age requirement by between threeand six months in “special deserving cases”. 9Statistics on the number of under-18s serving ingovernment armed forces were not available.Military training and military schoolsA number of cadet colleges admitted childrenfrom the age of ten, but pupils could choosewhether or not to join the armed forces aftercompleting their schooling. The majority ofgraduates from the Military College, Jhelum, aresidential school and college educating around500 cadets and run by the Pakistan Army, enteredthe PMA. 10 The Military College and cadet schoolswere reported to attract students because of thehigh quality of education that they offered. 11Children in the justice systemIn December 2004 the Lahore High Court revokedthe Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (JJSO)2000 which established certain protections forchildren within the criminal justice process,including defining a child as a person below18 years of age; providing for special juvenilecourts; regulating arrest, bail and probation;and prohibiting the death penalty and the useof fetters and handcuffs. The Lahore High Courtheld that the JJSO unduly privileged juveniles andargued that it was necessary to retain the deathpenalty for juveniles in order to deter crime.Although the JJSO was temporarily reinstatedwhile an appeal remained pending as of mid-2 6 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2007, the JJSO remained largely unimplemented.As a result children continued to be treatedon a par with adults within the criminal justicesystem 12 and subjected to widespread abuses indetention, 13 and continued to be sentenced todeath and executed. 14Armed groupsThe Taleban and other armed groups suchas Hizb-e Islami and al-Qaeda were widelybelieved to be active in the tribal areas ofPakistan, regrouping and rearming, and afew thousand non-Pakistani insurgents werebelieved to be operating in these areas. 15 Thegovernment continued to deny allegations thatit or its intelligence services (the Inter-ServicesIntelligence, ISI) were providing direct supportto the Taleban. There were, however, credibleallegations that in Waziristan and other borderareas Pakistani and Afghan Taleban leaderswere training suicide bombers for operations inAfghanistan. 16 A UN report in September 2007found that Pakistan remained an importantsource of human and material assistance for theinsurgency in Afghanistan generally and suicideattacks in particular. 17 Those trained for suicideattacks included children (see below).Madrasas served as an alternative to thefailing public school system in many areas forthose unable to afford private education, andalso attracted those seeking religious instructionfor their children. Many madrasas failed toprovide an adequate education, focusing solelyon Islamic studies, and there was no regulationor oversight of the education given in numerousunregistered madrasas. Some madrasasreportedly continued to promote religiousradicalism and violence, and were used formilitary training, although madrasas were not thesole recruiting grounds for insurgents and themajority were not involved in militancy. 18There were reports that in PakistanadministeredKashmir, following the October2005 earthquake, some armed groups wereinvolved in establishing schools, and anecdotalevidence that they were recruiting children. 19In July 2007 it was reported that a 14-yearoldboy was returned to his family in Pakistanafter being recruited from a madrasa in SouthWaziristan, trained and sent over the borderto carry out a suicide attack on a provincialgovernor in Afghanistan, where he was detainedby security forces before he could carry out theattack. The boy reportedly alleged that at leasttwo other boys from his madrasa had beenindoctrinated to carry out suicide attacks. 20Another report indicated that in towns on theedge of Pakistan’s tribal belt children agedbetween 11 and 15 were being recruited fromschools by pro-Taleban insurgents and trainedin Afghanistan as suicide bombers. Young boyswere reported to have been lured by the promiseof adventure and sacrifice, but reports alsoindicated that there was a degree of coercion andthat parents and teachers feared retaliation ifthey prevented children from going. 21One suicide attack by a child took place inPakistan. In September 2007 it was reported thata suicide bomber aged about 15 or 16 had blownhimself up in the town of Dera Ismail Khan inNWFP, killing himself and 17 others, in the contextof a wave of attacks by pro-Taleban militants inthe area following the July 2007 siege of the LalMasjid. 22A number of children were caught up in thesiege of the Lal Masjid. Many were young girlsand boys who were students at the two madrasasassociated with the Lal Masjid. Those carryingand using weapons were reported to be studentsover the age of 18. 23In July 2007 a national child rightsorganization expressed concern about therecruitment and training of children and theirtraining and preparation for military actionand conflict. In urging the government toratify the Optional Protocol and take action toprotect children from recruitment it referredto unconfirmed reports of the involvement ofchildren as young as 15 in political violence inKarachi in May 2007, as well as at the Lal Masjidin Islamabad in July 2007. 24There were unconfirmed reports that armedBaloch nationalist groups and tribal leaders wereusing children as young as 14 in the ongoing lowlevelinsurgency in Balochistan. 25Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There were no government programs for thedisarmament, demobilization and reintegrationof children involved in armed conflict, despitethe recommendation which the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child made to the Pakistangovernment in October 2003, that it developin collaboration with non-governmentalorganizations and international organizationsa comprehensive system for the reintegrationand recovery of children who had participated inhostilities. 26International standardsPakistan ratified the ILO Minimum AgeConvention 138 in July 2006.1 Constitution, Article 106, as amended in 2002.2 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Elections,democracy and stability in Pakistan”, Asia ReportNo. 137, July 2007.3 South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment2006, www.satp.org.4 Amnesty International Report 2007.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 6 7

5 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “‘With friendslike these …’ human rights violations in AzadKashmir”, September 2006.6 Amnesty International Report 2006.7 See, for example, “Police probe attack at RedMosque”, BBC News, 28 July 2007, “Courtdemands Red Mosque answers”, 28 August 2007.8 Second periodic report of Pakistan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/65/Add.21, 11 April 2003.9 Pakistan Army, www.joinpakarmy.gov.pk/index.php.10 Military College Jhelum, www.militarycollege.edu.pk.11 Confidential source.12 Amnesty International (AI), “Pakistan: Protectionof juveniles in the criminal justice system remainsinadequate” (ASA 33/021/2005), October 2005.13 “Tragedy of Pakistan’s prison children”, BBCNews, 6 November 2006.14 Amnesty International Report 2007.15 ICG, Pakistan’s tribal areas: Appeasing themilitants, Asia Report No. 125, 11 December 2006.16 HRW, The Human Cost: The Consequences ofInsurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, April 2007.17 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA),Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007),September 2007.18 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006. See also C.Christine Fair, “Militant recruitment in Pakistan: anew look at the militancy–madrasah connection”,Asia Policy, No. 4, July 2007, http://asiapolicy.nbr.org.19 “Education vacuum poses long-term threat tochildren”, IRIN, 5 June 2006; ICG, Pakistan:Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia PolicyBriefing No. 46, 15 March 2006.20 “Boy forced by Taliban to become would-bebomber is pardoned”, Guardian, 16 July 2007.21 “Recruiting Taleban ‘child soldiers’”, BBC News,12 June 2007.22 “17 killed in latest Pakistan suicide attack”,Agence France-Presse, 10 September 2007.23 Confidential source, August 2007.24 Society for the Protection of the Rights of theChild, “Ratification of Convention on Child RightsSought”, news release, 24 July 2007, www.sparcpk.org.25 Confidential source, above note 23.26 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Pakistan, Concluding observations,UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.217, 27 October 2003.PANAMARepublic of PanamaPopulation: 3.2 million (1.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 8 August 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no armed forces. The minimumage for recruitment to the police was 18,but cadets could enter police training at 17.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeSince the abolition of the armed forces in 1990,security and law enforcement had been theresponsibility of the police and the NationalAir and Maritime Services under the controlof the Ministry of Government and Justice. 1Police cadets received instruction at the PoliceAcademy, the Police Training and SpecializationCentre, and the Superior Studies Centre.Candidates for the Police Academy had to beaged 18–25 and have three years’ secondaryeducation. Candidates for the Superior StudiesCentre had to be aged 17–22 and single, and tohave completed secondary-school. 2DevelopmentsEvery month hundreds of Colombians, includingchildren, sought asylum in Panama from violenceand recruitment by armed opposition groupsin Colombia; large numbers were turned away. 3An estimated 200 were given refugee status. 4A further 900 were given temporary protectionon humanitarian grounds, but humanitarianorganizations criticized their lack both offreedom to work and of freedom of movement. 5In September 2007 the National RefugeeOffice (Oficina Nacional para la Atención de losRefugiados, ONPAR) announced that over 400refugees living in the country for more than 15years would be granted permanent residencypermits, and that ONPAR was establishing acommission to look at the situation of more than800 displaced Colombians, including those whomight wish to opt for voluntary repatriation, inthe border province of Darién. 6In June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that, with regard toColombians under temporary protection, Panama2 6 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

facilitate the naturalization of their children bornin Panama, and revise its practice of restrictingtheir freedom of movement, especially in the caseof young people. The Committee also called onPanama, in those cases where families could bedeported without breaching international humanrights or refugee law, to avoid separating childrenfrom their parents. 71 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Panama, August2006, www.flacso.cl.2 Inscripción a la Academia de Policía PresidenteBelisario Porras, Inscripción al Centro deEnseñanza Superior Doctor Justo Arosemena,www.panamatramita.gob.pa.3 Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panama: immigrationpolicy tightened”, 31 July 2006, and “Panamá:aumenta la xenofobia contra inmigrantes yrefugiados”, 7 May 2007, www.jrs.net.4 “Jesuitas censarán a refugiados de Curundú”, LaPrensa, 3 January 2006, http://mensual.prensa.com.5 UN news service, “Panamá otorga estatus derefugiados a 42 indígenas colombianos, reportaACNUR”, 15 December 2006, www.un.org/spanish/News; Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panamá:la legislación para los refugiados no se adapta ala ley internacional”, 5 February 2007.6 Jesuit Refugee Service, “Panama: some refugeesget rights, others must wait”, 14 September 2007.7 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Panama, Concluding observations,UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.233, 30 June 2004.PAPUA NEWGUINEAPapua New GuineaPopulation: 5.9 million (2.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 3,100Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentinto the armed forces was 16. In practice,there were no reports of under-18s beingrecruited.ContextFollowing the end of a nine-year secessionistconflict in 1997, and the withdrawal of PapuaNew Guinea troops from the island province ofNorth Solomons (known as Bougainville) in 2003,the Papua New Guinea government approveda constitution for the Autonomous Region ofBougainville in December 2004.In May 2005 the UN Observer Mission onBougainville (UNOMB) declared the weaponsdisposal program provided for in the 2001Bougainville Peace Agreement to be completeand verified the situation as conducive to holdingelections, which took place in May–June 2005.The first Bougainville president and AutonomousBougainville government were sworn into officein June 2005. The peace agreement also providedfor a referendum on the province’s independenceto be held after 10–15 years. 1There were high levels of violent crimeacross the country, and a state of emergencywas declared in August 2006 in the SouthernHighlands. In Bougainville there were reports thatformer combatants who had remained outsidethe peace process had rearmed, contributing tothe high level of gun crime on the island. 2P — RGovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1974 Defence Act, which provided the legalbasis for voluntary recruitment, stated that aperson aged 16 or 17 could be enlisted, but notwithout “the written consent of his parents orguardians or, where the parents or guardians aredead or unknown, or where it is unreasonablein all the circumstances that their consent beC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 6 9

obtained, of a Provincial Administrator”. A personunder 16 years of age could not be enlisted(Article 30). Members of the armed forces under18 could be exempted from military discipline ifthis was provided for by regulations or defencecouncil orders (Schedule 1.C3). There were noprovisions to protect under-18s from involvementin hostilities. The Defence Act also established areserve force, consisting of volunteers dischargedor transferred from the regular force, or personsenlisted directly into the reserves (Article 14).In times of war or “defence stand by” the headof state could order the whole or any part ofthe reserve force to be on continuous full-timemilitary service (Article 41). 3Although there was no conscription, in the1975 constitution’s prohibition of forced labourthere was a specific exclusion from this of “labourof a reasonable amount and kind (including inthe case of compulsory military service, labourrequired as an alternative to such service inthe case of a person who has conscientiousobjections to military service) that is required inthe national interest” (Article 43).Child recruitment and deploymentThere were no reports of under-18s beingrecruited in practice into the military. Currentmilitary policy was to recruit only those with acertificate of completion of school grade 12, andhence over 18. 4 It was not known whether thispractice was reflected in any updated legislation,defence council orders or other militaryregulations.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Efforts for the rehabilitation of formercombatants, including child soldiers, continuedin Bougainville province. After UNOMB withdrew,UNICEF increased its presence in Bougainville inorder to help improve the situation of women andchildren. Many UNICEF-supported programs weredesigned to contribute to the reintegration of excombatantsand reduce the likelihood of furtherarmed conflict. 5 The UN Development Programme(UNDP) was implementing the BougainvillePlanning and Community Support Project inco-operation with the Autonomous Bougainvillegovernment, the Papua New Guinea governmentand other agencies and non-governmentalorganizations. The project included support forestablishment of a youth network, and promotionof human rights awareness and enhancementof conflict resolution skills through training incivic education, human rights, conflict resolutionand trauma healing. 6 During the Bougainvilleconflict, thousands of young men and childrenas young as 14 had been deployed to fight by theBougainville Revolutionary Army or in front linepositions by the “resistance force” established bythe Papua New Guinea military. 7DevelopmentsHuman rights organizations continued tocriticize severely the treatment of under-18s bylaw enforcement officials, in particular ongoingpatterns of beatings, rape and torture in policecustody. Although some progress was madein establishing a juvenile justice system, therewas yet to be a demonstrable change in policetreatment of children. 8New child protection legislation was drafted.In 2007 a submission was being drafted bythe Minister for Community Development torecommend ratification of the Optional Protocol. 91 Australian Government Department of ForeignAffairs and Trade, Bougainville Peace Process,www.dfat.gov.au/ .2 Amnesty International Report 2007.3 Defence Act, 1974.4 Confidential Child Soldiers Coalitioncorrespondence, June 2007.5 Confidential source, October 2007.6 UNDP, Bougainville Rehabilitation andReconstruction and Development, www.undp.org.pg/ .7 Initial report of Papua New Guinea to UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/28/Add.20, 21 July 2003.8 Human Rights Watch, “Still making their ownrules: Ongoing impunity for police beatings, rape,and torture in Papua New Guinea”, 30 October2006.9 Confidential source, above note 5.2 7 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

PAR AGUAYRepublic of ParaguayPopulation: 6.2 million (2.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 10,100Compulsory recruitment age: 17Voluntary recruitment age: no legal minimumage (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 27 September 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Following continued public andinternational pressure about recruitmentof children, by 2007 under-18s were nolonger allowed to volunteer for military orpre-military service.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe armed forces were mainly conscripted. 1Military law required the recruitment of allmales the year they turned 18, thus allowingthe conscription of 17-year-olds. 2 Conscientiousobjectors, disabled people, people belongingto indigenous communities and Catholic priestswere not required to do military service. 3 Intimes of armed conflict all citizens could beconscripted; special forces could also bemobilized for specific missions. 4 Women could beconscripted, but only in support functions. 5Conditions of service for conscripts wereextremely poor, with very strict disciplinaryregimes. Between 1989 and 2005 more than110 conscripts aged between 12 and 20 haddied during compulsory military service,mostly as a result of ill-treatment or firearmsaccidents. 6 A former conscript who had spenthis military service at the Mariscal Estigarribiamilitary base in Chaco was found in the junglein 2006, suffering from severe malnutrition andpsychological problems because of the serviceconditions. 7In November 2006 the UN Special Rapporteuron torture expressed concern about thebeating and descuereo of conscripts, a formof systematic bullying which involved forcingindividuals to carry out extreme forms of exerciseas punishment. He also expressed concern thatthere had been no convictions for torture afterthe new penal code entered into force in 1999,and that torture was not criminalized in themilitary criminal code. 8Numerous cases of soldiers, includingunder-18s, who had died in service over the yearswere under investigation before the nationalcourts, but no progress had been made in theinvestigations. By October 2007 the government,working with the armed forces, the police andnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), hadreportedly identified over 250 such cases. 9Military training and military schoolsEach branch of the armed forces had its owntraining and specialist schools. 10 Militaryschools, which were entirely under militarycontrol, accepted children as young as 12. Littleinformation was available as to the educationprovided, the disciplinary regime or thepunishments that students might be subjectedto. 11There were several such schools, includingthe Mariscal Solano López Military Academyfor officer training and the Mariscal Estigarribiamilitary school for the instruction of noncommissionedofficers (NCOs). 12 Six new NCOschools had been opened throughout the countryby 2005. 13Until 2006 secondary-school students wishingto bring forward their military service couldattend four-week courses once a year for threeyears at the Students’ Military Instruction Centrefor Reserve Officers (Centro de Instrucción Militarpara Estudiantes de Formación de Oficiales deReserva, CIMEFOR). The first two periods werecompulsory and the third year was optional.Cimeforistas, as cadets were known, receivedinstruction in the use of firearms and physicaland academic instruction. 14On 24 June 2005, 18-year-old Darío González,a third-year student at the NCO Military Collegein Encarnación, died of a gunshot wound to thehead, the third such case at the institution. InJuly René González, also aged 18, a student atthe NCO Military School in Dimabel, attemptedsuicide. No investigation had been carried out ineither case. 15Child recruitment and deploymentThe law allowed under-18s to bring forward theirenlistment, but no minimum conditions were set.Only a children’s court could grant an under-18permission to bring forward his military service.Administrative sanctions were provided for thoserecruiting under-18s without this authorization,but were not enforced. Recruits under 18 wereautomatically deemed to have reached the age ofmajority once they joined the armed forces, andwere then bound by military law and discipline. 16Forced recruitment of children between12 and 17 was very common. Military truckstravelled to communities and children were takenaway following false promises of education, foodand health care. 17 Parents were often pressurizedor coerced into signing authorizations allowingtheir children to be conscripted, although theseauthorizations had no legal standing. 18 The lackP — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7 1

of registration at birth facilitated this practice:around 22 per cent of all under-18s in Paraguaywere not registered at birth and so had no legalpapers. 19In all, around 60 per cent of recruits inmilitary units were reportedly under 18. In 2005three young indigenous recruits were foundat the Engineering Command in Asunción, andfour others at Cavalry Regiment No. 4, in Saltodel Guiará, even though by law members ofindigenous communities were exempt fromconscription. 20 The Inter-institutional Commissionfor Visiting Military Quarters (ComisiónInterinstitucional de Visita a Cuarteles),established in 2001, 21 visited 40 military units inMarch 2005 and found 168 under-18 conscripts,most of whom had been forcibly recruited. Someconscripts were used as forced labour in unpaidjobs for the benefit of their superior officers. 22Regulations were modified in 2005 to allowonly those who were 18 or older to join activeservice, but for a year or more military authoritiescontinued to recruit children as Cimeforistas,using a Supreme Court decree that allowed suchrecruitment with parental consent. 23In April 2006 the UN Human RightsCommittee expressed concern about thepersistence of recruitment of children, especiallyin rural areas, and called for it to be abolishedand for all complaints of ill-treatment anddeaths of conscripts to be investigated andcompensation awarded to the victims. 24In March 2006 Paraguay replaced its originaldeclaration on ratifying the Optional Protocol,which had stated that 16 was the minimum agefor voluntary recruitment, 25 with a declarationstating that the minimum age for recruitmentinto the armed forces was 18. 26 Legislation togive effect to this change was pending beforeCongress in mid-2007. 27In June 2006 government authorities publiclyrecognized their responsibility in, and apologizedfor, the deaths of Gerardo Vargas Areco and VíctorHugo Maciel Alcaráz, two recruits under 18, whodied during military service in 1989 and 1995respectively. The apology followed complaintspresented by NGOs before the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights. 28In January 2007 the commander of the armedforces dismissed from the armed forces all cadetsunder 18 following an outcry by NGOs when16-year-old Víctor José Coronel, a Cimeforistaat the Luque Air Force unit, was hospitalizedfollowing severe physical and psychologicalabuse, reportedly at the hands of his superiors. 29Also in January 2007 the appeals court issued aruling that under-18s could not be recruited toCIMEFOR. 30In October 2007 a case of human rightsviolations against two conscripts who were 14at the time of their recruitment in 1997 was stillpending before the Inter-American Commissionon Human Rights. 31DevelopmentsNeighbourhood security commissionsNeighbourhood security commissions(comisiones vecinales de seguridad ciudadana)were set up in some of the poorest parts of thecountry, with the support of the Ministry of theInterior and in direct communication with thepolice, as part of the 2005 government-initiatedSafe Paraguay Plan. The commissions had over13,000 members, equipped with mobile phonesand weapons, in three departments – Caaguazú,Canindeyú and San Pedro. 32 According to reports,these commissions were increasingly involvedin illegal detentions, death threats, house raids,killings and attempted killings, and torture andill-treatment. 33 They also offered protectionto drugs traffickers and cigarette smugglers.In July 2006 peasant leader Luis Martínez,from the Kamba community in Rembé, SanPedro Department, and a member of a peasantassociation critical of the commissions, died afterbeing shot over 40 times, reportedly by membersof a neighbourhood security commission. 34Several families from Rembé left their homesafter receiving death threats. Investigations intothe killing were stalled and by December 2006 analleged perpetrator had not been arrested. 351 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Paraguay, August2006, www.flacso.cl.2 Orlando Castillo, “Las Fuerzas Armadas”,Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2005, Codehupy,December 2005, http://www.codehupy.org.3 CODEHUPY, Informe alternativo de CODEHUPYal Segundo Informe Periódico del Estado deParaguay (ICCPR), 2005, at www.omct.org.4 Ley Nº 216, de Organización General de la FuerzasArmadas de la Nación, 9 July 1993, www.senado.gov.py.5 CODEHUPY, above note 3.6 Ibid.7 Vidal Acevedo, Orlando Castillo and RicardoYamil Derene, “Una de cal y otra de arena: unreconocimiento importante a los derechoshumanos, pero también significativo aumentopresupuestario a militares”, Derechos Humanosen Paraguay 2006, CODEHUPY, December 2006.8 UN Press Release, “Special Rapporteur on Tortureends mission to Paraguay”, 29 November 2006,www.ohchr.org.9 Information from confidential source, November2007.10 FLACSO, above note 1.11 Castillo, above note 2.12 Ejército Paraguayo, ORBAT, www.saorbats.com.ar.2 7 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

13 Plan Nacional de Seguridad Pública “ParaguaySeguro”, www.stp.gov.py.14 Cimefor Ejército, www.defensanacional.cc/images/Cimefor01.doc.15 Maria Noguera and Andrés Vázquez, “Continúanprácticas de malos tratos, tortura y reclutamientoforzado”, Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2005,CODEHUPY, December 2005.16 CODEHUPY, above note 3.17 Asociación de Familiares de Víctimas delServicio Militar Obligatorio (AFAVISEM), “Niñosy Adolescentes en Cuarteles: Una realidad enParaguay”, 10 January 2006, www.vivaparaguay.com.18 CODEHUPY, above note 3.19 UNICEF Paraguay, Situación de la infancia enParaguay, undated, www.unicef.org/paraguay/spanish/children_2699.htm.20 Noguera and Vázquez, above note 15.21 See Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004.22 CODEHUPY, above note 3.23 Information from Amnesty International (AI)Paraguay, June 2007.24 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration ofsecond periodic report submitted by Paraguay,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2, 24 April 2006.25 See Child Soldiers, above note 21.26 Amended declaration, www2.ohchr.org.See also Centro por la Justicia y el DerechoInternacional (CEJIL), “Paraguay pide perdónpúblico por el reclutamiento ilegal y muerte dedos niños mientras realizaban el servicio militarobligatorio”, 20 June 2006, www.cejil.org.27 Government communication to Coalition, July2007.28 Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,Acuerdo de Solucion Amistosa, Caso Nº 11607,Victor Hugo Maciel v. Paraguay, in Gaceta Oficialde la Republica del Paraguay, 19 May 2006, www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/vargas/Escrito2.pdf;Caso Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, Sentencia, 26September 2006, www.corteidh.or.cr. See alsoAcevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.29 “Juez rechazó reincorporación de los menoresal Cimefor”, La Nación, 19 January 2007, www.lanacion.com.py; “Otra víctima más del serviciomilitar”, Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia,Paraguay, 9 January 2007, http://mocpy.cabichui.org.30 Corte Suprema de Justicia, “Cámara rechazóapelación promovida por padres de menores”, 30January 2007, www.pj.gov.py.31 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,Informe Nº 82/03, Petición 12.330, Admisibilidad– Marcelino Gómes Paredes y Cristián ArielNúñez, 22 October 2003, www.cidh.oas.org.32 Acevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.33 Juan Martens and Roque Orrego, “De laconstancia de las violaciones a la legalidadpenal, a la ilegalidad paraestatal de la mano decomisiones vecinales de ‘seguridad ciudadana’”,Derechos Humanos en Paraguay 2006,CODEHUPY, December 2006.34 Acevedo, Castillo and Yamil Derene, above note 7.35 Martens and Orrego, above note 33.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7 3

PERURepublic of PeruPopulation: 28.0 million (10.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 80,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18 (16 as cadets)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 8 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Although there was no evidence of childrenserving in the armed forces, in someindigenous areas children from the age of12 served in self-defence committees.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Congressional National Defence Commissionwas considering a new military service law in late2006. 1 In September 2006 it was proposed in theCongress that compulsory military service, whichhad been dropped in 1999, 2 be reinstated, sincethe number of voluntary recruits was falling. 3It was also proposed to reinstate compulsorypre-military education in all secondary-schoolsto “promote in students their love and respectfor national values [and] the protection of [Peru’s]interests in order to raise better citizens”. 4 Theproposals were still before the Congress inOctober 2007.According to the Law on Voluntary MilitaryService, men and women aged 17–45 had aduty to do military service and had to registerwith military authorities the year they turned 17.Forcible recruitment was prohibited.After registering, those volunteering to domilitary service joined active service units at18, while all the others went into the reserves,although certain groups were exempted. Ifquotas were not filled with volunteers, theexecutive could order the conscription of otherindividuals from the military register. Service wasfor a maximum of 24 months. Those choosingto stay on longer signed a renewable two-yearcontract and could join the non-commissionedofficer hierarchy after four years. Students inmilitary and police schools who had spent atleast one year at school were considered to havefulfilled their military duty. 5Military training and military schoolsIn April 2004 the Ministry of Defence introducededucation in international humanitarian law forall military personnel. 6 Each branch of the armedforces was responsible for its own schools andentry was by selection. Officer and NCO cadetswere on average between 16 and 21. 7The selection procedure for entry into thearmy’s Military School at Chorrillos includedextensive tests as well as a home visit and aninterview. Candidates had to pay around US$130to register. 8 On graduating, officers receivedthe rank of second lieutenant. 9 Candidates forthe Army Technical School (Escuela Técnica delEjército) had to have completed the fifth yearof secondary education and be at least 16 yearsold. 10Navy School graduates were given the rankof naval second lieutenant (alférez de fragatade comando) and a degree in naval-maritimesciences. The Navy Recruits School (Escuela deReclutas) trained recruits in military, technicaland general subjects and offered them avocational diploma. 11The air force had five training centres andschools, including the Officers’ School (Escuelade Oficiales de la Fuerza Aerea del Perú), wherecadets could choose to specialize in one of 11areas, such as flying, special operations andaerial defence. 12Military secondary-schools accepted childrenfrom the age of 13. Candidates and parents hadto sign an honour pledge (compromiso de honor)on application. 13 The Army Intelligence School(Escuela de Inteligencia del Ejercito) offered shortcourses on self-defence to children betweenseven and 15 and prepared candidates for entryinto military schools. 14Armed groupsComités de autodefensaSelf-defence committees, which had emergedduring the 1980s as a response by smallcommunities to the internal armed conflict,continued to operate. In 1991 Legislative Decree740 allowed peasant rondas (self-defencegroups) to carry weapons, while LegislativeDecree 741 standardized their name as comitésde autodefensa (CADs). 15Article 88 of the decree regulating the Lawon Military Service (Supreme Decree 004-DE-SG)established that CADs were recognized rural orurban organizations freely and spontaneouslyconstituted, authorized to carry out self-defenceactivities to counter crime, to stop terroristand drug trafficking activities and to defendthemselves against irregular groups. They alsosupported the armed forces and the police in thedevelopment and “pacification” of their regions.Those wishing to do active military service in aself-defence committee had to be aged 18–30and serve in their own community for a period oftwo years. Volunteers received a stipend, land,priority to receive agricultural or other credits and2 74 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

preferential conditions for entry into military orpolice schools. 16In November 2005 members of aninternational non-governmental organizationvisited several indigenous communities near theEne River in Ayacucho, where they found childrenas young as 15 taking part in CADs. Communityleaders interviewed stated that everyoneaged 12–60 was expected to defend theirvillage in case of attack by armed groups, drugtraffickers or illegal woodcutters. 17 The Truth andReconciliation Commission reported that thesegroups remained in existence for fear of a returnof armed opposition groups such as SenderoLuminoso, but that such fears were in most casesunjustifiable. 18DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Peru and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.7 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Perú, August 2006,www.flacso.cl.8 Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, Admisión, www.ejercito.mil.pe.9 FLACSO, above note 7.10 Escuela Técnica del Ejército, Requisitos, www.ejercito.mil.pe.11 FLACSO, above note 7.12 Ibid.13 Colegio Militar Francisco Bolognesi (Arequipa),Condiciones de admisión, www.cmfb.edu.pe.14 Escuela de Inteligencia, www.ejercito.mil.pe.15 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “Loscomités de autodefensa”, Informe Final, Tomo II,Capítulo 1.5, www.cverdad.org.pe.16 Reglamento de la Ley No. 27178, “Ley del ServicioMilitar”, Decreto Supremo Nº 004-DE-SG, 17March 2000, at www.defensaidl.org.pe.17 Save the Children, “Child Soldiers in Local Self-Defence Patrols in Peru”, 6 November 2005,http://video.google.es/videoplay?docid=1174230518302730264&q=ni%C3%B1os+soldado.18 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, abovenote 15.1 Instituto de Defensa Legal, “Editorial”, En laMira: Boletín de Seguridad y Defensa, No. 37,Jan–March 2007, www.defensaidl.org.pe.2 See Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004.3 Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley275/2006-CR, Que modifica los artículos 31,34,45 y 49 e incorpora el artículo 49a de la Ley No27178, Ley del Servicio Militar, 18 September2006.4 Congreso de la República, Proyecto de Ley223/2006-CR, Que propone restituir en lacurricula educativa la instrucción premilitar enlos centros de educación de nivel primaria ysecundaria de todo el país, 15 September 2006,www.defensaidl.org.pe.5 Dirección de Movilización, Ley del Servicio MilitarVoluntario del Perú, 29 February 2000, www.serviciomilitar.mil.pe.6 Resolución Ministerial Nº 536-2004-DE-SG,Aprueban la Directiva Nº 001 MINDEF/CEA-DIH, con la finalidad de integrar el DerechoInternacional Humanitario en la doctrina einstrucción de los institutos armados, 4 May2004, www.mindef.gob.pe. See also InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Regionaldelegation in Lima, Annual Report 2006, 24 May2007, www.icrc.org.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7 5

PHILIPPINE SRepublic of the PhilippinesPopulation: 83.1 million (34.6 under 18)Government armed forces: 106,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 17 (training only)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 26 August 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s ingovernment armed forces; legislation wasin force to protect children from militaryrecruitment. There continued to be reportsof children being used by governmentlinkedparamilitaries and armed oppositiongroups.ContextA one-week state of emergency was declared inFebruary 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after claims that members of the military,leftist politicians and communist armed groupswere plotting a coup. In June the same year thepresident declared an “all-out war” to eliminatethe New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing ofthe Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). 1Thousands more troops were committed tothe anti-insurgency campaigns in central andsouthern Luzon and the Bicol regions. 2Formal peace talks between the governmentand the National Democratic Front, representingthe CPP and the NPA, collapsed in 2004. Informaltalks continued for another year, following thegovernment’s refusal to seek the removal of theCCP/NPA from the terrorist watch-lists of theEuropean Union and the USA. 3Armed clashes between the RevolutionaryProletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) and the NPA were reported in 2005 and2006. 4 The RPA-ABB had concluded a peaceagreement with the government in December2000.Following the signing of a ceasefireagreement in 2003, peace negotiations betweenthe government and the armed separatist MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued tomake slow progress. Negotiations reached animpasse in May 2006 because of disagreementsover ancestral-domain land claims and theamount of territory to be included in an expandedMuslim autonomous region as part of the peacesettlement. 5 Tensions were increased by theabduction of an Italian priest in June 2007 andthe MILF’s admission of involvement in thekilling and beheading of government troops inBasilan in July 2007 by the radical armed IslamistAbu Sayyaf group. 6 There were indications inSeptember 2007 that the peace talks would beresumed. 7The 1996 peace agreement with the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF) continuedto hold, although clashes between MNLF andthe armed forces were reported in April 2007. 8US Special Forces were based in Jolo island toprovide non-combat support to the Philippinesarmed forces in their operations against AbuSayyaf. These operations were renewed in Julyand August 2006 following reports that senioroperatives from the Indonesian radical Islamistarmed group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had takenrefuge with Abu Sayyaf. 9The UN Secretary-General’s 2003, 2005 and2006 reports on children and armed conflictreferred to the situation in the Philippines.The Abu Sayyaf Group, the MILF and the NPAwere included in the Annex II list of parties thatrecruited and used children in situations ofarmed conflict. 10GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1987 constitution stated that “the primeduty of the Government is to serve and protectthe people. The Government may call upon thepeople to defend the State and, in the fulfilmentthereof, all citizens may be required, underconditions provided by law, to render personalmilitary or civil service” (Article 2(4)).In its 2003 declaration on ratifying theOptional Protocol, the government stated thatthe minimum age for voluntary recruitment to theArmed Forces of the Philippines was 18, “exceptfor training purposes whose duration shall havethe students/cadets/trainees attain the majorityage at the completion date”. 11 The prohibitionon recruitment of under-18s was provided forin various acts and regulations. Under the1991 Memorandum Circular No. 13 on SelectiveEnlistment/Reenlistment of the Department ofNational Defense and the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, only those aged 18 and above couldenlist with the armed forces. The 1991 RepublicAct 7077, also known as the “Citizen ArmedForces of the Philippines Reservist Act”, providedfor the expansion of the armed forces “by thewell-disciplined Citizen Armed Force in the eventof war, invasion of rebellion”. 12 The minimum agefor reservists in the Citizen Armed Force was 18.The recruitment and use of under-18s wasalso prohibited under the Special Protectionof Children against Abuse, Exploitation andDiscrimination Act (Republic Act 7610), whichdeclared children to be “Zones of Peace”. Itrequired that “Children shall not be recruitedto become members of the Armed Forces of the2 7 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Philippines or its civilian units or other armedgroups, nor be allowed to take part in thefighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies”. 13Specific legislation also existed to prohibit therecruitment of “children of indigenous culturalcommunities or indigenous peoples into thearmed forces under any circumstances”. 14Penalties of 20 years’ imprisonment anda fine of up to 2 million pesos (approximatelyUS$49,000) were provided for under the Actto Institute Policies to Eliminate Trafficking inChildren (Republic Act 9208, 2003) for anyonefound guilty of recruiting, transporting oradopting a child “to engage in armed activitiesin the Philippines or abroad”. 15 The Act Providingfor the Elimination of the Worst Forms of ChildLabour and Affording Stronger Protection for theWorking Child (Republic Act 9231, 2003) alsoprohibited the recruitment of children under theage of 18 for use in armed conflict, and providedfor perpetrators to be punished by up to 20 years’imprisonment or a fine. 16Military training and military schoolsThe minimum age for entry into the PhilippineMilitary Academy was 17 and for the PhilippinesAir Force Flying School 18. Once enrolled, a cadetbecame a member of the armed forces, although“in practice does not participate in armedconflict”. 17Armed groupsParamilitariesThe government paramilitary Citizen’s ArmedForce Geographical Units (CAFGU) and theCivilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs)assisted the military and police officials inthe government’s anti-insurgency campaigns,operating under guidelines issued in 1987 bythe Department of National Defence, whichrequired that their membership was voluntary.Both the CAFGU and CVOs were reported tohave recruited under-18s. The government’sinitial report to the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child on the Optional Protocol statedthat, especially in remote areas, “children arereportedly being recruited into paramilitarystructures to provide security and protectionagainst ordinary criminal elements such as cattlerustlers, thieves and other armed bandits”, andthat these organizations, notable among whichwere the CVOs and CAFGU, “are also fielded tofight guerrilla insurgents”. 18In 2005 recruitment of two children by theCAFGU was reported in Negros Occidental bythe Region VI (Western Visayas) Office of theCommission on Human Rights (CHR). The CHRinformed the local military commander, whothen sent the recruits home. However, no actionappeared to have been taken against the militarycommander for having recruited the children.There were also reports that children whowere captured or rescued from armed groupswere subsequently used in CAFGU operations.Vigilante groups in Mindanao, set up by themilitary as village defence groups, recruitedchildren from indigenous communities. 19In 2004 children were also reported to havebeen recruited from ethno-linguistic sub-groupsin Davao City, Mindanao, by vigilante groupsset up by the military as part of its counterinsurgencyefforts against the CPP-NPA insouthern Mindanao. 20Armed political groupsThere were continued reports of the involvementof children in armed groups including the CPP-NPA, the MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group, the MNLFand the RPA-ABB. Research carried out by anational human rights organization found thatthe children who joined were predominantlyfrom large, impoverished, rural families in areaswhere economic opportunities were limitedand government delivery of social services wasweak. 21New People’s ArmyEstimates of the numbers of children, bothboys and girls, in the NPA varied significantly.According to one estimate, around one-fifth ofthe NPA’s 7,500-strong force were under 18. 22Another estimate put the figure at 3 per cent ofthe NPA’s 9,500-strong force. 23The CPP publicly declared that it prohibitedthe recruitment of under-18s into the NPA. InApril 2006 the executive committee of the CPPcentral committee reiterated that “the minimumage requirement initially spelled out in 1999has since become a basic policy of the NPA andcovers the entire organization”. 24 However, theCPP had also noted in a public statement inNovember 2005 that “units are confronted ona daily basis by youthful volunteers who wishto join the people’s army but fail to meet theminimum age requirements”. The statementspoke of sanctions imposed on “Red fightersdiscovered to have failed to meet the new agerequirement … [who] are discharged from theNPA and reassigned to various other non-combatand non-hazardous tasks as civilian activists orelse sent home to support family production orcontinue their schooling”. 25 It also said that whilechildren over the age of 15 had been accepted,they did not participate in direct hostilities butin activities “that prepare them for self-defence,for defending their communities and contributingto the over-all revolutionary effort”, which, itargued, “are often maliciously misinterpretedby the armed forces as actual participation incombat.” 26Government forces and the media continuedto report NPA recruitment and use of children inhostilities. The 33 cases of rescued, captured orP — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7 7

surrendered children involved in armed conflictthat were handled by the Department of SocialWelfare and Development from January 2005 toMarch 2007 were all reported to be members ofthe NPA. In 2004 and 2005, in the context of anintensification of counter-insurgency operationsby government forces on the islands of Leyteand Samar, Eastern Visayas region, recruitmentof under-18s was reported to have continued.During the period 2005 to 2007, the Departmentof Social Welfare and Development handled 12cases from the islands of Samar and Leyte; fourof these were girls and the youngest was 11. 27In Negros Occidental the NPA was reported tohave increased recruitment in the last quarter of2005 in the northern area of the province. A raidin November 2005 conducted by the CPP-NPAagainst one of its splinter groups reportedlyinvolved children who acted as lookouts. 28 FromJuly to October 2006 ten children were capturedby government forces in Negros Occidental. 29In April 2007 the media reported that a younggirl had been killed in an encounter betweenthe armed forces and NPA units in a villagein southern Mindanao. The military initiallyclaimed that the girl was a “child warrior”. Aninvestigation by the Commission on HumanRights (CHR) revealed that the 11-year-old hadbeen killed in crossfire. 30Moro Islamic Liberation FrontThere were continuing reports that childrenhad joined the MILF in Maguindanao, ShariffKabunsuwan and Lanao del Sur. 31 According toone estimate, in 2005 up to 13 per cent of MILF’s10,000 members were children. 32In May 2006 the MILF stated that “Thegeneral policy of the MILF is not to recruitchildren for combat; if they are with the MILF,their roles are purely auxiliary in character.”It was noted that the MILF is “fully cognizantthat the rightful place of children is in schools”,although it “is preferable that children, who areforsaken or have no reliable guardians, are takencared of by the MILF rather than allow them tobecome misfits in society”, and that it was “theright of everybody including children to selfdefenceespecially when communities or villagesare under indiscriminate military actions by theenemy”. 33Abu Sayyaf GroupThe Abu Sayyaf Group, together with the RajahSolaiman Movement, whose membershipconsisted primarily of militant converts to Islam,was reported to have been responsible for bombattacks which from January 2000 had causedover 1,700 casualties, including the deaths ofyoung children and teenagers. Both groups werereported to be linked to the JI. 34 US Marinesinvolved in clashes with Abu Sayyaf in August2007 were quoted by the media as saying thatAbu Sayyaf “was fully armed with heavy type[s]of weapons and they were all young, as young as15 years old”. 35 The Abu Sayyaf group made nopublic statements on the age of recruitment.Demobilization, rehabilitationand reintegration (DRR)The Republic Act 7610 outlined standardoperating procedures for the treatment bygovernment forces of under-age membersof armed groups. It required that individualsunder 18 “arrested for reasons related toarmed conflict” by the military or the policebe separated from adults in detention, beprovided with immediate free legal assistance,have their parents or guardians immediatelyinformed of their arrest, and be transferred tothe custody of the Department of Social Welfareand Development within 24 hours from thetime of rescue. 36 The March 2000 Inter-agencyMemorandum of Agreement, on the handling andtreatment of children involved in armed conflict,revised in June 2006, set out the responsibilitiesof various government agencies and standardprocedures to be observed in handling childsoldiers. The memorandum required police andmilitary authorities “to protect the child fromfurther exploitation or trauma”. It also requiredthat under-18s be transferred to the Departmentof Social Welfare or local authority within 24hours “under normal conditions” and within72 hours “when the situation does not warrantthe turnover of the child within the prescribedperiod”. Parties to the memorandum includethe departments of Defence, Interior, LocalGovernment and Health, as well as the militaryand the police. 37In some cases the guidelines relating torescued, captured or surrendered child soldierswere not implemented. In one reported case,a 13- or 15-year-old boy, suspected of being amember of the NPA, was forced to lie on the roadfor several hours in the heat of the day. 38Other children who surrendered orwere captured were charged with rebellion,possession of firearms and other similar securityrelatedcharges. In March 2007 the ProgramManagement Bureau of the Department ofSocial Welfare and Development reported thatthree children from a province in the southernLuzon region were in military custody and thatcharges had been filed against them. Another twochildren from southern Luzon were also reportedto have been charged and were awaiting trial.Provisions in the Memorandum of Agreementwhich required that former child soldiers beprotected from exposure to the media, exceptwhere justified “by compelling national securityinterest” and in consultation with the Departmentof Social Welfare and Development, were alsoignored in some cases. In March 2007 the2 7 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

armed forces issued a media release displayingpictures of children and young people captured inMindanao. 39In cases where guidelines were adhered toand children were returned to their families, awide range of services was provided by the socialwelfare and development offices, including legalassistance. Counselling and protective custodywere provided to children who were unableto return to their families. Other cases weredocumented of children associated with armedgroups being returned directly to their families bythe military or the police without the support oflocal social services. 401 “Crush-NPA war has 3 deadlines”, Manila Times,20 June 2006, www.manilatimes.net.2 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Scared silent:impunity for extrajudicial killings in thePhilippines”, June 2007.3 Ibid.4 “NPA, RPA fight anew in Victorias City”, SunStar,29 November 2005, www.sunstar.com.ph/;“Scores killed as rival rebel groups clash”, ManilaTimes, above note 1, 9 August 2006.5 Amnesty International Report 2007.6 “MILF admits attack against marines, says23 troops dead”, GMA.TV, 11 July 2007, www.gmanews.tv.7 “Government–MILF peace talks to continue”,SunStar, above note 4, 10 September 2007.8 “AFP overruns 2 MNLF Sulu camps”, GMA.TV,above note 6, 15 April 2007.9 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007;International Crisis Group (ICG), “Indonesia:Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status”, Crisis GroupAsia Briefing No. 63, 3 May 2007.10 Reports of the Secretary-General on Childrenand Armed Conflict, 26 October 2006, UN Doc.A/61/529-S/2006/826, and 9 February 2005, UNDoc. A/59/695-S/2005/72.11 Declarations and Reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.12 Republic Act No. 7077, 27 June 1991.13 Republic Act No. 7610, 17 June 1992.14 Republic Act No. 8371, Indigenous People’s RightsAct, 29 October 1997.15 Republic Act 9208, 26 May 2003.16 Republic Act 9231, 19 December 2003.17 Second periodic report of the Philippines on theConvention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/65. Add.31, 5 November 2004, para. 248.18 First periodic report of the Philippines on theOptional Protocol on the Involvement of Childrenin Armed Conflict, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/PHL/1, 7November 2007, para. 9.2.6.19 Philippine Coalition to Protect Children Involvedin Armed Conflict (Protect CIAC) & SoutheastAsia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers(SEASUCS), Preventing Children’s Involvementin Armed Conflicts in the Philippines: A Mappingof Programs and Organizations, November 2007,draft version.20 Protect CIAC & SEASUCS, Alternative report onthe implementation of the Optional Protocolto the Convention on the Rights of the Child onthe Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,November 2007, draft version.21 Philippine Human Rights Information Center(PhilRights), Deadly Play Grounds: ThePhenomena of Child Soldiers in the Philippines,2005.22 Andrew Marshall, “The Philippines unendingguerrilla war”, Time Magazine, 25 January 2007,www.time.com/time/magazine.23 PhilRights, above note 21.24 Researcher’s translation of “Panayam ng UnicefResearch Team hinggil sa usapin ng mga batangsundalo Abril 2006” (Interview by the UnicefResearch team with the CPP EC-CC on thequestion of child soldiers), Ang Bayan, specialissue, 25 August 2006, www.philippinerevolution.net. See also Protect CIAC & SEASUCS, abovenote 19.25 Information Bureau, Communist Party of thePhilippines, “The NPA does not allow below-18recruits”, press release, 19 November 2005, www.philippinerevolution.net.26 Researcher’s translation, above note 24.27 Summary of children involved in armed conflictJanuary 2005–March 2007 by the ProgamManagement Bureau of the Department ofSocial Welfare and Development, provided to theresearcher.28 Confidential sources, September 2007.29 From the draft report “The situation of childreninvolved in armed conflict in Negros Occidental”,a draft submitted on 22 January 2007 by theNegros Alliance of Human Rights Advocates(NAHRA) to the Philippine Coalition to Stopthe Use of Children as Soldiers (PCSUCS) aspart of the research component of the project“Strengthening protection of children involvedin armed conflict: implementation of the 11-pointProgram of the Philippine Coalition to Stop theUse of Children as Soldiers”.30 Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Case ofGalacio, Grecil Buya versus Elements of the 67thIB, PA, Case No. XI-07-2984 CV RE, copy of thedocuments provided to the researcher by theChild Rights Center of the CHR – National Officeon 22 June 2007.31 SEASUCS, above note 19.32 PhilRights, above note 21.33 Moroland, “MILF reiterates policy on ‘childsoldiers’”, 2 May 2006, http://moroland.net.34 HRW, Lives Destroyed: Attacks against civilians inthe Philippines, July 2007.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 7 9

35 “Military: No letup in war vs terror”, Inquirer,Mindanao Bureau, 21 August 2007, http://archive.inquirer.net.36 Republic Act No. 7610, 17 June 1992.37 Copy provided to the Philippine Coalition toProtect Children Involved in Armed Conflict.38 Confidential sources, June 2006.39 (Diamond) Division, Philippine Army, “Armyin Agusan Del Sur Captured Minor NPACombatants”, 26 March 2007. Copy ofphotograph held by the Philippine Coalition toProtect Children Involved in Armed Conflict.40 Confidential sources.POL ANDRepublic of PolandPopulation: 38.5 million (8.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 141,500Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 7 April 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The minimum age for voluntary recruitmentappeared to be 17.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution stated that “It shall be the dutyof every Polish citizen to defend the Homeland”and that “Any citizen whose religious convictionsor moral principles do not allow him to performmilitary service may be obliged to performsubstitute service” (Article 85). Under the Law onthe Universal Obligation to Defend the Republicof Poland of 21 November 1967, “A person whohas attained 18 years of age may be called up formilitary service.” 1All men between the ages of 18 and 28 wereliable for military service. Students were allowedto replace military service with participation inmilitary training during their studies. Reservistscould be required to do service up to the ageof 50, but in practice most conscripts were notcalled up for reservist training in peacetime.To comply with NATO standards, over the lastdecade the government had reduced the size ofthe armed forces and increased the number ofnon-conscript soldiers. 2 The length of regularmilitary service was reduced from 18 months to12 months on 1 January 2004 and again, to tenmonths, on 1 January 2005. From 1 July 2005regular military service was nine months, threemonths for university graduates. 3 In January2006 the Defence Minister said that compulsoryconscription would end in six years, and thatsince 1990 the number of troops had beenreduced from 450,000 to 150,000. 4Voluntary recruitment could begin from theage of 17 under the 1970 Law on Regular MilitaryService. 5 Poland’s declaration to the OptionalProtocol stated that the minimum age forconscription was 18, and 17 for voluntary servicein the armed forces, with applicants obliged toprovide a birth certificate and obtain parentalconsent. However, Poland’s Initial Report tothe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child onthe Optional Protocol stated that the voluntary2 8 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

ecruitment age was 18, even in the case of“mobilization and war”. 6Military training and military schoolsThe military education system comprised onemilitary academy, two civil–military academies,two officer high schools and eight schools fornon-commissioned officers (NCOs) followingreorganization in 2001 and 2002. There were alsosix technical training centres for NCOs and juniormilitary specialists. 7DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Poland and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.International standardsPoland ratified the Optional Protocol in April2005. In its Initial Report to the Committeeon the Rights of the Child on the OptionalProtocol, the government stated that althoughthe current Penal Code did not explicitly punishthe recruitment of children, the Ministry ofJustice was drafting an amendment to ban theconscription or recruitment of under-18s intomilitary service. 81 Second periodic report of Poland to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.12, 6 February 2002.2 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Reviewof the Current Situation, April 2005, www.quaker.org.3 Communication from Polish embassy, 19 April2007.4 Judy Dempsey, “Poland will set own course,defense chief vows”, International HeraldTribune, 24 January 2006, www.iht.com.5 Initial report of Poland to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.11, 31January 1994.6 Report by Poland on the realization of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/POL/1,2007.7 Polish Army, Military Education, http://wojskopolskie.pl.8 Report on the realization of the Optional Protocol,above note 6.PORTUGALPortuguese RepublicPopulation: 10.5 million (2.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 44,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionsuspended)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 19 August 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1976 constitution (2005 revision) statedthat “every Portuguese person shall possessthe fundamental right and duty to defend thenation”, and that “the law shall regulate militaryservice and shall lay down the forms, voluntary orcompulsory nature, duration and content of theperformance thereof”.With the suspension of conscription in2004, service in the Portuguese armed forcesbecame entirely voluntary, in keeping with theprovisions of the 1999 Military Service Law. 1 Thecommitment to voluntary recruitment, with aminimum age of 18, was included in Portugal’sdeclaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol in August 2003. 2 However, all 18-yearoldswere still obliged formally to register theirnames with their local authority. On an annualNational Defence Day, a randomly selected groupof approximately one hundred 18-year-olds wereinvited to attend a promotional event outliningthe various options available to those who choseto perform voluntary military service or embarkon a military career. Voluntary military servicewas open to all those between the ages of 18and 24, extending to the age of 27 for universitygraduates and 30 for those with a medicaldegree. The length of voluntary military servicevaried from an initial period of 12 months (afterwhich a volunteer could leave the armed forces,or return for a second year of service) to anannually renewable contract for a maximum ofeight years. 3Military training and military schoolsIndividuals seeking to become career officersin the Portuguese armed forces could attendone of three military academies (for the army,navy and air force) that granted universityP — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 8 1

degrees. Applicants had to have completedtheir secondary education, and those under18 required parental consent. Postgraduateeducation was offered by the Instituto de EstudosSuperiores Militares, which took students fromall three armed forces. 4DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Portugal and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 Information from defence attaché, Embassy ofPortugal, London, October 2007.2 Declaration of Portugal on ratification of theOptional Protocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 Information from Defence attaché, above note 1.4 Ibid.QatarState of QatarPopulation: 813,000 (204,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 12,400Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: acceded 25 July 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution, approved in a publicreferendum in April 2003, stated that “Defendingthe country is the duty of all citizens” (Article53); however, military service is not compulsory.The minimum age for voluntary recruitment was18, and there were no indications that under-18sserved in the armed forces. Qatar’s declarationon acceding to the Optional Protocol stated that“The State of Qatar declares that recruitmentto its armed forces and other regular forces isvoluntary and is for those who have attainedthe age of 18 years and that it takes account ofthe safeguards set forth in paragraph 3 of thesame article [Article 3, Optional Protocol] … theState of Qatar affirms that its national legislationmakes no provision for any form of compulsory orcoercive recruitment.” 2DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Qatar and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Qatar, 22January 2008, www.fco.gov.uk.2 Declaration on accession to Optional Protocol:www2.ohchr.org.2 8 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

ROMANIARomaniaPopulation: 21.7 million (4.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 69,600Compulsory recruitment age: 20 (conscriptionsuspended)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 10 November 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1991 constitution, as amended, stated that“Citizens may be conscripted from the age of 20and up to the age of 35, except for volunteers”(Article 55).Under a new law of December 2005, the lastconscription was to take place in October 2006and compulsory military service was suspendedfrom 1 January 2007 (Article 2). Militaryservice remained compulsory in times of war,mobilization or siege (Article 3). 1 Law 446/2006stated that in the case of war, mobilization orsiege, military service became mandatory formen aged 20 to 25. 2 Men aged between 20 and35 had previously been liable for military serviceof 12 months and higher education graduates forsix months, and during times of war the minimumage of conscription was 18. 3Male and female citizens could performmilitary service on a voluntary basis. 4 Theminimum age for voluntary military serviceremained 18. From October 2006 all volunteerswere contracted for an initial five-year term ofservice. Subsequent voluntary service contractswere for successive three-year terms up to theage of 36. 5The 2004 Law on the Protection andPromotion of the Rights of the Child stated thatin armed conflicts the authorities were requiredto ensure the demobilization of child soldiers, toremedy the physical and psychological effects ofconflict on children and to promote their socialreintegration. 6Military training and military schoolsYoung people between the ages of 15 and 20could volunteer for pre-military training, whichaimed to provide “knowledge and orientation inthe military and technical field” and to cultivate“ethical and civic values”. 7Military high schools were open to both maleand female students. Postgraduate education forall military personnel, male or female, could beundertaken at the National Defence University aswell as at various civilian universities. 8DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Romania and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 Parliament of Romania, Law on Delay ofCompulsory Military Service and Passing toVoluntary Based Military Service, No. 395 of 16December 2005.2 Information from the Romanian embassy, London,12 June 2007.3 Law on the Preparation of the Population forDefence, No. 46 of 1996, Article 11; Bart Horemanand Marc Stolwijk, Refusing to Bear Arms: Aworld survey of conscription and conscientiousobjection to military service, War ResistersInternational, 1998, www.wri-irg.org.4 Law on Delay of Compulsory Military Service,above note 1, Article 1.5 CIA, The World Factbook 2007.6 Law No. 272 of 2004, Article 78(1); Informationfrom the Romanian embassy, above note 2.7 Law on the Preparation of the Population forDefence, above note 3, Article 45.8 NATO, Romania – National Report, www.nato.int.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 8 3

RUSSIANFEDER ATIONRussian FederationPopulation: 143.2 million (28.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 1,027,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (16 at militaryeducation institutes)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 15 February 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Boys aged 15 or 16 had to undergo basicmilitary training in their final year atschool. Some orphans and other childrendeprived of parental care were “adopted”by military units, lived in military barracksand received military training in school.Boys and girls studying at MilitaryEducational Institutes from the age of 16were regarded as being on military service.Under-18s were reportedly recruited intoopposition separatist forces in the ChechenRepublic and other parts of the northCaucasus.ContextThe Russian Federation remained committedto the introduction of a non-conscript armyin a revised Military Doctrine published bythe Ministry of Defence in March 2007. 1However, only a fraction of recruits met medicalrequirements in 2006, and increasing instabilityin the north Caucasus led many non-conscriptsoldiers to cancel their contracts. 2 One of theaims of a five-year Military–Patriotic EducationProgram announced in 2005 was to increase“patriotic awareness” and improve defencecapability. 3Armed men thought to be Chechenseparatists seized a school in Beslan, northOssetia, in 2004 and scores of children died inthe ensuing violence. By the end of 2006 thenumber of federal troops in Chechnya was cutfrom 80,000 to around 35,000. 4 Some repairsto social infrastructure took place, but violenceremained an everyday occurrence in Chechnyaand elsewhere in the north Caucasus. Hostagetaking,enforced disappearances and torturecontinued – sometimes involving children. 5 Somejournalists and activists monitoring the situationwere killed or suffered reprisals. 6 In 2007 thenumber of federal troops deployed in Chechnyawas said to have risen again. 7The Russian Federation was a member ofthe Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),established in June 2001, comprising alsoChina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistan, whose goals included mutual cooperationin security matters. 8GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeConscription remained a universal obligation formen aged 18–27, and for women with a militaryproficiency qualification. 9In 2006 the government introduced anamendment to the Law on Military Obligationsand Military Service to shorten the duration ofmilitary service. In 2007 the length of servicewas cut from 24 months to 18, and to oneyear for conscripts with a higher education. In2008 all conscripts, regardless of educationalbackground, would do one year’s service. The lawcancelled occupational deferrals and repealedprovisions for the drafting of reservists. 10Alternative service for conscientious objectorsremained at 1.75 times the length of conscription,1.5 times for those willing to do civilian jobs inthe military.The logistics of conscription were basicallyunchanged. Military registers throughout thecountry enrolled all 17-year-olds. Under the Lawon Military Obligations and Military Service,active duty for conscripts began when they were18 (Articles 8 and 22). Conscientious objectorshad to apply for alternative service at theearliest stage of the conscription process, whenthey were only 16 or 17. 11 Later requests wereinadmissible.A new requirement was that prior toenrolment boys had to undergo training in thebasics of military service in their final year atschool, when they were 15 or 16 (Article 13).Sixteen-year-olds who had already left schoolwere supposed to attend training sessions atcentres in their neighbourhood.Under the Law on Contractual MilitaryService, military service contracts were open tovolunteers from the age of 18, including noncitizens(Article 34). Candidates had to havecompleted at least one year’s study at a MilitaryEducational Institute that offered professionaltraining in military subjects to boys and girls fromthe age of 16. Students at these institutes wereregarded as being on military service (Article35). Each day of training counted as two days ofconscription.It was not known if conscripts or contractsoldiers received training in the RussianFederation’s international human rightsobligations.2 8 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

A large shortfall in conscription numberswas reported each year. In July 2006 the DeputyDefence Minister said in relation to the last callup:“Instead of the traditional celebration of themilitary draft as an honourable constitutionalduty, Russian men had to be forcibly escorted tothe barracks by police”. 12 Several reasons weresuggested for the shortfall. In the first quarter of2006 only five per cent of recruits in Moscow metthe medical requirements for call-up, accordingto the official newspaper of parliament (Duma).Others were reported to be barely literate. 13 Yetmore evaded call-up because they feared bullyingfrom older soldiers. 14In November 2006 the UN Committeeagainst Torture said that the Russian Federationshould adopt a policy of zero tolerancetowards dedovshchina (also known as hazing)in the military – the systematic physical andpsychological abuse and humiliation of newrecruits by longer-serving or senior soldierswhich sometimes involved acts of considerableviolence. 15 Some Russian human rightsorganizations saw the new measures to improveofficers’ professionalism (see below) as a steptowards this goal.Reports of hazing in the armed forces werecommonplace from almost every military district.The case of 19-year-old Andrey Sychev attractedbitter controversy in 2006. One of eight newrecruits in Chelyabinsk who were severely beatenby senior officers, he was gang-raped for severalhours and then forced to hold a crouchingposition for several more hours, resulting ininjuries that required amputation of his genitalsand legs. 16 The alleged culprits were, unusually,brought to trial, and in September 2006 weresentenced to prison terms. 17Military training and military schoolsLegal amendments in July 2006 were aimedat improving the professionalism of officers.They provided for the introduction of militarytraining centres in civilian higher-educationestablishments and of new rules for existingmilitary departments in such institutions.Full-time students could enlist free of chargein a military training centre but had to give acommitment to undertake a three-year militaryservice contract on graduation. If they failed to dothe service, they had to refund their tuition costsand be conscripted. 18 By 2003 nearly half the1,304 higher-education institutions were private,following the ending of the state monopoly ofeducation. 19 The government was the only bodyentitled to establish institutions for professionalmilitary education, 20 but it could teach in civilianeducational institutions if it had the consent ofstudents and parents, and at Ministry of Defencecost. 21The Law on Military Obligations and MilitaryService provided for state-run military educationestablishments for boys (Article 19). Suvorovmilitary colleges, Nakhimov naval-militarycolleges and musical military colleges fororchestra players provided a general educationwith extra military options for boys aged7–16. They prepared pupils for entry to MilitaryEducation Institutes and a life in the military.Cadet Schools provided boys of 12–15 withvocational training for jobs in specific branches ofthe armed forces. 22Entry to these institutions was competitive,but automatic for applicants who were orphansor children otherwise deprived of parental care.Cadet School was regarded as beneficial forthese children because it guaranteed them asocial context and later a job. There appearedto be no procedure for finding out if a childgenuinely wanted to attend Cadet School or foran informed adult to represent his best interests.There was also no legal means for reversingthe decision to attend Cadet School or theundertaking to do vocational military work ongraduation. Cadet Schools offered a very limitedcurriculum, hard physical drill, little relaxationand military discipline from an early age.Monitoring of pupils’ welfare was entrustedto unspecified local authorities. 23 However, suchauthorities had an interest in cutting costs andconcealing problems. The governor of Irkutsk,for example, set up a Cadet School for 12-yearoldboys who wanted to become officers, oncondition they were from local children’s homes.A local strategic rocket base agreed to guaranteejobs for the graduates. The first year, 23 boysaged 13–15 from orphanages or shelters for thehomeless joined. The local authority paid 12 percent of Cadet Corps costs and the Ministry ofDefence the rest, rejecting on financial groundsthe original plan to house the children in civilianpremises. The boys lived in barracks, studiedRussian and mathematics six days a week, anddid two hours’ parade drill daily. By 2007 nearlyhalf the military districts had Cadet Corps andpublicized them on a website. 24Leningrad Military District had revived aTsarist tradition of “adopting” as “sons of theregiment” 12 boys deprived of parental care.The boys were subject to military discipline.Punishments included working in the kitchen,sweeping the grounds and extra guard duty.For more serious infractions days off could becancelled, and boys who failed an end-of-yearexam had leave withdrawn. The boys’ day beganat 6.30 a.m. and ended with marching andsinging. In between, according to one womanofficer, they were shooting, riding, learningEnglish and “constantly digging holes”. Everychild had an automatic weapon which they hadto learn to clean. All day they were accompaniedby an officer who at night time slept in theirquarters in a separate building. One 12-year-oldorphan was separated from his only living relative– his brother – and was too far away to see himP — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 8 5

at weekends after he was taken to live with theregiment of the Leningrad Military District. Hisbrother was brought to the regiment when spacebecame available a year later. It was not known ifthis was voluntary. 25Armed groupsThe Law on Defence states: “The creation andexistence of other military formations or armsand military technology, in which military serviceis foreseen, is not envisaged by Federal laws andis forbidden and punishable by law.” 26 In practicenumerous armed groups continued to operate inChechnya and the north Caucasus. They includedgroups closely linked to the security forces and arange of non-state groups.Government-linked armed groups inChechnyaBy 2006 power structures in Chechnya weresaid to have been significantly “Chechenized”,following elections in the republic and thewithdrawal of many federal troops. Suchstructures included the republic’s Ministry ofInternal Affairs, which had responsibility forpolicing and security. In practice this meant thatsome armed groups controlled by separatistfighters were absorbed wholesale into the officialsecurity forces without preliminary screening orretraining. Human rights monitors said that “antiterroroperations” now resembled a vendettabetween clans. 27There were credible reports that a parallelsystem of secret detention centres operatedin the republic. 28 Four of them were linked toRamzan Kadyrov, appointed Chechen presidentby President Vladimir Putin in 2007. Theyincluded centres run by a regiment that guardedoil and other economic installations, “antiterroristcentres”, and two prisons in privatehouses. Other detention centres were run by twofederal armed battalions and by special units ofthe Federal Security Service. 29 Reports of tortureat these detention centres, and the enforceddisappearance of civilians arrested by armedunidentified masked men, were rife. In somecases civilians were taken hostage and executedby unidentified forces. Increasingly, theseepisodes spilled over into other republics of thenorth Caucasus, most recently Kabardino-Balkarin 2005 and Karachaevo-Cherkessk in 2006. 30Children were among the victims. In the runupto parliamentary elections in November 2005,villagers from Noviye-Atagi told local humanrights monitors that in September children aged12, 13 and 14 had been among people detainedand subjected to enforced disappearance,severe beatings and sometimes torture. Thevillagers believed they were being punishedfor not showing sufficient support for AkhmedKadyrov, Ramzan Kadyrov’s father, in the earlierpresidential elections. Many people fearedreprisals if they spoke about such abuses. 31Non-governmental armed groupsNon-governmental armed groups were active inmany parts of the north Caucasus, and attackedfederal and local government structures. Somewere associated with Chechen separatists.Others were influenced by radical Islamist ideas.Sometimes the groupings overlapped. Elsewhere,small militia groups with extreme Russiannationalist views were sporadically reported tohave attacked and killed foreigners, or Russiansthey suspected of sympathizing with Chechennationalism.In September 2004 armed men thought to beChechen separatists seized a secondary-schoolin the north Ossetian town of Beslan, taking athousand pupils and their teachers hostage.Of at least 331 people killed in an explosionand crossfire during the rescue attempt, morethan half were children. Hundreds more werewounded. 32In October 2005 several scores of youngmen identifying themselves as members ofthe Kabardino-Balkar Section of the CaucasianFront set fire to nine buildings associated withfederal security forces in the republic’s capital,Nalchik. The Chechen separatist commanderShamil Basayev later claimed responsibility fororganizing them. The attackers were reported tobe Islamists aged between 17 and 30 who wereangry about the treatment of Muslims in therepublic. At least 35 people were killed and over100 – some of them student bystanders – said tohave been injured in crossfire with the securityforces. 33 Some of the young attackers were latertortured in police detention. 34The editor of the Russian–Chechen FriendshipSociety bulletin in Nizhny-Novgorod was forcedinto hiding in 2005. A group calling itself thePatriotic Youth Front had distributed leaflets inher neighbourhood and apartment block, givingher full name and address and inciting readersto kill her as a “traitor who deserves shame andcontempt”. 35In September 2006 the governor of Kareliaclaimed that an unknown organization wasinciting young people through the internet andmobile phones to attack members of the minorityethnic Chechen population or other people fromthe Caucasus region in the south who were livingin Petrozavodsk. This followed organized violenceagainst Chechens and Azeris by the inhabitantsof neighbouring Kondopoga, orchestrated by agroup calling itself the Movement against IllegalMigration. 36DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Russia and 58 other states endorsed the Paris2 8 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Commitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.* Titles of non-English-language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 “Russia revises military doctrine to reflect globalchanges”, RIA Novosti, 5 March 2007.2 US Library of Congress, Country Profile: Russia,October 2006, http://lcweb2.loc.gov.3 Statute of the Russian Federation Government,No. 422, 11 July 2005.4 President of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov, pressconference, 28 February 2006.5 See Ombudsman of the Chechen Republic,Special Report on Disappearances, April 2006,www.ombu.ru.6 International Helsinki Federation for HumanRights, International Federation for HumanRights, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Center“Demos”, Human Rights Center “Memorial”, Ina Climate of Fear, 24 November 2005, www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/chechnya112005a.pdf; InternationalHelsinki Federation, “A Fair Trial for StasDmitrievsky”, 2 February 2006, www.ihf-hr.org;Amnesty International (AI), “Disappearance ofjournalist Elina Ersenoeva”, 29 August 2006 (EUR46/040/2006); “Murder of Anna Politkovskaya”,AFP, 8 October 2006.7 Tony Wood, “Diary” (account of visit toChechnya), London Review of Books, 22 March2007.8 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.9 Law on Military Obligations and Military Service,No. 53-FZ, Article 13(2).10 Federal Law Amending Certain Legal Acts of theRussian Federation Pursuant to Shorten Durationof Military Service by Conscription, No. 104-FZ, 6July 2006.11 Federal Law on Alternative Civilian Service, No.113-FZ, Article 11.12 Quoted in Moscow Human Rights Institute,Survey No. 99, Analysis of Spring ParliamentaryLegislation in the Russian State Duma, SpecialIssue on the Army and Citizens’ Rights, 18 July2006 www.hrights.ru/laws/law99.htm .13 “Countdown to call up”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,October 2006.14 See, for example, Pravda, 23 February 2006;Human Rights Watch (HRW), The Wrongs ofPassage, October 2004.15 UN Committee against Torture, Considerationof fourth periodic report submitted by RussianFederation, Conclusions and Recommendations,UN Doc. CAT/C/RUS/CO/4, 6 February 2007.16 Human Rights House Network, www.humanrightshouse.org.17 HRW, Impact, October 2006.18 Federal Law Amending Certain Legal Acts of theRussian Federation Concerning Defence andMilitary Service, No. 96-FZ, 3 July 2006.19 Russian Federation Law on Education, 1992.20 Ibid., Article 11(2).21 Ibid., Article 14.22 Statute on the Suvorov Military Colleges, theNakhimov Naval–Military Colleges, and the Cadet(Sea Cadet) Corps, No. 696, 11 June 1996.23 Ibid, Item 10.24 Russian Cadet Corps library, www.ruscadet.ru.25 Ibid.26 Law on Defence, No. 96-FZ, Article 1(9).27 In a Climate of Fear, above note 6.28 Council of Europe – Committee for the Preventionof Torture (CPT), News Flash, May 2006, www.cpt.coe.int.29 International Helsinki Federation, UnofficialPlaces of Detention in the Chechen Republic, 12May 2006, Appendix 2.30 Kabardino-Balkar: Gazeta, No. 230, 5 December2005, www.lenta.ru/news/2005; HRW, “LawyersIllegally Removed From Cases of Abused Suspectsin Nalchik”, 18 November 2005; Karachaevo-Cherkessk: “Security forces and rebels shootit out in Cherkessk”, Eurasia Daily Monitor,Jamestown Foundation, 4 January 2007, www.jamestown.org.31 In a Climate of Fear, above note 6.32 “Russia marks Beslan siege deaths”, BBC News, 1September 2007.33 “Russia: Kondopoga Violence ContinuesUnabated”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty(RFE/RL), 6 September 2006.34 “Former Nalchik detainee charges torture”,Chechnya Weekly, 3 November 2005, JamestownFoundation.35 AI, “The Russian–Chechen Friendship Societyunder threat” (EUR 46/017/2005), 3 May 2005.36 “Russia: Kondopoga violence continuesunabated”, above note 33; “Kadyrov contradictsAlkhanov in his response to the violence inKarelia”, Chechnya Weekly, 8 September 2006,Jamestown Foundation; “The provocative andaggressive behavior”, Kommersant, 5 September2006, www.kommersant.com.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 8 7

RWANDARepublic of RwandaPopulation: 9.0 million (4.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 33,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 23 April 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCChildren were recruited from Congoleserefugee camps in Rwanda by armed unitsunder the command of Laurent Nkunda,and deployed in the eastern DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) in 2007.There was no evidence of under-18s in theRwandan armed forces.ContextRwandan government forces fighting in thearmed conflict in the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC) conflict officially withdrew fromthe DRC in October 2002. Regional relationscontinued to be characterized by tension,however, and in 2004 Rwanda threatened onthree occasions to renew military operations inthe DRC, citing in June 2004 the need to protectCongolese Tutsi from ethnic violence and in Apriland November the need to counter the threatposed by dissident Rwandan forces based in theeastern DRC. There were credible reports thatRwandan army units entered the DRC in eachof these months, but this was denied by thegovernment. 1 In September 2004 Rwanda andthe DRC signed the terms of reference for a JointVerification Mechanism, providing a frameworkfor jointly addressing cross-border issues,including the presence in the DRC of Rwandanarmed groups. 2 The two governments committedto ensuring the disarmament, demobilizationand repatriation of foreign armed groups within12 months of the date of signature. 3 By the endof 2007 about 15,300 of an estimated 18,500fighters, primarily the Democratic Forces for theLiberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiquespour la liberation du Rwanda, FDLR), had beenrepatriated to Rwanda. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe June 2003 constitution reaffirmed Rwanda’sadherence to international treaties, including theUN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 5 In its2003 report to the UN Committee on the Rights ofthe Child, the government stated that “althoughvoluntary enlistment in the armed forces issubject by law to a minimum age of 16, the lawthat was recently passed on the rights of the childand protection of children against violence statesin article 19 that military service is prohibited forchildren under 18”. The report further stated thatsince enlistment in the armed forces has alwaysbeen voluntary, no minimum conscription agewas specified in Rwandan legislation. 6 There wereno reports of child-soldier recruitment or use bythe Rwandan armed forces.Armed groupsRecruitment in refugee camps byarmed units under the command ofLaurent Nkunda 7An upsurge in child recruitment from refugeecamps and communities in Rwanda occurredfrom January 2007. 8 Children said that they hadbeen offered money and employment if theyreturned to North Kivu, DRC, but on arrival wererecruited into armed units loyal to armed groupleader Laurent Nkunda. 9 Rwandan authoritiescarried out a joint assessment with officials fromthe UN refugee agency UNHCR in May. Theyvisited refugee camps to establish mechanismsfor improved child protection, includingimproved control of the exit of children from thecamps. 10 The Rwandan government initiated aninvestigation into the alleged removal in July ofeight children from Kiziba camp, for deploymentin South Kivu. 11 Some Rwandan child soldiersrepatriated to Rwanda were reportedly arrestedand beaten by the authorities. 12 Twenty-sevenchildren had been released from armed groupunits loyal to Nkunda by mid-2007; they included16 Rwandan children (of whom 13 were recruitedin Rwanda). 13 In July the UN Secretary-Generalcalled on the Rwandan government to “actimmediately” to stop all recruitment of childsoldiers in the refugee camps and elsewhere inRwanda. 14Government militiasLocal Defence Forces (LDFs) were created bythe government in the late 1990s and chargedwith ensuring local security. LDF memberswere appointed by local officials and servedas volunteers; they received limited trainingand some were authorized to carry weapons.LDF members were implicated in human rightsabuses, including the illegal detention of streetchildren, during the first months of 2006. 15Children (some as young as 14) were reported tohave been recruited into LDFs before 2004. 16 A2005 law formalized the legal status, structureand organization of the LDFs and established18 as the minimum recruitment age. 17 No LDF2 8 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

ecruitment of children was reported after the lawcame into effect. 18Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Provision for ex-combatants repatriatedfrom the DRC was managed by the RwandaDemobilization and Reintegration Commission(RDRC), a government agency operating withinthe framework of the World Bank’s Multi-countryDemobilization and Reintegration Program(MDRP). By 2007 some 650 Rwandan formerchild soldiers who had taken part in the DRCarmed conflict had been repatriated to Rwandaunder the program. Of these, 85 had takenpart in an education program, 147 had receivedvocational training and 192 had been assistedwith income-generating activities. 19 Accordingto one non-governmental organization (NGO)survey, only two of the returnees were girls,although this was attributed to the smallnumbers of girls recruited in Rwanda and the factthat girls preferred to return as civilians throughthe UNHCR-run program. 20In late 2005 the RDRC opened ademobilization centre for child soldiers next toLake Muhazi, and in March 2007 the Muhazicentre housed 38 former child soldiers, mostof whom had fought with the FDLR. Formerchild soldiers were reported to spend three tosix months at the centre, where they receivedcivic education, psychosocial assistance andeducation or vocational training, while theirfamilies were traced. When leaving the centreformer child soldiers received a basic kit but nocash payments. 21DevelopmentsDetention of children accused ofinvolvement in the genocideOf the 120,000 people detained for involvementin the 1994 genocide, some 4,500 werereportedly below the age of 18 at the time of thegenocide. 22 Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame,ordered the release of all “genocide minors”in January 2003, but under implementingregulations only those who had spent themaximum possible sentence in pre-trial detentionwere eligible to be freed. 23 During the samemonth the government released some 1,100detainees who had been children in 1994. 24 Afurther 1,900 were released in July 2005 and 78more in March 2007. It was unclear whether anyindividuals below the age of 18 in 1994 remainedin detention as of October 2007. 25Article 74 of the law on crimes againsthumanity and genocide stated that childrenunder the age of 14 at the time of the crimecould not be held legally responsible for theiractions or detained, and that children over 14but under 18 should receive reduced penalties. 26A system of community-based gacaca tribunals(based on traditional courts), established by thegovernment in 2001, continued to try personsaccused of involvement in the genocide. A2007 amendment to the gacaca law reducedthe maximum penalty for minors convicted ofoffences under categories 2, 3 and 4 of thelaw from 12 years and 6 months to 5 years and6 months. 27 Accused persons had no right tocounsel in gacaca jurisdictions, and the courtswere widely accused of faulty procedure, judicialcorruption and false accusations. 281 “Democratic Republic of the Congo”, AmnestyInternational Report 2005.2 Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, UN Doc. S/2004/1034, 31 December2004.3 Ibid.4 Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General onthe UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, S/2007/671, 14 November 2007.5 The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda,2003, Articles 28 and 47.6 Second periodic report of Rwanda to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.22, 8 October 2003.7 See the entry on the DRC in this volume for adetailed explanation.8 Child Soldiers Coalition sources, eastern DRC,April 2007.9 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Army should stopuse of child soldiers”, 19 April 2007.10 HRW, Renewed Crisis in North Kivu, October2007.11 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S.2007/757,21 December 2007.12 Coalition sources, July 2007.13 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in the Democratic Republic ofCongo, S/2007/391, 28 June 2007.14 Ibid.15 Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 and2007.16 Information from Amnesty International, March2004.17 Law No. 25/2004 of 19 November 2004Establishing and Determining the Organisationand Functioning of the Local Service in Charge ofAssisting in Maintenance of Security Referred toas “Local Defence,” Article 9(3), Official GazetteNo. 1, 1 January 2005.18 Confidential sources, Rwanda, March–April 2007.P — RC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 8 9

19 Multi-country Demobilization and ReintegrationProgram (MDRP), “Rwanda, Demobilization andReintegration Commission”, 1 November 2006;MDRP, Monthly Statistical Progress Report,September 2007; both at http://www.mdrp.org.20 Save the Children-UK, Crossing the Border: TheDemobilisation and Reintegration of RwandanBoys and Girls Associated with Armed Groupsin the Democratic Republic of Congo, July 2004,www.savethechildren.org.uk.21 Confidential sources, Rwanda, March–April 2007.22 Report of the Special Representative of theCommission on Human Rights on the situation ofhuman rights in Rwanda, UN Doc. A/55/269, 4August 2000.23 Parquet Général, “Instruction concernantl’exécution du communiqué présidential du01 janvier 2003 venant de la présidence de larépublique qui concerne la libération provisoiredes détenus des différentes catégories,” 9January 2003.24 Ministry of Justice, Imbonerahamwe igaragazaibisabwa n’intangazo ryaturutse muri Perezidansiya Repubulika/Chart showing what was requiredby the Communiqué of the President of theRepublic, March 2003.25 Confidential sources, April and September 2007.26 Second periodic report, above note 6.27 Category 1 offences included crimes relatedto the organization or incitement of genocide.Categories 2 and 3 defined “less serious”crimes including co-authorship of, or being anaccomplice to, deliberate killing or the inflictionof serious injuries with or without the intentionto cause death. Category 4 refers to those whohave committed such acts but have reached anamicable settlement with the victim or beforethe public authority. Article 51, Organic Law No.10/2007 modifying and complementing OrganicLaw No. 16/2004 of 19 June 2004, establishingthe organization, competence and functioningof gacaca courts charged with prosecuting andtrying the perpetrators of the crime of genocideor crimes against humanity committed between1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994; OrganicLaw No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2000 settingup “gacaca jurisdictions” and organizingprosecutions for offences constituting thecrime of genocide or crimes against humanity,committed between 1 October 1990 and 31December 1994, www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw.28 Human Rights Watch World Report 2008.SAN MARINORepublic of San MarinoPopulation: 28,000 (5,000 under 18)Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: 16 in time of war oremergencyVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 5 June 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces, but 16-year-olds couldbe recruited in time of war or emergency.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no compulsory military service inSan Marino, and the minimum age for voluntarymilitary service in the republic’s armed forceswas 18. The Voluntary Military Force (CorpiMilitari Voluntar) carried out various ceremonialfunctions and could provide assistance in thepreservation of order. The Guard of the Great andGeneral Council (Guardia del Consiglio Grandee Generale) was charged with its protectionand the protection of the Captains Regent (jointheads of state). The Fortress Guard included anartillery unit, and had responsibility for bordercontrol and customs operations and maintainedsecurity at important government buildings.The Gendarmerie was responsible for lawenforcement and public security, including rescueoperations in the wake of disaster. 1Although service in these forces was notobligatory, Law Number 15 of 26 January 1990 onthe Regulation and Discipline of Military Corpsand their Officers stipulated that all citizensbetween the ages of 16 and 60 could be recruitedin a time of war or other national emergency. 2Article 1 of the 1974 constitution, however, statedthat San Marino “rejects war as a means to settledisputes between States, and in its internationalpolicy, adheres to principles enshrined in theCharter of the United Nations”. Article 288 ofthe Criminal Code prohibited any unauthorizedformation of armed groups, while Article 284criminalized any action aiming at the provocationof armed conflict within San Marino territory. 31 Information from the San Marino Departmentof Foreign Affairs, October 2007; Guardia delConsiglio Grande e Generale, Functions, 2004,www.guardiadelconsiglio.sm.2 9 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2 Information from the Department of ForeignAffairs, October 2007.3 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Secondperiodic report of San Marino, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SMR/2, 10 January 2007.SaO TOME ANDPRINCIPEDemocratic Republic of Sao Tome and PrincipePopulation: 157,000 (73,000 under 18)Government armed forces: unknownCompulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17, with parentalconsentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182National law provided for 17-year-olds toenlist voluntarily in the armed forces, but itwas not known how many were serving.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1990 constitution stated that it is the“honour and supreme duty of citizens toparticipate in the defence of the sovereignty,independence and integrity of the state” (Article63); it defined the age of majority as 18. The lawon compulsory military service stated that theminimum age for recruitment was 18; 17-yearoldscould volunteer with the consent of a parentor legal representative; military service was fortwo years. 1 It was not known whether the agelimit was strictly enforced, or how many under-18s were serving in the armed forces.DevelopmentsIn considering Sao Tome and Principe’s initialreport in 2004, the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child welcomed measures taken to protectand promote children’s rights, but expressedconcern about the lack of compatibility betweensome domestic laws and the provisions andprinciples of the convention, and the lack ofimplementation of relevant domestic laws. Iturged the government to accede to the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of theChild on the involvement of children in armedconflict. 21 Initial report of Sao Tome and Principe to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/8/Add.49, 1 December 2003.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Sao Tomeand Principe, Concluding observations, UN Doc.CRC/C/15/Add.235, 1 July 2004.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9 1

saudi arabiaKingdom of Saudi ArabiaPopulation: 24.6 million (10.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 224,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: not applicable 1Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182There was no evidence of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextSince 2003 there had been several attackson Saudi and Western targets, in which some300 people were killed. 2 Thousands of Saudiyoung men held in jails were enrolled in “deradicalizationprograms”, which aimed to “reformand re-educate” potential al-Qaeda members.The government offered financial incentives oncompletion of the program in an effort to preventrecruitment to armed groups. 3GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the constitution, “[t]he defence ofthe Islamic religion, society, and country is a dutyfor each citizen.” There was no conscription. 4In April 2005 Saudi Arabia reported to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child that “theState prohibits the enlistment of any youngperson under the age of 18 in the armed forces”. 5The Saudi Arabia National Guard, additionalto the regular armed forces, was under thecontrol of the head of state, rather than theMinistry of Defence. It reportedly recruitedprimarily from tribes loyal to the ruling family,although the sources for potential recruits werewidened to meet the demands for a larger force. 6According to the government there were nomilitias, and safeguards existed, including inmilitary codes and articles, to ensure that under-18s were not recruited into the armed forces. 7Military training and military schoolsMilitary training began at the age of 18, andrecruits were regarded “as students and notmilitary subjects in the armed forces”. 8 Trainingtook place at four military schools: the KingAbdul Aziz Military Academy, the King Fahd AirForce Academy, the Chief of Staff’s Academy andthe King Fahd Security Academy. Members of theSaudi Arabia National Guard received training atthe King Khaled Military Academy and from theUS-based Vinnell Corporation. 9Armed groupsAn al-Qaeda offshoot, al-Qaeda in the Arabianpeninsula, stormed the US consulate inDecember 2004, killing nine people and injuringothers. 10 On 24 February 2006 a Saudi-basedal-Qaeda cell conducted a suicide attack on SaudiAramco’s Abqaiq oil facility near Dammam, whichresulted in the death of two security guards andseveral of the bombers. 11 There were no reports ofthe involvement of under-18s in these groups.DevelopmentsIn March 2006 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that the governmentexpedite the process of ratification of theOptional Protocol on the involvement of childrenin armed conflict. 121 No national elections. Nationwide municipalelections were held for the first time in 2005,in which male Saudis aged 21 and abovewere eligible to vote, “Q&A: Saudi municipalelections”, BBC News, 9 February 2005.2 “Saudi Arabia”, Amnesty International Report2007; “Saudi police round up militants”, BBCNews, 7 June 2007.3 “Saudi jails aim to tackle terror”, BBC News, 31January 2008.4 CIA, “Saudi Arabia”, World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov.5 Second periodic report of Saudi Arabia to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/136/Add.1, 21 April 2005.6 Global Security, “Saudi Arabia National Guard”,27 April 2005, www.globalsecurity.org.7 Letter from the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia tothe Coalition, 22 April 2004.8 Ibid.9 Global Security, above note 6.10 “Saudis renew vow to fight terror”, BBC News, 7December 2004.11 “Al-Qaeda behind ‘Saudi oil plot’”, BBC News, 25February 2006.12 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by SaudiArabia, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/SAU/CO/2, 17 March 2006.2 9 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

SENEGALRepublic of SenegalPopulation: 11.7 million (5.8 million under 18)Government armed forces: 13,600Compulsory recruitment age: 20Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 3 March 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. No recent information on theuse of child soldiers by an armed groupwas available.ContextIn June 2004 the Senegalese governmentannounced a general amnesty for membersof the armed group Democratic Forces ofCasamance Movement (Mouvement des forcesdémocratiques de Casamance, MFDC), despitethe human rights abuses and other crimes it hadcommitted during the conflict. Members of theSenegalese armed forces also benefited fromimpunity for human rights violations carriedout in Casamance. 1 Following a new peaceagreement signed in December 2004 betweenthe government and the main wing of the MFDC,reconstruction work and de-mining began in theCasamance region. However, implementation ofthe agreement was hampered by disagreementbetween rival MFDC factions. The extent ofgovernment support for implementation of theagreement was also unclear. 2Sporadic fighting in Casamance resumedin 2006. 3 Clashes between the dissident MFDCSadio, which had crossed the border intoGuinea-Bissau, and members of the Guinea-Bissau army led to the displacement of morethan 8,000 people in the border regions duringMarch 2006. 4 Fighting between MFDC Sadio andthe Senegalese armed forces in August 2006 lednearly 4,000 people to flee to Gambia. 5 In May2006 it was reported that MFDC Sadio was layingmines in the areas it occupied. 6 Several attacksattributed to the group took place in northernCasamance in February 2007, 7 coinciding withpresidential elections, when the incumbent,Abdoulaye Wade, was re-elected.An estimated 3,000–5,000 people died duringthe 22-year conflict. 8 In January 2005 it wasreported that 659 people, mostly women andchildren, had been the victims of mine-relatedincidents. 9GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 2001 constitution stated that the rights andduties of citizens during war would be the subjectof an implementing law (Article 70). Recruits tothe armed forces had to be between 18 and 21years of age; the period of military service was24 months, after which the recruit could chooseto remain in the armed forces or to be placed onthe reserve list. 10 In its declaration on ratifyingthe Optional Protocol, the government statedthat it had raised the minimum age for regularconscription to 20. 11There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.Armed groupsThe number of active MFDC combatants wasnot known; no factions were known actively tohave recruited new members in recent years. Theextent to which children were associated with theMFDC was not documented, although it appearedthat there was no widespread recruitment ofchildren.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The December 2004 peace agreement called forthe demobilization and disarmament of MFDCfighters, and the government committed itselfto their integration on a voluntary basis withingovernment paramilitary forces. No attempt toimplement the agreement appeared to have beenmade by March 2007.None of the peace agreements signedbetween the government and the MFDC made anyreference to the demobilization of child soldiers. 12DevelopmentsThe UN Committee on the Rights of theChild expressed concern that the physical,psychological and social needs of childrenaffected by the conflict in Casamance had notbeen sufficiently addressed, and that landminescontinued to pose a risk to children. It urged thegovernment to take all appropriate measures toaddress these issues. 131 Amnesty International Report 2005.2 Confidential sources, Senegal, May 2007.3 Amnesty International Report 2007.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9 3

4 European Community Humanitarian Aid Office(ECHO), Aide humanitaire d’urgence en faveur despopulations Bissau guinéennes et sénégalaisesaffectées par le conflit de Casamance, 19 May2006, ECHO/-WF/BUD/2006/03000.5 Diadie Ba, “Thousands flee south Senegalfighting”, Reuters Foundation, 25 August 2006.6 “Senegal”, World Food Programme EmergencyReport, 19 May 2006, www.reliefweb.int.7 “Senegal: Casamance fighting allegedly linked toelections”, IRIN, 21 February 2007.8 Martin Evans, “Senegal: Mouvement des ForcesDémocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)”,briefing paper, Armed Non-state Actors Project,Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,December 2004.9 Reliefweb, “West Africa: Report on theHumanitarian Situation No. 12: January 2005”,http://reliefweb.int.10 Initial report of Senegal to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.31,17 October 1994.11 Senegal’s declaration on the Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.12 Confidential source, Senegal, July 2007.13 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,consideration of Second periodic report ofSenegal, UN Doc. CRC/C/SEN.2, Concludingobservations, UN Doc CRC/C/SEN/CO/2, 20October 2006.SERBIARepublic of SerbiaPopulation: 9.9 million (2.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 39,700Compulsory recruitment age: 17Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 31 January 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Compulsory recruitment took place inthe year an individual turned 18 and theminimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 18.ContextMontenegro declared its independence in June2006 following a referendum, and secededfrom the state of Serbia and Montenegro, theloose union of two semi-independent republicscreated in 2003 following the break-up offormer Yugoslavia. Kosovo remained under theadministration of the UN Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 1 Its military securitywas maintained by the Kosovo Force (KFOR), aNATO-led mission under a UN mandate. 2Serbia remained party to all internationalagreements, treaties and conventions to whichSerbia and Montenegro had been a party. A newconstitution was approved by over 53 per centof voters in a referendum in October 2006, andendorsed by parliament in November. A StrategicDefence Review in 2006 committed Serbia toconsiderable restructuring which would preparethe armed forces for involvement in multilateraldefence activity. In November 2006 Serbia wasinvited to join the NATO Partnership for Peaceprogram. 3Serbia’s lack of co-operation in arresting andtransferring indicted suspects to the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(Tribunal) resulted in the suspension of talks ona Stabilization and Association Agreement withthe European Union (EU). The former Serbianpresident, Slobodan Milosevic, on trial beforethe Tribunal for war crimes and crimes againsthumanity, died in March 2006 following a heartattack. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeIn its initial report to the UN Committee on theRights of the Child the government stated that2 9 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the conscription process began with registrationat the start of the calendar year in which a citizenturned 17. Actual recruitment to the armed forcestook place in the year an individual turned 18,although recruitment could take place at age 17if specifically requested. Military service couldbe deferred until the age of 21, should conscriptswish to complete their education first. However,military service could commence at any time afterthe conscript became 18 years old. In a time ofwar, 17-year-olds could be required to performmilitary service on order of the president. 5In its declaration on ratification of theOptional Protocol, the government stated that theminimum age for voluntary recruitment was 18. 6In June 2006 the defence minister announcedarmy reforms which included the creation of avolunteer army by 2015. 7Military training and military schoolsThe Ministry of Defence provided militaryeducation at a military gymnasium and a militaryacademy. 81 Amnesty International Report 2007.2 NATO, Kosovo Force, www.nato.int.3 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CountryProfile, www.fco.gov.uk.4 Amnesty International, above note 1.5 Initial report of Serbia to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/SRB/1, 31August 2007.6 Declaration on ratification of the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.7 Centre for Civil–Military Relations, “Army reformscontinue”, 15 June 2006, www.ccmr-bg.org.8 Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.yu.SEYCHELLE SRepublic of SeychellesPopulation: 81,000 (41,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 200Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18; younger withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 23 January 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCNo information was available on thepresence of under-18s in the armed forces.Volunteers could be recruited under theage of 18 with parental consent.GovernmentNational legislation and recruitmentpracticesThere were no reports of under-18s in the securityforces. In its initial report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, the government statedthat there was no conscription. It reported thatthe minimum age for voluntary military service inthe Defence Forces was 18 and that exceptionsrequired the written consent of a parent orguardian. 1 In its consideration of the report, theCommittee recommended the government ratifythe Optional Protocol to the Convention on theRights of the Child on the involvement of childrenin armed conflict. 21 Initial report of Seychelles to UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.64,3 May 2002.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of initial report of Seychelles, UNDoc. CRC/C/SR.816, September 2002, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.189, 9October 2002.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9 5

© Coalition 2005Peace monument in Kono, former stronghold of the armed group the Revolutionary UnitedFront, Sierra Leone2 9 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Sierr a LeoneRepublic of Sierra LeonePopulation: 5.5 million (2.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: 10,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 15 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18sin the armed forces. Children wereallegedly recruited in Sierra Leone byLiberians United for Reconciliation andDemocracy (LURD) to fight in Liberia inJuly 2005. The trial of the former Liberianpresident, Charles Taylor, for crimesagainst humanity, war crimes and otherserious violations of international lawcommitted in Sierra Leone, including therecruitment and use in hostilities of childsoldiers under the age of 15, began in June2007 before the Special Court for SierraLeone. The same month the Special Courtconvicted three former commanders of theArmed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)of recruitment and use in hostilities ofchildren under 15; in August it convicted aleader of the pro-government Civil DefenceForces (CDF) of the same charge.ContextThe Truth and Reconciliation Commission,which had been established under the 1999Lomé Peace Agreement, published its report inOctober 2004. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) completed its peacekeeping mandatein December 2005. It was succeeded by theUnited Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone(UNIOSIL), established by UN Security CouncilResolution 1620, which was mandated to assistSierra Leone in consolidating peace and humanrights, building capacity of state institutions, andstrengthening the rule of law and the securitysector.In August 2007 the All People’s Congress(APC) won parliamentary elections. In SeptemberErnest Bai Korom, representing the APC, waselected president, replacing Ahmad TejanKabbah.The conflict in Sierra Leone, which began in1991, was officially declared over in January 2002with completed disarmament and demobilizationof armed groups. 1 The Liberian conflicts of1990–7 and 2000–3, and the conflict in Côted’Ivoire since 2002, were intricately linked,with operations across borders, including inGuinea, which bordered all three countries, and acomplex web of governments and armed groupsproviding support to factions in neighbouringcountries. 2 A migrant population of thousands ofyoung fighters, including child soldiers, crossingthe borders between Liberia, Guinea, SierraLeone and Côte d’Ivoire, saw conflict mainly asan economic opportunity. Many had first beenforcibly recruited as children in one conflict,then willingly crossed borders to take up armsin another, often with a different armed group. A2005 study by Human Rights Watch found thatmost had been motivated by the promises offinancial gain, and many could not articulate thepolitical objective of the group they fought with.The risk of re-recruitment was exacerbated byhigh rates of youth unemployment and corruptionand deficiencies in the implementation ofdisarmament, demobilization and reintegration(DDR) programs. 3 An August 2006 report by theUN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) noted thathigh levels of unemployment, particularly youthunemployment, across west Africa posed a riskto stability in the region. This was reiterated in a2007 report by the UN Secretary-General whichhighlighted also the importance of reform of thesecurity sector in countries in the region as ameans of addressing it. 4In May 2007 the Secretary-General assessedthe security situation in Sierra Leone as stablebut fragile, with risks to stability from the highrate of youth unemployment, concerns over theaccountability of the authorities, the weakness ofthe justice system and the lack of improvement ingeneral living standards. 5 A June 2007 UN reporton conditions in prisons indicated that failure toprotect prisoners’ rights could also threaten thecountry’s stability. 6Sierra Leone was ranked the least-developedcountry in the world by the UN DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) 2007–8 Human DevelopmentIndex, based on 2005 data. 7The Child Rights Act, passed in June 2007,introduced into domestic law the internationaldefinition of a child as any person under the ageof 18 and other provisions of the Conventionon the Rights of the Child and the AfricanCharter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 8It included (Section 28) a prohibition on theuse of land mines and other weapons declaredby international instruments to be adverse tochildren.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9 7

GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Sierra Leone government affirmed in 2006in its second report to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child that, as stated in itsdeclaration on ratifying the Optional Protocol,the age of recruitment into the armed forces hadbeen raised from 17.5 to 18 years. The 2007 ChildRights Act enacted this into law, stipulating thatthe minimum age of recruitment into the armedforces was 18 (Section 28), and amending theSierra Leone Armed Forces Act of 1961 to thiseffect.In its declaration on ratifying the OptionalProtocol, Sierra Leone had stated that therewas no compulsory recruitment into the armedforces and that recruitment was exclusively on avoluntary basis. 9Armed groupsReports of recruitment of children foruse in neighbouring countriesThere were reports that, in 2005, children inSierra Leone were being recruited with a viewto fighting in Liberia. In July near Kaliahun ineastern Sierra Leone men from Liberia wereaiming to recruit children for the Liberians Unitedfor Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and inAugust Liberian LURD sympathizers were seekingto recruit children allegedly to work in diamondmines in Liberia as a cover for a recruitmentstrategy. 10 In August 2005 two boys claimed thatthey had escaped from a recruitment camp inLiberia. 11 In September 2005, cases of childrenwho went to Liberia to sell goods but never cameback were also documented in the Kaliahundistrict. 12Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The Lomé Peace Agreement had explicitlyprovided that the special needs of children shouldbe addressed in the disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR) process. According tothe final report of the Truth and ReconciliationCommission, there were no accurate statisticsfor the number of children associated with thefighting forces during the conflict. Estimatesby different organizations including UNICEF,UNAMSIL, and local agencies ranged from 5,000to 10,000 depending on the criteria used. 13 Thenational body responsible for the DDR program,the National Committee for Demobilisation,Disarmament and Reintegration (NCDRR)confirmed to the Commission that more than6,774 children entered the DDR program. Ofthese, 3,710 had been with the RevolutionaryUnited Front (RUF), 2,026 with the progovernmentCivil Defence Forces (CDF), 471 withthe Sierra Leone Army and 427 with the ArmedForces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); 144 werewith other factions or non-affiliated. 14It was estimated that about 30 per cent ofchild soldiers in the conflict were girls, but only8 per cent (513) of the former child soldiersin the DDR program were female. The Truthand Reconciliation Commission identified thisfailure to address the needs of girl soldiers asthe most glaring problem in the DDR program,and in contravention of UN Security CouncilResolution 1314 of August 2000 on children andarmed conflict, which called for special attentionto be given to the needs of girls in the wake ofconflict, including in DDR programs. Gender hadbeen given scant regard in the planning of theDDR program, which did not take into accountthe gender-specific roles played by girls and thecomplexity of their situations. One reason for thelack of participation of girls in the DDR programwas that most of them had been considered ascamp followers and not as combatants in theirown right. In fact, they had played many rolesin the conflict, as porters, fighters and “bushwives” held in sexual slavery by their captors.Some commanders to whom the girls had beenattached as “bush wives” refused to allow themto participate in the DDR program. Other girlsrefused to participate for fear of stigmatization. 15UNICEF set up the “Girls Left Behind Project”to provide assistance to such girls. In the Kono,Bombali and Port Loko districts where the projectwas operated by UNICEF’s non-governmentalorganization (NGO) partners, by the time itclosed in February 2005 over 1,000 girls had beenidentified who had not gone through the DDRprocess, and 714 girls had been provided withservices. Some similar projects were set up byNGOs. 16 One local NGO continued to work withgirls without focusing exclusively on girls formerlyassociated with the fighting forces, but involvingother girls affected by the conflict, includingcommercial sex workers. 17Demobilized children under 15 were sent toInterim Care Centres (ICCs) under the care ofUNICEF and child protection agencies, after whichthey were reunited with their families or went tofoster families, and entered education projects.Those aged 15–17 could go into NCDRR trainingand employment programs for up to nine months,at the end of which they received a start-up kit.However, in many cases they were unable tomake effective use of their training because of theweakness of the economy, and start-up kits ontheir own were not enough to start a sustainablebusiness. To that extent the DDR program had nottaken economic realities into account and hadgiven insufficient consideration to sustainability. 18The levels of economic deprivation reportedlywere a factor in some Sierra Leone former2 9 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

combatants, including former child soldiers,returning to fighting in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. 19DevelopmentsThe economic exploitation of children, includingin diamond mining, had been especially highduring the conflict. Levels of child labour recordedby UNICEF increased between 2003 and 2005. 20In its second periodic report to the Committee onthe Rights of the Child the government indicatedthat the lack of proper and effective monitoringand capacity in the relevant ministry might haveled indirectly to the increase in child labour. The2007 Child Rights Act criminalized the use ofchildren, especially young children, in hazardouslabour and other forms of economic and sexualexploitation of children, and the 2005 Anti-humanTrafficking Act (2005) contained provisions for theprevention of child labour and trafficking. 21At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Sierra Leone and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.Truth and Reconciliation CommissionThe Truth and Reconciliation Commissionpublished its final report in October 2004. Itwas mandated to give special attention to theexperiences of children who, at the onset ofthe conflict in 1991, had comprised half thepopulation. It took steps to reach out to childrento ensure that their voices would be heard andpublished a child-friendly version of its report. Achapter of its final report focused on children andexamined the continuing impact of the conflict onchildren.All sides had recruited children, who were themain victims of forced recruitment. By 1998 about25 per cent of the fighting forces were under 18.The disproportionate targeting for recruitment ofboys aged 10–14 led the Commission to concludethat the armed groups deliberately sought toenlist them. Over 50 percent of people whosuffered forced recruitment were abducted at theage of 15 or younger, and over 28 per cent at theage of 12 or younger.The RUF had been the first to enlist childrenand were responsible for the highest numberof child recruitments recorded. The governmentside had started recruiting children in 1991–2under President Momoh, who encouragedchiefs and community leaders to organize thecivilian population into local vigilante groups toaugment the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The mainrecruitment of children into the army took placeduring the National Provisional Ruling Council(NPRC) government when proper recruitmentprocedures were not followed in view of theemergency situation and the need to increase thenumber of soldiers. Some children were recruitedillegally and given the roll number of soldiers whohad been killed, while the salaries and benefitsdue to the dead soldiers were embezzled bysenior officers and administrators for whom theconflict had become profitable business.The Commission noted the dual identitiesof children as victims and perpetrators. Theviolence of conflict had deadened their senses,already impaired by drug abuse. Peer pressureand the need for a sense of belonging led them toconform, and they often had to become ruthlessin order to survive.Sexual violence was systematic, but theCommission could not establish conclusivefigures. Most girls abducted by the RUF and AFRCwere compelled to be available to their captorsfor sex, resulting in the “bush wife” phenomenonof sexual slavery. The group targeted for sexualslavery was girls and women aged 10–25; 50 percent of them were 15 or under, and 25 per centwere 12 or under. Of the rape victims 25 per centwere 13 or younger.Many children had been mutilated with thename of the armed group who had captured thembranded or carved on their bodies to preventthem escaping. These scars added to the fearof stigmatization after the conflict. UNICEFestablished a project to provide plastic surgery toa number of children to remove or disguise theirscars.Many children were not reunited with theirfamilies after the conflict. Some had been soyoung when abducted that they did not rememberwho their families were. Others had been rejectedby their families, or the fear of stigma andrejection led them to refuse to go back to theircommunities. Girls in particular faced stigmaand rejection for having become “bush wives” orsexual slaves. In cases where they had babies thebabies had often been rejected too.All the armed factions pursued a policy offorcibly administering drugs to children to loosentheir inhibitions and to spur them to violence.In the years after the conflict there was a highnumber of young people addicted to drugs, withattendant psychiatric and other health problems.These factors, together with the deficienciesin the DDR program, including the failure toinclude girls and young women, had led to adramatic rise in the number of street childrenafter the conflict, as well as a growth in thenumber of young girls engaged in prostitution asa means of survival. 22S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 2 9 9

Special Court for Sierra LeoneThe Special Court for Sierra Leone, created bythe government and the UN in January 2002,was mandated to try those “bearing the greatestresponsibility” for crimes against humanity,war crimes and other serious violations ofinternational law during the conflict in SierraLeone. In 2002 it was confirmed that childrenwould not be indicted by the Court. 23 The Court’sprosecutors viewed all children as victims as wellas perpetrators, and thus felt individual childrencould not be been seen as bearing greatestresponsibility. 24By June 2007, eight people were on trial inthe Special Court in Freetown, for crimes whichincluded the recruitment and use of childrenunder 15. They were three former AFRC leaders,two former CDF leaders, and three former RUFleaders. Two others had been indicted by theCourt: the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, whohad died in custody in 2003, and the leader ofthe CDF, Hinga Norman, who died in February2007. 25 In March 2006 the Nigerian authoritiesapprehended Charles Taylor, former presidentof Liberia, who was transferred to the authorityof the Court where he was charged with warcrimes, crimes against humanity and otherserious violations of international humanitarianlaw, including the use of child soldiers during hisalleged involvement in the Sierra Leone conflictsupporting the RUF. 26 In June, in order to protectstability in Liberia and the sub-region, whichmight be disrupted if he were to be put on trial inwest Africa, he was transferred to The Hague tobe tried by a trial chamber of the Special Court. 27He first appeared before the Special Court in TheHague on 4 June 2007. His trial was adjourneduntil January 2008 to allow time for his lawyers toprepare for trial. 28The first verdict by the Special Court wasannounced on 20 June 2007 in the case of AlexTamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and SantigieBorbor Kanu. These three former commandersof the AFRC were found guilty on 11 out of 14charges, including the recruitment of childrenunder the age of 15 and their active use inhostilities. 29 The judgment marked the first timethat an international criminal tribunal foundindividuals guilty of recruitment and use ofchildren as soldiers. These convictions werewelcomed by human rights NGOs as a historicprecedent, showing that the recruitment of childsoldiers was considered to be among the mostserious of crimes and that those involved couldand would be brought to justice. 30 The threewere sentenced to between 45 and 50 years’imprisonment, covering all counts on which theywere found guilty. 31On 2 August 2007 the Court announcedits verdicts in the cases of two CDF leaders.Moinina Fofana was convicted on four countsof the eight-count indictment, but found notguilty of the charge of conscripting or enlistingchildren under the age of 15 into armed forcesor groups or using them to participate activelyin hostilities. Allieu Kondewa was found guiltyon this charge, along with four other charges.He was sentenced on 9 October 2007 to sevenyears’ imprisonment for this specific charge. TheCourt concluded that he had initiated children asyoung as 11 into the “Avondo Society”, a groupof Kamajors (“hunters”, members of the CDF).Both individuals were to serve their sentencesconcurrently, which meant that Moinina Fofanawould serve a total of six years and AllieuKondewa would serve eight years. 321 Amnesty International Report 2003.2 See entries on Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Liberia inthis volume.3 See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Youth, Povertyand Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’sRegional Warriors, March 2005; Report of the UNSecretary-General on ways to combat subregionaland cross-border problems in West Africa, UNDoc. S/2004/200, 12 March 2004; Report of theSecretary-General on inter-mission cooperationand possible cross-border operations betweenthe UN Mission in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission inLiberia, and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UNDoc. S/2005/135, 2 March 2005.4 Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity inWest Africa, 2nd edn, UN Office for West Africa(UNOWA), August 2006, www.un.org/unowa;Report of the Secretary-General on cross-borderissues in West Africa, UN Doc. S/2007/143, 13March 2007.5 Fourth report of the Secretary-General on theUnited Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,UN Doc. S/2007/257, 7 May 2007.6 “Sierra Leone prisons threaten peace”, BBC News,22 June 2007. See also UN Integrated Office inSierra Leone (UNIOSIL), “Presentation of a report‘Behind the walls – an inventory and assessmentof prisons in Sierra Leone’ – statement by theERSG Victor Angelo on 21 June 2007”, pressrelease, UNIOSIL/PIO PR 50, www.uniosil.org.7 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 2007/2008Human Development Index rankings, http://hdr.undp.org.8 UNICEF, “Sierra Leone approves the National ChildRights Bill”, press release, 7 June 2007.9 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.10 Coalition interview with confidential sources,Freetown, November 2005, cited in Child SoldiersCoalition, Child Soldiers and Disarmament,Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegrationin West Africa, November 2006.11 Report submitted to UNICEF by a child protectionagency in Sierra Leone, 18 August 2005, cited inChild Soldiers Coalition, above note 10.3 0 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

12 Coalition meeting with a child protection agency,Freetown, October 2005, cited in Child SoldiersCoalition, above note 10.13 Amnesty International (AI) estimated in 2000that by then more than 10,000 children had beenassociated with the fighting forces – see SierraLeone: childhood – a casualty of conflict (AI IndexAFR 51/69/00), 31 August 2000.14 “Children and the armed conflict in Sierra Leone”,Chapter 4 of the Final Report of the Truth andReconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Vol.3b, October 2004.15 Ibid. See also Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana,Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces inNorthern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique:Their Lives during and after War, InternationalCenter for Human Rights and DemocraticDevelopment, 2004, www.ichrdd.ca.16 John Williamson, Reintegration of Child Soldiersin Sierra Leone, USAID report, 2005, http://pdf.usaid.gov.17 Coalition interview with Caritas Makeni official,Makeni, December 2005.18 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SierraLeone, above note 14.19 HRW, above note 3.20 UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 2005 and2007. The 2005 report, based on figures up to2003, indicated that the child labour rate forthose aged 5–14 was 57 per cent; the 2007 report,based on figures up to 2005, indicated that thechild labour rate was 59 per cent.21 Second periodic report of Sierra Leone to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/SLE/2, 8 September 2006.22 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of SierraLeone, above note 14.23 Special Court for Sierra Leone, “Special Courtprosecutor says he will not prosecute children”,press release, 2 November 2002, www.sc-sl.org.24 Coalition interview with chief of prosecutionsof Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown,December 2006.25 Special Court for Sierra Leone, www.sc-sl.org.26 Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2006/376, 9 June 2006; Special Court for SierraLeone, Summary of charges against CharlesTaylor, www.sc-sl.org.27 Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia, UN Doc.S/2006/743, 12 September 2006; Report of theSecretary-General on children and armed conflict,UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006.28 “Taylor trial delayed until 2008”, BBC News, 20August 2007.29 Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Special Court for SierraLeone, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, 20 June 2007.30 Coalition, “Child Soldiers Coalition welcomesverdicts against child recruiters in Sierra Leone”,press release, 20 June 2007.31 Special Court for Sierra Leone, sentencingjudgment, SCSL-04-16-T, 19 July 2007.32 Special Court for Sierra Leone, sentencingjudgment, SCSL-04-14-T, 9 October 2007.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 0 1

SINGAPOREThe Children and Young Persons Act (1993,amended 2001) provided for the generalprotection of the rights and welfare of children –Republic of Singaporedefined as under 14 – and young people – definedas over 14 and under 16. The Act contained noPopulation: 4.3 million (1 million under 18)specific provisions prohibiting the recruitmentGovernment armed forces: 72,500or use of children in conflict situations, nor didCompulsory recruitment age: 18it refer explicitly to children involved in conflictVoluntary recruitment age: 16situations as being among those in need ofVoting age: 21protection. However, the Act provided that “anyOptional Protocol: signed 7 September 2000 act which endangers or is likely to endangerOther treaties ratified (see glossary):the safety of the child or young person” was acriminal offence.CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182Recruits could volunteer for military1 Enlistment Act, Chapter 93.service in the armed forces from the age of 2 Central Manpower Base, Ministry of Defence, “MySon, the NS Man: What Parents Should Know16 and a half.About the NS”, 2007, www.ns.sg.3 “Register for NS-FAQ-Enlistment”, www.ns.sg.Government4 Enlistment Act, above note 1, Article 19.5 “About BMT”, 2006, www.mindef.gov.sg/; “MyNational recruitment legislation andSon, The NS Man”, above note 2.practice6 “My Son, the NS Man”, above note 2.Under the 1970 Enlistment Act, male citizens and 7 Enlistment Act, above note 1, Article 33.permanent residents aged 16 and a half were 8 Amnesty International, Annual Reports 2005,required to register and to undergo a physical2006 and 2007.examination, 1 but only those aged 18 and overwere liable to perform military service. Fulltimeservice was for two to two and a half yearsaccording to rank attained during service. 2Males over the age of 16 and a half couldenlist earlier under the Voluntary Early EnlistmentScheme (VEES) with parental consent. They wererequired to undergo medical and psychologicalscreening to determine their capacity to copewith the national service training, and to servefor the same period as those conscripted underthe national service program. 3 The Enlistment Actalso permitted “any person” to apply for regular(volunteer) service in the armed forces. 4All those who enlisted were required toundergo basic military training for between sevenand 26 weeks, depending on physical capacity. 5Information concerning training programsspecifically for recruits under 18 was unavailable,as were statistics on the number of under-18swho had voluntarily enlisted.Persons undergoing national service wereprovided with medical and psychologicalcounselling services. They were provided witha monthly allowance and permitted to havecontacts with their family on a regulated basis. 6Refusal to enlist and to perform nationalservice was an offence under the EnlistmentAct, punishable by a fine, imprisonment ofnot more than three years, or both. 7 At least14 conscientious objectors were imprisonedbetween 2004 and 2006, and others continuedto serve prison sentences; all were members ofthe banned Jehovah’s Witness religious group. Noalternatives to military service were offered. 83 0 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

SLOVAKIASLOVENIASlovak RepublicPopulation: 5.4 million (1.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 15,200Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionabolished in 2006)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 7 July 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Conscription was abolished in 2006. Therewere no reports of under-18s serving in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe transition to a non-conscript armed force wascompleted and conscription was abolished in 2006.However, in cases of military emergency or state ofwar, the armed forces could recruit men above theage of 18. National legislation did not permit anyauthority to recruit under-18s for any armed forces. 1Military training and military schoolsThere were three military colleges and a policeacademy. 2DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Slovakia and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles for protectingand assisting child soldiers and followed a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsored bythe French government and UNICEF.International standardsSlovakia ratified the Optional Protocol in July2006. Its declaration stated that anyone servingprofessionally in the armed forces was requiredto be 18. 31 Communication from the embassy of Slovakia,London, March 2007.2 Embassy of Slovakia, London, United Kingdom,http://dev.dracon.biz/embassy.3 Optional Protocol, Declarations and reservations,www2.ohchr.org.Republic of SloveniaPopulation: 2.0 million (345,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 6,600Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeA major reorganization of the armed forceswas under way, aimed at changing from aconscription-based territorial defence forceto a volunteer army deployable within NATO.Conscription ended in October 2003 andcompulsory reserve service was to end by 2010. 1In March 2007 the volunteer force consisted of6,500 soldiers, with a further 2,000 expected tobe recruited by 2010. Recruits were required tohave been in education between the ages of 15and 18, and to be under 25. 2 In its declarationon ratifying the Optional Protocol in September2004, the government stated that the minimumage for voluntary recruitment was 18. 3Previously, under the Military Service Act, allmen aged between 19 and 27 had been liablefor conscription, although 18 year olds couldvolunteer for military service. In time of war oremergency, 18 year olds could also have beencalled up. 4Military training and military schoolsThe military education system was overhauled,and in 2005 the process of merging all militaryschools under one command began. The FlightSchool was subordinated to the Doctrine,Development, Education and Training Command.The military schools provided education andtraining programs for soldiers, non-commissionedofficers, officers and specialized militarypersonnel. Also in 2005 an e-learning centre and aCommand and Unit Combat Training Centre wereestablished, and 67 army personnel successfullycompleted basic military professional training atthe Non-commissioned Officer School and theOfficer Candidate School. 5S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 0 3

DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Slovenia and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.1 US Department of State, Background Note, March2007, www.state.gov.2 Slovenian Army, www.slovenskavojska.si.3 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Second periodic report of Slovenia to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.19, 18 June 2003.5 Ministry of Defence, Annual Reports, www.mors.si.SOLOMON ISL ANDSSolomon IslandsPopulation: 478,000 (227,000 under 18)Government armed forces: no armed forcesCompulsory recruitment age: not applicableVoluntary recruitment age: not applicableVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThere were no armed forces. The minimumrecruitment age to the police force was18. Former child soldiers were left out ofreintegration programmes aimed at excombatants.ContextFollowing five years of internal armed conflictand the intervention in 2003 of the Australian-ledRegional Assistance Mission for the SolomonIslands (RAMSI), also known as Operation“Helpem Fren” (Helping a Friend), progresscontinued on the reconstruction of infrastructureand key institutions affected by the armedconflict. There were concerns, however, that theroot causes of the conflict remained, as more than80 per cent of the population were still dependenton subsistence agriculture and fishing and hadlimited access to health and education services.The marked disparity in development betweenthe capital, Honiara, and the provinces, and thereported corruption among political leaderscontinued to present significant challenges todevelopment. 1In 2005 the High Court convicted at leastten people for their role in the conflict, includingHarold Keke, former leader of the GuadalcanalLiberation Front, sentenced to life imprisonmentfor the 2002 murder of Augustine Geve, a formerpriest and government minister. 2 It appearedthat no investigations had taken place intorecruitment of children by militias and other casesof alleged war crimes affecting children during theconflict, as recommended by the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child in 2003. 3GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere were no armed forces. According to thePolice Act, “no person shall be enlisted in theForce unless … he is of or above the age ofeighteen years and under the age of twenty-eight3 0 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

years”. 4 No law had been enacted to protectchildren from their involvement in armed conflict.As part of proposed reforms, all studentswould be required after Form 5 (age 17) “toundertake National Service through governmentdrivenprograms”. 5 It was not clear whatactivities this service would entail and no furtherinformation was available.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The UN Development Programme (UNDP) helpedto demobilize over 1,000 police special constablesbetween July 2002 and July 2004, most ofthem recruited from former armed groups. 6The reintegration packages offered technicalassistance, monitoring and guidance for projectswith a maximum duration of six months. 7While it was recognized that differentmeasures were needed for women and childreninvolved in the armed conflict, 8 in reality childrendid not benefit from the UNDP program, andconcerns remained for hundreds of former childsoldiers, for whom few provisions had beenmade. 91 Amnesty International (AI), Amnesty InternationalReport 2005 and 2006.2 AI, Amnesty International Report 2006.3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by SolomonIslands, Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.208, 2 July 2003.4 Solomon Islands, Police Act, Police Regulations,section 72(2).5 Solomon Islands, Department of Prime Ministerand Cabinet, “Government Policy Framework”,May 2006, www.pmc.gov.sb/; UNESCO, Institutefor Statistics, Global Education Digest 2006:Comparing Education Statistics across the World,Montreal 2006, unesdoc.unesco.org.6 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country Programme:Solomon Islands, www.unddr.org.7 UNDP, “Support to the Reintegration of SpecialConstable in Solomon Islands”, project brief,2006, www.unddr.org.8 Country Programme: Solomon Islands, above note6.9 UNICEF EAPRO, Emergencies: Refugees, IDPs andChild Soldiers, Natural Disasters, 2005.SOMALIASomaliaPopulation: 8.2 million (4.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: information notavailableVoluntary recruitment age: information notavailableVoting age: 18 1Optional Protocol: not applicableOther treaties ratified: none applicableThe recruitment and use of child soldierssignificantly increased, with thousandsof child soldiers involved in all partiesto hostilities which escalated in 2006.Intense fighting resulted in large numbersof civilian deaths and injuries, among themmany children, and massive displacement.ContextSomalia remained without a central government.The Transitional Federal Government (TFG),created from 2002–4 peace talks in Kenya, wasbased in Baidoa town in the west of the country.Although recognized by the UN it was unable toextend control beyond Baidoa or to establishitself in the capital, Mogadishu, until early 2007,following attacks by Ethiopian forces backingthe TFG. The self-proclaimed Regional State ofPuntland controlled the north-east and remainednominally part of Somalia. The TFG opposed thede facto independence of Somaliland in the northwest.2 In September 2007 fighting broke outbetween Somaliland’s armed force and Puntland’smilitia over an unresolved dispute relating toterritory in Sool and Sanaag. 3The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a complexunion of clan-based sharia courts, dominated bythe Hawiye clan based in Mogadishu, emergedas the major force opposed to the TFG in 2006. 4The UIC seized control of Mogadishu in June2006 after four months of fighting against thereportedly US-backed coalition of Mogadishubasedarmed factions known as the Alliance forthe Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism(ARPCT). The fighting disproportionately affectedchildren, as much of it took place in residentialareas of Mogadishu, although UIC controlsubsequently improved security in Mogadishu fora short period. 5 The UIC subsequently extendedits control over much of southern and centralSomalia with the exception of Baidoa. 6In December 2006, Ethiopian government forcesintervened in Somalia in support of the TFG and,with the backing of the US government, oustedS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 0 5

the UIC within a few days. 7 In early January 2007the United States announced that it had carriedout an air strike against suspected terrorists withal-Qaeda links fighting alongside the UIC nearAfmadow. The attacks reportedly resulted incivilian casualties, including children. 8 Followingthe establishment of Ethiopian and TFG troops inMogadishu in January 2007, attacks on Ethiopianand TFG forces by insurgent groups increased.In late March, Ethiopian forces launched a majoroffensive, using rocket bombardments and shellingof entire neighbourhoods to dislodge insurgentforces and occupy strategic locations. Hundreds ofcivilians died trying to flee or while trapped in theirhomes, and tens of thousands fled the city. Fourdays of heavy fighting ended with a brief ceasefirewhich broke down in late April, when Ethiopianforces launched a second major offensive tocapture additional areas of north Mogadishu, againshelling and bombarding civilian neighbourhoods.The TFG declared victory on 26 April, but attacks byinsurgent forces resumed within days. 9After the fall of the UIC, high levels ofinsecurity and criminal activity returned tosouthern and central Somalia. Hostilitiescontinued, with Ethiopian forces and the TNGfighting insurgent groups, including remnantsof the UIC. Some 1,200 civilians were killed andseveral thousand were injured between October2006 and late 2007. An estimated 35 per centof the victims were children. 10 The TFG began todisarm UIC remnants and militias in Mogadishuin March 2007. 11 However, the security situationin Mogadishu deteriorated in April as antigovernmentgroups began staging hit-and-runattacks, using improvised explosive devices andsuicide bombings against the TFG and Ethiopianforces. The latter retaliated with indiscriminateshelling and rocket fire, much of which fell onresidential areas of the city. 12The recruitment and use of children by allparties to the hostilities, including the TFG, theUIC, their allied militias, the ARPCT and variousother clan militias, increased in 2006 and 2007. 13The rape of women and girls, including gang rapeby soldiers and other militias in Mogadishu, wasreportedly common. 14Between February and May 2007, 400,000civilians fled the conflict in Mogadishu. 15 As ofOctober 2007 there were approximately 850,000internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somaliaas a result of the conflict and of severe droughtand flooding in 2006. 16 There were hundreds ofthousands of Somali refugees in neighbouringcountries, in particular in Ethiopia and Kenya. 17UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007)authorized an African Union peacekeepingMission in Somalia (AMISOM), and a firstcontingent of 1,100 Ugandan troops arrived inMogadishu in March 2007. They came underrepeated attack by anti-TFG militias. 18 In July 2007the African Union Peace and Security Councildecided to extend the AMISOM mission for afurther six months. 19GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeLack of clarity over legal provisions andinadequate systems of birth registration madeit difficult to establish the exact ages of thosewho were recruited into each territory’s forces. 20According to one media report, TFG officialssaid that recruitment for a new national armyhad started in many regions of the country inmid-2005. The deputy Defence Minister statedthat recruits, to be drawn from all the country’sregions, would be located at the military basesof Mahadaay, Abqaale, Buq-Goosaar, Ceel-Gaal,Luuq-Jeelow, Waajid and other camps in the LowerJuba region. Reports indicated that recruitmentand encampment of recruits had started inPuntland, with recruits reporting to Abqaalemilitary camp near Gaalkacyo. A recruitmentexercise also reportedly began in Kismaayo. 21 TheSomaliland constitution contained no minimumage for recruitment into the armed forces, butthere were no reports of recruitment of children. 22It was not known whether Puntland forcesrecruited or used children.Transitional Federal Government (TFG)The TFG acknowledged that it had childrenin its ranks. Credible photographic evidenceand eyewitness reports of TFG child soldiersrevealed children as young as 11 years of age atcheckpoints and under-18s in military uniformpatrolling Mogadishu airport in January 2007. 23Following fighting between the TFG and the UICin December 2006, reports were received of UICchild soldiers injured, killed or detained by theTFG. 24Armed groupsUnion of Islamic Courts (UIC)The UIC comprised mainly members of the al-Shabaab (youth militants), a militia of 500–700fighters, largely drawn from the Hawiye andOgaden clans. 25 The UIC was responsible forsignificant levels of forcible recruitment ofchildren in the latter part of 2006, declaringpublicly their intention to recruit from schools.Children were recruited from schools inMogadishu and the Hiran region. Headmastersfrom a variety of Mogadishu schools werereportedly called to meetings in September 2006in which they were each required to commit aquota of 300–600 adolescent children to militarytraining programs of up to six months. 26 After theUIC seized control of Mogadishu in June 2006,some children between the ages of 10 and 16were forcibly recruited for military training by3 0 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

the UIC in Dabble, near Kismayo, in Mogadishuand Hiran regions. 27 There were reports thatthe UIC used child soldiers in recruiting effortsand rallies. 28 A large number of child soldierswere reportedly abandoned when the UIC fledMogadishu in December 2006. 29Alliance for the Restoration of Peaceand Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT)During heavy fighting with the UIC in Marchto June 2006, the ARPCT recruited numerouschildren, some forcibly, into its ranks, both inMogadishu and the Hiran region. The ARPCTrecruited street children and children fromschools for its militia. 30Armed militiasBy June 2007 it was estimated that there were50,000–70,000 members of clan militia and otherarmed groups operating in Somalia. 31 In mid-2006the armed group led by Abdi Qeybdid and MusaSudi Yalalow recruited children as young as 13 inMogadishu. There were also reports of severalchildren as young as seven in armed groups inGalgadud, Dusamareb. 32 Boys as young as 14or 15 participated in militia attacks, and manyyouths were members of criminal gangs known asmoryaan (parasites). 33Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)In November 2005, Puntland authoritiesembarked on the first ever DDR program withthe UN Development Programme (UNDP),but it was not known whether children wereincluded. 34 In September 2006 the UN countryteam visited Mogadishu and raised the issue ofchild recruitment. The UIC responded positively,acknowledging that child recruitment should behalted, but there was no evidence of any actiontaken to that effect. 35In February 2007 UNICEF offered tosupport the TFG in developing a plan for thedemobilization of children from its forces. Aresponse and follow up to this offer was pendingby October 2007. 36 The issue of child soldiers wasto be addressed as part of the UN task force onDDR in Somalia. 37DevelopmentsIn December 2006 the UN Resident andHumanitarian Co-ordinator for Somalia formallyreminded both the TFG and the UIC of theirobligations to uphold international standardsand laws concerning the recruitment of childreninto armed forces and groups, and to ensure theimmediate release of any children. 38In May 2007 the UN Secretary-General’sreport on children and armed conflict in Somaliaurged the TFG and UIC to end the recruitmentand use of child soldiers, and to take necessaryactions for the unconditional demobilization ofall children. The report urged the TFG to takeconcrete steps to ratify the Convention on theRights of the Child and the Optional Protocol oninvolvement of children in armed conflict, and tohalt the proliferation of small arms. 39At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, representatives from Somalia and 58other states endorsed the Paris Commitments toprotect children from unlawful recruitment or useby armed forces or armed groups and the ParisPrinciples and guidelines on children associatedwith armed forces or armed groups. Thedocuments reaffirmed international standardsand operational principles for protecting andassisting child soldiers and followed a widerangingglobal consultation jointly sponsoredby the French government and UNICEF. At themeeting Somali government ministers requestedassistance from the international community toaddress the problem of children in the TFG armedforces. 40The UIC and the TFG were listed as partiesrecruiting or using children in situations of armedconflict in the December 2007 Secretary-General’sreport on children and armed conflict. 411 The Transitional Federal Charter of the SomaliRepublic, February 2004, www.mpil.de.2 Amnesty International Report 2007; HumanRights Watch (HRW), Shell-shocked: civiliansunder siege in Mogadishu, August 2007.3 Report of the Secretary-General on the situationin Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/658, 7 November2007; confidential source, 2008.4 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Can the SomaliCrisis be Contained?”, Africa Report No. 116, 10August 2006.5 HRW, above note 2.6 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/259, 7May 2007.7 HRW, above note 2.8 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.9 HRW, above note 2.10 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict, A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21December 2007.11 HRW, above note 2; “Somalia: children, womenmost affected by fighting”, IRIN, 12 January 2007.12 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.13 Ibid.14 Report of the Secretary-General on the situationin Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/658, 7 November2007.15 UNHCR News, “Renewed violence in Mogadishusets thousands on the road once more”, 20 July2007, and “Thousands flee Mogadishu as freshfighting erupts”, 30 October 2007, www.unhcr.org.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 0 7

16 United Nations Office for the Co-ordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Monthly SomaliaHumanitarian Analysis Report for October 2007,13 November 2007; UNCHR News, “Latest figuresshow 90,000 flee fighting in Mogadishu”, 31October 2007, www.unhcr.org.17 UNHCR News, above note 16.18 Report of the Secretary-General on the situationin Somalia, UN Doc. S/2007/381, 25 June 2007.19 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 14.20 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006, Somalia, 6 March2007, www.state.gov.21 “Somalia: Start of new army recruitment”, KenyaBroadcasting Corporation, 10 July 2005, www.kbc.co.ke.22 US Department of State, above note 20.23 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.24 US Department of State, above note 20.25 HRW, above note 2.26 US Department of State, above note 20;confidential source, 2008.27 Office of the Special Representative of theSecretary-General for Children and ArmedConflict, Developments in Somalia, www.un.org/children/conflict/english/somalia.html.28 US Department of State, above note 20.29 OCHA Somalia, IASC, Donors Summary of MeetingHeld on 4 January 2007, http://ochaonline.un.org.30 Report of the Secretary-General on the situationin Somalia, UN Doc. S/2006/418, 20 June 2006;Office of the Special Representative, above note27.31 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 18.32 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.33 US Department of State, above note 20.34 UN OCHA, “Somalia: Puntland factsheet August2006”, 28 August 2006, www.reliefweb.int.35 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.36 Ibid.37 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 18.38 Monthly report of the Secretary-General onSomalia, UN Doc. S/2007/115, 28 February 2007.39 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.40 “Government calls for assistance to rehabilitatechild soldiers”, IRIN, 2 February 2007.41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 10.SOUTH AFRIC ARepublic of South AfricaPopulation: 47.4 million (18.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 62,400Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 8 February 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Large numbers of under-18swere members of criminal gangs.ContextPolitical violence in the run-up to the March2006 municipal elections in KwaZulu-Natal ledto the deaths of a number of African NationalCongress (ANC) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)candidates. 1 Criminal gangs linked to politicalparties or their members were reportedlyassociated with the violence. 2 It was not knownwhether under-18s were involved.In 2005 South Africa National Defence Force(SANDF) troops operating in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) as part of the UNpeacekeeping mission were accused of sexualmisconduct towards women and girls. Eight of theallegations were substantiated, and the soldiersresponsible were returned to their country. 3 Therewere two cases of South African soldiers undertrial for sexual misconduct in peacekeepingmissions in the DRC and in Burundi. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no general conscription, althoughthe Defence Act No. 42 of 2002 provided forthe possibility of mobilization during a state ofnational defence. Article 90 stated that “afterdeclaration of a state of national defence, thePresident may, by proclamation in the Gazette,authorise the mobilisation of persons for servicesin the Defence Forces if it is necessary.” 5The 2002 Defence Act established 18 asthe minimum age for voluntary recruitment tothe SANDF, military training and mobilization,including in times of emergency (Articles 52, 82and 91). 63 0 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsCriminal violence remained high and tens ofthousands of under-18s belonged to armedgangs. 7 The number of people involved in gangswas not known, but current membership wasbelieved to be high, not least because thesegangs had expanded their operations into ruralareas. Activities included involvement in thedrugs trade, prostitution and control over localeconomic activities. Gang members deliberatelytargeted vulnerable young people for recruitment.Young gang members were reportedly usedto carry out attacks because, if arrested andtried, they were less likely to face a long prisonsentence. Initiation rituals included rape or killingrival gang members, and gang members adoptedparticular styles of clothing and were encouragedto have gang tattoos and learn the gang’s history.Attempts to leave a gang could be punished bydeath. 8South Africa had the second-highest HIVprevalence in the world 9 and AIDS was the maincause of death among children under five (40 percent of deaths). More than 1 million children hadlost one or both parents to AIDS. 10During 2006 the number of people applyingfor asylum in South Africa noticeably increased,the majority seeking refuge from armed conflictin the DRC, although the number of Zimbabweanasylum seekers rose significantly. 11 Hundreds ofchild migrants, some as young as ten, arrivedin South Africa from Zimbabwe, risking beingrobbed or raped by trafficking gangs if they wereunable to pay them. 12At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, South Africa and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.8 Andre Standing, “The threat of gangs and antigangspolicy”, Occasional Paper 116, Institute ofSecurity Studies, August 2006, www.iss.co.za.9 UNICEF, “At South Africa’s third national AIDSconference, all eyes on rising child mortality”,www.unicef.org.10 UNICEF, Saving Children, Enhancing Lives,Combating HIV and AIDS in South Africa: SecondEdition 2006, www.unicef.org.11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2007.12 “Zimbabwe: Child migrants seek a better life inSouth Africa”, IRIN, 3 September 2007.1 Amnesty International Report 2007.2 “South Africa: Province hit by spate of politicalkillings”, IRIN, 4 April 2006.3 US State Department, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices, 2005, www.state.gov.4 Treaty body Monitor, UN Committee againstTorture, 37th session, 6–24 November 2006,www.ishr.ch.5 Defence Act 42 of 2002, Article 90.6 Government Gazette, Vol. 452, No. 24576, 20February 2003, www.gov.za/gazette.7 “South Africa: Gang culture in Cape Town”, IRIN,27 February 2007.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 0 9

SPAINKingdom of SpainPopulation: 43.1 million (7.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 147,300Compulsory recruitment age: ConscriptionsuspendedVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 8 March 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s ingovernment forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 30 of the 1978 constitution stated that“Citizens have the right and the duty to defendSpain. The law shall determine the militaryobligations of Spaniards and shall regulate, withall due guarantees, conscientious objectionas well as other grounds for exemption fromcompulsory military service; it may also, whenappropriate, impose a community service in placeof military service.” Article 30 also included theprovision that “The duties of citizens in the eventof serious risk, catastrophe or public calamitymay be regulated by law.”Spain has maintained professional armedforces after compulsory military service wassuspended with the adoption of the Armed ForcesPersonnel (Regulations) Act, Act 17/1999. The Actset the minimum age for voluntary military servicein the Spanish Armed Forces at 18. Reservists inthe armed forces, to be mobilized “to meet theneeds of national defence when these cannot bemet by professional military staff,” likewise hadto be 18 years of age to be eligible for service.Admission to military training institutions wassimilarly limited to those who had reached theage of 18. 2 Recruits had to be at least 18 to jointhe Civil Guard (Guardias Civiles), who had bothpolicing and military functions under Organic Law2/1986 (amended). The Civil Guard came underthe authority of both the Interior and DefenceMinistries, except in wartime, when the DefenceMinistry would hold exclusive authority. 3DevelopmentsWhile noting that the government had madeefforts to process the applications of child asylumseekers, the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild expressed concern in October 2007 that“identification of children who may have beenrecruited or used in hostilities prior to arrival inSpain is inadequate and … data on these childrenare not systematically collected”. The Committeeconcluded that this “failure to identify suchchildren could result in a breach of the principle ofnon-refoulement”. A lack of available informationabout the asylum process for conflict-affectedchildren and the inadequate provision of medical,psychological and social services for thoseseeking asylum in Spain was also emphasizedby the Committee. The Committee called onthe government to enact legislation explicitlycriminalizing the recruitment and involvementof children in armed conflict, and to “strengthenextraterritorial jurisdiction for these crimes whenthey are committed by or against a person whois a citizen of or has other links with the Stateparty”. Although welcoming Spain’s support forthe European Union 1998 Code of Conduct onArms Exports and the government’s subsequentcriminalization of the illegal arms trade, theCommittee recommended that the governmentnow “consider introducing a specific prohibitionwith respect to the sale of arms when the finaldestination is a country where children are knownto be – or may potentially be – recruited or usedin hostilities”. 4The Government’s Master Plan for SpanishCo-operation for 2005–8 named the situation ofchildren in armed conflict as a priority with regardto the agenda for human rights protection duringthis period. The Spanish Agency for InternationalCo-operation actively supported a UNICEF projectfor the reintegration of former child soldiers inthe Democratic Republic of the Congo and otherprojects assisting conflict-affected children inTimor-Leste and Colombia. 5At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Spain and 58 other states endorsed theParis Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forcesor armed groups and the Paris Principles andguidelines on children associated with armedforces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 “ETA call off Spanish ceasefire”, Reuters, 5 June2007.2 Initial report of Spain to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ESP/1,16 October 2006.3 LO 2/86 fe Fuerzas y Cuerpos de SeguridadReguladora del Estado, de las Policias de lasComunidades Autonomas y de las PoliciasLocales, Organic Law 2/1986, 14 March 1986,www.igsap.map.es.3 1 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

4 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Spainon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/ESP/CO/1, 17 October 2007.5 Initial report, above note 2.SRI L ANK ADemocratic Socialist Republic of Sri LankaPopulation: 20.7 million (6.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 150,900Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 8 September 2000Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)continued to recruit and use children,despite repeated commitments not to doso. Children in the east of the country wereforcibly recruited and used by the Karunagroup, a breakaway group of the LTTE, withthe complicity of, and in some instancesactively working with, the security forces.ContextIn November 2005 Mahinda Rajapakse wonpresidential elections which had been markedby the LTTE’s obstruction of voting, especiallyin the north. In the following months there werealmost daily attacks on security forces by theLTTE, killings of high-profile public and militarypersons and increased death and injury tocivilians (including children) in bomb attacks.Civilians, including children, were also killed andinjured as a result of indiscriminate attacks bythe Sri Lankan armed forces. Fighting escalateddramatically from May 2006, after a suicide bombattack on the army commander in Colombo.There was heavy fighting between governmentforces and the LTTE, in particular in the east of theisland. In mid-July 2007 the government declaredthat it had won a victory in the east and that thearea had been cleared of LTTE presence.Widespread extrajudicial executions, enforceddisappearances and violations of internationalhumanitarian law were committed againstcivilians and people not taking part in thefighting. 1 Between April 2006 and March 2007more than 230,000 people were newly displaced,according to the UN refugee agency (UNHCR). 2Around half of them were from Batticaloa districtin the east. They reportedly faced pressureto return to their homes, including threats bylocal authorities that the assistance they werereceiving would cease if they did not return. 3The delivery of humanitarian and developmentassistance was subject to multiple challenges andconstraints, which resulted in the scaling downof humanitarian and development support tothe affected population, including to vulnerableS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1 1

children, and also in hampering access ofindependent observers and monitors to thoseaffected areas. 4The Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002collapsed in practice, although neither partyformally renounced it. The leader of the LTTEin late November 2006 stated that the LTTE nolonger felt bound by it. 5 In mid-April 2007, theminister of defence was quoted as having saidthat the ceasefire no longer had meaning. 6The indiscriminate use of claymore andpressure mines and other methods of killingallegedly employed by the LTTE resulted inchild casualties. On 15 June 2006, 65 civilians,including 14 children, were killed and 70 othercivilians were injured by a claymore mine attackon a civilian bus in Anuradhapura district. 7 ASri Lankan Air Force aerial bombardment on 2January 2007 killed seven displaced children andinjured several others in Padahuthurai, Mannardistrict. 8 Bombing and shelling by the securityforces in other parts of the country, includingJaffna, Batticaloa, Mullaitivu and Killinochchidistricts, resulted in destruction of schools andthe death of and injury to teachers and students.The European Union (EU) listed the LTTEas a “terrorist organization” in May 2006.Subsequently, the LTTE said that they werenot going to guarantee full security for EUcitizens, thus pressuring EU states to withdrawtheir nationals from the country. This includedthose participating in the Sri Lanka MonitoringMission (SLMM), set up in 2002 to monitor theCeasefire Agreement. 9 Consequently, from aroundSeptember 2006, the SLMM was functioning withonly 30 monitors, half the original number, fromIceland and Norway.The independence of the Human RightsCommission (HRC) and other constitutionalbodies (including the Police Commission) wasundermined in 2006 when – in the absence of afunctioning Constitutional Council – the presidentof Sri Lanka directly appointed their members,contrary to the constitution. 10The HRC and SLMM, together with UNICEFand the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), were among the organizations monitoringthe recruitment and use of child soldiers. Withthe escalation of violence, all faced increasingobstacles to their work.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeEnlistment of soldiers to the armed forceswas voluntary, and governed by the SoldiersEnlistment Regulations of 1955. Enlistmentswere conducted as either “recruits” or “directlyenlisted soldiers”, at a minimum age of 18. Allthose who qualified for enlistment had to producean authentic birth certificate. 11According to the 1985 Mobilization andSupplementary Forces Act, the National CadetCorps was open to those over 16. It provided premilitaryand civil training to students, but cadetscould not be called to active service and were notmembers of the armed forces.In February 2006 the Penal Code wasamended to make “engaging/recruiting childrenfor use in armed conflict” a crime punishable by20 years’ imprisonment. Despite these provisions,there had so far been no arrests of cadres of theLTTE or Karuna group (see below) in relation tochild recruitment. 12 This was partly because thepolice often refused to accept complaints fromparents of abducted children, despite parentshaving information about the identity of theabductors. 13The government was repeatedly condemnedfor tolerating the aiding and abetting by thesecurity forces of child recruitment by the Karunagroup. In November 2006 a UN special advisoron children and armed conflict “found strongand credible evidence that certain elements ofthe government security forces are supportingand sometimes participating in the abductionsand forced recruitment of children by the Karunafaction”. 14 President Rajapakse and other SriLankan officials repeatedly promised that thegovernment would investigate the allegationsof state complicity and hold accountable anymembers of the security forces found to haveviolated the law. Human Rights Watch repeatedlyasked the government for the results of theinvestigations and, in August 2007, questionedthe sincerity of the government’s commitment toan investigation. 15 A government committee wasestablished in 2007 to investigate the allegations.There were longstanding concerns aboutthe treatment of children who “surrendered”to the security forces; in December 2006 thegovernment was criticized for not making adistinction between children and adults. 16The government subsequently appointed acommissioner general for rehabilitation, andas of mid-2007 was developing a rehabilitationprogram in cooperation with UNICEF. Thisincluded setting up a rehabilitation centre for“child surrendees”, of whom there had beenmore than 60, all of whom had been recruitedby the LTTE. As of that time, however, no specificprogram had been established for girls. 17A particular concern relating to formerlyrecruited children in the custody of the Sri Lankansecurity forces was their exposure to the media.Concerns were raised that this public exposureresulted in stigmatization and increased thevulnerability of the child and their family. 18 In July2007 the Anglican bishop in Colombo expressedconcern at the wider exposure of children toprograms highlighting images of war after allschools in the country were called upon to holdceremonies to celebrate the security forces’military victory in the east. 193 1 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Armed groupsKaruna groupThe Karuna group broke away from the LTTE inMarch 2004, with an estimated 5,000 to 6,000fighters, many of them under-18s. It was led byVinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, known as ColonelKaruna; its political wing was the Tamil MakkalViduthalai Pulikal (TMVP). It consisted mainly offormer LTTE cadres from the east of the country.On the verge of defeat at the hands of the LTTE inApril 2004, Karuna disbanded his troops and sentthousands of under-age fighters home. Over thenext two years, as he slowly regrouped and beganto wage more effective attacks on LTTE forcesin the east, the Karuna group resumed forciblyrecruiting children. By the middle of 2006, thiswas occurring on a large scale. 20By September 2007 there were reports ofabout 400 children recruited by the Karuna group.Their average age at the time of recruitmentwas about 16. Over 200 of those recruited aschildren were believed to remain with the groupand over 150 of them were still below 18. Allexcept one of the children were boys. In theperiod since November 2006 over 20 children hadbeen released and ten re-recruited. The Karunafaction was also reported to have targeted forrecruitment children who had returned homeafter previously being associated with the LTTE.It was likely that there was under-reporting ofrecruitment, as some children received a monthlyallowance on completion of military trainingand impoverished families were therefore lessinclined to report their recruitment. 21International criticism of the Karuna groupgrew. In April 2007 UNICEF publicly criticized thegroup for stalling on its promises to end childrecruitment after being deliberately misled whentrying to visit the group’s camps to verify reportsof child recruitment. 22 The chairman of the UNSecurity Council Working Group on Childrenand Armed Conflict issued a statement stronglycondemning and calling for an end to the recentrecruitment and use of child soldiers. 23 However,Karuna continued to deny that children werebeing recruited into his group. 24Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)According to some sources, the LTTE, which hadrecruited under-age fighters for many years,pledged on 18 June 2007 to rid its ranks of allunder-18s by the end of 2007. 25 The LTTE hadpreviously made similar promises, but this wasthe first time that it had set a clear deadline. 26However, the Special Representative of the UNSecretary-General for Children and Armed Conflictreported that that the LTTE had assured herspecial advisor that they would accelerate therelease of all children under the age of 17, buthad not committed to the full release of childrenunder 18. 27The LTTE consistently denied that it knowinglyrecruited children and it claimed that childrensought to join by disguising their age. 28 However,there is overwhelming evidence of recruitment,often forced, throughout areas under LTTEcontrol as well as from government-controlledareas in the north and east. The recruitment ofchildren typically followed a pattern of increasedrecruitment during the season of temple festivalsand a fall during periods of internationalcondemnation.As of September 2007 the total numberof children known to have been recruited bythe LTTE since January 2002 was well over sixthousand, although the real number was thoughtto be much higher. Over the years the recruitmentrate had fallen steadily, from almost 1,500 in2002 to around 125 in the first nine months of2007. Re-recruitment trends over this periodfluctuated, with 30 children in 2002, about 70 in2003, almost 300 in 2004, about a hundred eachyear in 2005 and 2006, and about 25 in the firstnine months of 2007. With one exception (April)the number of children recruited each monthduring 2007 was always lower than the numberreleased. By mid-2007 about 1,500 peoplerecruited as children remained in LTTE ranks, ofwhom over 300 were still below 18. The averageage of recruitment increased from 14 to 16 duringthe period 2002–7. Approximately one third of thechildren recruited by the LTTE were girls. 29The LTTE’s “Child Protection Authority”reportedly put notices in the media to alert thepublic to its efforts to release under-age recruits.The LTTE said in July that because of the difficultsituation it was not possible to assure saferelease procedures for under-18s, thus delayingthe process. 30 It later claimed that all but 63children in the north had been released by earlyOctober 2007 and that any names remaining onthe UNICEF database were due to problems ofverification as a result of the conflict. 31 However,according to other sources, well over 200 childrenfrom the north remained unaccounted for.There were further concerns that new villagebasedmilitary training, in which all civilians agedbetween 15 and 50 were compelled to participate,was being conducted in LTTE-controlled areas.In addition, there were reports of a new type ofsix-month residential military training being runby the LTTE, after which people were allowed tocontinue their civilian lives, but had to remainavailable for military duties. 32The LTTE’s efforts on releasing under-18swere likely to be linked to increased internationalcondemnation, in particular the call for targetedsanctions by the UN Secretary-General. 33 The UNSecurity Council’s Working Group on childrenand armed conflict on 10 May 2007 issued astrong condemnation of the LTTE but stoppedshort of recommending sanctions. In a directcommunication to the LTTE, the chairman of theWorking Group urged it to proceed immediately,S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1 3

in a transparent manner, to return the children totheir families, to respect the neutrality of schoolsand to permit access to humanitarian actors inthe zones under its control. The LTTE was alsowarned of possible further measures, should itnot act in response to this message. 34Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The Action Plan for Children Affected by Warsigned in 2003 by the government and the LTTEwas intended to provide comprehensive supportfor conflict-affected children and included aframework for the release and reintegration ofchild soldiers. It provided, among other things,for three transit camps to be set up. However, thecentre in Kilinochchi functioned for only a shorttime and the other two never opened. 35In 2004 the transit centre in Kilinochchi wasclosed due to a lack of commitment on the part ofthe LTTE to release children as had been agreedin the Action Plan. By the end of 2004 the TamilRehabilitation Organization, an organizationclosely linked to the LTTE, completed constructionof an educational skills development trainingcentre in Kilinochchi, and while the LTTE madecommitments that they would not releasechildren to the centre, it was found that they weredoing so. 36 In December 2006 the UN Secretary-General called on the LTTE to release childrendirectly to their families as stipulated in theAction Plan, with adequate information sharingwith UNICEF to ensure timely verification. 37DevelopmentsAt a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris,Sri Lanka and 58 other states endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelines onchildren associated with armed forces or armedgroups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers andfollowed a wide-ranging global consultationjointly sponsored by the French government andUNICEF.The LTTE were listed as a party recruiting andusing children in hostilities in the Annex to theSecretary-General’s annual report on childrenand armed conflict between 2003 and 2007. TheKaruna group was listed for child recruitment anduse in 2006 and 2007.1 See, for example, International Crisis Group (ICG),Sri Lanka’s human rights crisis, Asia Report No.135, June 2007; documents issued by HumanRights Watch (HRW), including “Letter to theHuman Rights Council”, March 2007, “Sri Lanka:Karuna Group and LTTE continue abducting andrecruiting children”, March 2007; InternationalCommission of Jurists, “Sri Lanka – ICJ inquestobserver finds flaws in investigation into killingof ACF aid workers”, April 2007; AmnestyInternational (AI), Sri Lanka: A Climate of Fear inthe East, February 2006.2 UNHCR News, “More than 40,000 civilians fleelatest fighting in eastern Sri Lanka”, 13 March2007, www.unhcr.org.3 See Interagency Standing Committee report, SriLanka fact sheet: Batticaloa district, 29 March2007, at www.reliefweb.int.4 Report of the UN Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in Sri Lanka, UN Doc.S/2006/1006, 20 December 2006.5 “‘Heroes’ Day’ speech by LTTE chief VelupillaiPrabhakaran”, South Asia Intelligence Review,27 November 2006, www.satp.org.6 TamilNet, “There is no ceasefire agreement withLTTE-Gothabaya”, 12 April 2007, www.tamilnet.com.7 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.8 “16 Tamil civilian Christians killed by bombing inSri Lanka”, Journal Chrétien, 6 January 2007, atwww.spcm.org/Journal.9 “Interview with then head of SLMM”, The Nation,20 August 2006.10 Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, “Contempt of theconstitution: reaching the zenith of disregard forthe rule of law in Sri Lanka”, Asian Legal ResourceCentre (ALRC), Article 2, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2006),www.article2.org.11 Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition fromSri Lanka High Commission, London, 31 July 2007.12 Ibid.13 HRW, Sri Lanka – Complicit in Crime: StateCollusion in Abductions and Forced Recruitmentby the Karuna Group, January 2007.14 Statement by Allan Rock, UN Special Advisoron Children and Armed Conflict, Colombo, 13November 2006, as quoted in ICG, above note 1.15 HRW, Sri Lanka: Return to War: Human Rightsunder Siege, August 2007.16 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.17 Communication from Sri Lanka High Commission,above note 11.18 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.19 “Save the children from war agenda: bishop”,Daily Mirror, 21 July 2007, www.dailymirror.lk.20 ICG, above note 1.21 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Sri Lanka, UN Doc. S/2007/758,21 December 2007.3 1 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

22 UNICEF, “UNICEF says Karuna faction not seriousabout child releases: child recruitment continuesas hostilities escalate in troubled island nation”,27 April 2007, www.unicef.org/srilanka.23 Permanent Mission of France to the UN in NewYork, “Children and Armed Conflict / Meetingof the Working Group”, 10 May 2007, www.franceonu.org.24 HRW, above note 13.25 “UNICEF cautiously welcomes Tigers’ release ofchild soldiers”, IRIN, 29 June 2007; also statedin communication to the Coalition from the LTTE,23 July 2007. See also Report of the Secretary-General, above note 21.26 The LTTE made promises in 1998 when the thenSpecial Representative for children affected byarmed conflict visited Sri Lanka, to UNICEF inOctober 2002 and again in January 2003, andunder the Action Plan for children affected by warin March 2003.27 Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalfor Children and Armed Conflict, Oral statement toHuman Rights Council, 20 September 2007, www.un.org/children/conflict.28 AI, above note 1.29 For more detailed figures on 2006–7, see Reportof the Secretary-General, above note 21.30 Communication from the LTTE, 23 July 2007.31 Communication to the Coalition from the LTTE, 11October 2007.32 AI, above note 1.33 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.34 Permanent Mission of France, above note 23.35 For more details on the Action Plan and itsoperation in 2003–4 see Child Soldiers: GlobalReport 2004. See also Child Soldiers Coalition,The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) andChild Recruitment, July 2006.36 Information from local sources who wish toremain anonymous.37 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 4.SUDANRepublic of SudanPopulation: 36.2 million (16.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 104,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 26 July 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC API and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Thousands of child soldiers were recruitedand used by armed forces, governmentbackedmilitias and armed oppositiongroups in Sudan. Recruitment of childrenfrom refugee camps in Chad occurredin 2006. DDR efforts were hampered byongoing conflict in Darfur and the lackof basic infrastructure for successfulreintegration in the south.ContextArmed conflict continued in Darfur and delays tothe implementation of the 2005 ComprehensivePeace Agreement (CPA) threatened to derail theconsolidation of peace in southern Sudan. 1 TheCPA officially ended more than two decades ofnorth–south conflict between the ruling NationalCongress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). It providedfor a six-year interim power-sharing agreementto be followed by a referendum in 2011, in whichthe people of southern Sudan would vote on selfdetermination.In the interim, the CPA establishedthe transitional Khartoum-based government ofnational unity (GoNU) and a semi-autonomousGovernment of southern Sudan, based in Juba,southern Sudan. Under the CPA the nationaland southern governments shared power,resources and wealth but maintained separateconstitutions, armies, budgets and laws. 2 Thepresident of the former government of Sudan,General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, becamepresident of the national unity government,while the first vice-presidency was assumed bythe southern Sudan president and leader of theSPLM, Dr John Garang de Mabior, who was killedin a helicopter crash in July 2005 and replacedby Salva Kiir Mayardit. 3 UN Security CouncilResolution 1590 of 24 March 2005 mandated aUN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS) tosupport and monitor implementation of the CPA. 4The CPA required all other armed groups tojoin either the former Sudanese government’sarmed forces – the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)– or the SPLA by 9 January 2006. 5 The JanuaryS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1 5

expected to become operational by the end of2007.Relations between Chad and Sudandeteriorated substantially in 2006 and 2007, eachgovernment accusing the other of supporting itsarmed opposition groups. 31 Increasingly frequentJanjaweed cross-border attacks into easternChad were reported, resulting in the deaths ofhundreds of civilians. 32 As of late 2007 therewere approximately 240,000 Sudanese refugeesin eastern Chad, 60 per cent of whom wereestimated to be children. 33GovernmentNational recruitment legislationThe 2005 interim constitution stated that“Defence of the Country is an honour and dutyof every citizen” and “Every citizen shall defendthe country and respond to the call for nationaldefence and national service”. 34 Under theNational Service Law of 1992 (under review in late2007), all men between 18 and 33 were liable formilitary service, which applied to all branches ofthe armed forces. 35 The length of military servicewas 18 months for high-school graduates, 12months for university and college graduates and24 months in all other cases. According to thelaw, women were also liable for military servicebut in practice were not called up. 36 The draftSudan Armed Forces Act, which set 18 as theminimum age for recruitment and criminalizedthe recruitment of children, had not reached theNational Assembly as of June 2007.Southern Sudan’s interim constitution,adopted in December 2005, defined a childas anyone under the age of 18. It stated that“Defence of the Sudan in general and SouthernSudan in particular, is an honour and a duty ofevery citizen” and that “Every citizen shall ...defend the country and respond to the call fornational service”. 37 In Southern Sudan, the ChildBill 2006, which prohibited the recruitment ofchildren, passed its first reading in the SouthernSudan Assembly in June 2007. 38 Recruitment anduse of children was a breach of both the CPA andthe DPA. 39Child recruitment and deploymentSudan Armed Forces (SAF)The SAF denied recruitment or use of children intheir forces, but military officials acknowledgedthat children from armed groups were transferredinto their forces during the unification process.In May 2006, child soldiers were seen in a newlyintegrated SAF unit. In August 2006 the SAFestimated that there were approximately 19,000soldiers in these units and it was thought that asignificant number of them were under 18. 40 Therewere reports of children associated with both theSAF and allied militias in Darfur. 41Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)The SPLA acknowledged that it had child soldiersin its ranks and made high-level commitmentsto end their recruitment and use. However, 47children were reported in the Kilo 7 barracks inBentiu (Unity state) in July 2006, and they werenot released until July 2007. These childrenhad been enticed by SPLA junior officers whopromised education in Southern Sudan. SPLAforces raided a school in Nasir, Upper Nile,in October 2006 and abducted 32 boys forthe purpose of recruitment. All but two weresubsequently released. In September 2007the UN confirmed the presence of childrenassociated with SPLA forces in Southern Sudan.The youngest of the children was nine and theaverage age 16. 42Armed groupsMilitias and armed groups associatedwith the SPLAMilitias increased recruitment, including childrecruitment, before incorporation into either theSAF or SPLA in order to bolster their numbers andstrengthen their negotiating power. Commandersfrom Southern Sudan were confirmed to beactively recruiting children in Khartoum. Somearmed groups in the SSDF continued to recruitchildren after their incorporation into the SPLA inJanuary 2006. 43 The Pibor Defence Forces, a groupallied to the SPLA in April 2007, was responsiblefor the recruitment and use of at least 78 children,the youngest of whom was a boy aged six. TheSouthern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilizationand Reintegration (DDR) Commission was notifiedof their presence. Following the formal change ofalliance from the SAF to the SPLA in April 2007,the whereabouts of the children were unknown. 44Armed groups in DarfurThousands of children were recruited and usedby numerous armed groups in Darfur and activelyinvolved in the armed conflict between May andJuly 2006. IDPs interviewed in May 2006 followingSudan government-backed Janjaweed militiaattacks on villages near Kutum, northern Darfur,said that many armed child soldiers were amongthose who attacked them and Janjaweed wereknown to have recruited children from Sudaneserefugee camps in Chad in 2006. 45 In May 2006SLA-Minawi was observed forcibly recruitingboys in Gereida, and in April 2007 armed childrenbelieved to be as young as 12 were identifiedwith SLA-Minawi in northern Darfur. Recruitmentcontinued in 2007 by SLA-Minawi, factions ofthe SLA which had not signed the DPA and theopposition JEM (Peace Wing). 463 1 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integrationwas signed by the SPLA and the former SouthSudan Defence Forces (SSDF), which comprisedmost of the militias in southern Sudan previouslybacked by Khartoum. 6 However, the incompleteintegration of other armed groups into the SAFand SPLA led to continued tensions in the south.The CPA’s Abyei Protocol provided for sharedgovernment in the oil-rich Abyei transitionalregion. The Protocol granted Abyei specialadministrative status, an interim oil-revenuesharing plan, and a 2011 referendum to decidewhether to join what might be an independentsouthern Sudan. However, in violation of the CPA,the NCP rejected the July 2005 Abyei BoundariesCommission (ABC) report on demarcation of theregion. Both the SPLA and the SAF increasedtheir forces in and around the Abyei region andalong the border between north and south. Underthe CPA, SAF troops were required to hand overcontrol of the southern oilfields to joint patrolsby 9 July 2007, but the deadline was missed. 7 In2006 and 2007 both the SAF and SPLA severelyrestricted UN military observers’ movementsin the Abyei region. 8 In violation of the CPA theNCP continued to sponsor proxy militias, andhostilities continued in oil-producing areas. 9 InOctober 2007 the SPLM temporarily suspendedparticipation in the national unity government,citing among other concerns lack of progress overdemarcation of the Abyei region, transparency ofoil revenues and preparations for the census and2009 national elections. 10Conflict continued in Darfur with theopposition Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement(JEM) (both non-Arab ethnically based groups)fighting the SAF and their proxy Janjaweed militiasover perceived exclusion from state structures ofpower and wealth. 11 Hundreds of thousands ofpeople were killed and over 2.4 million displacedduring the conflict, which had begun in 2003. 12The mandate of the African Union Mission inSudan (AMIS), set up to monitor a failed April2004 ceasefire, was expanded in October 2004 toprotect civilians. 13 However, it had limited successin stabilizing the region and itself came underattack. 14The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), 15 signed inMay 2006 between the national unity governmentand a faction of the SLA headed by Minni Minawi(SLA Minawi), was rejected by the JEM and otherSLA factions. These groups criticized the DPAfor failing to address sufficiently power-sharing,representation in government, disarmamentof the Janjaweed militia, and a victim’scompensation fund. 16 The DPA was followed byfragmentation and proliferation of armed groupsand an intensification of violence. Elements of thearmed opposition groups that did not sign theDPA regrouped as the National Redemption Front(NRF), and from late June 2006 launched a seriesof attacks against the government. 17In August 2006 the NCP launched a newoffensive; its forces bombed villages, killingand displacing hundreds of civilians, includingchildren. 18 The NCP continued to support and armsome tribal and militia groups through selectivearms dealings and unilateral negotiations. 19Despite repeated disarmament promises itcontinued to incorporate the Janjaweed intoofficial security structures and paramilitarygroups such as the Border Intelligence Brigadeand the Popular Defence Forces. The Janjaweedcontinued to receive training and financialand material assistance from the government,including vehicle-mounted heavy machine gunsand mortars. The NCP ordered the reopeningof the Popular Military Defence (PMD) militarytraining camps around the country. 20 In April2007 the government formally launched theTransitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), thehighest governing body for the region. 21Throughout 2007 the SAF, the Janjaweed andDarfur armed groups continued to commit serioushuman rights abuses. 22 Continuing violence andNCP intransigence severely limited access forhumanitarian agencies in Darfur. 23 As of July 2007,2.2 million displaced people lived in camps inDarfur, and an estimated 80 per cent of the camppopulation were women and children. 24 A UNarms embargo was imposed on Darfur under UNSecurity Council Resolution 1591 of March 2005. 25However, the IDP camps were increasingly violentand militarized. 26 Rape and other sexual violenceagainst women and girls were widespread.Younger girls were specifically targeted for rape,and many victims identified the perpetrators asmembers of the SAF, the central reserve policeand the Janjaweed. 27 In August 2006 over 200women and girls were sexually assaulted over afive-week period in Kalma camp in south Darfur. 28Twelve years of conflict in eastern Sudan overperceived political and economic marginalizationunder the Khartoum government was broughtto an official end by the Eastern Sudan PeaceAgreement (ESPA) in October 2006. The ESPAwas signed by the GoNU and the Eastern SudanFront, a coalition of armed groups including theBeja Congress and the Free Lions Movementrepresenting the Rashaida ethnic group. InOctober 2006 eight Eastern Front members tookoffice in the National Assembly in accordancewith the ESPA. 29 However, implementation of theESPA was limited.In July 2007 UN Security Council Resolution1769 established a hybrid UN–African UnionMission in Darfur (UNAMID), with the aim ofimproving protection for civilians in Darfur, andspecifically requesting that the protection ofchildren be addressed in the implementationof the DPA. In addition it called for “continueddialogue with the parties towards thepreparations of time-bound action plans to endrecruitment and use of child soldiers and otherviolations against children”. 30 UNAMID wasS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1 7

© Ron Haviv 2005Young Sudanese soldiers in the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) armed group in SLAterritory, northern Darfur, Sudan3 1 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Chadian-backed Sudanese armedopposition groupsMassive recruitment by Sudanese armedopposition groups took place in March and April2006 among the refugee and IDP communities ineastern Chad. Recruitment was at times carriedout forcibly, with reports of torture as a coercivemeans. In July 2007 the UN reported that theChadian government had alleged that more than1,000 children had been recruited by the SLA inrefugee camps in the east. 47 In March 2006 theG-19 faction of the SLA, working in co-operationwith Chadian government officials, recruited,some forcibly, 4,700 Sudanese refugees,including hundreds of children, from the Breidjingand Treguine UN-supervised refugee camps50 km west of Adré in eastern Chad. 48 Mostof these people subsequently returned to thecamps. In 2006 Sudanese children were recruitedfrom the Djabal and Goz Amir refugee camps ineastern Chad, where teachers were among therecruiters. 49 In January 2007, 39 children wererecruited from the Breidjing refugee camp bySudanese armed opposition groups. 50Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandanarmed opposition group, was present insouthern Sudan and attacked and killed civilians.Peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandangovernment began in July 2006 in Juba and acessation-of-hostilities agreement was signed inAugust 2006. 51 The LRA forcibly recruited childrenfrom southern Sudan in the first half of 2007. 52While the total number of remaining LRA fightersremained unknown, up to 2,000 women andchildren were believed to remain in LRA camps. 53Disarmament, Demobilizationand Reintegration (DDR)The CPA obliged its signatories to demobilize allchildren in their ranks by July 2005. The NationalCouncil for DDR Co-ordination and the NorthernSudan DDR Commission were established by theCPA in February 2006 and a DDR Commissionfor Southern Sudan was created in May 2006.Despite the establishment of dedicated children’sdesks within these commissions, DDR washampered by continued conflict in Darfur and bythe lack of basic infrastructure in communities.Large numbers of children were still held inmilitary barracks beyond the CPA deadline andsome children returned to the armed forcesbecause of the lack of an effective reintegrationprogram. 54From 2001 to April 2006 an estimated 20,000children from the SPLA were demobilized andreturned to their families and communitieswith UNICEF support, but an estimated 2,000children were still associated with the SPLA,mainly in non-combat roles and in remote areas. 55As of August 2007, the Southern Sudan DDRCommission planned for the further release andreintegration of almost 600 children from SPLAranks in Southern Sudan. Following trainingon child protection for 64 SPLA and SAF fieldcommanders, in June 2007 commanders fromboth forces made a commitment to end childrecruitment, and an Area Joint Military Committeeaction plan to address abductions, rape andsexual violence was developed in Upper Nile,Jonglei and Unity states. 56An action plan for the identification andrelease of children was signed between SLA-Minawi and UNICEF on 11 June 2007. The actionplan was anticipated to benefit approximately1,800 children. Talks by UNMIS and UNICEF withrepresentatives of SLA (Wahid), SLA (Shafi), andSLA (Free Will) indicated that the groups werewilling to collaborate with the internationalcommunity towards the release of children intheir ranks. However, by the end of June 2007 noconcrete commitments to release children hadbeen made by those armed groups. 57Preparations for a children’s DDR programby UNICEF in collaboration with the NorthernSudan DDR Commission and the Eastern Frontwere being developed in mid-2007. As of August2007, preparations were under way between theUN Development Programme (UNDP) and theNorthern Sudan DDR Commission for the returnand assembly of former fighters of the EasternFront. 58 In late 2007 the UN Secretary-Generalreported that as part of the 2006 Eastern SudanPeace Agreement 3,700 ex-combatants werebeing demobilized, 250 of whom were children. 59DevelopmentsMrs Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN SpecialRepresentative for children and armed conflict,visited Sudan in January 2007, following whichthe government of Southern Sudan committedto increasing the budget for children’s DDRprograms. The national unity government agreedto allow UNICEF and UNMIS to visit and monitorSAF camps as well as the military barracksof armed forces and groups allied with it. Italso agreed to adopt and implement nationallegislation to criminalize recruitment of childsoldiers. DPA signatories and non-signatoriescommitted to co-operating with preparationof action plans to identify and release childrenassociated with their forces. 60At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Sudan and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 1 9

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.In May 2007 the International Criminal Court(ICC) issued arrest warrants for the Minister forHumanitarian Affairs in the Sudan governmentand a Janjaweed leader on charges of war crimesand crimes against humanity committed in 2003and 2004 in Darfur. 61 The Sudanese governmentrefused to co-operate with the ICC. 62Several parties in Sudan were listed asrecruiting or using children in situations of armedconflict in the December 2007 Secretary-General’sreport on children and armed conflict. 63International standardsSudan ratified the Optional Protocol in July 2005.In its declaration it stated that it was committedto maintaining a minimum age of 18 for voluntaryservice and “a prohibition of forced or voluntaryconscription” of under-18s. 641 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Sudan countrysummary, Human Rights Watch World Report2008.2 United Nations Mission in Sudan, ComprehensivePeace Agreement between the Government of theRepublic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement/Sudan People’s LiberationArmy, www.unmis.org.3 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Garang’s death:implications for peace in Sudan”, Africa BriefingNo. 30, 9 August 2005, www.crisisgroup.org.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1590(2005), UNDoc. S/RES/1590 (2005), 24 March 2005.5 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note 2.6 John Young, “The South Sudan Defence Forcesin the wake of the Juba Declaration”, Small ArmsSurvey, November 2006, www.smallarmssurvey.org/; Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in the Sudan, UN Doc.S/2006/662, 17 August 2006.7 ICG, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock”, AfricaBriefing No. 47, 12 October 2007.8 UNMIS, CPA Monitor, October 2007, www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_oct07.pdf9 UN Office of the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General for Children andArmed Conflict, “Visit to Sudan of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Conflict Mission Report”,24 January–2 February 2007, www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/countryvisits/SudanVisitReport.pdf.10 UNMIS, The CPA Monitor, October 2007, www.unmis.org.11 ICG, “Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process”,Africa Report No. 125, 30 April 2007.12 HRW, Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design, September2007.13 HRW, Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?January 2005.14 HRW, Sudan: Peacekeeper Killings Are WarCrimes, 1 October 2007.15 UNMIS, Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006,www.unmis.org.16 ICG, “Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement”, AfricaBriefing No. 39, 20 June 2006.17 ICG, “Getting the UN into Darfur”, policy briefing,Africa Briefing No. 43, 12 October 2006.18 “Sudan”, Human Rights Watch World Report2007.19 ICG, above note 11.20 ICG, “Darfur’s New Security Reality”, Africa ReportNo. 134, 26 November 2007.21 ICG, above note 11.22 Report of the Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict in the Sudan, UN Doc.S/2007/520, 29 August 2007.23 ICG, above note 20.24 United Nations Office for the Co-ordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Darfur, HumanitarianNeeds, 4 September 2007, http://ochaonline2.un.org.25 UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), UNDoc. S/RES/1591 (2005), 29 March 2005.26 ICG, above note 20.27 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.28 “Sudan”, above note 18.29 ICG, “Sudan: Saving Peace in the East”, AfricaReport No. 102, 5 January 2006; AmnestyInternational (AI), “Sudan”, Amnesty InternationalReport 2007; UNMIS, The CPA Monitor, October2006, www.unmis.org.30 African Union and United Nations HybridOperation in Darfur (UNAMID).31 Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and theCentral African Republic, 22 December 2006, UNDoc. S/2006/1019.32 AI, “Chad”, Amnesty International Report 2007.33 UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Action in Chad: Factsand Figures Snapshot Report”, 15 November2007, www.reliefweb.int.34 Interim National Constitution of the Republic ofthe Sudan 2005, www.unmis.org.35 Child Soldiers Coalition, correspondence withSudanese NGO, September 2007.36 War Resisters’ International, Sudan, 15 July 1998,www.wri-irg.org.37 Government of Southern Sudan InterimConstitution, United Nations Mission in Sudan(UNMIS), The CPA Monitor, October 2007, www.unmis.org.38 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.39 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, above note 2;Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006, UNMIS,www.unmis.org.40 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.41 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.3 2 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

42 Ibid.43 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.44 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.45 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 6.46 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.47 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Chad, 3 July 2007, UN Doc.S/2007/400.48 HRW, Violence beyond Borders: The HumanRights Crisis in Eastern Chad, June 2006.49 Report of the Secretary-General on children inarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/61/529-S/2006/826,26 October 2006.50 Report of the Secretary-General on children inarmed conflict, UN Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757,21 December 2007.51 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.52 “Edward Lomude: ‘LRA soldiers beat me and leftme for dead’”, IRIN, July 2007.53 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260, 7May 2007.54 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.55 UNICEF, “UNICEF welcomes child demobilisationin Southern Sudan”, 24 April 2006, www.unicef.org.56 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 22.57 Ibid.58 Ibid.59 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 50.60 UN Office of the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General for Children and ArmedConflict, above note 9.61 International Criminal Court, “Warrants for Arrestfor the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairsof Sudan, and a leader of the Militia/Janjaweed”,press release, 2 May 2007, www.icc-cpi.int.62 HRW, above note 1.63 Report of the Secretary-General, above note 50.64 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.SurinameRepublic of SurinamePopulation: 449,000 (161,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,800Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: not knownVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: signed 10 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 182No information was available on thepresence of under-18s in the armed forcesor the minimum age of recruitment.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the constitution, military service,or alternatively unarmed military service orcivilian service, was compulsory. 1 However, thelaw providing for compulsory military service hadbeen repealed, so that military service was nolonger compulsory. 2 No information was availableon the minimum age of voluntary recruitment.The armed forces, under the control of theMinistry of Defence, were supplemented by acivil police force controlled by the Ministry ofJustice and Police. 3 Joint police and militaryoperations were formalized in October 2005.The Netherlands, the USA and China providedtraining, military equipment and logistics. 4Armed groupsIn October 2006 former members of the JungleCommando, an armed opposition groupdisbanded after a peace agreement was signedin 1992, reportedly threatened to blow up ahydroelectric dam if the government failed toimplement the peace agreement fully. Formerinsurgents had been promised jobs, retrainingand land to start their own businesses afterdemobilization. 5DevelopmentsInternational standardsSuriname ratified the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention 182 in April 2006.1 Constitution of Suriname, Article 180.2 Initial report of Suriname to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.11,23 September 1998.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 2 1

3 US Department of State, Country Reports onHuman Rights Practices 2006.4 Suriname.net, National Security, www.surinam.net.5 “Former Suriname rebels threaten to blow uphydro-power dam”, Caribbean Net News, 14October 2006, www.caribbeannetnews.com.SWAZIL ANDKingdom of SwazilandPopulation: 1.0 million (514,000 under 18)Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: conscription notenforcedVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeRecruitment was regulated by the 1977 UmbutfoSwaziland Defence Force Act, which set theminimum age for conscription and voluntaryrecruitment into the armed forces at 18 years.Conscription was not, however, currently in force. 1DevelopmentsIn October 2006 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child expressed a number of concernsrelating to the protection of child rights, includingSwaziland’s lack of a systematic review to bringdomestic legislation into line with the provisionsof the UN Convention on the Rights of theChild, the lack of clarity in minimum ages forcriminal responsibility and marriage, low birthregistration and the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS on children in Swaziland. The Committeerecommended that Swaziland ratify the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of theChild on the involvement of children in armedconflict. 2The Committee welcomed the fact that theconstitution enacted in 2005 included provisionsaffording special protection to children. 31 Initial report of Swaziland to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRFC/C/SWZ/1, 16 February 2006.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Swaziland,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/SWZ/CO/1, 16 October 2006.3 Ibid.3 2 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

SWEDENKingdom of SwedenPopulation: 9.0 million (1.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 27,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 20 February 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed services, although children couldparticipate in military training programsfrom the age of 15.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll residents of Sweden between the ages of 16and 70 were liable for compulsory military, civilianor national service under the terms of the 1994National Total Defence Service Act. Compulsorymilitary service was performed in the armedforces and compulsory civilian service in supportof the civilian dimension of the Total Defence,defined as “the protection of Swedish societyin times of crisis or war”. 1 The obligation tocompulsory national service applied only in a timeof officially declared emergency preparedness.Compulsory military and civilian service waslimited to those who were 18 years old or older,and compulsory national service was restrictedto those who had reached the age of 16. As partof the Total Defence, 16-year-olds were prohibitedfrom performing any tasks that could constitutean aspect of military defence. 2 All Swedishmen of 18 to 47 were liable for military service,which lasted for seven and a half months. Of theapproximately 50,000 young men of conscriptionage 40 per cent were recruited each year. Theright to conscientious objection to military servicewas guaranteed on the basis of the 1994 TotalDefence Service Act. Objectors were required toperform a substitute service, also of seven and ahalf months’ duration. 3Military training and military schoolsSweden’s Armed Forces held voluntary youthcourses aimed at informing young peoplebetween the ages of 15 and 20 about the TotalDefence and career opportunities. Young peopleunder the age of 18 at the time of application hadto have the permission of a parent or guardian toparticipate in these activities. While 15-year-oldswere permitted to participate in firearms training,training with automatic weapons was restrictedto those aged 17 or above. The governmentemphasized that “these activities do not involvevoluntary recruitment to the armed forces”, andare “only aimed at providing information about,and promoting interest in, the Total Defence”. 4However, in 2007 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child encouraged the government to raisethe minimum age for firearms training in thesevoluntary activities to 18, in keeping with thespirit of the Optional Protocol. 5DevelopmentsIn July 2004, Chapter 4, Section 1(a) of the PenalCode, regarding the cross-border traffickingof human beings for sexual purposes, wasextended to include “non-cross-border humantrafficking and the trafficking in human beingsfor the purpose of forms of exploitation otherthan for sexual purposes, for example, for warservice and forced labour”. 6 In December 2005the government mandated the Swedish MigrationBoard to include the compulsory recruitmentof child soldiers in its consideration of forms ofpersecution concerning children in the asylumprocess. As part of a reform of its Penal Codeto allow for the greater integration of the RomeStatute of the International Criminal Court intodomestic law and practice, Sweden undertookto “criminalize, as a war crime, the recruitmentof children under the age of 15 years into thenational armed forces or the use of such childrenfor the active participation in hostilities”. As aresult, “the recruitment and use of child soldiersin hostilities, both within and outside Sweden, isdeemed to be an offence according to Swedishlaw”. 7 In 2007 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that these proposedreforms be completed as swiftly as possible. 8At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Sweden and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Initial report of Sweden to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol,UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SWE/1, 10 July 2006;Swedish Armed Forces, “The Facts 2006–2007”,www.mil.se.2 Initial report, above note 1.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 2 3

3 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.4 Initial report, above note 1.5 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Swedenon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SWE/CO/1, 8 June 2007.6 Initial report, above note 1.7 Ibid.8 Concluding observations, above note 5.SWITZERL ANDSwiss ConfederationPopulation: 7.3 million (1.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 4,200Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 26 June 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Both compulsory and voluntary enlistmentin the Swiss armed forces before the age of18 was explicitly prohibited.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 59 of the 1999 constitution provides thebasis for conscription; basic military training wascompulsory for all men aged 19 to 26. As the armywas a predominantly militia-style force, standingforces were considerably smaller than the reserveforces. While basic military training normallylasted 21 weeks, the requirements of reserveduty included participation in six or seven 17-daytraining periods up to the age of 34 for all men(continuing up to the age of 50 for officers). 1 Bothcompulsory and voluntary enlistment in the Swissarmed forces before the age of 18 was explicitlyprohibited. The 1995 Federal Act concerningthe Army and Military Administration (LAAM)stipulated that enlistment (including registrationand attendance of recruitment sessions) shouldtake place at the beginning of the year duringwhich those eligible for compulsory serviceturned 19, extending to the end of the year thatthose eligible for compulsory service turned 25. Itstipulated that the actual performance of militaryservice should begin at the start of the yearwhen the conscript became 20, with recruitmenttraining normally beginning at this time. TheLAAM also provided for voluntary military servicefor all Swiss women. A range of provisions in theSwiss Criminal Code prohibited and criminalizedthe recruitment and use in hostilities of childrenunder the age of 18 by armed groups. 2According to the government, all armed forcespersonnel received instruction in internationalhumanitarian law and children’s rights duringtheir training periods. Swiss civilian personnelparticipating in international peace-buildingmissions were given training in the particularneeds of children in armed conflicts as a core partof their preparation by the Department of ForeignAffairs. 33 2 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Military training and military schoolsAccording to the 2002 Ordinance on theRecruitment of Conscripts (OREC), all Swisscitizens received information at the age of 16from their cantonal authority regarding thepossibilities for military or civilian service, forservice in civil protection or in the Red Cross.The OREC also required all those eligible forconscription in the year they turned 19 to attendrecruitment sessions. Eighteen-year-olds wishingto do their recruitment training early could alsoattend. 4 There were no schools operated orcontrolled by the armed forces.5 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Switzerlandon implementation of the Optional Protocol,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CHE/CO/1, 17 March 2006.DevelopmentsIn examining Switzerland’s Initial Report onimplementation of the Optional Protocol inJanuary 2006, the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child took particular note that Switzerlandwas “a country of destination of asylum-seekingand migrant children coming from war-torncountries”. The Committee expressed concernover the apparent lack of relevant trainingregarding the needs of war-affected children forthose interviewing asylum seekers, and regrettedthe absence of any data on child asylum seekerswho had been involved in armed conflict in theircountries of origin. The Committee called on theSwiss authorities to provide asylum-seeking,refugee and migrant children who might havebeen involved in armed conflict with “immediate,culturally sensitive multidisciplinary assistancefor their physical and psychological recovery andfor their social reintegration”. 5At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Switzerland and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Quaker Council for European Affairs, The Rightto Conscientious Objection to Military Service inEurope: A Review of the Current Situation, April2005.2 Initial report of Switzerland to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on the implementationof the Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/CHE/1, 14 July 2005.3 Ibid.4 2002 Ordinance on the Recruitment of Conscripts,www.admin.ch.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 2 5

SYRIASyrian Arab RepublicPopulation: 19.0 million (8.4 million under 18)Government armed forces: 307,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 17 October 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports that under-18s wereused by government armed forces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder the terms of the constitution conscriptionwas compulsory for all Syrians (Article 40).In practice, it only applied to Syrian (andPalestinian) males over the age of 19 living inSyria. Under the Service of the Flag Law, DecreeNo. 115 of 5 October 1953, the minimum age forconscription was the “first day of January in theyear in which a Syrian citizen reaches 19”. The lawreserved the right to lower the recruitment age to18 in times of “war or emergency” from the “firstday of January following the date on which therecruit reaches 18 years of age”. 1 In 2005 militaryservice was reduced from 30 to 24 months. 2 In2007 Decree No. 30 further amended the Flag Lawand updated conditions for the deferral of serviceand exemptions, including study and residencyabroad. 3 Those from families with only one sonwere also exempted. 4 From the ages of 17 to 42,all Syrian males required advance permissionfrom the Armed Forces recruitment department toleave the country. Voluntary recruitment was opento men and women over 18. 5Article 6 of the Service of the Flag Lawstipulated the procedures to be followed toprevent the direct participation in hostilities ofmembers of the armed forces below 18 years ofage. There was no known domestic legislation tocriminalize the recruitment of under-18s, but Syriasaid that it closely monitored the ages of recruits.Syria held that all international instrumentssigned by the government, including the OptionalProtocol, were treated as domestic law, so thatthere was “no need to enact a special law toincorporate such an instrument into domesticlaw”. 6Military training and military schoolsSyria had phased out military education inschools. 7 The Ministry of Defence ran schoolsfor the families of those who had died in thecourse of military service, but these followed thesame curriculum as those run by the Ministry ofEducation. 8 Conscripted officers were trained atthe three main armed forces academies at Homs,Latakia and Aleppo. 9Child recruitment and deploymentThere were no reports that children were beingrecruited into government forces. 10 However,there was potential for confusion on verifyingthis, given problems in registering births in someareas, particularly Kurdish regions. The needfor improved documentation, irrespective of thelegal status of parents, was highlighted by the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child.Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights madeit difficult to verify implementation in that area. 11Armed groupsSyria continued to support a number of non-statearmed groups in the region, including thosereported to have recruited under-18s, notablyHizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and PalestinianIslamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory. 12 Leaders of both Hamas and PIJ werebased in Damascus. 13 Palestinian groups,including Islamic Jihad, Fatah and the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine-GeneralCommand (PFLP-GC), were also alleged to havecarried out military training inside Syria. 14 Noinformation came to light on the involvement ofunder-18s. There were a number of Iraqi armedgroups, both Shia and Sunni, with members inSyria, notably former Ba’athists. 15 Observers hadnot noted any efforts to recruit under-18s fromthe growing refugee population. However, lowschool registration and limited humanitarianassistance meant that there was a strong risk ofthis happening. 16DevelopmentsOn acceding to the Optional Protocol in 2003,Syria supported the “straight-18” position,and stated that “the statutes in force and thelegislation applicable to the Ministry of Defenceof the Syrian Arab Republic do not permit anyperson under 18 … to join the active armed forcesor the reserve bodies or formations”. 17 Its initialreport to the Committee on the Rights of the Childrelating to the Optional Protocol was consideredin October 2007. The Committee appreciated anumber of Syria’s legal commitments on childrecruitment to date, but it urged Syria to enactlegislation explicitly prohibiting the recruitment ofchildren, whether by or against Syrian nationals. 18Syria worked with the International Committeeof the Red Cross to train a number of militaryofficials in international humanitarian law (IHL) aspart of efforts to integrate IHL into theoretical and3 2 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

practical military training and civil society. 19 TheCommittee on the Rights of the Child praised itsprogress in raising awareness of the Conventionon the Rights of the Child. However, it urged Syriato develop a systematic program to improveawareness and training on the Optional Protocolsfor all relevant professional groups. 20Having ratified the ILO Convention No. 182on child labour in 2003, Syria amended somelegislation accordingly, but loopholes remainedand penalties were minimal. 21Syria remained formally at war with Israel,which maintained its occupation of the GolanHeights.16 Confidential sources, August 2007.17 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.18 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Syria,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SYR/CO/1, 5 October 2007.19 International Committee for the Red Cross, AnnualReports 2004–6, www.icrc.org.20 Concluding observations, above note 18.21 IRIN News, “Syria: Child labourers operate inlegal loophole, say rights workers”, 13 July 2006.* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 Initial Report by Syria to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/SYR/1,18 April 2007.2 “Military services in Syria reduced to two years”,Arabic News, 7 January 2005, www.arabicnews.com.3 “President Assad Publishes Decree Number 30”,al-Baath, no.13136, 6 May 2007 (Arabic). Thisincluded payment of an exemption fee of betweenUS$500 and US$8,000 for Syrians living abroad;www.syria-news.com.4 Confidential sources, August 2007.5 Ismail al-Jarradat, “Interview with Syrian Head ofRecruitment, General Muhammad Ali Qamtad”,al-Thawra, 9 May 2007 (Arabic).6 Initial Report, above note 1.7 Confidential sources, 15 July 2007.8 Initial Report, above note 1.9 exploitz.com!, “Syria – Military Training”, www.exploitz.com.10 Confidential sources, above note 7.11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Syria,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPSC/SYR/CO/1, 31 October 2006.12 “Syria threatened to fight in Lebanon war– Hezbollah”, Reuters, 23 July 2007; IsraeliMinistry of Foreign Affairs, “Iranian and Syriansupport for Hizbullah and the Palestinian terroristorganizations”, 18 March 2007, www.mfa.gov.il.13 Hamas’s political leader, Khaled Mashal, and PIJ’ssecretary-general, Dr Ramadan al-Shallah. SeeAmira Howaidy, “Constants reiterated,” Al-AhramWeekly, 31 January 2008, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg.14 Matthew Levitt, “Terror from Damascus (PartI): The Palestinian terrorist presence in Syria”,PeaceWatch #420, Washington Institutefor Near East Policy, 7 May 2003. www.washingtoninstitute.org.15 Brookings Institute–University of Bern, “Iraqirefugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: a fieldbasedsnapshot”, occasional paper, June 2007,www3.brookings.edu.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 2 7

TAIWANTaiwanPopulation: 22 million (5.2 million under 18) 1Government armed forces: 290,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 20 2Treaties ratified: not applicableThe minimum age for recruitment to thearmed forces was 18, and there were noreports of under-18s serving in the forces.ContextTensions remained high between Taiwan andChina. Taiwan continued to build its defencepolicies around a potential attack by China,which it claimed was involved in an ongoingmilitary build-up. 3 In June 2007 proposals by theTaiwanese president to hold a referendum onwhether the island should seek membership ofthe UN were met with severe criticism from China,which said that such moves would endangerpeace and stability in the region. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1947 constitution states that “The peopleshall have the duty of performing military servicein accordance with law” (Article 20).The 1933 Military Service Law, as amendedin 2000 and 2005, provided the legal basis forconscription, stating that all males were liable formilitary service from 1 January of the year afterthey turned 18 until 31 December of the year theyturned 40, this range being defined as the militaryservice age (Article 3). Exemption on healthgrounds and deferment for school and collegestudents were allowed. Citizens sentenced toimprisonment for at least five years or whohad served a total of three years in prison wereineligible for service (Article 5). 5Under the Implementation Act for SubstituteService of 2000, those conscripts consideredunsuitable for regular military service wereallowed to perform substitute service, includingin the police, fire, social, environmental, medicaland educational services. 6 Enlisted men couldalso apply for substitute service. 7 Accordingto the government, about 14,000 conscriptsperformed substitute service in 2005. 8The 1954 Punishment Act for Violation toMilitary Service System, as amended in 1967 and1972, provided for prison sentences of up to fiveyears for males of military service age who triedto avoid recruitment (Article 3). 9The 1959 Act of Military Service for VolunteerEnlisted Men, as amended in 2003, stated thatmales who had reached military service age couldvolunteer to enlist for between three and fiveyears, and could apply to extend their term forbetween one and three years (Article 3). Furtherextension could be ordered by the Ministry ofDefence in the event of war or disorder, or if thenumber of retirees would affect national defence(Article 5). According to the government about6,500 enlistees signed up in 2005. 10Military service requirements were currentlyundergoing substantial revisions as part of anoverall streamlining of the armed forces, whichaimed to see troop numbers reduced to around275,000 by the end of 2008. 11 While the militaryhad hitherto consisted primarily of conscripts,efforts were now in place to reduce the numbersof conscripted troops while encouragingvolunteers. The government aimed for a ratio of60 per cent volunteers to 40 per cent conscriptsby 2008. 12From January 2006 the compulsory serviceperiod for conscripts was reduced from 22 to 16months, to be reviewed annually. 13 The DefenceMinistry announced that, subject to sufficientnumbers of volunteers enlisting, the period wouldbe further reduced to 14 months in 2007, and 12months in 2008. 14 The 2005 amendments to theMilitary Service Act also allowed women to serveas enlisted personnel. 15After discharge from active duty, all reservistshad to report to their local military reserveunits, which were sub-units of the Armed ForcesReserve Command. Reservists were organizedinto various units according to their militaryoccupational specialty. Registered reserviststotalled 3.4 million in 2005. 16Military training and military schoolsTaiwan operated a range of military educationestablishments, including the Republic ofChina Military Academy, Naval Academy and AirForce Academy, as well as various specializedmilitary schools, such as Fu Hsing Kang College,established to train in “political warfare”, theNational Defence Medical Centre, the NationalDefence Management College and the ChungCheng Institute of Technology. The armed forcesalso operated a number of branch schools, suchas the infantry, armour, and artillery and missilebranch schools of the army. The Chung ChengArmed Forces Preparatory School provided seniorhigh school education to students who wished tocontinue in one of the three service academiesor attend the Fu Hsing Kang College followinggraduation. It combined a regular senior highschool education with basic military training. 173 2 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

1 Government Information Office, Taiwan Yearbook2006 (figures from 2006), www.gio.gov.tw.2 CIA, The World Factbook, 2008.3 “National Defence”, Taiwan Yearbook 2006,above note 1.4 VOA News, “China blasts Taiwan president’ssupport for UN referendum”, 13 June 2007, www.voanews.com.5 Military Service Act, 2 February 2000.6 “National Defence”, above note 3.7 Conscription Agency of the Ministry of Interior,www.nca.gov.tw.8 “National Defence”, above note 3.9 Punishment Act for Violation to Military ServiceSystem, 24 February 1972.10 “National Defence”, above note 3.11 Ibid.12 Ministry of National Defence, 2006 NationalDefence Report, R.O.C., Ch. 7.13 Ibid.14 “Compulsory service to be reduced to 1 year by2008 if recruiting is successful”, Central NewsAgency, 27 September 2005.15 “National Defence”, above note 3.16 Ibid.17 Ibid.TAJIKISTANRepublic of TajikistanPopulation: 6.5 million (3.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 7,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 5 August 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Weapons training could begin in schoolfor senior students. There were someallegations of illegal conscription of under-18s into the armed forces.ContextIn May 2006 armed men, allegedly linked to thearmed opposition group Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan (IMU) (see Uzbekistan entry), raided aTajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of the attackersand Tajik and Kyrgyz security forces were killedin the ensuing fighting. 1 During 2006 at least 30alleged IMU members and 50 alleged membersof the banned Islamic opposition party Hizb-ut-Tahrir were detained and many were sentenced tolong prison terms after unfair trials. 2Tajikistan was a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO), established inJune 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation andUzbekistan, whose goals included mutual cooperationin security matters. 3Until 2005 about half of Tajikistan’s conscriptsserved with the Russian army, which protectedTajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. 4 In mid-2005Russian forces withdrew from the border, handingover control to Tajik border guards, but retainedseveral thousand troops at a military base in thecapital, Dushanbe. 5 There were also French andIndian air force bases in Tajikistan. 6GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe armed forces were largely conscripted.Conscription was provided for in the constitution.The Law on Universal Military Responsibility andMilitary Service required men aged 18–27 to domilitary service for 24 months, or 18 months forthose with higher education.In February 2006 the president notedthat over 40 laws and decrees had come intoforce in the previous five years in the field ofdefence, including those to protect the rightsS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 2 9

and social interests of conscripts. 7 Details of theamendments were not readily available.The Law on Universal Military Responsibilityand Military Service stated that alternativeservice could be carried out in accordance withlegislation, but no legislation had been passedto provide for it. A group of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) were still campaigning in2007 for an alternative service law, but therewere fears that the government might deletethe provision from the Law on Universal MilitaryResponsibility and Military Service. 8 In October2007 the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses andtwo evangelical Christian groups were suspendedfor three months because of members’ refusal toserve in the military. 9About 12,000 conscripts were called up everyyear. 10 Dozens of cases were reported annuallyin which officers or officials took bribes to letconscripts avoid military service. The governmentrepeatedly acknowledged the problem ofcorruption in the armed forces. 11 One governmentofficial said parents did not want to send theirchildren into the army because of poor foodand living conditions. 12 Enlistment targets werenot met because young men left to find work inRussia or avoided conscription. In some casesunder-age boys were reportedly rounded up byconscription officers who had failed to reachtheir targets. In 2004 nine senior military officialswere sacked for enlistment offences and onesenior officer was convicted of abuse of powerby an army court. At least some of these casesreportedly involved under-age boys. 13 Cases ofunder-age recruitment to fulfil quotas continuedto be reported in 2006. 14Tajikistan prohibited the voluntary recruitmentof under-18s to the armed forces, according to itsdeclaration made on accession to the OptionalProtocol in 2002. 15Military training and military schoolsThe Ministry of Defence participated in thedevelopment of educational standards, programsand methods for the preparation of civiliansfor military service. 16 Students in senior schoolclasses studied principles of military science toprepare them for military service. 17 In 2006 oneschool sent 30 students to the Russian militarybase for five days where they were taught how tofire weapons. 18Students could take two-year courses at amilitary school in Dushanbe based on the SovietmodelSuvorov schools. On average about 100students graduated every year and went on tostudy in the Military Institute of Tajikistan andabroad in Russia and other countries. 19Armed groupsIn October 2004 a boy captured by security forcesin the Pakistani border region of Waziristan saidhe been abducted with four younger boys from avillage in Tajikistan and trafficked to Pakistan bymasked Tajik men in 2002. The Pakistani militarysaid he had been trained to plant mines andthat armed groups were increasingly recruitingteenagers from Central Asia to carry out attacks. 20In Tajikistan there was scepticism that childrenhad been abducted and trafficked from thecountry. 21 In June 2006 the boy was released intothe custody of a relief organization in Pakistan,which said he had been arrested by the Pakistanimilitary in a madrasa (Islamic religious school) inPakistan and unlawfully detained, and was beingreturned to his family. 22In May 2007 the State Committee on NationalSecurity stated that an Iranian citizen detainedby the Tajik authorities had taken Tajikistani boysaged 10–15 to a neighbouring country purportedlyfor religious education, but in fact for training byarmed groups. The State Committee on NationalSecurity did not specify which armed groups wereimplicated, how many boys were involved, orwhich country they were sent to. 23DevelopmentsInternational standardsTajikistan ratified the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention 182 in June 2005.1 Dadodjan Azimov, “Are Islamic militantsregrouping in the Fergana Valley?”, Institute ofWar and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December2006, www.iwpr.net; see also AmnestyInternational Report 2007, entry on Kyrgyzstan.2 Amnesty International Report 2007.3 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.4 International Institute for Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance 2004/2005, quoted in DerekBrett, Military Recruitment and ConscientiousObjection: A Thematic Global Survey, Conscienceand Peace Tax International, May 2006, p.11,http://cpti.ws.5 Tajikistan Country Profile, BBC News, 23 March2007; Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s military presencein Tajikistan to be legalized and diluted”,Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,6 October 2004 , www.jamestown.org; ZoyaPylenko, “Badakhshan: more poverty afterRussian withdrawal”, Central Asia–CaucasusAnalyst, 16 November 2005, www.cacianalyst.org.6 Shishir Gupta, “Tajik air base is ready, gives Indiaits first footprint in strategic Central Asia”, IndianExpress, 25 February 2007, www.indianexpress.com; “France to boost air group in Tajikistan– embassy”, RIA Novosti, 11 May 2006, http://en.rian.ru.3 3 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

7 “Address of President Emomali Rakhmonov of theRepublic of Tajikistan on the Occasion of ArmedForces Day of the Republic of Tajikistan andDefence of the Fatherland”, presidential website,23 February 2006, www.president.tj; N. Dodov,“The Seventh Session of the Third Majlisi MiliMajlisi of the Republic of Tajikistan”, Khovar NewsAgency, 16 November 2006, www.khovar.tj.8 “Alternative Military Service Under Review”, IWPRNews Briefing Central Asia, 12 July 2007.9 “Tajik officials ban Jehovah’s Witnesses,Baptists”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 23 October 2007, www.rferl.org.10 O. Sidirov, “The armed forces of Tajikistan– yesterday and today”, Gazeta.kz, 13 March2007, www.gazeta.kz.11 See, for example, “Address of PresidentE. Rakhmonov on the Occasion of the 14thAnniversary of the Creation of the Armed Forces ofthe Republic of Tajikistan”, presidential website,23 February 2007.12 “Why doesn’t your son serve in the army?”,Avesta, 22 February 2007, www.avesta.tj.13 Gulnora Amirshoeva, “Tajik army abuses tackled”,IWPR, 5 November 2004.14 Correspondence with confidential source,Dushanbe.15 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,www2.ohchr.org.16 Law on Universal Military Responsibility andMilitary Service, Article 18.17 “Cultural events have taken place at the Ministryof Defence to celebrate the forthcoming 23February Armed Forces Day of the Republic ofTajikistan”, Safina Television, undated, www.safina.tj.18 Valentina Kondrashova, “Russian militarypersonnel gave schoolboys lessons in initialmilitary preparation”, Asia Plus News Agency,1 June 2006, www2.asiaplus.tj.19 O. Sidirov, above note 10.20 See, for example, “Qaeda using children forterrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26 November2004; “Tale of a lost militant”, Reuters, 15December 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk.21 “Why doesn’t the ‘Tajik boy’ come home?”,Khovar, 12 November 2004, at www.tajik-gateway.org.22 “Innocent foreigners detained”, Dawn, 31 May2006, www.dawn.com; “Pakistani court ordersrelease of two Tajik Al-Qaeda militants”, KUNA(Kuwait News Agency), 5 June 2006.23 “Terrorist accomplice detained in Tajikistanfor recruiting teenagers to madrasah studies”,Interfax, 23 May 2007, www.interfax-religion.com;“Tajik youths were trained as future mohajedinsand suicide bombers”, Regnum, 21 May 2007,www.regnum.ru.tanzaniaUnited Republic of TanzaniaPopulation: 38.3 million (19.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 27,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18; younger withparental consentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 11 November 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces although their presencecould not be ruled out as defence forceregulations permitted recruitment undersome circumstances. No recruitment ofchild soldiers from Burundian refugeecamps was reported after September 2004.ContextTanzania continued to host large numbers ofrefugees who had fled conflict in their countriesof origin. The UN Refugee Agency’s (UNHCR)planning figures for 2008–9 indicated over381,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Tanzania,mostly from Burundi and the Democratic Republicof the Congo (DRC). 1 In January 2007 there weresome 600,000 refugees, over 350,000 fromBurundi and over 120,000 from the DRC. 2 In early2007 the Tanzanian authorities were accused ofill-treating Burundian and Rwandan refugees andof forcibly expelling them during 2006. 3The entry of Burundi’s main armed oppositiongroup, the Conseil National pour la Défensede la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défensede la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD, led by PierreNkurunziza), into the Burundian government in2003 and the subsequent reform of the armedforces there appeared to have triggered thereturn to Burundi of some 90,000 refugeesin 2004. Thousands more returned ahead ofBurundian local and legislative elections in 2005. 4Repatriation of both Burundian and DRC refugeescontinued in 2007. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeWhen acceding to the Optional Protocol inNovember 2004, Tanzania stated in its declarationthat “the minimum age for the voluntaryrecruitment into armed conflict is eighteenyears.” 6S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3 1

However, Section 67 of the Defence ForcesRegulations prohibited the recruitment of personsapparently under 18 into the armed forces,“except that where a person is not of the apparentage of eighteen years he may be enrolled in theDefence Forces with the consent in writing of oneof his parents or guardian, or, when the parents orguardian are dead or unknown, with the consentof the Area Commission of the district in whichthat person resides”. 7 The regulations providedthat no child under the age of 18 could be useddirectly in armed conflict. 8In July 2007 the government stated that theage of voluntary recruitment to all defence forceswas set at 18 and that birth and other certificateswere scrutinized to prevent the recruitmentof under-18s. It also stated that only over-18scould enlist, and that some military training wasprovided. There was no compulsory recruitment. 9The government reported that although therecruitment of under-18s appeared to be apossibility in exceptional circumstances, inpractice there was no such recruitment of under-18s in the Tanzania People Defence Forces (TPDF).No schools were under the control of the TPDF. 10Armed groupsPrior to 2004 Burundi’s armed political groupsreportedly recruited children as young as eightfrom refugee camps in Tanzania and carried outtraining in or near camps. 11The entry of the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza)into the Burundian government in 2003 andthe subsequent return to Burundi of largenumbers of CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) fighters ledto improvements in camp security. Recruitmentby the CNDD-FDD (Nkrunziza) was reportedin refugee camps as late as September 2004,and at the end of that year they and otherarmed political groups were reported still tobe demanding financial contributions from therefugee population. 12Although recruitment, including of children,by the one remaining active Burundian armedpolitical group, the National Liberation Forces(Forces nationales de libération, FNL), wasreported in Burundian territory borderingTanzania in 2006, 13 no recruitment fromBurundian refugee camps had been reportedsince 2004. 14DevelopmentsIn 2005, in its second periodic report to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, Tanzaniaacknowledged that child trafficking existed withinTanzania, and proposed introducing a “Children’sLaw” to address this and other child protectionissues, including a consistent legislativedefinition of a child. 15 In 2006 the Committeeexpressed concern at the lack of a clear timeframe for finalizing and enacting this legislation. 16As of October 2007 the government reportedthat it had yet to incorporate internationalhumanitarian laws (such as the Convention on theRights of the Child and its Optional Protocols) intoits domestic legislation. 171 UNHCR Global Appeal 2008–2009, Tanzania,http://www.unhcr.org.2 UNHCR Global Appeal 2007, Tanzania, www.unhcr.org.3 Human Rights Watch (HRW), letter to PresidentJakaya Mrisho Kikwete of Tanzania, 8 May 2007.4 Amnesty International (AI), “Burundi: refugeerights at risk: human rights abuses in returns toand from Burundi”, AI Index: AFR 16/006/2005,27 June 2005.5 UNHCR, “Uncertain future for return operationfrom Tanzania to Congo”, News Stories, 24September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/; UNHCRNews, ‘UNHCR and partners in new initiatives toboost repatriation to Burundi”, 12 July 2007, www.unhcr.org.6 Declaration on accession to the Optional Protocol,http://www2.ohchr.org.7 Confidential sources, Tanzania, July 2007.8 Second periodic report of Tanzania to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.26, 24 August 2005.9 Letter to the Child Soldiers Coalition from theTanzania High Commission, London, July 2007;Second periodic report, above note 8.10 Initial report of Tanzania to the Committee on theRights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TZA/1,19 October 2007.11 HRW, “Child Soldier Use 2003, a Briefing forthe 4th UN Security Council”, Open Debate onChildren and Armed Conflict, January 2003.12 Burundi: refugee rights at risk, above note 4.13 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict inBurundi, UN Doc. S/2006/851, 27 October 2006;ITEKA, (Burundian Human Rights League), http://www.ligue-iteka.africa-web.org.14 Confidential sources, Dar es Salaam, June 2007.15 Second periodic report of Tanzania to theCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/70/Add.26, 24 August 2005.16 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Tanzania,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/TZA/CO/2, 21 June 2006.17 Initial report, above note 10.3 3 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

THAIL ANDKingdom of ThailandPopulation: 64.2 million (18.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 306,600Compulsory recruitment age: 20Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 27 February 2006Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. Children were reported tobe involved with armed separatist groupsin the south. Refugees from Myanmarincluded former child soldiers recruitedby the Myanmar armed forces and armedpolitical groups.ContextViolence in the four mainly Muslim southernprovinces escalated steadily; over 2,000 peoplehad been killed there since 2004. Armed groupsbombed, beheaded or shot Muslim and Buddhistcivilians, including monks and teachers. Humanrights violations committed by the authoritiesincluded the deaths of scores of people, enforceddisappearances and arbitrary detention. 1In September 2006 Prime Minister ThaksinShinawatra was deposed in a bloodlessmilitary coup. Coup leaders abrogated the 1997constitution and issued decrees institutingmartial law. 2 A new constitution was endorsed ina referendum in August 2007.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeArticle 71 of the 2007 constitution states that“Every person has a duty to defend the country.”The 1954 Military Service Act providedthe legal basis for conscription, requiring thatevery Thai man who had attained the age of 20would be recruited into the armed forces; 3 anestimated 80,000 troops in the Thai military wereconscripts. 4 The age of voluntary recruitment was18. 5 The age for participation in hostilities was notstipulated in law. 6In February 2006 Thailand acceded to theOptional Protocol, stating in its declaration thatmilitary service was compulsory by law andthat Thai men reaching the age of 18 had a dutyto register on the inactive military personnellist. However, the age given for compulsoryrecruitment in the declaration appeared to beat variance with the 1954 law cited above. Thedeclaration states, “At the age of 21, selectedinactive military personnel will become activemilitary personnel. Inactive military personnelmay also voluntarily apply to become activemilitary personnel to serve in the national armedforces. Women are exempt from compulsorymilitary service both in times of peace and intimes of war, but are subjected to other dutiesassigned by law. In times of war or national crisis,inactive military personnel (men aged over 18)may be recruited to participate in the armedforces.” 7Military training and military schoolsThe Armed Forces Academies Preparatory Schooloffered secondary education to students beforethey joined a military or police academy. Theschool aimed to enhance the knowledge andefficiency of pre-cadets, who were divided intofour battalions directly controlled by platooncommanders, their military education and trainingbeing provided by the Regiment of Cadets.Applicants to the school had to be unmarried andbetween 14 and 17 years of age, with educationalqualifications to the level of Grade 10, and theyhad to meet the health and height qualificationsrequired by the armed forces or police. 8In its accession declaration to the OptionalProtocol, Thailand stated that admission tomilitary schools was on a voluntary basis,depending on success in the entranceexaminations and subject to the consent ofparents or legal guardians. High school anduniversity students regardless of gender couldapply voluntarily to receive military training fromthe Army Reserve Command, with the consentof parents or legal guardians. Students whocompleted three years’ training were exempt frommilitary service as active military personnel whenthey reached the age of 21. 9 The minimum age forenrolment in the Reserve Officer Training Corpswas 16. 10Armed groupsAlthough reliable information was scarce, therewere credible reports of the use of childrenin operations by separatist armed groups insouthern Thailand. 11 The most active of theseparatist groups, the National RevolutionFront-Coordinate (Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, BRN-C), had a youth wing withover 7,000 members, which, together withunits organized into cells, was reported to beresponsible for much of the violence. 12 BetweenJanuary 2004 and June 2007 separatist groupswere responsible for the deaths of at least 70teachers, and burned down 170 governmentschools. 13 Children were among those who werekilled. 14S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3 3

BRN-C was reported to have penetrated someIslamic elementary schools and private boardingschools (ponohs) in the southern provinces. 15There was no information to indicate that militarytraining took place in the schools, but accordingto some sources “suitable” children or youngpeople were selected to join after-school studygroups, where initiation into the BRN-C began.The number of children in the BRN-C or otherarmed groups was not clear, nor was the extentto which under-18s took part in their operations.However, there were indications that boys belowthe age of 18, some in their early teens, wereused to distribute leaflets and write graffiti, andfor sabotage and arson. 16 Occasionally, under-18s were reported to have been used to plantbombs. 17Some reports indicated that governmentforces had killed children suspected ofinvolvement in the southern insurgency. 18 Therewere also reports of the arbitrary detention ofunder-18s suspected of belonging or havinglinks to armed groups. More than 600 people, ofwhom at least six were under 18, were reportedlydetained in operations from June to August 2007and had “volunteered” to undergo a program offour months’ occupational training in an armycamp as an alternative to being charged withoffences relating to national security. 19 The sixwere reported to have been released in August.In its declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, Thailand stated that “Non-governmentalmilitias are prohibited by law, regardless of theage of persons concerned.” 20DevelopmentsSeveral thousand Lao Hmong asylum seekersremained in a camp in Phetchabun province inpoor conditions. According to some sources, alarge percentage of the camp population werechildren. 21Over 140,000 refugees, largely from the Karenethnic group, were living in refugee camps on theThailand–Myanmar border. 22 Tens of thousandsof others were living outside the camps; thesereportedly included former child soldiers, whohad escaped from the Myanmar armed forces(Tatmadaw) and were reported to encounterdiscrimination, ostracism and other difficulties inthe refugee camps. Many former Tatmadaw childsoldiers who fled to Thailand remained outsidethe camps, where they had no access to supportor services. Increasing restrictions imposed by theThai authorities on international organizationsmade it extremely difficult for these organizationsto provide protection for former child soldierscrossing the border. 23There were reports of the recruitment ofseveral children who lived in Mae La refugeecamp in Thailand by the Karen National Union-Karen National Liberation Army – Peace Council(KNU-KNLA PC), which had broken away from theKNLA (an ethnic Karen armed group fighting theTatmadaw) and made peace with the Myanmargovernment in 2007. 24 There were reported tobe plans by the UN Working Group on childrenaffected by armed conflict to develop a formalsystem for monitoring and reporting on therecruitment of child soldiers from the camps. 251 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “‘It was likesuddenly my son no longer existed’: enforceddisappearances in Thailand’s southern borderprovinces”, Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No.5(C), March 2007.2 Amnesty International Report 2007.3 Second periodic report of Thailand to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, 31 May2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.15.4 Global Security, “Royal Thai Military”, www.globalsecurity.org.5 CIA, The World Factbook, Thailand.6 Second periodic report of Thailand, above note 3.7 Declaration of Thailand on acceding to theOptional Protocol, 27 February 2006, www2.ohchr.org.8 Thailand Armed Forces Academies, www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5522/T_T_HE.HTM.9 Declaration of Thailand, above note 7.10 “Training for war so that we may live in peace”,Bangkok Post, 10 October 2006,www.bangkokpost.net.11 Confidential correspondence, June 2007.12 HRW, “‘Suddenly my son no longer existed’”,above note 1.13 HRW, “Thailand: education in the south engulfedin fear”, 14 June 2007.14 HRW, “No One is Safe: Insurgent ViolenceAgainst Civilians in Thailand’s Southern BorderProvinces”, August 2007.15 International Crisis Group (ICG), “SouthernThailand: insurgency, not jihad”, May 2005.16 Confidential interviews, Bangkok, February 2007.17 Coalition confidential source.18 “Army vows to probe killing of teenagers by unit,and take action if soldiers guilty”, Nation, 15 April2007, www.nationmultimedia.com.19 Working Group on Peace and Justice, “The humanrights situation in south Thailand”, briefing note,20 August 2007. Copy on file at Coalition.20 Declaration of Thailand, above note 7.21 HRW, “Thailand: Protect Hmong refugees:more than 8,000 Lao Hmong at risk of forcedrepatriation”, 30 August 2007.22 UNHCR, “Borders with Myanmar remain calm;no influx of refugees”, UNHCR News Stories, 1October 2007.23 “Sold to be soldiers: the recruitment and use ofchild soldiers in Burma”, Human Rights Watch,Vol. 19, No. 15(C), October 2007.3 3 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

24 Karen Human Rights Group, “Child soldiersrecruited to support the expansion of the KNU-KNLA Peace Council”, news bulletin, 28 May2007, www.khrg.org.25 Thai Burma Border Consortium, TBBC ProgrammeReport: January to June 2007, 30 Aug 2007.TIMOR-LE STEDemocratic Republic of Timor-LestePopulation: 947,000 (463,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 1,250Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 17Optional Protocol: acceded 2 August 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICCThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces. The demobilization processdid not include specific programs aimed atassisting demobilized child soldiers.ContextViolence erupted in April 2006 after almost600 soldiers – more than a third of the armedforces – were dismissed after protesting overdiscrimination and poor conditions of work. Upto 38 people died and some 150,000 peoplewere displaced in subsequent fighting. In May2006 an international peacekeeping force wasdeployed. The UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)had its mandate extended as a result of theviolence, and was replaced in August 2006 by theUN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT),mandated to foster stability and support nationalelections in 2007; it included up to 1,608police personnel within a civilian peacekeepingcomponent.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 2004 Organic Law of the Falintil–ETDF(East Timor Defence Forces) provided the basisfor voluntary recruitment, and stated that thedefence force was to be “exclusively made up ofcitizen volunteers” and that “No person under18 years of age may be recruited for militaryservice in the Falintil–ETDF” (Article 14.2). UNidentity cards issued in early 2001 for the nationalConstituent Assembly elections were used as theproof of age for enlistment purposes. As of 2006there were 1,435 persons in the force, comprisingtwo infantry battalions and one naval component.A 2006 review by the secretary of state fordefence examined a range of potential policyaspects, including the introduction of compulsorymilitary service. Timor-Leste’s initial report on theOptional Protocol stated that this was viewed ashighly unlikely to be supported, and that therewas believed to be no prospect of amendingS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3 5

current provisions concerning recruitment underthe age of 18.In February 2007, however, a Law onMilitary Service was passed, which providedfor conscription for those aged between 18 and30. Under the law the duration of service forthose selected for active service was 18 months,extendable by a maximum of 12 months “inthe event of national service requirements”.Although the law provided for exemption frommilitary service for various categories, includingindividuals with care responsibilities, therewas no provision for conscientious objection oralternatives to military service. Some 40,000East Timorese were estimated to be eligible forconscription.Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)The pro-independence armed group, ArmedForces for the National Liberation of East Timor(Falintil) had been demobilized in 2000 andofficially dissolved in 2001. All under-18 membersof Falintil were reported to have been sent backto their homes and schools. The demobilizationprocess, implemented by the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM), did not includespecific programs aimed at assisting demobilizedchild soldiers.DevelopmentsIn October 2005 the Commission for Reception,Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste submittedits final report to the Timor-Leste president. Itcontained a detailed account of human rightsviolations in Timor-Leste between 1974 and 1999,including abuses against children. It found thatduring Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste(1975–99) children, some as young as six yearsold, were used by the Indonesian armed forces,Indonesian-backed militia and, to a lesser extent,by the pro-independence armed group, Falintil,and its clandestine front. According to the report,children associated with Falintil were the victimsof extrajudicial execution, arbitrary detention,torture and other human rights violations by theIndonesian occupying forces. Child members ofthe pro-Indonesian militias responsible for muchof the violence that took place both before andafter the August 1999 Popular Consultation onindependence were reported to be among thosewho had suffered the greatest impact sinceIndonesia’s withdrawal from the territory and itssubsequent independence. As those seen to havebeen on “the wrong side”, they suffered stigmaand many had not returned from West Timor,Indonesia, where they had fled in 1999, for fear ofretribution or ostracism.The serious crimes process established bythe UN to try serious violations of human rightsended its operations in May 2005. The SpecialPanels established within the national courtsystem had exclusive jurisdiction in relation tograve crimes – war crimes, genocide and crimesagainst humanity – as well as for murder, sexualoffences and torture committed from 1 Januaryto 25 October 1999. Recruitment and use ofchildren were not among the crimes with whichany of the 97 suspects tried by the court werecharged. Indonesia refused to co-operate with theserious crimes process and took no further actionsubsequent to the widely discredited ad hochuman rights court in Jakarta to bring to justicemembers of the Indonesian armed forces andother Indonesian citizens or individuals residentin Indonesia for crimes committed in Timor-Leste.At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Timor Leste and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assistingchild soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.International standardsTimor-Leste submitted its initial report on theOptional Protocol in 2006, together with its initialreport to the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild (CRC).The report stated that “Promotion andadvocacy of the principles and priorities of theProtocol have occurred as part of broader effortsby Government – especially in cooperation withUNICEF – to promote and advocate the principlesand provisions of the CRC. The Government’s earlyaccession to both the Convention and its optionalprotocols has enabled a unified approach tocommunity awareness raising.”1 Report of the UN Independent SpecialCommission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, Geneva, 2October 2006, www2.ohchr.org.2 United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.3 Initial report of Timor-Leste to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TLS/1, 28 June 2007.4 Secretary of State for Defence, Force 20-20, 2006,www.etan.org.5 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3.6 Unofficial translation of Law of Military Service byCoalition.7 “Concern at Timor army conscription”, TheAustralian, 31 January 2007, www.etan.org.8 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3.3 3 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

9 Chega! Final Report of the Commission forReception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor(CAVR), 2005, www.etan.org.10 Regulation on the Establishment of the UnitedNations Transitional Administration in EastTimor, 27 November 1999, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1, Section 3.11 Initial report of Timor-Leste, above note 3.TOGOTogolese RepublicPopulation: 6.1 million (3.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 8,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (see text)Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 28 November 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThere were no reports of under-18s in theregular armed forces. The extent to whichany under-18s may have participated inthe violence around the 2005 presidentialelections was not documented.ContextImmediately after the death in February 2005 ofPresident Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had ruledTogo since 1967, the Togolese Armed Forces(Forces armées togolaises, FAT) proclaimed FaureGnassingbé, his son, as president, precipitatinga constitutional and political crisis. In the face ofinternational pressure, Faure Gnassingbé steppeddown and called presidential elections for April2005, which he won amid widespread violenceand allegations by opposition parties of voterigging.1According to a fact-finding mission sent toTogo by the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, at least 400 people were killed andthousands wounded during the crisis. Estimatesby government sources were considerablylower, of 60 to 70 killed. 2 The non-governmentalTogolese Human Rights League (Ligue togolaisedes droits de l’homme, LTDH) reported 811killed. 3 Most of the victims were believed to beadults, although some children were also killed.The security forces were also alleged to haveabducted students from schools. 4More than 40,000 people sought refuge inneighbouring Benin and Ghana and thousands ofothers were internally displaced. As of September2007 the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) estimatedthat 13,300 Togolese refugees remained in Beninand Ghana. 5 Although opposition supporters wereresponsible for some violence, including killings,most of the violence and killings were attributedto government security forces and militias, whowere accused of using disproportionate force inresponse to opposition violence, of the deliberatekilling of people in their homes and of attemptingto hide evidence of the scale of the killings.Violence against women, including rape, by allparties was reportedly widespread. 6S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3 7

In August 2006 the government andopposition parties signed an agreement callingfor a government of national unity, making anumber of electoral reforms and establishingan ad hoc committee to support UNHCR inassisting refugees to return. The governmentalso agreed to reform the armed forces, whichwere traditionally dominated by northerners andmembers of the president’s ethnic group, andwhich had a record of committing human rightsabuses. However, no progress was reportedregarding an end to impunity for the armedforces, in particular with regard to violence duringthe 2005 elections. 7 Parliamentary electionswere scheduled for 2007. 8 The elections, whichtook place in mid-October 2007, were won bythe ruling party, the Rally of the Togolese People(Rassemblement du peuple togolais, RPT). 9GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 2002 constitution stated that the defenceof the nation and its territorial integrity wasthe duty of every Togolese citizen, that everycitizen had the duty to undertake nationalservice under the conditions provided for in law,and that every citizen had the duty to fight anyperson or group of people who attempted tochange the democratic order established by theconstitution. Togo’s declaration on ratifying theOptional Protocol in November 2005 stated thatall recruitment was voluntary, but some sourcesreported that conscription was in force on aselective basis for a two-year term. 10Togo’s declaration on ratification of theOptional Protocol stated also that the minimumage for voluntary recruitment into the nationalarmed forces was 18.Armed groupsUnder the presidency of Gnassingbé Eyadémagovernment security forces were supportedby militias created by and linked to the rulingparty. Militias repeatedly participated in violenceagainst the population and political opponentsand were active in the violence which followedthe April 2005 presidential elections, particularlyin Lomé and Atakpamé. Members of the securityforces and militias reportedly opened fire onunarmed demonstrators and attacked peoplein their homes or at polling stations. 11 Militiamembers acting alongside members of thesecurity forces were reportedly armed withmachetes and other knives (armes blanches).The majority of militia members were young men.However, the extent to which any under-18s mayhave been active in or alongside the militias wasnot clear. 12The report by the UN fact-finding missiondescribed how opposition supporters at timesformed “disorganized political militias” duringthe 2005 violence, and it severely criticizedopposition leaders for not providing theleadership which should have prevented violenceby their supporters. Opposition supporters,primarily armed with weapons such as machetesor cudgels, attacked government officials andsupporters. Foreign nationals were also thetargets of xenophobic attacks. 13 It was not clearto what extent under-18s had been active inviolence by opposition supporters.DevelopmentsInternational standardsTogo ratified the Optional Protocol in November2005. 141 Amnesty International Report 2006.2 Office of the UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR), Rapport de la missiond’établissement des faits chargée de faire lalumière sur les violences et les allégations deviolations des droits de l’homme survenuesau Togo avant, pendant et après l’électionprésidentielle du 24 avril 2005, 29 August 2005,www.reliefweb.int.3 Amnesty International (AI), Togo: Will historyrepeat itself? (AFR 57/012/2005), 20 July 2005.4 AI, Togo: A high-risk transition (AFR57/008/2005), 18 March 2005; AI, above note 3.5 “Togolese refugees start going home from Ghanawith UNHCR help”, UNHCR news, 27 September2007, www.unhcr.org.6 OHCHR, above note 2.7 Amnesty International Report 2007; “SpecialRapporteur on torture concludes visit to Togo”,UN press release HR/07/63, 18 April 2007, www.ohchr.org (HRC media).8 “Togo: political agreement aims to end 12-yearfeud”, IRIN, 21 August 2006.9 “Togo ruling party wins election”, BBC News, 18October 2007.10 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),The Military Balance 2007.11 AI, above note 3.12 OHCHR, above note 2.13 Ibid.14 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.3 3 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

TONGAKingdom of TongaPopulation: 102,000 (43,000 under 18)Government armed forces: not knownCompulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 21Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThe minimum age of voluntary recruitmentto the Tonga Defence Services was 16.ContextFollowing the death of King Taufa’ahau TupouIV in September 2006, a government committeerecommended that all lawmakers be electedby the public. Government delays in enactingdemocratic reforms sparked rioting in Nuku’alofain November 2006 which left six people dead. 1 Astate of emergency, banning gatherings of morethan four people, was subsequently declared andwas extended until May 2007. 2 Reports indicatedthat around 600 people, including children, hadbeen detained and subjected to torture andother abuse. 3 Following the riots, the governmentagreed to hold parliamentary elections in 2008. 41 “Six found dead after Tonga riots”, BBC News, 17November 2006.2 “Tonga extends state of emergency”, 16 April2007, www. news.com.au/; “Tonga MP warnscontinuing state of emergency could lead to moreviolence”, Radio New Zealand International, 16April 2007, www. rnzi.com.3 “Tongan authorities accused of human rightsviolations,” ABC news online,13 December 2006,www. abc.net.au.4 “People’s reps say govt. has agreed to 2008elections”, Tonga-Now, 16 November 2006, www.tonga-now.to/ .5 Kingdom of Tonga, Tonga Defence Services Act1992, Part V – Enlistment and Terms of service inthe Regular Force, Enlistment, Section 25(2) and25(3).6 Kingdom of Tonga, Act of Constitution of Tonga,1988 Revised Edition, Articles 22 and 64.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder-18s could enlist in the defence serviceswith the consent in writing of the person’sparents or guardian. If the required consentcould not “reasonably be obtained”, the consentof a magistrate could be obtained instead. Theminimum age of recruitment was 16. 5 There wasno conscription.Article 22 of the 1988 constitution statesthat “It shall be lawful for the King to commandany taxpayer to join the militia for the purposeof instruction or for parade on public occasionsshould he think fit and also in time of war to callout all those capable of bearing arms and tomake orders and regulations for their control andprovisioning.” No minimum age of recruitment isspecified, although Article 64 of the constitutionstates that “Every Tongan subject of twentyoneyears of age or more who being a male andnot a noble pays taxes”, making them liable tobe conscripted into a militia. 6 It was not clear,however, whether under-21s were protected fromconscription in the militia.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 3 9

Trinidad andTobagoRepublic of Trinidad and TobagoPopulation: 1.3 million (355,000 under 18)Government armed forces: 2,700Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182No information was available on whetherany under-18s were serving in the armedforces.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription. 1 The minimum ageof recruitment to the regular armed forces was18, and to the reserve 25. 2 Candidates for theregular forces between the ages of 16 and 18 hadto have written parental or guardian consent. 3From 1985 the government had reported to theInternational Labour Organization (ILO) that inpractice there had been no recruitment of under-18s. However, it repeatedly failed to follow theILO recommendation to amend the Defence Actso as either to fix the legal minimum age at 18or to allow a child under the age of 18 who hadbeen recruited to choose to leave the serviceon reaching 18, in line with similar regulationsapplicable to recruits to the cadet force. 4Military training and military schoolsBoys and girls of secondary-school age couldjoin the cadet force, open to children and youngpeople aged 12–19, which aimed to give “mental,moral and physical training”. 5 Those wishing toenrol had to have parental consent. 6 There wereapproximately 40 secondary-schools in the cadetforce system and school students made up nearly90 per cent of the membership. Courses includedfirst aid, rifle target-shooting and navigation.The cadet force provided assistance in times ofnational disaster, such as hurricanes. 7International standardsTrinidad and Tobago ratified the ILO MinimumAge Convention 138 in September 2004.1 Second periodic report of Trinidad and Tobago tothe Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/83/Add.12, 15 November 2004, para. 246.2 Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force, www.ttdf.mil.tt.3 Defence Act, No. 7 of 1962, Chapter 14:01, http://rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt.4 International Labour Organization (ILO)Committee of Experts on the Application ofConventions and Recommendations (CEACR),Individual Direct Request concerning ForcedLabour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) Trinidad andTobago (ratification: 1963) Submitted: 2006– Trinidad and Tobago, ILO, www.ilo.org/ (ilolexdatabase). See also Regulation 27 of the CadetForce Regulations, subsidiary legislation underthe Cadet Force Act, Chapter 14:02, http://rgd.legalaffairs.gov.tt.5 Tranquillity Government Secondary-school, ExtracurricularActivities, www.tranquillity.edu.tt.6 Cadet Force Act, No. 28 of 1963.7 “Developing nation’s youth”, Trinidad Guardian, 7June 2005, www.guardian.co.tt.8 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Trinidad and Tobago, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/TTO/CO/2, 17March 2006.DevelopmentsIn March 2006 the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child recommended that the governmentratify the Optional Protocol. 83 4 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

TunisiaRepublic of TunisiaPopulation: 10.1 million (3.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 35,300Compulsory recruitment age: 20Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 20Optional Protocol: ratified 2 January 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces.2 Initial report of Tunisia to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TUN/1, 30 August 2007.3 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.4 Ibid.ContextIn December 2006, fighting between the policeand alleged members of the Salafist Group forPreaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour laPrédication et le Combat-GSPC), an armed groupreportedly linked to al-Qaeda, left dozens ofpeople dead and many others injured, includingpolice officers. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeUnder Articles 2 and 29 of Act No. 2004-1 of 14January 2004 concerning national service andArticle 18 of Act No. 95-92 of 2 November 1995promulgating the Child Protection Code, Tunisiastrictly prohibited service in the armed forces bypersons under the age of 18, and the involvementof children in armed conflict. The Code forbadethe use of children to commit crimes, includingacts of violence and terror (Article 19). Tunisianlegislation did not contain special provisionsfor lowering the age of conscription, even inexceptional circumstances. 2The constitution stated that “defence ofthe country and the integrity of the territoryis a sacred duty of every citizen” (Article 15).In accordance with Article 1 of Act No. 51-1989of 14 March 1989, recruitment into the armedforces was compulsory for all citizens oncethey reached the age of 20, unless they weremedically exempt. The minimum age for voluntaryrecruitment of Tunisian citizens into the armedforces was 18 years. 3Military training and military schoolsRecruits between the ages of 18 and 23 could beadmitted into military schools. 4S — Z1 “Tunisia”, Amnesty International Report 2007.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 4 1

TURKEYRepublic of TurkeyPopulation: 73.2 million (25.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 514,900Compulsory recruitment age: 19Voluntary recruitment age: : 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 4 May 2004Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, ILO 138, ILO 182In a state of emergency or partialmobilization, individuals aged 15 and overwere apparently liable for service in civildefence forces.ContextThe human rights situation deteriorated ineastern and south-eastern provinces as fightingincreased between the security forces and thearmed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Therewere attacks on civilians in other areas by armedgroups. 1PKK attacks increased, and claimed as manyas 600 lives in 2006. 2 A unilateral PKK ceasefire inOctober 2006 did not halt its attacks in responseto counter-insurgency and counter-terrorismoperations, especially in the south-east. Kurdishseparatists were blamed by the security forcesfor a May 2007 bomb blast that killed six peoplein the capital, Ankara. 3 In April 2007 the chief ofgeneral staff called for a military assault on PKKbases in northern Iraq. 4 In June 2007 the largestoperation against PKK fighters in recent yearswas launched in the south-east amid continuingconcerns about a Turkish cross-border attackinto Iraq. 5 Clashes between the PKK and thearmy increased noticeably in October 2007,heightening fears of a cross-border incursion. 6After the security forces killed four PKKmembers in March 2006, violent protests brokeout and four children were among 13 killed duringclashes between demonstrators and the securityforces in the south-east. 7GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAccording to the constitution, “National serviceis the right and duty of every Turk” (Article 72).Under Military Law No. 1111, men’s liability formilitary service started in the year they turned20. 8 Liability continued to the age of 41, except ongrounds of health or disability. Women were notconscripted and could join the armed forces onlyafter attending military school. 9 Length of servicewas 15 months for private solders and noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) and 12 monthsfor reserve officers. 10 Students could deferconscription until they had completed higher orvocational education. There was no provision forconscientious objectors. 11 In times of mobilizationor a state of emergency, individuals liable formilitary service could be recruited from the ageof 19. The Military Code provided for voluntaryrecruitment to some parts of the armed forces ata minimum age of 18, but the government statedon ratifying the Optional Protocol in 2004 thatthis was not applied in practice. 12Other legislation apparently permitted thedeployment of 15- to 18-year-olds in civil defenceforces during national emergencies. During anational crisis, the constitution allowed thesuspension of rights and freedoms and otherextraordinary measures. The National DefenceService Law 3634 stated that “in cases of generalor partial mobilization and in preparation ofmobilization under a state of emergency, childrenunder the age of 15 … shall not be held liable”. 13Military training and military schoolsStudents at military schools and the NCOpreparatory school were not liable for compulsorymilitary service or considered members of thearmed forces. Admission to military high schoolsand preparatory schools for NCOs was voluntaryand required parental consent. The minimumentrance age was 13 years, and students couldleave at any time. Basic military training andskills were not provided in these schools unlessstudents wanted to become “professionalsoldiers”, in which case they received educationon “military courtesy rules, elementary militarygeneral culture etc”. 14It was not apparent from the Law on MilitaryAcademies whether under-18s were legallyprohibited from admission. The Naval Academyhad no stated minimum entrance age butcandidates could not be over 19 or admitted morethan 12 months after leaving secondary-school. 15Although school leavers could potentially beaged only 17, the Turkish Military Academy’sstated objectives implied that candidates had tobe over 18. The Academy said that its objectiveswere to educate and train commissionedofficers who had “necessary military qualitieswith developed leadership qualities” or “a BSdegree on the scientific branches determined inaccordance with the needs of related Service”,and to provide postgraduate education relatedto service needs. 16 Information from the AirForce Academy referred to undergraduate andpostgraduate education but made no referenceto age. 17War colleges for all branches of the armedforces were open to graduates who hadcompleted their minimum two-year tactical-3 4 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

level command and staff duties, and a NationalSecurity College provided senior officer training. 18Armed groupsThe government continued to organize, armand pay the Village Guards, a civil defence forcenumbering 60,000 and mainly concentrated inthe south-east as part of its security operationsthere. 19 It was not known whether there wereunder-18s in these paramilitary forces.It was not known how many PKK fighterswere under 18. Recruitment of under-18s of bothsexes had been reported in 2003. 20 The PKK wasbelieved to have used children in its forces since1994, and was believed in 1998 to have had 3,000child soldiers, more than 10 per cent of themgirls, in its forces based in Iraq and operatingin south-east Turkey. 21 Some estimates put thenumber of PKK fighters in northern Iraq as highas 10,000, a third of them women. 22 However, theTurkish military estimated that 3,800 were basedin Iraq and that up to 2,300 were operating insideTurkey. 2317 Turkish Air Force Academy, www.hho.edu.tr.18 Turkish War Colleges, www.harpak.tsk.mil.tr.19 “Local guards divide Turkish Kurds”, BBC News, 4August 2006.20 “Daughters of the revolution”, Observer, 1 May2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk.21 Center for Defense Information, Terrorism project,“Children used as soldiers in Iraq”, 18 November2002, www.cdi.org.22 Katie Scott, “Awaiting the invasion”, GuardianUnlimited, undated, accessed on 18 July 2007,www.guardian.co.uk/weekendphotoprize/story/0,,1776811,00.html.23 AP, “Turkey troops head to Iraq border”, CNN,30 May 2007, http://edition.cnn.com.1 Amnesty International Report 2007.2 US Department of State, Country Reports onTerrorism 2006, www.state.gov.3 “Kurds implicated in Ankara bomb attack”,Independent, 23 May 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk.4 “Turkish general calls for military assault in Iraq”,Financial Times, 13 April 2007, www.ft.com/cms.5 einnews.com, Kurdistan Workers Party News,www.einnews.com.6 “Dozens die in Turkey border clash”, BBC News,21 October 2007.7 Amnesty International, “Turkey: Recent violationsmust be investigated”, 13 April 2006, PublicStatement, AI Index Number EUR 44/005/2006.8 Initial report of Turkey to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/51/Add.4,8 August 2000.9 All About Turkey, “Turkish Army”, www.allaboutturkey.com.10 Initial report of Turkey on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/TUR/1,undated.11 Quaker Council for European Affairs, “Turkey”,The Right to Conscientious Objection in Europe,2005, www.wri-irg.org.12 Declarations and reservations to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.13 Initial report to the UN Committee on the Rightsof the Child, above note 8.14 Initial report on the Optional Protocol, above note10.15 Turkish Naval Academy, Admission, www.dho.edu.tr.16 The general objective of the Turkish MilitaryAcademy, www.kho.edu.tr.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 4 3

TURKMENISTANTurkmenistanPopulation: 4.8 million (1.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 26,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 29 April 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThe minimum age for voluntary recruitmentwas 17. Conscripts were employed innon-military roles to save governmentexpenditure but were often unpaid.ContextPresident Saparmurat Niyazov, TurkmenCommunist Party Chief from 1985 and head ofstate since October 1990, died in December 2006.Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov was electedpresident in February 2007 with the support ofkey members of the security establishment. Thenew government made legislative and policychanges to improve the socio-economic situationand educational base, while also reportedlyensuring that any changes in the political andsecurity fields did not weaken presidentialpowers. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeYoung men could be called up for compulsorymilitary service at 18. Under the 2002Conscription and Military Service Act (Article 15)the minimum age for voluntary military servicewas 17. 2 It was reportedly common for families tomake boys volunteer at the age of 17 as a way tosave money or to guard against their becominginvolved with drugs or criminals. 3 Army servicewas also seen as a way out of unemployment. 4Boys often saw no other options on leavingschool. 5Education reforms in 2007 could potentiallyreduce the number of 17-year-olds joining thearmy. A presidential decree in March 2007increased the number of years of compulsoryeducation to ten. The requirement that studentsmust have work experience before enteringuniversity was also abolished. 6 The governmentsaid it wanted to facilitate students studyingabroad. 7 However, in September 2007 it wasreported that 17-year-olds could still carry outtheir military service early. 8Longstanding problems within the militaryincluded widespread corruption in the DefenceMinistry and the general staff, bribe taking bydraft commissions, and incompetence. Clanrivalries sometimes led to violence againstnew recruits, sometimes with fatal outcomes. 9President Berdymuhammedov said publicly thatmore attention should be paid to the health ofconscripts. 10Thousands of public sector workers weredismissed to reduce government expenditure inthe last years of President Niyazov’s rule. From2002 onwards conscripts in the armed forcesreportedly served as hospital orderlies, guards atindustrial plants, firemen and traffic police. Themilitary had to conscript almost everyone eligiblein order to fill these posts. An estimated 75 percent of men of conscription age were called up. 11Non-government sources reported that the costof paying conscripts was passed to the bodiesemploying them. However, as these organizationscould not pay even their own staff, conscriptswere often forced to beg on the streets. 12Military training and military schoolsTwo military schools, in the cities of Mary andDashoguz, enrolled boys who had graduatedfrom the seventh grade of secondary-school,aged about 13. Students wore military uniformsand lived in military-style barracks. Only ethnicTurkmen were admitted. In 2004 the Dashoguzschool had about 660 students. There wasstrong competition for entry to these schools,with substantial bribes reportedly being paidfor admission. Graduates of military schoolscould enter the Military Institute without workexperience. 13There was a Military Institute to train officersand specialists in Ashgabat. 14 A new MilitaryAcademy also opened in 2007 to train youngofficers for border services. 15DevelopmentsInternational standardsTurkmenistan acceded to the Optional Protocolin April 2005. Its declaration on accession statedthat male citizens aged 18–30 were liable toconscription, and that they could volunteer at theage of 17. 16 In May 2006 the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child considered Turkmenistan’sinitial report on its implementation of theConvention on the Rights of the Child. 171 “Security reform just for show”“Security reform just for show”, News BriefingCentral Asia, IWPR, 13 March 2007.2 See Initial report of Turkmenistan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/TKM/1, 5 December 2005.3 4 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

3 International League for Human Rights andTurkmen Initiative for Human Rights, AlternativeReport on Compliance by the Republic ofTurkmenistan with the UN Convention onthe Rights of the Child, 24 May 2006, www.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project.4 “Dumbing down Turkmenistan”, ReportingCentral Asia No. 294, IWPR, 18 June 2004.5 Correspondence from confidential source, 6March 2007.6 “Turkmenistan: President pushes ahead witheducation and agricultural reform”, IRIN, 4 April2007, www.irinnews.org.7 “Education set for overhaul”, IWPR, 6 February2007.8 “Turkmenistan announces regular military callup”,Turkmenistan.ru, 17 September 2007, www.turkmenistan.ru.9 “Abuse rife in the military”, IWPR/Turkmen Radio,1 June 2006, www.iwpr.net.10 “There has been a meeting of the cabinet ofministers of Turkmenistan”, Gündogar, 20 March2007, www.gundogar.org.11 “Turkmen army unfit for service”, IWPR/TurkmenRadio, 13 October 2006.12 Turkmen initiative for human rights, “TheTurkmen Army”, 25 April 2006, www.eurasianet.ww.eurasianet.org/turkmenistan.project.13 Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, “Militaryschools”, 6 December 2004.14 Oleg Sidorov, “The armed forces of Turkmenistan– a decisive force?”, Gazeta.kz, 27 December2006, www.gazeta.kz.15 “Sitting of the cabinet of ministers ofTurkmenistan”, State News Agency ofTurkmenistan (TDH), 12 August 2007,www.turkmenistan.gov.tm.16 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.17 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted byTurkmenistan, Summary record, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1143, 7 June 2006.UGANDARepublic of UgandaPopulation: 28.8 million (16.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 45,000Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 6 May 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRG, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO138, ILO 182, ACRWCUp to 2,000 women and children remainedwith the opposition Lord’s Resistance Army(LRA) in October 2007. They included girlsoldiers who had been raped and bornechildren while in the ranks. Childrenwere abducted and used by the LRA incombat and other roles and forced tocommit and witness human rights abuses.Fighting and LRA abuses had significantlydecreased by early 2006. Children wererecruited and used by the national army,the United People’s Defence Force (UPDF),and auxiliary Local Defence Units (LDU).Children captured by the UPDF were usedfor gathering intelligence on the LRA andto identify LRA positions and weaponscaches.ContextArmed conflict between government forces andthe opposition Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)in northern Uganda continued between 2004and early 2006. The government’s strategyof pursuing a military solution to the conflictcontributed to humanitarian suffering and abusesagainst the civilian population. In March 2004a major military operation (Iron Fist II) resultedin an escalation of the conflict, with the LRAintensifying its attacks and expanding into thesouth and east, to areas previously less affectedby the conflict, such as Lango and Teso. 1 Thenational army – the United People’s DefenceForce (UPDF) – and auxiliary local defence units(LDUs) committed human rights violations,including killings, beatings and rape and othercrimes of sexual violence. 2 UPDF soldiers werealso responsible for killings and torture duringlaw enforcement operations to combat insecurityand weapons proliferation in the Karamoja regionof north-eastern Uganda from mid-2006. 3 In oneincident 66 children were reportedly crushedby armoured vehicles or trampled to death byS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 4 5

stampeding animals following shooting during aFebruary 2007 raid by UPDF troops. 4The LRA was responsible for the killing,torture, rape, mutilation and abduction of thousandsof adults and children, which continued tobe carried out until late 2005. 5 In January 2004President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni announcedthat he had referred the case of the LRA to theInternational Criminal Court (ICC), and arrestwarrants were issued in October 2005 for LRAleader Joseph Kony and four senior commanders.The ICC stated that the LRA had “established apattern of brutalization of civilians by acts includingmurder, abduction, sexual enslavement,mutilation, as well as mass burnings of housesand looting of camp settlements”. The war crimeof forced enlistment of children below the ageof 15 was included among the charges againstJoseph Kony, Vincent Otti and Okot Odhiambo. 6Two of those charged were subsequently killed;Raska Lukwiya was killed by government troopsin August 2006 and Vincent Otti died in Octoberor November 2007. According to some reportsOtti was executed after being accused by Kony ofspying for the government. 7The LRA was sustained by support from theSudanese government which reportedly beganin 1994; this waned in early 2005 following thepeace agreement which officially ended the civilwar in southern Sudan. 8 Military pressure fromthe Ugandan armed forces caused the LRA partlyto retreat to Garamba National Park in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) in Septemberthe same year.Peace talks between the Ugandan governmentand the LRA officially opened in July 2006in Juba, southern Sudan, and a cessation-of-hostilitiesagreement was signed in August by bothparties. The talks stalled after three months ofnegotiations, but resumed in April 2007, and theagreement was extended until 30 June, followingwhich remaining LRA combatants in Sudancrossed into the DRC and assembled in GarambaPark. 9 The Juba peace process and the LRA’s withdrawalfrom Uganda brought welcome securityimprovements to the civilian population. No violentincidents attributed to the LRA were reportedfrom mid-2006 in Uganda, and some 300,000displaced persons began to leave camps forareas closer to their original homes. 10 However,as of October 2007, 1.4 million people remainedin camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs)which were characterized by acute overcrowdingand lack of accommodation, medical care andnutrition. 11GovernmentNational recruitment legislationThe 1995 constitution required every citizen “todefend Uganda and to render national servicewhen necessary”, and every able-bodied citizen“to undergo military training for the defenceof this Constitution and the protection of theterritorial integrity of Uganda whenever calledupon to do so” (Article 17(1)(e)). It stated that theduty of every Ugandan citizen was “to protectchildren and vulnerable persons against any formof abuse, harassment or ill-treatment” (Article17(1)(c)). The constitution stated that childrenunder the age of 16 “are entitled to be protectedfrom social and economic exploitation and shallnot be employed in or required to perform workthat is likely to be hazardous or to interfere withtheir education or to be harmful to their healthor physical, mental, spiritual, moral or socialdevelopment” (Article 34(4)). It also specifiedthat “children may not be separated from theirfamilies or the persons entitled to bring themup against the will of their families or of thosepersons, except in accordance with the law”(Article 31(5)).Uganda’s 2002 declaration on ratification ofthe Optional Protocol stated that there was noconscription and that the minimum voluntaryrecruitment age for the armed forces was legallyset at 18. 12 The UPDF Act (2005) set the minimumage at 18 for recruitment into the armed forces. 13Section 52(2)(c) stated that “no person shall beenrolled into the Defence Forces unless he orshe is at least 18 years of age and has attainedsuch level of education as may be prescribed”.In compliance with the Convention on the Rightsof the Child, the Children’s Act 2000 provided forthe care, protection and maintenance of children.The age of criminal responsibility was set at 12years of age. The act stated that “where a child isarrested, the police shall under justifiable circumstancescaution and release the child” (Section89 (1)), that “No child shall be detained with anadult person” (Section 91 (8)) and that a childshould be put in safe custody (Section 91(3)).Child recruitment and deploymentThe UPDF continued to hold children capturedfrom the LRA for longer than the 48-hour limitspecified by UPDF regulations, and to usechildren for intelligence-gathering or to identifyweapons caches. In 2005, children who escapedor were captured or released from the LRAwere reportedly pressured by the UPDF to jointheir forces and fight the LRA. The Ugandangovernment said in March 2005 that the UPDFhad never knowingly recruited a child, butadmitted that age verification could be difficultand that sometimes under-18s were recruited. 14Local Defence UnitsThe LDUs were established in the late 1990s toprovide protection for IDP camps and the roadsin northern Uganda. While administered and paidfor by the Interior Ministry, they operated underUPDF command. 15 Children below the age of 15continued to serve in LDUs throughout 2007.3 4 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Local government officials said that under-18swere often drawn to enlist by the promise of payand because of a lack of alternative educationalor employment opportunities. 16 Some 1,000children who were reported to have been enrolledinto LDUs in late 2004 in Kitgum, Pader and partsof Teso had apparently not been demobilized byOctober 2007. 17Government-backed militiasMilitia groups armed by government forces wereestablished in several areas from 2003. Theyincluded the Amuka militia, formed in Lango in2003, and the Frontier Guards in Kitgum andPader and the Elephant Brigade in Gulu, allformed in early 2004. 18 The Arrow Boys, formedin Teso in mid-2003, were used to protect IDPcamps, took part in military operations andreceived some pay and training from the armedforces. 19 Some of the groups, including theFrontier Guards in Kitgum, reportedly includedchildren. 20 The Amuka militia, the Arrow Boys andthe Frontier Guards were reportedly demobilizedin early 2006; some of their members wereapparently absorbed into the UPDF and LDUs.Child protection agencies were not involved inthe demobilization process, and it was not knownwhether those released included children oradults who had been recruited as children. 21Armed groupsLord’s Resistance ArmyAbout 25,000 children were abducted by theLRA from the beginning of the conflict in the late1980s. Abductions peaked after 2002, with anestimated 10,000 children abducted betweenMay 2002 and May 2003 alone. 22 Throughout2003 and 2004 more than 20,000 child “nightcommuters” sought safety each night in Gulu,Kitgum and Pader towns, to reduce the riskof their abduction. 23 During active hostilitieschildren in the LRA were forced to participatein combat and to carry out raids, kill andmutilate other child soldiers and civilians andloot and burn houses. Children were forced tokill relatives, including their younger siblings,often to “initiate” them into the LRA. They weretrampled to death, beaten or mutilated either aspunishment or if physically unable to keep upwith their unit. Girls were routinely raped andmany bore children while in the ranks. Whilethousands of children managed to escape orwere captured by government troops, largenumbers of those abducted, and their children,remained unaccounted for. Many were believedto have died in battle, to have been killed by theirabductors or to have died from injury or illness. 24In some regions an estimated 24 per cent ofLRA child soldiers were girls. 25 Girls as young as12 were used in combat and for other militarypurposes, as well as for sexual slavery. Manybore children as a result of rape. On averagegirls spent longer with the LRA than boys, sincethey were defined as “wives” of commandersand left in rear camps with their babies. 26 Thegirls, especially those with babies, found it moredifficult to return to their communities, wherethey were stigmatized and rejected. 27Abductions decreased from 2005, with justover 200 reported for the first six months of2006. 28 Some Sudanese and Ugandan childrenwere forcibly recruited by LRA fighters based incamps in southern Sudan during 2006 and early2007. 29 About 70 children, including about tengirls, were returned from the LRA after escapeor capture in Sudan in 2007. The LRA had yet torelease any women or children from its ranks,claiming that those remaining were their wivesand children. They maintained this stance despiterepeated pleas, including a request by the UNSecretary-General. While the total number ofremaining LRA fighters in the bush remainedunknown, up to 2,000 women and children werebelieved to remain in LRA camps in the easternDRC and southern Sudan. 30Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)There was no official DDR program in northernUganda. The majority of children leaving the LRAwere captured by or surrendered to governmentforces, or escaped. Under military procedures,LRA children were to be referred to the UPDF’schild protection unit and released within 48hours. However, children were frequently heldfor longer periods and some were used forintelligence purposes or as guides to identifyLRA positions and weapons caches. Fewer thanhalf the returning child soldiers registered fordemobilization with the UPDF, fearing the armyitself, or rejection by their communities if theywere identified as LRA members. 31 Those whodid not register at reception centres and whoreturned straight home could not obtain anamnesty certificate or a resettlement package. 32During the 1990s non-governmental organizations(NGOs) and other agencies established anumber of reception centres to respond to theneeds of returning children, in Gulu, Lira and otherlocations. Such centres had assisted some 20,000returning children and youth. 33 Children stayedfrom three to four months in the centres, whichoffered a variety of services, including medicalassistance, family tracing, recreational activities,counselling and psychosocial support. Someoffered training programs, mainly focused on lifeskills, and basic skills training. While the childrenwere at the centres, efforts were made to preparefamilies and communities for the children’s return.In practice, support for children at reception centresvaried widely and was often inadequate, particularlyin relation to health and trauma issues. 34S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 4 7

© Jake Price 2005Former child soldier, handicapped after stepping on a land mine, World Visionrehabilitation centre, Gulu, northern Uganda3 4 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

The number of former child soldiers enteringthe reception centres decreased substantiallyafter 2004. In one survey only about 600 childrenwere found to have arrived at centres in 2005. 35By June 2007, following the LRA’s retreat to theDRC and Sudan, many reception centres werealmost empty. 36 Difficulties faced by childrenreturning to their communities were widelyreported. Girls in particular faced rejection,especially those who returned with babies. In onestudy, returning child soldiers in the Teso regionreported extensive and persistent stigmatizationand rejection by their communities and constantbullying by their peers at school. They also notedthat assistance which set them apart from otherwar-affected children provoked jealousy in thecommunity. 37DevelopmentsJustice and accountabilityIn January 2004 President Museveni publiclyannounced that he had referred the case of theLRA to the International Criminal Court (ICC). InOctober 2005 the ICC unsealed arrest warrantsagainst LRA leader Joseph Kony and four seniorcommanders. They were accused of crimesagainst humanity and war crimes, includingmurder, abduction, rape, mutilation and sexualenslavement. Three of the five were charged withthe forced enlistment of children below the ageof 15. 38 Human rights organizations and othersemphasized the need for the ICC prosecutorto act independently and to investigate crimescommitted by all parties to the conflict, includinggovernment forces. 39The involvement of the ICC was widelybelieved to have added impetus to the peaceprocess, but potential tensions emerged over theobjectives of peace and justice. The security ofchildren still with the LRA was a major concern,and there were fears that their safety would befurther endangered if hostilities resumed.Civil society organizations raised concernsthat the threat of prosecution would cause theLRA to withdraw from peace negotiations: theLRA repeatedly cited the ICC indictments asan obstacle to finalizing a peace agreement. 40Concern was also expressed that the ICC’sinvolvement would undermine progress achievedthrough the 2000 Amnesty Act which provideda framework for the surrender and reintegrationof LRA and other insurgents. 41 Several surveysrevealed complex views among the population,with variations across different regions andlevels of exposure to LRA and UPDF abuses.Some emphasized traditional justice processesand reconciliation, but a significant proportionexpressed the view that LRA members, UPDFtroops and political leaders should be punishedfor conflict-related crimes. 42The government and the LRA signed theAgreement on Accountability and Reconciliationon 29 June 2007. It set out a national frameworkto address “serious crimes, human rights violationsand adverse socioeconomic and politicalimpacts” of the conflict and to promote peaceand reconciliation. The agreement providedfor the prosecution in Ugandan courts of thosewho “bear particular responsibility for the mostserious crimes”, to be complemented by traditionaljustice and other informal processes andreparations to be established in law. The partiesagreed to negotiate subsequently an annex to theagreement “to set out elaborated principles andmechanisms for implementation”. 43 Human rightsorganizations emphasized that national trials inUganda would not represent an alternative tothe ICC unless certain benchmarks were reached,including fulfilment of the conditions that the trialswere credible, impartial and independent, appliedappropriate penalties and were consistentwith international fair trial standards. 44Other developmentsIn June 2006 the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General for children and armedconflict visited Uganda. During the visit thegovernment acknowledged the presence ofchildren in the UPDF and in LDUs. It agreed tostrengthen the implementation of existing legaland policy frameworks on the recruitment anduse of children in armed conflict, to monitor theimplementation of various laws and to removechildren found in the armed forces. 45Representatives of the Security Council WorkingGroup on children in armed conflict visitednorthern Uganda in February 2006. In July 2007the chair of the Working Group issued a publicstatement condemning the recruitment and useof children, and other abuses by the LRA, andurging it to take immediate steps to release unconditionallychildren associated with its forces. 46The LRA, the UPDF and LDUs were listed as partiesrecruiting and using children in the Annex tothe Secretary-General’s annual report on childrenand armed conflict between 2002 and 2007.At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, Uganda and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect children fromunlawful recruitment or use by armed forces orarmed groups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The documents reaffirmed internationalstandards and operational principles forprotecting and assisting child soldiers and followeda wide-ranging global consultation jointlysponsored by the French government and UNICEF.1 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Stolen Children:Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda,March 2003; HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten:Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in NorthernUganda, September 2005.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 4 9

2 HRW, above note 1; Amnesty International (AI),Uganda: Doubly Traumatised: Lack of Accessto Justice for Female Victims of Sexual andGender-Based Violence in Northern Uganda, 30November 2007, AI Index: AFR 59/005/2007.3 HRW, Get the Gun! Human Rights Violations byUganda’s National Army in Law EnforcementOperations in Karamoja Region, September 2007.4 IRIN, “Uganda: Children killed in Militaryoperation – charity”, 30 March 2007.5 HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten, above note 1.6 International Criminal Court (ICC), “Warrant ofarrest unsealed against five LRA commanders”,press release, 14 October 2005, www.icc-cpi.int.7 “Uganda peace talks to restart despite death ofsenior rebel leader”, Independent, 16 August2006; “Vincent Otti is confirmed dead”, NewVision, 21 November 2007; “Uganda’s LRAconfirm Otti death”, BBC News, 23 January 2008.8 HRW, Uprooted and Forgotten, above note 1.9 International Crisis Group (ICG), Northern UgandaPeace Process: The Need to Maintain Momentum,14 September 2007.10 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260, 7May 2007.11 “Uganda, Humanitarian Country Profile”, IRIN,December 2007.12 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.13 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Uganda,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/UGA/CO/2, 23 November 2005.14 HRW, “Submission to the Committee on theRights of the Child (CRC)”, May 2005; Reportsof the Secretary-General on children and armedconflict, UN Docs. A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26October 2006, and A/62/609-S/2007/757, 21December 2007.15 HRW, above note 14.16 Ibid.17 Report of the Secretary-General, 26 October2006, above note 14; Human Rights Watch, abovenote 14.18 UN Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA), “Humanitarian Update UgandaFebruary 2004”, Vol. VI, Iss. II”, 29 February 2004,www.reliefweb.int.19 Information from AI, March 2004.20 M. Wessells, Child Soldiers: From Violence toProtection, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,MA, 2006.21 Child Soldiers Coalition sources, September2007.22 Report of the UN Secretary-General, 26 October2006, above note 14.23 Report of the Secretary-General on children andarmed conflict in Uganda, UN Doc. S/2007/260,7 May 2007; Report of the Secretary-Generalon children and armed conflict, UN Doc.S/2003/1053, 10 November 2003.24 HRW, above note 1; Child Soldiers Coalition, ChildSoldiers Global Report 2004.25 Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on VulnerablePopulations, Abducted: The Lord’s ResistanceArmy and Forced Conscription in NorthernUganda, Human Rights Center, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley and Payson Center forInternational Development, June 2007.26 UNICEF, A Hard Homecoming: Lessons Learnedfrom the Reception Center Process on EffectiveInterventions for Former “Abductees” in NorthernUganda, June 2006, www.unicef.org.27 Rights & Democracy, Where Are the Girls? Girls inFighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leoneand Mozambique: Their Lives during and after theWar, 2004, www.ichrdd.ca.28 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,above note 23.29 “LRA soldiers beat me and left me for dead”, IRINNews, 16 July 2007.30 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,above note 23.31 UNICEF, The State of Youth and YouthParticipation in Northern Uganda: Findings fromthe Survey for War-Affected Youth, June 2006,www.unicef.org.32 UNICEF, above note 26.33 Abducted, above note 25.34 Child Soldiers Coalition, Returning Home:Children’s Perspectives on Reintegration, a CaseStudy of Children Abducted by the LRA in Teso,Eastern Uganda, February 2008.35 UNICEF, above note 26.36 Abducted, above note 25.37 Redress, Victims, Perpetrators or Heroes? ChildSoldiers before the International Criminal Court,September 2006, www.redress.org; Coalition,above note 34.38 ICC, above note 6.39 HRW, “ICC to investigate all sides in Uganda”, 4February 2005.40 For example, “Ugandan rebels demand ICC dropindictments”, Deutsche Presse Agentur, 9 July2007, www.reliefweb.int.41 Refugees International, “Uganda: challengesof peace and justice”, 19 February 2008, www.refugeesinternational.org; Redress, above note37; Coalition, above note 34.3 5 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

42 Redress, above note 37; Oxfam International, TheBuilding Blocks of Sustainable Peace, September2007; International Center for TransitionalJustice, Forgotten Voices: A Population-BasedSurvey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice inNorthern Uganda, 2005, www.ictj.org; UN Officeof the High Commissioner for Human Rights,Making Peace our Own: Victims’ Perceptions ofAccountability, Reconciliation and TransitionalJustice in Northern Uganda, 2007, www.ohchr.org.43 Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliationbetween the Government of the Republicof Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, 29 June 2007.44 HRW, Uganda: The June 29 Agreement onAccountability and Reconciliation and the Needfor Adequate Penalties for the Most SeriousCrimes, July 2007.45 Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2007,above note 23.46 Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict,Message to the head of the Lord’s ResistanceArmy delegation to the Juba peace talks through apublic statement by the Chairman of the WorkingGroup to be transmitted by the Special Envoy forthe areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army,UN Doc. S/AC.51/2007/13, 20 July 2007.UKR AINEUkrainePopulation: 46.5 million (9.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 187,600Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 19Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 11 July 2005Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Orphans and the children of militarypersonnel could be given intensivepreparation for military careers from theage of 15, and 17-year-olds could enrol in ahigher military education institution.ContextIn April 2005 Ukraine launched an intensifieddialogue with NATO but extensive military reformwas necessary before it could enter into fullNATO membership. In a 2006 defence policypaper, Ukraine outlined plans for transition to anon-conscript army by 2010, as well as improvingsocial benefits for troops and modernizingequipment. 1Amendments to the Criminal Code in January2006 brought Ukraine closer in line with theOptional Protocol. Imprisonment of up to 12 yearswas introduced for the use of trafficked childrenin an armed conflict, the same offence beingpunishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment ifcommitted by an organized gang (Article 149).GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAn amendment to the 1999 Law on Military Dutyand Military Service, adopted in March 2005,reduced the conscription pool. Previously, menbetween the ages of 18 and 27 were liable forconscription, but the new law set an upper agelimit of 25 years. It also reduced the length ofservice for conscripts: from 24 months to 18 inthe navy, and from 18 months to 12 in the armyand air force, with university graduates servingnine months and junior commanders three.Voluntary contracts in the armed forces of upto three years were available to men and womenbetween the ages of 19 and 30. 2There was no reduction in the length ofalternative service for conscientious objectors,which remained punitive at 27 months. 3 A list often minority religious groups whose memberswere eligible to apply had been specified in aS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5 1

1999 government decree. 4 Objectors from Jewishor majority faiths, or who were not religious, hadno alternative to compulsory military service.In November 2006 the UN Human RightsCommittee considered Ukraine’s sixth reporton its implementation of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, andnoted that the right to conscientious objectionagainst mandatory military service should befully respected, for those of all religions aswell as non-religious conscientious objectors.The Committee also noted that new recruits inthe armed forces were still subject to hazing– systematic abuse and humiliation by longerservingor senior soldiers which sometimesinvolved acts of considerable violence. Onerecruit in Zhytomyr region had died as a resultof hazing in January 2005. The Committeeurged Ukraine to ensure that hazing stopped,by adopting disciplinary measures againstthe soldiers responsible and facilitating theintervention of independent monitors such as theOmbudsman. 5Military training and military schoolsYoung people could enrol for training in ahigher military education institution betweenthe ages of 17 and 21. 6 Potential officers couldenrol between the ages of 18 and 23. In 2005the Ministry of Defence announced the closureof 23 higher military schools by 2009, amongthem the Mikolaiv Military Motor College andthe Vasilkiv Air Force College. 7 All higher militaryeducation for ground troops was in future to beconcentrated in one national university at Lviv.Among reasons given for the closures were fallingenrolments and students’ need for vocationalskills which they could transfer to civilian life. 8At least one secondary-school offered twoyears’ intensive military preparation from the ageof 15, specifically for orphans and the childrenof military personnel. The orphans’ secondaryschoolin the Crimean town of Alushta reportedthat in 2004, 90 per cent of its former studentshad gone on to a career in the armed forces. 9International standardsIn July 2005 Ukraine ratified the OptionalProtocol, stating in its declaration that 19 was theminimum age for voluntary enlistment. 101 Ministry of Defence, White Book 2006: DefencePolicy of Ukraine, www.mil.gov.ua.2 Ministry of Defence, Professional Army,Conditions of acceptance on service on contractbasis, www.mil.gov.ua.3 1999 Law on Alternative Service, No. 310815, as amended on 17 November 2005, citedin Conscience and Peace Tax International,Submission to UN Human Rights Committee, 22June 2006, www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/CPTI.pdf; Marc Stolwijk, The Rightto Conscientious Objection in Europe: A Reviewof the Current Situation, Quaker Council forEuropean Affairs, April 2005, http://www.quaker.org/qcea/coreport.4 Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 2066/199.5 UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration ofsixth report submitted by Ukraine, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CCPR/C/UKR/CO/6, 28November 2006.6 Ministry of Defence, above note 2, MilitaryEducation.7 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 381 of 26 May2005.8 Kiev National University “Enlightment” website,www.osvita.org.ua; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15December 2006, www.nvo.ng.ru.9 Crimean Ministry of Education and Science,www.ccssu.crimea.ua/edu/school/military.html.10 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.DevelopmentsIn October 2007 Ukraine endorsed the ParisCommitments to protect children from unlawfulrecruitment or use by armed forces or armedgroups and the Paris Principles and guidelineson children associated with armed forces orarmed groups. The two documents, which werepreviously endorsed by 59 states at a February2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, reaffirmedinternational standards and operationalprinciples for the protection of and assistance tochild soldiers, following a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.3 5 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

United Ar abEmir ate sUnited Arab EmiratesPopulation: 4.5 million (1.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 50,500Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18 for officers andwomen; unknown for othersVoting age: not applicableOptional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182There were no reports of under-18s servingin the armed forces. There was limitedinformation available on the minimumage for voluntary recruitment. Childrenbetween 15 and 18 years old receivedmilitary training at school.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution stated that “defence of theunion is a sacred duty for every citizen” (Article43). There was no conscription, and migrantscomprised some 30 per cent of the armed forces. 1No information about voluntary recruitment wasprovided in the UAE’s report to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child in October 2001.The law on the recruitment of UAE nationalsas armed forces officers set the minimum age forrecruitment at 18, and required officer recruitsto be graduates of the UAE or other recognizedmilitary educational institutions. 2 The minimumage for recruitment to other ranks remainedunclear.The government encouraged women tojoin the UAE military. 3 Recruitment was open towomen between the ages of 18 and 28, providedthey had completed middle school. 4Military training and military schoolsMilitary education was part of the secondaryschoolcurriculum for students aged 15 to 18.It aimed at “inculcating values of patriotism,self-denial and readiness to defend one’s countryin students and thus motivate them to take upmilitary careers”. Voluntary professional militarytraining began at the completion of secondaryeducation. Training took place at nine militaryschools (including two schools for femalewww.globalsecurity.org/2 “Military recruitment law approved”, KhaleejTimes online, 9 April 2003, www.khaleejtimes.com.3 US State Department, Human Rights Report2005, www.state.gov.4 UAE State report to the International Conferenceon Education, September 2004, www.ibe.unesco.org/ (Arabic).5 Ibid.recruits). 5 1 Global Security, “Emirati Forces”,S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5 3

United KingdomUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIrelandPopulation: 59.7 million (13.1 million under 18)Government armed forces: 191,000Compulsory recruitment age: No conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 16Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 24 June 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182The UK appeared to intensify its effortsto recruit under-18s with a range ofrecruitment methods during the reportingperiod, at the same time strengtheningsafeguards for their protection.ContextIn March 2007 the last remaining UK forceswere withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina,but sizeable contingents continued to serve inAfghanistan and Iraq. As of 5 September 2007, atotal of 76 British Forces personnel or Ministry ofDefence (MoD) civilians had died while servingin Afghanistan since the start of operations inNovember 2001. As of 9 August 2007, a totalof 168 British Armed Forces personnel or MoDcivilians had died in Iraq (during Operation TELIC)since the start of the campaign in March 2003. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThere was no conscription into the UK armedforces and no statutory minimum age forrecruitment. In November 2006 the governmentreplaced separate disciplinary legislationcovering the armed forces with a new ArmedForces Act, 2 which, while providing for thedrawing up of regulations regarding enlistmentand terms and conditions of enlistment andservice by the Defence Council, failed to include astatutory minimum age for enlistment.In practice, enlistment for “non-officers”was not permitted until the age of 16, althoughapplication could be made up to five monthspreviously in the case of the army and up tothree months previously for the navy and the airforce. Officers could be recruited into the navyfrom the age of 17, into the air force from 17and a half, and into the army from 17 years and9 months. The minimum enlistment age to thearmy’s Brigade of Gurkhas was 17 and a half on31 January of the year following enlistment. 3 Entryinto the Territorial Army, which operated on apart-time basis, was from age 17 for both soldiersand officers. 4 All three services required parentalor guardian consent for those enlisting below theage of 18.As at 1 April 2007 there were 1,000 non-officermembers of the regular forces aged 16, and 3,470aged 17; 355 of these were female. The majorityof under-18s were members of the army, with farfewer in the navy and the air force. 5In its initial report to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation ofthe Optional Protocol, the government arguedthat “To be unable to recruit from this age groupwould mean that high quality school leaverswould settle into other careers and thus belost to the Services. This would create seriousmanning problems for the Armed Forces since30% of all recruits in 2006/07 were aged under18. The Services, in particular the Army, would beunable to man current structures and maintaincurrent capabilities.” 6 Reflecting this position,the government resisted calls made by theHouse of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC– see below) to consider raising the minimumrecruitment age to 18. 7In ratifying the Optional Protocol, thegovernment stated that safeguards to protectunder-18s were maintained by informing thepotential recruit about the nature of militaryduties, ensuring that the decision to enlist wasvoluntary, and obtaining free and informedparental consent. Doubts about the effectivenessof some of these safeguards were expressed,particularly in relation to the army. Reportsby the Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI) 8 onarmed services training published in 2005 and2007 spoke of recruitment practices being“overzealous” and contributing to a “very highdrop-out rate” 9 and of recruitment proceduresand materials which “sometimes mislead”, withsome recruits reporting that they had beensteered into trades for which they were unsuitedor had little interest, but where shortagesexisted. 10In the case of all three services, recruits,regardless of age, were not permitted to leaveduring the first 28 days of duty. They could thenexercise “discharge as of right” and leave withinthe first six months. 11 After the expiration of the“discharge as of right” period, under-18 recruitsto the army had no legal right to be transferredto the reserve until the age of 22, for which 12months’ notice had to be given. 12 The normalprocedure was for all new recruits to enlist fora 22-year “open engagement”. Those endingtheir (regular) service before the completion ofthis period were required to serve in the armyreserve for the balance of the 22 years or for aperiod of six years, whichever was less. 13 Armedforces personnel under the age of 18 years and3 months could also apply for discretionarypermission to leave before their eighteenth3 5 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

irthday if they were “genuinely unhappy”. Thegovernment itself acknowledged that this did notoffer “discharge as of right”. 14 Terms of servicefor all three services were complicated andpotentially confusing for new recruits, especiallythose under 18 with low educational attainment. 15Those undertaking specialist employmenttraining in all three services were required towaive their right to give 12 months’ notice toterminate their contracts after the minimumrequired period of service, which could meanthe deferment of their ability to transfer to thereserve. 16 Set against this, recruitment literatureaimed at school leavers stressed opportunitiesfor gaining educational and vocationalqualifications without referring explicitly to theresulting obligation to remain in the services forlonger periods. In concluding that recruitment tothe army should remain open to 16- and 17-yearolds,the Deepcut Review (see below) highlightedthe benefits to some young people of trainingopportunities offered by the armed forces,commenting on the lack of opportunity for lesseducationally inclined 16-year-olds in the UK. 17In 2005 ALI commented that the “early dropoutis very high, varying from about 15 per centfor the Royal Air Force to 47 per cent in the RoyalMarines”, with more than a third of all entrantsdropping out during the initial training period inthe army. 18The primary target group for the armedforces’ promotional activity was children andadolescents. A National Audit Office reportpublished in November 2006 noted that theservices were “developing their youth strategiesin order to raise awareness at an earlier ageto secure similar levels of recruitment from asmaller target population”. There were concernsthat those non-officer recruits who were oflow educational attainment and from poorcommunities 19 were joining as a last resort andfor other negative reasons, including the lackof civilian career options in their particularcommunities. 20The Ministry of Defence Armed Forces YouthPolicy, aiming to promote the reputation of thearmed forces and improve recruitment, had aparticular focus on young people at risk of socialexclusion. 21 The MoD and the Youth Justice Boardfor England and Wales in late 2004 launcheda joint pilot program of courses which did notinvolve military training, but offered challengingoutdoor activities and development of teamwork,leadership and self-esteem. Those successfullycompleting the program were to be referred tolocal cadet forces, 22 which were not part of thearmed forces but were sponsored by the MoDand said to be at the core of the Youth Policy. 23Boys and girls aged between ten and 18could join either the combined cadet force (CCF)units based in schools 24 or cadet forces for theseparate services linked to an establishment ofone of the regular or reserve armed forces. 25 Themost recent Army Continuous Attitude Surveyshowed that 22 per cent of serving soldiers and50 per cent of serving officers had been part of acadet organization. 26Military training and military schoolsIn the case of the army, most 16-year-oldswere enlisted through “junior entry” and thenunderwent phase 1 training of between 14 weeksand a year for a general introduction to militarylife, including drill. They were then sent to phase2 establishments, where they were trained andlived alongside older trainees for technical andprofessional training. Phase 2 training could lastbetween a few weeks and up to a year for morespecialist training. Those recruited at 17, butalso some aged 16 (all generally referred to as“single entry” recruits), were trained by the ArmyTraining Regiment alongside adult recruits at anumber of other establishments. 27 Recruits to thearmy with specific qualifications could also enlistas apprentices in the Technical Corps betweenthe ages of 16 and 17, training in a range of tradesover a period of a year or more. Enlistment as anapprentice was on the same terms as for ordinaryrecruits, with a commitment to serve a minimumof four years from the age of 18. Studentswere paid during training. 28 Periods of trainingfor under-18s in the navy and air force variedaccording to chosen career paths.There were no schools operated by or underthe control of the armed forces, but the DefenceSixth Form College in Leicestershire, specificallyaimed at recruiting and training engineers for thearmed forces, was established by the MoD andwas overseen by the Defence Academy. 29 Whilethere was no legal obligation to join the armedforces on completing their studies, parents ofstudents who did not do so were required torepay a contribution towards teaching costs. 30Child recruitment and deploymentThe government stated that due to periods ofrecruit training, the number of under-18s joiningthe “trained strength” of the armed forces andliable for employment in military operationswas “small”. On 1 April 2007 the total “trainedstrength” of under-18s was said to be 730individuals – 0.5% of the total trained strengthof the armed forces. Very few of these under-18swere said to be posted to higher-readiness (i.e.“frontline”) units, and the likelihood of under-18staking a direct part in hostilities was thereforesaid to be “very small”. 31 In March 2006 theDeepcut Review (see below), while stoppingshort of recommending a ban on the recruitmentof under-18s into the army, recommended thatphase 1 and 2 training should be such that norecruit joined their unit until they reached the ageof 18. 32 In its June 2006 response to the Review,the government indicated that the possibilityof ensuring that trainees reached the age of 18S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5 5

efore being posted to their units was beingconsidered. 33On signing the Optional Protocol inSeptember 2000 the government had madea declaration reserving the right to deploymembers of its armed forces under the age of 18to take a direct part in hostilities where “thereis a genuine military need to deploy their unitor ship to an area in which hostilities are takingplace; and … by reason of the nature and urgencyof the situation … it is not practicable to withdrawsuch persons before deployment; or … to do sowould undermine the operational effectivenessof their ship or unit, and thereby put at risk thesuccessful completion of the military missionand/or the safety of other personnel”. Personnelunder 18 were not to be deployed on UNpeacekeeping operations in line with UN policy. 34The government reported in June 2007 that18 personnel aged under 18 had been deployedinto “areas where they may be exposed tohostilities” since the signing of the OptionalProtocol in 2003, but none since July 2005. Thegovernment further indicated that at least 15 ofthese were 17-year-olds who had been deployedto Iraq between 2003 and 2005, four of themwere female and the vast majority were deployedwithin a week of their eighteenth birthdays orwere removed from theatre within a week of theirarrival. Only four under-18s were said to havebeen deployed for a period of greater than two orthree weeks. 35Treatment of child recruitsThe fallout from the deaths of four soldiers atthe Deepcut army barracks in Surrey between1995 and 2002, two of whom were aged 17,continued. In March 2005 the House of CommonsDefence Committee published its report intothe MoD’s “duty of care” in armed forces’training establishments. The Committee foundthat the armed forces had failed to superviseadequately young recruits and noted the lackof an independent complaints procedure forabuse victims. It recommended that the MoDformulate a policy for the care of under-18s as ifit acted in loco parentis. 36 Policy guidelines weresubsequently issued by the MoD in July 2005 andrevised and reissued in March 2007, but thesemade it clear that “duty of care” responsibilitiesarose from the employment of under-18s andnot from acting in loco parentis. 37 The “dutyof care” report also raised concerns aboutthe lack of checks on the suitability of thosesupervising under-18s at training establishments,recommending that Criminal Records Bureau andmilitary service checks should be made beforeappointing such supervisors. 38 In October 2004 aformer training instructor at Deepcut was jailedfor a number of indecent assaults on youngsoldiers between 1992 and 1997. His victims werereported to have been aged between 17 and 21. 39The Deepcut Review, established in December2004 to review the circumstances surroundingthe deaths of the four soldiers, was published inMarch 2006. 40 It concluded that, on the balanceof probabilities, the deaths of three of thesoldiers 41 were self-inflicted and that bullying,ill-treatment or sexual harassment did not causetheir deaths (although the Review identified “lowmorale” among recruits as a problem), but thatthe opportunity for self-infliction was affordedby a policy of frequently assigning unsupervisedphase 2 trainees to armed guard duty at Deepcut.The Review recommended that the appropriateminimum age for armed guard duty (outside thecontext of training that was directly supervisedby an experienced adult soldier) should be 18throughout the armed forces. 42 The Review alsomade a number of recommendations about thetraining of under-18s and the need for specialmeasures to be taken to protect their welfare.In March 2007 ALI published its second reportfollowing its inspections of training methods inthe armed services which had begun in 2004.The report talked of “substantial improvements”since its previous inspections. 43Detention of suspected child soldiersIn 2006 the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) registered 59 children in detentionduring 16 visits to five places of detentionor internment in Iraq controlled by the UK orthe United States (USA). 44 However, the UKauthorities claimed that as of October 2005they were not holding any women or children indetention. 45 The government issued directionsto its armed forces on the treatment of prisonersof war, internees and detainees in May 2006,with a chapter on the treatment of juvenilesand children which clarified that the policywas to transfer prisoners who were or werebelieved to be juveniles to the ICRC as quickly aspracticable. 46DevelopmentsThe UK government continued to incorporatethe issue of children in armed conflict in theirforeign policy commitments. The Departmentfor International Development (DfID) financed anumber of projects for children affected by armedconflict, with a particular focus on programsconcerned with demobilizing and reintegratingchild soldiers into their communities. 47At a February 2007 ministerial meeting inParis, the UK and 58 other states endorsedthe Paris Commitments to protect childrenfrom unlawful recruitment or use by armedforces or armed groups and the Paris Principlesand guidelines on children associated witharmed forces or armed groups. The documentsreaffirmed international standards andoperational principles for protecting and assisting3 5 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging globalconsultation jointly sponsored by the Frenchgovernment and UNICEF.1 Ministry of Defence, “Operations in Iraq: Britishfatalities”, defence fact sheet, www.mod.uk.These figures include those killed in action andthose who died as a result of illness, non-combatinjuries or accident.2 Armed Forces Act 2006, c. 52.3 As set out in British Gurkhas Nepal StandingInstruction No.5.01, para 12. Gurkha recruitsundertook a 39-week basic training package.4 Army Jobs, “Entry requirements”, www.armyjobs.mod.uk.5 Defence Analytical Services Agency, TSP 08, “Agedistribution: UK regular male/female other ranksby age and service”, www.dasa.mod.uk. Note thatthe figures refer to UK regular forces and do notinclude Gurkhas or the Home Service battalionsof the Royal Irish Regiment.6 Initial periodic report of the UK to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child onimplementation of the Optional Protocol, UN Doc.CRC/C/OPAC/GBR/1, 3 September 2007.7 House of Commons Defence Committee’s ThirdReport of Session 2004–05, “Duty of Care”, www.publications.parliament.uk.8 ALI, a non-departmental public body, becamepart of the new Office for Standards in Education,Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED) in April2007.9 ALI, “Safer training”, March 2005, www.mod.uk.10 ALI, “Better training”, March 2007, www.mod.uk.11 Army Terms of Service (Amendment) Regulations1999 (SI No.1610), Regulation 7A(2); Royal NavyTerms of Service (Ratings) Regulations 2006,Regulation 7 (SI No. 2918); Royal Air Force Termsof Service Regulations 2007, Regulation 8; all atwww.opsi.gov.uk.12 This “notice period” of four years, required inorder to transfer to the reserve while servinga 22-year term, was available to all recruitsregardless of age (Regulation 5 of the ArmyTerms of Service Regulations 1992 (SI No.1365),as amended by the Army Terms of Service(Amendment) (No.2) Regulations 1999 (SINo.2764)), but the notice period could not beginuntil a recruit had reached the age of 18, therebymaking the minimum term of service for 16-yearoldrecruits six years followed by a period of sixyears’ service in the reserve.13 Regulation 12, Army Terms of Service Regulations1992 (SI No.1365).14 Initial periodic report, above note 6.15 For Terms of Service see above note 11.16 Army Terms of Service Regulations 1992 (SINo.1365), Regulation 11, restricted rights totransfer to the reserve, as well as other perceived“benefits”, to those undergoing training ofanything more than two weeks. A course lastingmore than three months could invite a restrictionof the right to be transferred to the reserve beforethe expiry of up to six years. Similar restrictionsexisted under Regulation 12 of the Royal AirForce Terms of Service Regulations 2007, andRegulation 5 of the Royal Navy Terms of Service(Ratings) Regulations 2006.17 Nicholas Blake QC, The Deepcut Review: a reviewof the circumstances surrounding the deaths offour soldiers at Princess Royal Barracks, Deepcut,between 1995 and 2002, March 2006, www.official-documents.gov.uk.18 “Safer training”, above note 9.19 Up to 50 per cent of recruits were reported tohave literacy and numeracy skills at Entry Level3 (equivalent to those of an average 11-year-old)or Entry Level 2 (equivalent to an average 7-yearold).House of Commons Defence Committee,“Duty of care”, www.publications.parliament.uk.20 David Gee, Informed choice? Armed forcesrecruitment practice in the United Kingdom,November 2007, www.informedchoice.co.uk.21 MoD, “Strategy for delivery of MOD youthinitiatives”, paper by Directorate of ReserveForces and Cadets, April 2005, www.mod.uk.22 Youth Justice Board News, No. 25 (November2004), www.yjb.gov.uk.23 MOD, www.mod.uk.24 Minimum ages were: Sea Cadet Corps – 12 years(with some units having junior sections for10–12-year-olds), Army Cadet Force – 13 years,Air Training Corps – 13 years. Of 253 CCF unitsin operation in July 2006, only 52 were reportedto be in state schools, and most of these weregrammar schools. In June 2006 the governmentannounced a plan to set up six new CCF unitsin state schools in “deprived areas”. “GordonBrown wants more children to see the benefits ofbeing a cadet. But is he doing it the best way?”,Guardian, 25 July 2006.25 Defence Analytical Services Agency, UK DefenceStatistics 2005, www.dasa.mod.uk.26 MOD, Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Surveys:Army: Mar–Jul 2006, www.mod.uk.27 “Duty of care”, above note 19; MoD, Army Jobs,“Soldier training”, www.armyjobs.mod.uk.28 Army, “Training establishments”, www.army.mod.uk.29 The Defence Academy was responsible forpostgraduate education and the majorityof command, staff, leadership, defencemanagement, acquisition and technology trainingfor members of the UK armed forces and MoDcivil servants; www.defac.ac.uk. See also Ministryof Defence, “Individual Training and Educationin the Armed Forces”, Policy Paper No.6, 2004,www.mod.uk.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5 7

30 MoD, Army Jobs, “Welbeck – the defence sixthform college”, www.armyjobs.mod.uk.31 Initial periodic report, above note 6.32 Deepcut Review, above note 17.33 MoD, “The government’s response to the DeepcutReview”, June 2006, www.mod.uk.34 Report of the Secretary-General on theimplementation of the recommendations of theSpecial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,23 February 1999, UN Doc A/AC/121/43; reflectedin Policy on the Care of Service Personnel underthe Age of 18, provided as Annexure B to theinitial periodic report, above note 6. See also theUK’s declaration on ratification of the AdditionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org/; Foreign andCommonwealth Office, Explanatory Memorandumon the Optional Protocol to the United NationsConvention on the Rights of the Child, 1 February2003, www.fco.gov.uk.35 Communication from the Ministry of Defence tothe Child Soldiers Coalition, 7 November 2007.36 House of Commons Defence Committee’s ThirdReport of Session 2004–05 on “Duty of Care”,www.publications.parliament.uk.37 Policy on the Care of Service Personnel, abovenote 34.38 “Duty of care”, above note 19.39 “Deepcut army sex attacker jailed”, BBC News,22 October 2004.40 Deepcut Review, above note 17.41 Sean Benton, Cheryl James and Geoff Gray. Theinquest into the death of James Collinson wasongoing during the course of the review, and thereport therefore did not deal with the particularfacts of his death.42 Deepcut Review, above note 17.43 “Better training”, above note 10.44 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iraq”,ICRC Annual Report 2006, May 2007, www.icrc.org.45 Amnesty International, “Beyond Abu Ghraib:detention and torture in Iraq”, March 2006, AIIndex MDE 14/001/2006.46 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10: “Prisonersof war, internees and detainees”, Chapter 2B onthe treatment of juveniles and children, providedas Annexure J to the initial periodic report, abovenote 6.47 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human RightsReport 2006, www.fco.gov.uk.United State sof Americ aUnited States of AmericaPopulation: 298.2 million (74.9 million under 18)Government armed forces: 1,506,800Compulsory recruitment age: 18 (conscriptionnot currently in force)Voluntary recruitment age: 17Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 23 December 2002Other treaties ratified (see glossary):ILO 182The total number of 17-year-olds enlistingin the armed services dropped by nearly50 per cent between 2002 and 2005.The USA detained under-18s suspectedof participating in armed activities inAfghanistan and Iraq. Under-18s were alsodetained in Guantánamo Bay.ContextIn late 2006, US troops were stationed in146 countries worldwide. The largest foreigndeployment was to Iraq, where US armed forceswere engaged in military operations following thefall of the Iraqi government in April 2003. As ofOctober 2007, approximately 198,000 US troopswere stationed in and around Iraq. 1 According tothe US Department of Defense, between March2003 and 24 October 2007, 3,833 US soldiersand Defense Department civilian workers died inthe conflict, and over 28,000 were wounded. 2US forces were also engaged in militaryoperations in Afghanistan, with approximately26,000 US troops stationed in the country in2007. 3 Between October 2001 and 24 October2007, 383 US soldiers were killed and 1,707wounded in or around Afghanistan, as part of“Operation Enduring Freedom”. An additional 62US soldiers were killed in other locations as partof the operation. 4GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe USA currently maintained an all-volunteermilitary force, and accepted both male andfemale recruits from the age of 17 (US Code, Title10 Section 505(a)). Parental consent was requiredfor under-18s. The present law regulatingconscription (50 USC App 454.455) allowed forit at the age of 18, although conscription had3 5 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

not been activated since 1973, at the end of theVietnam war.In 2002 the US Congress enacted the NoChild Left Behind Act of 2002, which requiredsecondary-schools to provide military recruiterswith the names, addresses and telephonenumbers of all juniors and seniors (typicallyages 16–18), and to conduct recruiting activitieson school premises. Following enactment ofthe law, the number of schools denying accessto the military dropped from 8–10 per cent in2001 to less than 1 per cent in 2005. 5 In March2007 proposed legislation entitled the StudentPrivacy Protection Act of 2007 was introducedinto Congress. Its provisions would amend theNo Child Left Behind Act to allow a student’spersonal information to be provided to themilitary only if his or her parent or guardianprovided explicit, written consent. 6Child recruitmentIn the year ending 30 September 2005, 13,793recruits aged 17 joined the US armed forces– 6,780 into the active armed forces (5,387 boysand 1,393 girls), representing 4.46 per cent ofall new active duty recruits, and 7,013 into thereserve forces (5,013 boys and 2,000 girls),representing 15.3 per cent of the total reserves.The total number of 17-year-olds enlisting in thearmed services dropped by nearly 50 per centbetween 2002 and 2005. The steepest decreasewas in the number of 17-year-olds entering thereserves; in 2002, 16,885 boys and girls hadjoined the reserve forces, more than double thefigure for 2005. 7The US armed forces spent approximatelyUS$1.5 billion on recruiting each year, andmaintained approximately 14,000 “frontline”recruiters, who were assigned monthlyrecruitment goals. 8 Approximately 55 per cent ofUS youth aged 16–21 said that they had spokento a US military recruiter. 9A June 2006 Defense Department poll ofUS youth aged 16–21 found that declines in thepropensity of young people to join the military“were unprecedented in magnitude”. Thesurvey found that the proportion of youth that“probably” or “definitely” planned to join themilitary dropped from 14.5 per cent in December2005 to 10.1 per cent in June 2006. The steepestdrops were among African-Americans andHispanics.To meet 2006 recruitment goals, the armedservices added additional recruiters andincreased enlistment bonuses. From March2007 bonuses of up to US$14,000 – a US$2,000increase – were offered to new infantry soldiers. 10According to media reports, bonuses for highlyvalued specialties, such as special operationsforces, were as high as US$40,000. In 2005 thearmed forces also lowered recruitment standardsto accept a higher number of recruits with lowaptitude scores. In previous years the Army hadallowed only 2 per cent of its recruits to haveaptitude scores in the lowest 30 per cent, butraised this limit to 4 per cent in 2005. In fiscalyear 2006, 2,600 enlistees (3.8 per cent) withlow aptitude scores were accepted for service. 11The proportion of recruits holding a high-schooldiploma was 81.2 per cent as of August 2006,for the second year in a row falling below theDefense Department’s benchmark of 90 percent. 12In 2006, 486,594 high-school students wereenrolled in the Junior Reserve Officer TrainingCorps (JROTC), an elective program for studentsfrom the age of 14, with more than 3,300 unitsbased in secondary-schools across the country. 13The program’s stated goal was to “motivateyoung people to be better citizens”. Courses weretaught by retired military personnel, and includedmilitary drills with both real and dummy firearms.Total enrolment in the program grew by 8 per centbetween 2001 and 2006, fuelled by a 57 per centincrease in federal funding for the program. Anestimated 40 per cent of students who graduatedfrom high school with two or more years in theJROTC eventually enlisted in the military. 14Child deploymentNearly all 17-year-olds who enlisted in the USmilitary were still attending school, and wereplaced in a delayed entry program (the FutureSoldiers Training Program) until they had finishedtheir secondary education. Approximately 7,500were still 17 when they began their basic trainingprogram. On average, initial training lasted fromfour to six months, and the government reportedthat nearly 80 per cent of 17-year-olds turned 18during this period; approximately 1,500 soldierseach year were still 17 when they completed theirbasic training and were ready for operationalassignment. 15In 2003 each of the US armed servicesadopted an implementation plan regarding thedeployment of 17-year-old soldiers, in order tofulfil the USA’s obligations under Article 1 of theOptional Protocol. The US Army policy, issuedin January 2003, was not to “assign or deploysoldiers, less than 18 years of age, outside thecontinental US, Puerto Rico, or territories orpossessions of the United States”. 16 The USNavy assignment policy, issued on 28 February2003, stipulated that “At no time will anenlisted member under the age of 18 be issuedorders that require reporting to an operationalcommand,” including in a commissioned vesselor deployable squadron. 17 In April 2007 the navyadded a further review on final orders for sailorsunder age 18 to ensure that they were not beingordered to an operational unit. 18Initial guidance sent to Marine Corpscommanders in January 2003 did not precludedeployment of 17-year-olds; however, on 22S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 5 9

April 2007 the Marine Corps issued a new policy,stating that with immediate effect Marinesyounger than 18 were prohibited from beingoperationally deployed. 19The Air Force policy was not to assign airmenwho had not reached their 18th birthday tohostile fire or imminent danger zones. 20In 2004 the Director of Military PersonnelPolicy for the US Army acknowledged in a letterto Human Rights Watch that nearly 60 17-yearoldUS soldiers had been deployed to Iraq andAfghanistan in 2003 and 2004. 21 The Departmentof Defense subsequently stated that “thesituations were immediately rectified and actiontaken to prevent recurrence”. 22 Human RightsWatch sent written requests in April and August2007 for updated information regarding possibledeployment of 17-year-old US troops to Iraq orAfghanistan, but as of October 2007 had notreceived a response.Recruiter misconductIn 2005 more than 80 military recruiters weredisciplined for sexual misconduct with potentialenlistees. An investigation conducted by theAssociated Press concluded that one out of every200 frontline recruiters was disciplined for sexualmisconduct in 2005, and that most victims weregirls between the ages of 16 and 18 who wereconsidering enlistment in the military. 23 Theincidents of misconduct included groping, sexualassault and rape.DevelopmentsFrom 2001 the USA contributed US$34 millionto support programs to prevent the recruitmentand use of child soldiers and to demobilize andreintegrate child combatants, including US$10million through the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and US$24 million throughthe US Department of Labor. It supportedprograms in Angola, Afghanistan, Burundi,Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan andUganda. 24In April 2007 the Child Soldier Prevention Actof 2007 was introduced into Congress. 25 It wouldrestrict US military assistance to governmentsinvolved in the recruitment or use of childsoldiers. Research by the Center for DefenseInformation found that of nine governmentsinvolved in child recruitment and use, eightreceived some form of US military assistance in2007. 26In April 2007 the Senate JudiciarySubcommittee on Human Rights and the Lawheld a hearing to consider the Child SoldierPrevention Act, obstacles facing former childsoldiers seeking asylum in the USA, and ways forthe USA to address child recruiters from othercountries who came to the USA. 27On 3 October 2007 the Child SoldierAccountability Act was introduced into Congress.It would amend the US criminal code to allow theprosecution of individuals who have recruited orused child soldiers, whether in the United Statesor elsewhere. 28Detention of suspected child soldiersChildren suspected of participating in armedactivities were detained in US-run detentionfacilities in Afghanistan and Iraq and in itsnaval base in Guantánamo, Cuba. In 2006 theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)registered 59 children in detention during 16visits to five places of detention or internmentcontrolled by the USA or the UK in Iraq. 29 USsoldiers stationed at the detention centres andformer detainees described abuses againstchild detainees, including the rape of a 15-year-old boy at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, forced nudity,stress positions, beating and the use of dogs. 30Following US troop increases in Iraq in early2007, US military arrests of children there rosefrom an average of 25 per month in 2006 to anaverage of 100 per month. 31 Military officialsreported that 828 were children held at CampCropper by mid-September, including childrenas young as 11. A 17-year-old was reportedlystrangled by a fellow detainee in early 2007. 32In August 2007 the USA opened Dar al-Hikmah, a non-residential facility intended toprovide education services to 600 detainees aged11–17 pending release or transfer to Iraqi custody.US military officials excluded an estimated100 children from participation in the program,apparently on the grounds that they were“extremists” and “beyond redemption”. 33As of October 2007 it was not clear whetherchildren in US custody in Iraq were subject to thesame detention review process as adults (whohad no access to lawyers when presenting theircase to a review board that routinely decided 20cases an hour, and who had to sign pledges ofgood behaviour and produce a guarantor in orderto be released). 34 In addition, as of September2007 between 50 and 60 children aged 15–17 hadbeen turned over to Iraqi custody for trial. 35US forces in Afghanistan also detainedchildren, a number of whom were transferred tothe military detention facility at Guantánamo.Omar Ahmed Khadr, a Canadian national,was taken into US custody in Afghanistan inlate July 2002 when he was 15 years old, andsubsequently transferred to Guantánamo. InNovember 2005 he was charged for trial bymilitary commission under a military order signedby President George W. Bush in November 2001.The military commission system was replacedby a revised system under the 2006 MilitaryCommissions Act (MCA). In April 2007 OmarKhadr was charged for trial under the MCA withmurder and attempted murder in violation of the3 6 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

law of war, conspiracy, providing material supportfor terrorism and spying. 36 In June 2007 a militaryjudge dismissed the charges against Khadr on ajurisdictional question. 37 On 24 September 2007a newly established Court of Military CommissionReview overturned the ruling, allowingproceedings against Khadr to continue.On 11 October 2007 another Guantánamodetainee, Mohammad Jawad, was charged withattempted murder for allegedly throwing agrenade at a US military vehicle. He was 17 at thetime of the attack. 381 “US ground forces end strength,” Global Security,www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq.2 US Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil.3 “US will keep troop levels steady in Afghanistan”,Associated Press, 9 February 2007.4 Department of Defense, above note 2.5 “Charges fuel debate over military recruiters’access to students”, Associated Press, 16 April2006.6 House Resolution 1346, Student PrivacyProtection Act of 2007.7 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,Personnel and Readiness, “PopulationRepresentation in the Military Services, FiscalYear 2005”.8 US Government Accountability Office, “Militaryrecruiting: DoD and services need better data toenhance visibility over recruiter irregularities”,August 2006.9 Department of Defense, Defense HumanResources Activity, Joint Advertising, MarketResearch and Studies, “Department of Defense:Youth Poll Wave 9 – June 2005: Overview Report”,JAMRS Report No. 2006-001, January 2006, www.jamrs.org.10 “New army jobs qualifying for enlistment pay”,Stars and Stripes, 8 March 2007.11 “Lower standards help army recruit more”,Associated Press, 10 October 2006.12 Department of Defense, Defense HumanResources Activity, Joint Advertising, MarketResearch and Studies, “Department of Defense:Youth Poll Wave 11 – June 2006: OverviewReport”, JAMRS Report No. 2006-008, November2006, www.jamrs.org.13 US Army Junior ROTC website, www.usarmyjrotc.com/; Human Rights Watch e-mailcommunication from Marine Corps Junior ROTCoperations manager, 9 August 2007; US Air Force,“Fact Sheet: Air Force Junior Reserves OfficerTraining Corps”, December 2006, www.afoats.af.mil/; “JNROTC Basic Facts”, Navy Junior ROTCwebsite, www.njrotc.navy.mil.14 “Junior ROTC takes a hit in LA”, Los AngelesTimes, 19 February 2007.15 US Department of State, Initial Report of theUnited States of America to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child concerning the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of theChild on the Involvement of Children in ArmedConflict, 14 September 2002, www.state.gov.16 Ibid.17 Navy Personnel Command, First-Term PersonnelAssignment Policy, 28 February 2003.18 “Marines under 18 no longer will deploy tocombat zones”, Stars and Stripes, 26 April 2007.19 US Marine Corps, Revised 17 Year Old Marinein Combat Policy, 22 April 2007, MARADMIN272/07.20 US Department of State, above note 15.21 Brigadier General Sean J. Byrne, Director ofMilitary Personnel Policy, US Army, letter toHuman Rights Watch, 2 April 2004.22 Department of Defense, Information Paperregarding application of child soldiers protocols,provided to Senator Barbara Boxer, November2004.23 “Military recruiters cited for misconduct”,Associated Press, 20 August 2006.24 US Department of State, above note 15.25 Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1175, HR2620, HR 3028.26 Center for Defense Information, “US militaryassistance to countries using child soldiers,1990–2007”, www.cdi.org.27 US Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommitteeon Human Rights and the Law, “Casualties of war:child soldiers and the law”, hearing, Washington,DC, 24 April 2007, http://judiciary.senate.gov.28 Child Soldier Accountability Act, S. 2135.29 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRCAnnual Report 2006, “Iraq”, 24 May 2007, www.icrc.org.30 Amnesty International, “USA: Human dignitydenied: Torture and accountability in the ‘war onterror’”, October 2004.31 “US detains nearly 800 juveniles in Iraq”, AgenceFrance-Presse (AFP), 19 August 2007.32 Martin Fletcher , “They have planted bombs andshot soldiers – now it is time for school”, TheTimes, 15 September 2007, www.timesonline.co.uk.33 “US detains juveniles”, above note 31; Fletcher,above note 32.34 “US command in Baghdad launches bid torehabilitate Iraqi detainees”, Inside the Air Force,Vol. 18, No. 29, 20 July 2007; Nancy Montgomery,“Board decides fate of thousands of Iraqidetainees: panel of Iraqis and American militaryhas released more than 14,000 in 18 months”,Stars and Stripes, 23 February 2006.35 Walter Pincus, “US working to reshape Iraqidetainees: moderate Muslims enlisted to steeradults and children away from insurgency”,Washington Post, 19 September 2007.36 Charge sheet available at www.defenselink.mil.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 6 1

37 At his arraignment proceedings in Guantánamoon 4 June 2007, the military judge dismissed thecharges against him because, while Omar Khadrhad been designated as an “enemy combatant”in Guantánamo, nowhere was there a recordof his designation as an “unlawful enemycombatant”, the label which (when attached toa non-US national) is a prerequisite for trial bymilitary commission under the MCA.38 “Guantánamo captive charged”, Miami Herald, 12October 2007.URUGUAYEastern Republic of UruguayPopulation: 3.5 million (1.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 25,100Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 9 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182No under-18s were allowed to serve in thearmed forces, even in time of war.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeAll enlistment to the armed forces was voluntary,and it was without exception illegal to enlistanyone under the age of 18, even in time of war.Men and women between the ages of 18 and 30with basic (primary) education could volunteer,regardless of their marital status; they had toserve a minimum of two years. 1 There had beenno conscription for over 50 years. 2Military training and military schoolsSoldiers underwent a three-month trainingcourse, and further training depended on theirunit and superior officer. 3The Liceo Militar (Military High School)offered secondary education to children in thefourth to sixth year of secondary education(typically from age 15). 4 The Navy School (EscuelaNaval) offered fifth- and sixth-year secondaryeducation in science, the humanities, engineeringor economics. 5 Students from the Liceo Militarbecame members of the armed forces reserveson graduating. 6The Military School (Escuela Militar) wasa post-secondary-education centre for armyofficer cadets. Candidates followed a four-yearprogram, specializing in infantry, cavalry, artillery,engineering or communications. 71 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales(FLACSO), Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía,Reporte del Sector Seguridad en América Latinay el Caribe, Informe Nacional: Uruguay, August2006, www.flacso.cl.2 Second periodic report of Uruguay to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/URY/2, 13 October 2006.3 FLACSO, above note 1.4 Escuela Militar, Formación Profesional, www.escuelamilitar.edu.uy.3 6 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

5 Escuela Naval, Plan de estudios, www.armada.gub.uy.6 FLACSO, above note 1.7 Escuela Militar, above note 4.UZBEKISTANRepublic of UzbekistanPopulation: 26.6 million (10.7 million under 18)Government armed forces: ±55,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and IIThere were no reports of under-18s in thearmed forces.ContextOn 13 May 2005 hundreds of people werekilled when security forces fired on mainlypeaceful demonstrators in Andijon. Early thatmorning armed men had taken over the regionalgovernment building and broken into the prison,releasing hundreds of prisoners, who included23 Islamic businessmen on trial for allegedlinks with what the authorities claimed to be agroup called Akramia involved in terrorism. Thearmed men were among thousands of peoplewho during the day gathered in the main squareto protest against poverty and governmentrepression, when the security forces sealed offthe square and fired indiscriminately on thecrowd. 1 Eyewitness accounts indicated thatas many as 300 or more people were killed. 2According to the government, 187 people werekilled, most of them militants and securityofficials. 3 Following the killings, there was acrackdown on the activities of independentjournalists and human rights activists, includingwidespread torture of detainees. 4Remaining elements of the armedopposition group, the Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan (IMU), had since 2002 been basedin the Pakistani region of Waziristan, borderingAfghanistan. The IMU advocated the forcefuloverthrow of President Karimov of Uzbekistanand the establishment of an Islamic state,and in 1999 and 2000 had carried out attacksin Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from bases inAfghanistan. 5 An IMU breakaway group, theIslamic Jihad Group (IJG) (alternatively knownby other names such as the Islamic Jihad Union,and the Jamaat of Central Asia Mujahadins), wasbelieved to have been responsible for a series ofbombings and shootings in Tashkent, the capital,in March and April 2004. 6 In May 2006 armedmen, claimed by officials to be linked to the IMU,raided a Tajik-Kyrgyz frontier post; several of theattackers and Tajik and Kyrgyz security forceswere killed in the ensuing fighting. 7 In early 2007there were reports of fighting among elementsS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 6 3

of the IMU and troops and local tribespeople inWaziristan, but the extent of the fighting and anyIMU involvement was unclear. 8Uzbekistan was a member of the ShanghaiCooperation Organisation (SCO), established inJune 2001, comprising also China, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, andTajikistan, whose goals included mutual cooperationin security matters. 9GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeMilitary recruitment was regulated by the 2002Law on Universal Military Service, which wasamended in 2006, transferring the managementof conscription from the government to thePresidential Administration. The law governedpre-conscription preparation, conscription,voluntary service, mobilization of reserves,alternative service and military regulations. Theminimum age for conscription was 18. Therewere no reports of under-age recruitment. Moveswere made towards establishing a non-conscriptmilitary. 10Corruption in the conscription system wascommon. Although in Tashkent young peoplepaid bribes to be able to avoid military service,in rural areas where unemployment was rifebribes were paid to be conscripted and have thepossibility of work in law enforcement, customsor the military. 11The army was the largest in the region,was well financed, and provided soldiers withsubsidies for their families and future jobopportunities. 12 Spending on soldiers’ payincreased sharply in the months following theAndijon events. 13Military training and military schoolsA new decree in April 2005 was aimed atimproving military education. A new facultywas established at the Tashkent University ofInformation Technology on the use of radio airdefences, accepting students under 25 aftermilitary service, or military-school graduates from17–21 years of age. 14In 2006 there were overall more than sixapplicants for every place in the four militarycolleges (general, air force, motor-artillery andtank), and over eight for every place in the airforce college specifically. 15 The best collegegraduates were admitted to the Armed ForcesAcademy. 16 In January 2007 it was reported that anumber of schools had been established to trainnon-commissioned officers. 17An increase from 11 to 12 years in the durationof compulsory education in 2005 allowedstudents to spend nine years at a standardschool, and a further three in an academic lyceumor professional training college. 18 Students agedabout 17–18 took pre-conscription army trainingin grades 11 and 12 at the new professionalcolleges or lyceums, which included basic militaryskills and one lesson in firing automatic weaponsat a firing range. 19There were also informal military-relatedactivities in schools, including a national sportand military competition aimed at preparing boysaged about 11–16 for military service, in whichteams fired airguns and threw grenades. 20 In2005 more than 350,000 children participated. 21Armed groupsThere were no reports of the recruitment or useof under-18s in armed groups within or outsideUzbekistan. Pakistani military sources in 2004claimed that armed groups operating in Pakistanwere increasingly recruiting teenagers fromCentral Asia, but these claims were disputed andcould not be confirmed. 22 Children and youngpeople were among those killed in the violencein Tashkent in 2004, and five infants and childrenwere detained alongside family membersarrested on suspicion of preparing explosives. 23Children were reported to have been amongthose killed in Andijon in May 2005, among thosesubsequently detained by the authorities, andamong the refugees who fled abroad. 24DevelopmentsThe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childurged Uzbekistan to ratify the Optional Protocol. 25* Titles of non-English-language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 International Crisis Group (ICG), Uzbekistan:The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing No. 38, 25May 2005, www.crisisgroup.org; Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan,Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005, 20 June 2005, www.osce.org; Amnesty International Report 2006;Human Rights Watch World Report 2006; C.J.Chivers and Ethan Wilensky-Lanford, “Video ofill-fated Uzbek rising offers haunting, complexview”, New York Times, 22 June 2006.2 Amnesty International Report 2006.3 “Uzbekistan rejects accusations over Andijontrials”, AFP, 26 December 2005, at Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), www.rferl.org.4 See, for example, Human Rights Watch WorldReport 2007.5 ICG, Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty,Asia Briefing No. 67, August 2007.6 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developmentsand Implications for U.S. Interests, CongressionalResearch Service, 5 June 2006, http://fpc.state.gov; see also ICG, Uzbekistan: Stagnation andUncertainty, above note 5.3 6 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

7 Dadodjan Azimov, “Are Islamic militantsregrouping in the Fergana Valley?”, Institute ofWar and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1 December2006, www.iwpr.net; see also AmnestyInternational Report 2007, entry on Kyrgyzstan.8 Daniel Kimmage, “Central Asia: has IMU reachedthe end of the line?”, RFE/RL, 30 March 2007.For alternative interpretations see Joshua Foust,“What’s the real story in Waziristan?”, Registan.net, 7 April 2007, www.registan.net. See also ICG,Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, abovenote 5.9 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, www.sectsco.org.10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “To protect andpreserve independence is our holy duty”,Narodnoe Slovo, 11 August 2006, www.mfa.uz;“The results are deserved and the perspectivesare wide”, Uzbekistan Today, 12 January 2007,www.ut.uz.11 Correspondence from confidential source,Uzbekistan, April 2007.12 Oleg Sidirov, “The armed forces of the republicof Uzbekistan yesterday and today”, Gazeta.kz, 8February 2007, www.gazeta.kz.13 “Uzbek military personnel set to receive bigpay raise”, Eurasianet, 30 August 2005, www.eurasianet.org.14 Uzbekistan National News Agency (UzA),“Innovation in higher military education”,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2005, www.mfa.uz.15 Sidirov, above note 12; Press-uz.info, “TheMinistry of Defence reports strong competitionfor place in military colleges”, Gazeta.uz, 11 July2006, http://gzt.uz.16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Towards ConstitutionDay of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Defendingthe Independence of the Homeland”, NarodnoeSlovo, 25 November 2006, at http://jahon.mfa.uz.17 Anna Ivanova and Norali Ochilov, “Reliabledefenders of our independence”, Pravda Vostoka,15 January 2007, www.pv.uz.18 Second periodic report of Uzbekistan to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/104/Add.6, 30 August 2005.19 Correspondence from confidential source,Uzbekistan, April 2007.20 “Regional military sports competition ‘shunkorlar’has taken place”, UzA, 10 April 2007, www.uza.uz; see also “Pupils are preparing to becomedefenders of the homeland”, website of NukusSchool 11, 16 September 2005, http://nukus11.connect.uz.21 “‘Kamolot’, youth and military patriotism”, UzA, 9January 2006.22 See, for example, “Tale of a lost militant”,Reuters, 15 December 2004; “Qaeda usingchildren for terrorism”, Daily Times (Pakistan), 26November 2004, both at www.dailytimes.com.pk(for more detail see Tajikistan entry).23 Doug Burton, “Religious fanaticism fuels Uzbekblasts”, Washington Times, 31 July 2004, www.washingtontimes.com; Asia Monitor Centre,“Uzbekistan: chronicle of terror”, 5 April 2004,www.ames.kiev.ua.24 Reza Hossaini, “An eyewitness account fromAndijan”, UNICEF, 24 May 2005, www.unicef.org;“Uzbekistan: Andijon refugees in Romania awaitthird-country resettlement”, IRIN, 10 November2005, www.irinnews.org.25 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Uzbekistan, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/UZB/CO/2, 2 June2006.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 6 5

Venezuel aBolivarian Republic of VenezuelaPopulation: 26.7 million (10.0 million under 18)Government armed forces: 82,300Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 23 September 2003Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182There were reports of Colombian andVenezuelan armed groups recruiting under-18s in border areas.ContextThe increased militarization of the borderbetween Venezuela and Colombia, combined withrising insecurity, economic difficulties and armedconfrontations among Colombian and Venezuelanarmed groups, pushed a growing number ofColombian refugees and asylum seekers to citiessuch as Caracas and Maracaibo. 1In September 2004 five Venezuelan soldiersand an oil company engineer were killed in anambush by members of a Colombian armedopposition group in El Amparo, Apure state. Armyofficers admitted difficulties in safeguarding theborder against incursions by Colombian armedgroups, which were also involved in kidnappingsand smuggling. 2GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1978 conscription law established thatmilitary service was compulsory for all men aged18–50 (military age). Young men had to registerwith military authorities within 60 days of their18th birthday and serve for a maximum of 18months. Military service was voluntary for womenin times of peace and compulsory in times ofwar. Men of military age must show proof ofhaving fulfilled their military obligations in orderto be able to obtain a driver’s licence or to starta business. 3 The 1999 constitution expresslyprohibited forcible recruitment. 4Not all available men were called up for activemilitary service. In February 2005 PresidentHugo Chávez issued a decree establishing a“military reserve” made up of men of military agenot in active service. These new reserve units,under the direct authority of the president, weremanaged by the Strategic Operational Command,independent of the Ministry of Defence. Traininglasted for five months at military barracks or atschools, and those training for a further threeyears were deemed to have fulfilled their militaryobligations. 5A new conscription and military enlistmentlaw was being developed. It proposed that activemilitary service would no longer be compulsoryfor everyone, but all men and women of militaryage would be required to register, with heavyfines of up to US$350 for failing to register,not joining active service when called up ornot showing military papers when required.Household heads, university students, parentsand married men and women could do militaryservice during weekends and holidays. 6Although the law had yet to be enacted, inApril 2007 military authorities were urging alladults to register, and it was reported that over16,000 men and women had been incorporatedas reserves into the armed forces in January2007. 7 It was expected that there would be up to1.5 million reservists. 8Military training and military schoolsStudents at private or public military secondaryschoolswho received military training approvedby the Ministry of Defence were deemed to havefulfilled their military obligations. 9Pre-military instruction was compulsory forall students in the last two years of secondaryeducation (typically age 15–17) and additional tocompulsory military service. 10The officer training Military Academyadmitted students in the final year of secondaryschool(age 17). 11A new military education law was beingdebated in 2007. It proposed the establishmentof joint civilian–military activities, includingthe participation of the civilian population interritorial guard units. Secondary-educationstudents in all institutions would be requiredto follow a “diversified secondary and militaryprofessional” educational program for 18months, offering academic, scientific, technicaland military courses. Pre-military instruction insecondary-schools would continue under theauthority of the Ministry of Popular Power forDefence. 12Armed groupsAccording to reports there were at least tenarmed groups operating in Venezuela. 13 TheColombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC),the National Liberation Army (Ejército deLiberación Nacional, ELN), Colombian armybackedparamilitaries, and the VenezuelanBolivarian Liberation Forces–Liberation Army(Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación–EjércitoLibertador, FBL) controlled large areas alongthe border with Colombia, in effect carrying out3 6 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

state functions with regard to political and socialcontrol. 14The FBL had emerged in 1992 as a nationalistpolitical organization. It had military unitsin border areas, purportedly to “stop theadvancement of paramilitaries from Colombia”and any attempted “invasion by imperialistforces”. 15 Although it claimed to support thegovernment, President Hugo Chávez deniedany connections with the FBL. 16 It proposed thecreation of popular self-defence committeesin rural areas, the incorporation of the wholepopulation in national defence and securitypolicies and the extension of pre-militaryeducation from the first year of secondaryschool.17 In 2005 it was estimated that the FBLhad around 4,000 members in Alto Apure,near the Colombian border. 18 The local priest atGuasdualito, Apure state, reported that the FBLhad recruited youngsters, but this was denied byFBL spokespersons. 19Armed groups in the border areas imposedstringent controls on the movement of peopleand were responsible for the forcible recruitmentof children, kidnappings and unlawful killings.During 2006 at least 40 people, including someunder 18, died in El Nula and surrounding areas,reportedly during combat or as a result of theirlinks with one of these armed groups. Manychildren stopped attending school for fear ofbeing recruited. 20In October 2006 a member of the communityof Santa Inés in El Nula, Apure state, was killedby unidentified men believed to be membersof armed groups operating in the area. Thirtytwofamilies left their homes seeking safety. 21In February 2007 a four-year-old girl waskilled during an armed confrontation betweenColombian armed groups in El Amparo, Apurestate, allegedly over control of territory inVenezuela. 22The office of the UN refugee agency, UNHCR,in Táchira told the Child Soldiers Coalition aboutcases where whole families had migrated toVenezuela from Colombia when their childrenreached the age of nine or ten, for fear that armedgroups would take them away. In one case, amother of five children had fled her farm aftertwo of them had been recruited. However, fear ofrecruitment of children was not often seen as themain reason for fleeing Colombia, even thoughthe Coalition heard of cases where attempts hadbeen made to recruit several members of thesame family before leaving Colombia. 23Disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration (DDR)Although UNHCR estimated that around 200,000Colombians had fled to Venezuela in recentyears, 24 the Venezuelan government had nospecific policies on refugees or reintegration ofchild soldiers or refugees. 25DevelopmentsThe UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, onexamining Venezuela’s second periodic reportin October 2007, recommended improving thesharing of responsibilities between the NationalCommission for Refugees and child-protectioninstitutions, ensuring rapid access to refugeestatus determination procedures and subsequentassistance for unaccompanied and separatedchildren, and other measures contained in theCommittee’s general comment No. 6 on thetreatment of unaccompanied and separatedchildren outside their country of origin. 26International standardsVenezuela ratified the ILO Worst Forms of ChildLabour Convention 182 in October 2005.1 Child Soldiers Coalition, Armed Conflictin Colombia – Frontiers: Childhood at theBorderline, February 2007.2 Ibid.3 Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento militar.4 Rocío San Miguel, “Baduel oculta la verdad”,Noticiero Digital, 3 May 2007, http://noticierodigital.com.5 Vicente Ventura Barreiro, “Reserva militar deVenezuela o brazo armado de la RevoluciónBolivariana”, Newpolitic.com, c.2006, atwww.ciee.org.ar.6 “Consideran multar a quienes no exijan registromilitar”, El Universal, 24 April 2007,www.eluniversal.com.7 José Luis Carrillo, “Jefe de la CircunscripciónMilitar del Distrito Capital sostiene que tododeber es una obligación”, Venezuela Real, 27April 2007, http://venezuelareal.zoomblog.com.8 Venezuela en Red, “Civiles coadyuvarán en ladefensa en Venezuela”, 7 April 2005, http://venezuela-15a.blogspot.com.9 Ley de Conscripción y Alistamiento militar.10 Ibid.11 Academia Militar de Venezuela, www.academiamilitar.edu.ve.12 Propuesta de Ley de Educación Militar (accessed26 June 2007), www.ejercito.mil.ve.13 Centro de Documentación de los MovimientosArmados (Cedema), www.cedema.org.14 Provea (Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos), DerechosHumanos y Coyuntura, Boletín electrónico No.177, 12–30 October 2006, www.derechos.org.ve.15 “Hablan las FBL: Estamos dispuestos a conversarcon el señor Presidente”, Quinto Día Online,edition 412, 8 October 2004, www.quintodia.com.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 6 7

16 Ministerio del Poder Popular para laComunicación y la Información, “Soberanía,Chávez y sus posturas sobre las FARC”, 28January 2005, www.minci.gob.ve.17 Fuerzas Bolivarianas de Liberación – EjércitoLibertador (FBL-EL), “Visión”, www.fbl-el.org.18 “Aseguran que 4 mil hombres de la FBL operan enel Alto Apure”, El Universal, 19 July 2005.19 “Venezuela–Colombia: Violencia y silenciofronterizos”, IPS, March 2007, www.ipsnoticias.net.20 Equipo Pastoral de El Nula, “¿Quién tiene elcontrol de la zona?”, Provea, Derechos Humanosy Coyuntura, Boletín electrónico No. 177.21 “Foro por la Vida rechaza la posibilidad de estadode excepción en El Nula y solicita presenciade funcionarios públicos en la zona”, Provea,Derechos Humanos y Coyuntura, Boletínelectrónico Nº 177.22 “Venezuela–Colombia”, above note 19.23 Child Soldiers Coalition, above note 1.24 “Venezuela–Colombia”, above note 19.25 Second periodic report of Venezuela to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc.CRC/C/VEN/2, 5 April 2007 (only in Spanish atthe time of writing).26 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of second periodic reportsubmitted by Venezuela, Concludingobservations, UN Doc. CRC/C/VEN/CO/2,5 October 2007.Viet NamSocialist Republic of Viet NamPopulation: 84.2 million (30.5 million under 18)Government armed forces: 455,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18Voluntary recruitment age: 18 (17 for training)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: ratified 20 December 2001Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I, ILO 138, ILO 182Only male citizens over the age of 18could be recruited for military service andunder-18s could not be directly involvedin hostilities. Under-18s could participatedirectly in military operations in anemergency situation. Male citizens turning17 could be accepted into military schoolsand were recognized as servicemen onactive service.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1992 constitution states that “It is thesacred duty and the noble right of the citizen todefend his motherland. The citizen must fulfilhis military obligation and join in the all-peoplenational defence” (Article 77), and “The entirepeople shall endeavour to defend the socialistVietnamese motherland and ensure nationalsecurity” (Article 44).In its declaration on ratifying the OptionalProtocol in December 2001, and in subsequentreporting and other responses to the UNCommittee on the Rights of the Child, thegovernment stated that by law only male citizensover the age of 18 would be recruited for militaryservice and that under-18s would not be directlyinvolved in hostilities. Viet nam’s December2005 initial report to the Committee on theOptional Protocol stated that male citizens aged18 could enlist in the armed forces. However, thegovernment maintained its position that under-18s could directly participate in military battlesin the case of “an urgent need for safeguardingnational independence, sovereignty, unity andterritorial integrity”. 1The 1981 Military Service Law, as amended in1994, provided the legal basis for conscription.People’s Committees and other local officialshad to submit annually to the regional militarycommander a list of boys who would turn 17 inthat year (Article 19), and the resulting call-uptook place “once or twice” a year (Article 19). 2 In3 6 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

June 2005 an amendment to the Law on MilitaryCompulsory Service was adopted by the NationalAssembly. Article 12 provided that the age formilitary compulsory service for men was from18 to 25 years of age. A representative of thegovernment reported that the number of qualifiedcitizens called up for military compulsory servicewas very small in comparison with the totalpopulation. 3The recruitment of child soldiers wasnot specifically criminalized under nationallegislation. However, there existed severalpotential avenues for prosecution, in particularthe 1999 Penal Code, which stipulated that thosewho abused their position and power to actagainst the regulations governing military serviceregistration, orders for military service or regulartraining would be punished by up to three years’“non-custodial reform”, a form of communitybasedservice, or six months to three years’imprisonment (Article 261). 4Military training and military schoolsArticle 13 of the 1981 Military Service Lawstipulated that male citizens turning 17 andmeeting necessary qualifications could beaccepted into military schools and be recognizedas servicemen on active service; the governmentstated that application for such schools wasvoluntary. 5The government has stated that only studentsaged over 18 could participate in direct militarytraining. For those aged under 18, militarytraining was given to improve their knowledgeof national defence, and physical traininglimited to learning how to march, stand in lineand salute. Following graduation from militaryschools students were sent to serve in the army.Permission to retire from military service was atthe discretion of military authorities. 6The government also stated that there existedcertain schools set up in remote areas under thedirection of the army, created for children whowould otherwise have no access to education. 7It is unclear whether attendance at such schoolswas voluntary, what age limits were set forstudents and whether military training was given.UN Committee on the Rights of the Child inSeptember 2006. The Committee recommendedamong other things an explicit prohibition bylaw on recruitment to and use in armed forces orgroups of under-15s and their direct participationin hostilities. It also noted its concern thatuncertainty about the age of young recruitscould occur due to lack of birth registration inthe past. Where birth certificates were lacking,the Committee recommended that the age ofthe recruitment intake should be determinedby other reliable means, including medicalexaminations. The government stated itsintention to amend the Law on Military Service,the Ordinance on Self-Defence Militia and otherrelevant legal documents to ensure compliancewith the Optional Protocol. 91 Declaration of Viet Nam on ratification of theOptional Protocol, 20 December 2001, www2.ohchr.org.2 Law on Amendments and Supplements to aNumber of Articles of the Law on Military ServiceDuty, 22 June 1994.3 Viet Nam, Country presentation at the “Workshopto Mainstream the OP-CRC-AC in the SEA Region”,November 2007, Quezon City, Philippines,sponsored by the Southeast Asian Coalitionto Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (SEACUS),Coalition copy.4 Initial report of Viet Nam to the UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child on implementation of theOptional Protocol, UN Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/VNM/1,12 December 2005.5 Ibid.6 State party examination of Viet Nam’s initialreport on the OPAC, 43rd Session of the CRC, 22September 2006, www.crin.org.7 Ibid.8 Initial report of Viet Nam, above note 4.9 Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Viet Nam,Concluding observations, 17 October 2006, UNDoc. CRC/C/OPAC/VNM/CO/1; Initial report ofViet Nam, above note 4.Armed groupsViet Nam maintained a paramilitary self-defencemilitia force, whose operation was governedby the 1996 Ordinance on Self-Defence Militia.Article 2 of this Ordinance stipulated that personsselected to join the self-defence militia force hadto be 18. 8DevelopmentsViet Nam ratified the Optional Protocol inDecember 2001 and in December 2005 submittedits initial report, which was examined by theS — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 6 9

YemenRepublic of YemenPopulation: 21.0 million (11.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 66,700Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: acceded 2 March 2007Other treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182Although Yemen’s laws specified 18 asthe minimum recruitment age, under-agerecruitment to the armed forces reportedlyremained common.ContextThe government faced persistent oppositionfrom followers of Sheik Hussein Badr Eddinal-Houti, who was killed in September 2004after months of battles with Yemeni securityforces. Sheik al-Houti, one of the clerics of theZaidi Shia community, headed an armed group,the Faithful Youth (Shabab al-Moumineen,sometimes translated as the Believing Youth).This group, which was still active, led protestsat mosques against the United States (USA) andIsrael, and launched attacks against governmentand Western targets. Al-Houti’s followers claimedthat the Yemeni government had become tooclosely allied with the USA. 1 The Yemeni Ministryof Defence published a fatwa (religious edict) inMarch 2007, authorizing and obligating “the useof deadly force against the Faithful Youth”. 2Al-Qaeda cells were reportedly present inYemen. In July 2007 the organization allegedlycarried out a suicide bomb attack in the easternprovince of Marib, killing seven Spanish touristsand two Yemenis. An al-Qaeda member whohad escaped from a Yemeni prison with 23 othermilitants in February 2006 was killed in a shootoutwith the armed forces in January 2007. 3Inter-tribal violence, fuelled by the availabilityof firearms in the hands of tribesmen, resultedin a number of killings. 4 The government’s abilityto control these clashes remained limited.Tensions which periodically escalated intoviolent confrontations continued between thegovernment and some tribes. 5GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe constitution made no direct reference toconscription, but stated that “[t]he law shallregulate general mobilization which shall beannounced by the chairman of the PresidentialCouncil following the approval of the House ofRepresentatives” (Article 36). In 2001 Yemen’sNational Defence Council abolished compulsorymilitary service, relying instead on volunteersto fill posts in the military and security forces. 6Article 149 of Law No. 45 (2002) on Child Rightsstated that “persons under the age of 18 cannotparticipate in armed conflicts or be recruited”.The law forbade all exploitation of children aschild soldiers.Although Yemen’s laws specified 18 asthe minimum recruitment age, under-agerecruitment to the armed forces reportedlyremained common. The recruitment systemwas disorganized and birth registration wasirregular. Joining the army was highly soughtafter, since other employment opportunities wereextremely limited. Parents sometimes agreed tothe recruitment of their children into the armedforces because of their poor economic situation. 7During fighting between the Yemeni armedforces and the Faithful Youth in January–March2007, the Yemeni military reportedly used childsoldiers. Children as young as 15 were allegedlygiven weapons by the armed forces and sent tothe front with no training. 8Armed groupsParamilitariesYemen’s paramilitary force was about 70,000strong. Approximately 50,000 constitutedthe Ministry of Interior’s Central SecurityOrganization; they were equipped with a rangeof infantry weapons and armoured personnelcarriers. An additional 20,000 were the forcesof armed tribal levies. There was no availableinformation on whether children were part ofparamilitary groups. 9Armed political and tribal groupsThe security forces faced threats posed byIslamist and tribal armed groups. Yemen’smountainous topography contributed to alack of central government control in the moreremote governorates, which in turn enhancedthe authority of the country’s well-armedautonomous tribes. In July 2005 armed tribalmilitia blocked fuel deliveries in Sana’a to protestagainst proposed reductions in fuel subsidies.Tribesmen, particularly in the north, sometimeskidnapped foreign tourists and workers in orderto extract political and economic concessionsfrom the government. 10According to 2004 reports, children werewidely involved, often forcibly, in tribal and familyconflicts, and were often at risk of being killed, 11but no further information was obtained.3 7 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

DevelopmentsIn consideration of Yemen’s third periodicreport on the Convention on the Rights of theChild, the UN Committee on the Rights of theChild expressed concern about the lack of birthregistration for a significant number of children,and recommended that Yemen take appropriatemeasures to ensure the registration of all births. 12International standardsYemen acceded to the Optional Protocol on 2March 2007 and declared that it was committedto retaining 18 years as the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment into the Yemeni armedforces, as well as to retaining the ban on thecompulsory or voluntary recruitment of anyperson under 18 years of age. 13* Titles of non-English language sources have beentranslated by the Coalition.1 Global Security, “Al-Shabab al-Mum’en/Shababal-Moumineen (Believing Youth)”, www.globalsecurity.org.2 Yemen Ministry of Defence, www.yemen.gov.ye.3 “Al-Qaeda blamed for Yemen attack”, Al-Jazeera,3 July 2007; “Yemen kills al-Qaeda fugitive”,Al-Jazeera, 15 January 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net.4 “Yemen: Despite ban on arms, activists warn ofincreasing violence”, IRIN, 8 July 2007.5 “Al-Shabab al-Mum’en”, above note 1.6 US Library of Congress, Country profile: Yemen,http://lcweb2.loc.gov.7 Confidential source, Yemen, April 2007.8 Jane Novak, “Yemen: from nepotism to internaljihad”, Worldpress.org, March 2007, www.worldpress.org.9 Country profile, above note 6.10 Ibid.11 Yemen National NGOs Coalition, The Third NGOs’Alternative Periodic Report on Rights of the Child,www.crin.org.12 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Yemen,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.267, 21 September 2005.13 Declaration on accession to the OptionalProtocol, www2.ohchr.org.ZAMBIARepublic of ZambiaPopulation: 11.7 million (6.2 million under 18)Government armed forces: 15,100Compulsory recruitment age: no conscriptionVoluntary recruitment age: 18; 16 with parentalconsentVoting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ICC, ILO 138, ILO 182Under-18s could be serving in thearmed forces, given the low rate of birthregistration and the possibility for 16-yearoldsto enlist with parental permission.GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe Defence Act prohibited a child “under theapparent age of 18” from being recruited into thearmed forces without the consent of a parent,guardian or local district secretary (Chapter106). The use of children in hostilities was alsoprohibited by law. There was no conscription.Recruits had to be Zambian nationals and havea national registration card, obtainable at theage of 16. 1 The Juvenile Act defined a “child”as a person below 16 and a “young person” asbetween 16 and 19 years of age. 2There were no reports of under-agerecruitment, but the situation was not knownto have changed significantly since 2003, whenthe UN Committee on the Rights of the Childexpressed concern that the minimum age forvoluntary recruitment was an “apparent age” andnoted that “less than 10 percent of children wereregistered at birth in 1999, and even less in ruralareas”. 3DevelopmentsZambia hosted an estimated 120,000 refugeeswho had fled conflicts in Angola, Burundi, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwandaand Somalia. 4 Over 74,000 Angolan refugeeshad been repatriated under a four-year voluntaryrepatriation program (2003–6). 5 Voluntaryrepatriation of DRC refugees began in May 2007;some 60,000 reportedly remained in Zambia, ofwhom 40,000 were living in camps. 6S — Z1 Initial report of Zambia to the UN Committeeon the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.25, 19 November 2002.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7 1

2 UNHCR, “Zambia: analysis of the gap inprotection of refugees”, September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org.3 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,Consideration of report submitted by Zambia,Concluding observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.206, 2 July 2003.4 UNHCR, above note 2.5 Ibid.6 “Kinshasa: DRC–Zambia: Congolese refugeesreturn home”, IRIN, 8 May 2007.ZIMBABWERepublic of ZimbabwePopulation: 13.0 million (6.3 million under 18)Government armed forces: 29,000Compulsory recruitment age: 18 or 16Voluntary recruitment age: unclear (see text)Voting age: 18Optional Protocol: not signedOther treaties ratified (see glossary):CRC, GC AP I and II, ILO 138, ILO 182, ACRWCThe national youth training program, whichincluded paramilitary training of children,continued in 2007. Youth militias wereinvolved in human rights violations againstopposition supporters.ContextIntensified political opposition to PresidentRobert Mugabe’s political party, the ZimbabweAfrican National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) was met with a violent crackdown in a climateof economic crisis, hyper-inflation and systematichuman rights violations. 1GovernmentNational recruitment legislation andpracticeThe 1979 National Service Act regulatedrecruitment for national service and the armedforces. According to the government’s 1995 reportto the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,“The direct recruitment of children under 18 yearsof age into the army is prohibited by the NationalService Act of 1979. The Act provides for 18 yearsas the lower age limit for recruitment into regularnational service and 18 years for emergencynational service.” However, the same reportstated elsewhere, “Direct recruitment of childrenunder 16 years of age into the army is prohibitedby the National Service Act of 1979. The Actprovides for 16 years as the lower age limit forrecruitment into regular national service and 18years for emergency national service.” 2National youth service trainingprogramA compulsory national youth service trainingprogram for all school-leavers (also known asyouth militia training) introduced in January2003, 3 continued in 2007. 4 In 2003 thegovernment had stated that the training wasaimed at people aged 10–30. 5 Training centresprovided militia training in a 120-day program for3 7 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

1,000 young people at a time, although numbersdeclined as the economic and food crisisintensified in the country. 6 Several thousandchildren and young persons had received trainingby March 2007. Training focused on paramilitaryskills and political education, and allegedlyincluded torture and killing techniques. It wasreported that girls were repeatedly raped byother trainees and staff. 7The government gave preference to nationalyouth service graduates among those enteringand seeking employment in the civil services,especially in the security forces. 8 A number ofgovernment training programs, such as nursetraining and a program for media practitioners,admitted only youth militia graduates. There wereplans to draft hundreds of youth militia graduatesinto the civil service to be deployed as “youthdevelopment officers”. 9 In September 2007 theYouth, Gender and Women’s Affairs parliamentaryportfolio committee recommended the closure ofthe youth militia training centres as there was nofood to feed recruits. 10Youth militiasYouth militia worked alongside the securityforces, whose ranks were increasingly weakenedby desertion. Members of youth militias earnedmore than average civil servant pay, includingthat of police officers. 11 Information about theprecise age of youth militia members was notavailable.Youth militia, as well as ruling-partysupporters and the army, were used to intimidatethe opposition in the 2005 elections. 12 Youthmilitia were also deployed in “OperationSunrise”, in which they harassed motoristsand commuters when a new currency wasintroduced in 2006. 13 Violence involving youthmilitia intensified from March 2007, with reportsof beatings, abductions and arbitrary detentiontargeting opposition figures. 14 Militia were usedto enforce price controls, especially from mid-2007 in “Operation Reduce Prices”, when youthmilitia were sent to enforce price reductions of50 per cent by supermarkets, shops and stalls. 15Allegations of political intimidation and attackson opposition supporters, forced displacement,killings, torture, rape and the destruction ofproperty by members of ZANU–PF youth militiascontinued up to the end of 2007. 16DevelopmentsChildren were reported to be most affectedby the economic crisis in Zimbabwe. 17 Chronicmalnutrition affected a third of all children. 18The education system had almost stoppedfunctioning, due to the general economiccollapse, prohibitive fees for both governmentand private schools and lack of teachers, whowere not only underpaid but were harassed andthreatened by militias, including youth miltias. 191 “Zimbabwe”, Human Rights Watch World Report2008.2 Initial Report of Zimbabwe to UN Committee onthe Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.35,12 October 1995.3 “National service to be compulsory”, Herald(Harare), 2 July 2002, www.herald.co.zw.4 “Zimbabwe: Youth militia camps may close”,IRIN, 6 September 2007.5 Solidarity Peace Trust, “National YouthService Training – ‘shaping youths in a trulyZimbabwean manner’”, 5 September 2003, www.solidaritypeacetrust.org.6 “Zimbabwe: Youth militia camps may close”,IRIN, 6 September 2007.7 See monthly reports from the Zimbabwe HumanRights NGO Forum, www.hrforumzim.com.8 US Department of State, “Zimbabwe”, CountryReports on Human Rights Practices 2006, 6March 2007, www.state.gov.9 Zim Online, “Mugabe to draft youth militia intocivil service”, 17 November 2006, www.zimonline.co.za.10 “Youth militia camps may close”, above note 6.11 Martin Rupiya, “The military question”, Mail andGuardian online, 25 April 2007, www.mg.co.za/;Zim Online, “Zimbabwe: Central Bank doublessalaries for youth militia”, 13 February 2007,www.zimonline.co.za/12 “Major Zimbabwe police crackdown”, BBC News,23 May 2005.13 “Zimbabwe seizes millions in cash”, BBC News, 9August 2006.14 “Bashing dissent: escalating violence and staterepression in Zimbabwe”, Human Rights Watch,Vol. 19, No. 6(A) (May 2007), http://hrw.org.15 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Zimbabwe: aregional solution?”, Africa Report No. 132, 18September 2007.16 “Bashing dissent”, above note 14; US Departmentof State, “Zimbabwe”, Country Reports on HumanRights Practices 2007, 11 March 2008, www.state.gov.17 UNICEF UK, “Global support needed to protectchildren in Zimbabwe”, 26 July 2005; “Childrenhit hardest by Zimbabwe’s economic problems”,29 June 2007, www.unicef.org.18 Save the Children, Zimbabwe Country Brief 2006,www.savethechildren.org.uk/; “Zimbabwe:diarrhoea outbreak claims 34”, IRIN, 9 July 2007.19 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,Shadow Report to the Combined 7th, 8th and9th Report of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2007,www.amnesty.org/; “Zimbabwe: hunger bitesthe health and education sectors”, IRIN, 26 July2007.S — ZC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7 3

Uganda Coalition launch of a training eventon child protection for local authorities,Pader district, Uganda© Uganda Coalition 20073 74 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Summary of selectedinternational treatiesThe Coalition promotes the adoption and implementation of international legal standardsprotecting children from recruitment or use as soldiers. The following is a summary of themain regional and international legal standards relating to child soldiers:Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflict: This was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000and entered into force on 12 February 2002. The protocol sets 18 as the minimum age fordirect participation in hostilities, for recruitment into armed groups, and for compulsoryrecruitment by governments. States may accept volunteers from the age of 16 but mustdeposit a binding declaration at the time of ratification or accession, setting out theirminimum voluntary recruitment age and outlining certain safeguards for such recruitment.Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998): This establishes a permanent courtto try persons charged with committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.In its definition of war crimes, the statute includes “conscripting or enlisting children underthe age of fifteen years into national armed forces or using them to participate actively inhostilities” (Article 8.b.xxvi); and in the case of an internal armed conflict, “conscripting orenlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using themto participate actively in hostilities” (Article 8.e.vii). When drafting the treaty, delegatesagreed that the terms “using” and “participate” would prohibit not only children’s directparticipation in combat, but also their active participation in military activities linked tocombat such as scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as decoys, couriers, orat military checkpoints. Also prohibited is the use of children in “direct” support functionssuch as carrying supplies to the front line. The statute also defines sexual slavery as a crimeagainst humanity (Article 7(1)(g)). The court came into being on 1 July 2002.ILO Minimum Age Convention 138: This convention was adopted on 26 June 1973 and cameinto force on 19 June 1976. States ratifying the convention are bound to:pursue a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour andto raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a levelconsistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons (Article 1).ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182: The convention was adopted on 16 June1999 and came into force on 19 November 2000. It commits each state which ratifies it to“take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of theworst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency.” The term “child” applies to all personsunder the age of 18 years and the worst forms of child labour include:all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking ofchildren, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forcedor compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict (Article 3a).C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7 5

Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (1977): The protocols set15 as the minimum age for recruitment or use in armed conflict. This minimum standardapplies to all parties, both governmental and non-governmental, in both international andinternal armed conflict.Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, applicable to international armed conflicts, states:The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children whohave not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, inparticular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruitingamong those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have notattained the age of eighteen years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to givepriority to those who are oldest (Paragraph 2).If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, children who have notattained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and fall into the powerof an adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from the special protection accordedby this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war (Paragraph 3).Article 4(c) of the Additional Protocol II, applicable to non-international armed conflicts,states:Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in thearmed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989): Although the Convention on the Rights of theChild generally defines a child as any person under the age of 18, Article 38 uses the lowerage of 15 as the minimum for recruitment or participation in armed conflict. This language isdrawn from the two Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.Article 38 states that:States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have notattained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities (Paragraph 2).States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the ageof fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who haveattained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years,States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest (Paragraph 3).African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: The charter is the only regionaltreaty in the world which addresses the issue of child soldiers. It was adopted by theOrganization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) and came into force in November1999. It defines a child as anyone below 18 years of age without exception. It also statesthat: “States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to ensure thatno child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting anychild” (Article 22.2).3 7 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

The UN Security Council has passed a series of resolutions condemning the recruitment anduse of children in hostilities. These are resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000) 1379 (2001),1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict. To download UNresolutions visit http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7 7

Optional Protocol to theConvention on the Rights ofthe Child on the involvement ofchildren in armed conflictAdopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession byGeneral Assembly resolutionA/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000entered into force on 12 February 2002The States Parties to the present Protocol,Encouraged by the overwhelming support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child,demonstrating the widespread commitment that exists to strive for the promotion andprotection of the rights of the child,Reaffirming that the rights of children require special protection, and calling forcontinuous improvement of the situation of children without distinction, as well as for theirdevelopment and education in conditions of peace and security,Disturbed by the harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children and thelong-term consequences it has for durable peace, security and development,Condemning the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and direct attackson objects protected under international law, including places that generally have asignificant presence of children, such as schools and hospitals,Noting the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, inparticular, the inclusion therein as a war crime, of conscripting or enlisting children underthe age of 15 years or using them to participate actively in hostilities in both internationaland non-international armed conflicts,Considering therefore that to strengthen further the implementation of rightsrecognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child there is a need to increase theprotection of children from involvement in armed conflict,Noting that article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifies that, for thepurposes of that Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 yearsunless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier,Convinced that an optional protocol to the Convention that raises the age of possiblerecruitment of persons into armed forces and their participation in hostilities will contributeeffectively to the implementation of the principle that the best interests of the child are tobe a primary consideration in all actions concerning children,3 7 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Noting that the twenty-sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and RedCrescent in December 1995 recommended, inter alia, that parties to conflict take everyfeasible step to ensure that children below the age of 18 years do not take part in hostilities,Welcoming the unanimous adoption, in June 1999, of International Labour OrganizationConvention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of theWorst Forms of Child Labour, which prohibits, inter alia, forced or compulsory recruitment ofchildren for use in armed conflict,Condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training and use within andacross national borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the armedforces of a State, and recognizing the responsibility of those who recruit, train and usechildren in this regard,Recalling the obligation of each party to an armed conflict to abide by the provisions ofinternational humanitarian law,Stressing that the present Protocol is without prejudice to the purposes and principlescontained in the Charter of the United Nations, including Article 51, and relevant norms ofhumanitarian law,Bearing in mind that conditions of peace and security based on full respect of thepurposes and principles contained in the Charter and observance of applicable humanrights instruments are indispensable for the full protection of children, in particular duringarmed conflicts and foreign occupation,Recognizing the special needs of those children who are particularly vulnerable torecruitment or use in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol owing to their economic orsocial status or gender,Mindful of the necessity of taking into consideration the economic, social and politicalroot causes of the involvement of children in armed conflicts,Convinced of the need to strengthen international cooperation in the implementationof the present Protocol, as well as the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation and socialreintegration of children who are victims of armed conflict,Encouraging the participation of the community and, in particular, children and childvictims in the dissemination of informational and educational programmes concerning theimplementation of the Protocol,Have agreed as follows:Article 1States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forceswho have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.Article 2States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are notcompulsorily recruited into their armed forces.Article 31. States Parties shall raise in years the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment ofpersons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, ofthe Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking account of the principles containedC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 7 9

in that article and recognizing that under the Convention persons under the age of 18years are entitled to special protection.2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or accession tothe present Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntaryrecruitment into its national armed forces and a description of the safeguards it hasadopted to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced.3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces underthe age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that:(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person’s parents orlegal guardians;(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service;(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national militaryservice.4. Each State Party may strengthen its declaration at any time by notification to that effectaddressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform all StatesParties. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received by theSecretary-General.5. The requirement to raise the age in paragraph 1 of the present article does not apply toschools operated by or under the control of the armed forces of the States Parties, inkeeping with articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.Article 41. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under anycircumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use,including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize suchpractices.3. The application of the present article shall not affect the legal status of any party to anarmed conflict.Article 5Nothing in the present Protocol shall be construed as precluding provisions in the law of aState Party or in international instruments and international humanitarian law that are moreconducive to the realization of the rights of the child.Article 61. Each State Party shall take all necessary legal, administrative and other measures toensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the presentProtocol within its jurisdiction.2. States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the present Protocolwidely known and promoted by appropriate means, to adults and children alike.3. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within theirjurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the present Protocol aredemobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary,3 8 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

accord to such persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychologicalrecovery and their social reintegration.Article 71. States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, includingin the prevention of any activity contrary thereto and in the rehabilitation and socialreintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary thereto, including throughtechnical cooperation and financial assistance. Such assistance and cooperation willbe undertaken in consultation with the States Parties concerned and the relevantinternational organizations.2. States Parties in a position to do so shall provide such assistance through existingmultilateral, bilateral or other programmes or, inter alia, through a voluntary fundestablished in accordance with the rules of the General Assembly.Article 81. Each State Party shall, within two years following the entry into force of the presentProtocol for that State Party, submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Childproviding comprehensive information on the measures it has taken to implement theprovisions of the Protocol, including the measures taken to implement the provisions onparticipation and recruitment.2. Following the submission of the comprehensive report, each State Party shall include inthe reports it submits to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in accordance witharticle 44 of the Convention, any further information with respect to the implementationof the Protocol. Other States Parties to the Protocol shall submit a report every fiveyears.3. The Committee on the Rights of the Child may request from States Parties furtherinformation relevant to the implementation of the present Protocol.Article 91. The present Protocol is open for signature by any State that is a party to the Conventionor has signed it.2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification and is open to accession by any State.Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations.3. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocol,shall inform all States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed theConvention of each instrument of declaration pursuant to article 3.Article 101. The present Protocol shall enter into force three months after the deposit of the tenthinstrument of ratification or accession.2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol or acceding to it after its entry into force,the Protocol shall enter into force one month after the date of the deposit of its owninstrument of ratification or accession.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 8 1

Article 111. Any State Party may denounce the present Protocol at any time by written notificationto the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall thereafter inform the otherStates Parties to the Convention and all States that have signed the Convention. Thedenunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by theSecretary-General. If, however, on the expiry of that year the denouncing State Party isengaged in armed conflict, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of thearmed conflict.2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from itsobligations under the present Protocol in regard to any act that occurs prior to the dateon which the denunciation becomes effective. Nor shall such a denunciation prejudice inany way the continued consideration of any matter that is already under considerationby the Committee on the Rights of the Child prior to the date on which the denunciationbecomes effective.Article 121. Any State Party may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon communicate the proposedamendment to States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favoura conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon theproposals. In the event that, within four months from the date of such communication,at least one third of the States Parties favour such a conference, the Secretary-Generalshall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendmentadopted by a majority of States Parties present and voting at the conference shall besubmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval.2. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present article shall enterinto force when it has been approved by the General Assembly and accepted by a twothirdsmajority of States Parties.3. When an amendment enters into force, it shall be binding on those States Parties thathave accepted it, other States Parties still being bound by the provisions of the presentProtocol and any earlier amendments they have accepted.Article 131. The present Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian andSpanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the UnitedNations.2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of thepresent Protocol to all States Parties to the Convention and all States that have signedthe Convention.3 8 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

United NationsS/RES/1612 (2005)Resolution 1612 (2005)Adopted by the Security Council at its 5235th meeting, on 26 July2005The Security Council,Reaffirming its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000,1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001, 1460 (2003) of 30 January 2003, and 1539 (2004) of 22April 2004, which contribute to a comprehensive framework for addressing the protection ofchildren affected by armed conflict,While noting the advances made for the protection of children affected by armed conflict,particularly in the areas of advocacy and the development of norms and standards,remaining deeply concerned over the lack of overall progress on the ground, whereparties to conflict continue to violate with impunity the relevant provisions of applicableinternational law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict,Stressing the primary role of national Governments in providing effective protection andrelief to all children affected by armed conflicts,Recalling the responsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsiblefor genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes perpetratedagainst children,Convinced that the protection of children in armed conflict should be regarded as animportant aspect of any comprehensive strategy to resolve conflict,Reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity and, in this connection, its commitment to address the widespread impact of armedconflict on children,Stressing its determination to ensure respect for its resolutions and other internationalnorms and standards for the protection of children affected by armed conflict,Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 February 2005 (S/2005/72) andstressing that the present resolution does not seek to make any legal determination as towhether situations which are referred to in the Secretary-General’s report are or are notarmed conflicts within the context of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocolsthereto, nor does it prejudge the legal status of the non-State parties involved in thesesituations,Gravely concerned by the documented links between the use of child soldiers in violationof applicable international law and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weaponsC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 8 3

and stressing the need for all States to take measures to prevent and to put an end to suchtrafficking,1. Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflictin violation of international obligations applicable to them and all other violations andabuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict;2. Takes note of the action plan presented by the Secretary-General relating to theestablishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflictas called for in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1539 (2004) and, in this regard:(a) Underlines that the mechanism is to collect and provide timely, objective, accurateand reliable information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation ofapplicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed againstchildren affected by armed conflict, and the mechanism will report to the workinggroup to be created in accordance with paragraph 8 of this resolution;(b) Underlines further that this mechanism must operate with the participation of andin cooperation with national Governments and relevant United Nations and civilsociety actors, including at the country level;(c) Stresses that all actions undertaken by United Nations entities within the frameworkof the monitoring and reporting mechanism must be designed to support andsupplement, as appropriate, the protection and rehabilitation roles of nationalGovernments;(d) Also stresses that any dialogue established under the framework of the monitoringand reporting mechanism by United Nations entities with non-State armed groupsin order to ensure protection for and access to children must be conducted inthe context of peace processes where they exist and the cooperation frameworkbetween the United Nations and the concerned Government;3. Requests the Secretary-General to implement without delay, the above-mentionedmonitoring and reporting mechanism, beginning with its application, within existingresources, in close consultation with countries concerned, to parties in situations ofarmed conflict listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report (S/2005/72) thatare on the agenda of the Security Council, and then, in close consultation with countriesconcerned, to apply it to parties in other situations of armed conflict listed in theannexes to the Secretary-General’s report (S/2005/72), bearing in mind the discussionof the Security Council and the views expressed by Member States, in particular duringthe annual debate on Children and Armed Conflict, and also taking into account thefindings and recommendations of an independent review on the implementation of themechanism to be reported to the Security Council by 31 July 2006. The independentreview will include:(a) An assessment of the overall effectiveness of the mechanism, as well as thetimeliness, accuracy, objectivity and reliability of the information compiled throughthe mechanism;(b) Information on how effectively the mechanism is linked to the work of the SecurityCouncil and other organs of the United Nations;(c) Information on the relevance and clarity of the division of responsibilities;(d) Information on the budgetary and other resource implications for United Nationsactors and voluntary funded organizations contributing to the mechanism;(e) Recommendations for the full implementation of the mechanism;3 8 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

4. Stresses that the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism by theSecretary-General will be undertaken only in the context of and for the specific purposeof ensuring the protection of children affected by armed conflict and shall not therebyprejudge or imply a decision by the Security Council as to whether or not to include asituation on its agenda;5. Welcomes the initiatives taken by UNICEF and other United Nations entities to gatherinformation on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicableinternational law and on other violations and abuses committed against children insituations of armed conflict and invites the Secretary- General to take due account ofthese initiatives during the initial phase of implementation of the mechanism referred toin paragraph 3;6 Notes that information compiled by this mechanism, for reporting by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council, may be considered by otherinternational, regional and national bodies, within their mandates and the scope of theirwork, in order to ensure the protection, rights and well-being of children affected byarmed conflict;7. Expresses serious concern regarding the lack of progress in development andimplementation of the action plans called for in paragraph 5 (a) of its resolution1539 (2004) and, pursuant to this, calls on the parties concerned to develop andimplement action plans without further delay, in close collaboration with United Nationspeacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams, consistent with theirrespective mandates and within their capabilities; and requests the Secretary- Generalto provide criteria to assist in the development of such action plans;8. Decides to establish a working group of the Security Council consisting of all membersof the Council to review the reports of the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 ofthis resolution, to review progress in the development and implementation of theaction plans mentioned in paragraph 7 of this resolution and to consider other relevantinformation presented to it; decides further that the working group shall:(a) Make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promotethe protection of children affected by armed conflict, including throughrecommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions andrecommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict;(b) Address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations systemfor action to support implementation of this resolution in accordance with theirrespective mandates;9. Recalls paragraph 5 (c) of its resolution 1539 (2004), and reaffirms its intention toconsider imposing, through country-specific resolutions, targeted and graduatedmeasures, such as, inter alia, a ban on the export and supply of small arms and lightweapons and of other military equipment and on military assistance, against partiesto situations of armed conflict which are on the Security Council’s agenda and are inviolation of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of childrenin armed conflict;10. Stresses the responsibility of United Nations peacekeeping missions and United Nationscountry teams, consistent with their respective mandates, to ensure effective follow-upC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 8 5

to Security Council resolutions, ensure a coordinated response to CAAC concerns and tomonitor and report to the Secretary-General;11. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by United Nations peacekeeping operations toimplement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation andabuse and to ensure full compliance of their personnel with the United Nations codeof conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action inthis regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributingcountries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awarenesstraining, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability incases of misconduct involving their personnel;12. Decides to continue the inclusion of specific provisions for the protection of children inthe mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including the deployment,on a case-by-case basis, of child-protection advisers (CPAs), and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for and the number and roles of CPAs are systematicallyassessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation;welcomes the comprehensive assessment undertaken on the role and activities of CPAswith a view to drawing lessons learned and best practices;13. Welcomes recent initiatives by regional and subregional organizations and arrangementsfor the protection of children affected by armed conflict, and encourages continuedmainstreaming of child protection into their advocacy, policies and programmes;development of peer review and monitoring and reporting mechanisms; establishment,within their secretariats, of child-protection mechanisms; inclusion of child-protectionstaff and training in their peace and field operations; sub- and interregional initiativesto end activities harmful to children in times of conflict, in particular cross-borderrecruitment and abduction of children, illicit movement of small arms, and illicit tradein natural resources through the development and implementation of guidelines onchildren and armed conflict;14. Calls upon all parties concerned to ensure that the protection, rights and well-being ofchildren affected by armed conflict are specifically integrated into all peace processes,peace agreements and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning andprogrammes;15. Calls upon all parties concerned to abide by the international obligations applicableto them relating to the protection of children affected by armed conflict as well as theconcrete commitments they have made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, to UNICEF and other United Nations agenciesand to cooperate fully with the United Nations peacekeeping missions and UnitedNations country teams, where appropriate, in the context of the cooperation frameworkbetween the United Nations and the concerned Government, in the follow-up andimplementation of these commitments;16. Urges Member States, United Nations entities, regional and subregional organizationsand other parties concerned, to take appropriate measures to control illicit subregionaland cross-border activities harmful to children, including illicit exploitation of naturalresources, illicit trade in small arms, abduction of children and their use and recruitment3 8 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

as soldiers as well as other violations and abuses committed against children insituations of armed conflict in violation of applicable international law;17. Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities andfinancial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacitiesof national institutions and local civil society networks for advocacy, protection andrehabilitation of children affected by armed conflict to ensure the sustainability of localchild-protection initiatives;18. Requests that the Secretary-General direct all relevant United Nations entities to takespecific measures, within existing resources, to ensure systematic mainstreaming ofCAAC issues within their respective institutions, including by ensuring allocation ofadequate financial and human resources towards protection of war-affected childrenwithin all relevant offices and departments and on the ground as well as to strengthen,within their respective mandates, their cooperation and coordination when addressingthe protection of children in armed conflict;19. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that, in all his reports oncountry-specific situations, the protection of children is included as a specific aspectof the report, and expresses its intention to give its full attention to the informationprovided therein when dealing with those situations on its agenda;20. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by November 2006 on theimplementation of this resolution and resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), and 1539(2004) which would include, inter alia:(a) Information on compliance by parties in ending the recruitment or use of children inarmed conflict in violation of applicable international law and other violations beingcommitted against children affected by armed conflict;(b) Information on progress made in the implementation of the monitoring and reportingmechanism mentioned in paragraph 3;(c) Information on progress made in the development and implementation of the actionplans referred to in paragraph 7 of the present resolution;(d) Information on the assessment of the role and activities of CPAs;21. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 8 7

© Jason P. Howe 2005Children play near a checkpoint manned by government soldiers, Puerto Asis, Putumayo,Colombia3 8 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Child Soldiers 2008:Data SummaryDefinitionsGovernment forces data adapted from The Military Balance, International Institute forStrategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 2007, except where indicated.Population data adapted from The State of the World’s Children, UNICEF, 2007.± estimated figureEPNBGLSEvidence of recruitment or use of child soldiersPossible recruitment or use of child soldiersNo evidence of recruitment or use of child soldiersInsufficient birth registration made it possible that under-18s may have been recruitedand or used as child soldiersChildren were involved in armed gangs associated with political violenceLegal possibility of recruitment of under-18s but no reported practice.Children were used as spies, informants or messengers.* Parental consent allowed recruitment at a lower age than established by law orregulations.1 State is party to the treaty, through ratification, accession or succession [= full blackcircle]r State has signed treaty [= half black circle]! State has not signed treaty [= empty circle]n/anot applicable(Footnotes to the chart appear on page 406)C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 8 9

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsAfghanistan 50,000 29,863,000 15,849,000 P EAlbania 11,020 3,130,000 1,034,000 N n/aAlgeria 137,500 32,854,000 11,983,000 N PAndorra none 67,000 12,000 n/a n/aAngola 107,000 15,941,000 8,502,000 N no dataAntigua and Barbuda 170 81,000 27,000 N n/aArgentina 71,655 38,747,000 12,277,000 L n/aArmenia 43,641 3,016,000 819,000 E n/aAustralia 51,610 20,155,000 4,797,000 E n/aAustria 39,600 8,189,000 1,552,000 E n/aAzerbaijan 66,740 8,411,000 2,736,000 P NBahamas 860 323,000 108,000 N n/aBahrain 11,200 727,000 232,000 P n/aBangladesh 126,500 141,822,000 59,402,000 E PBarbados 610 270,000 63,000 E n/aBelarus 72,940 9,755,000 1,967,000 L n/aBelgium 39,690 10,419,000 2,120,000 L n/aBelize ±1,050 270,000 117,000 N n/aBenin 4,750 8,439,000 4,300,000 N n/aBhutan 9,000 7 2,163,000 983,000 N E 8Bolivia 46,100 9,182,000 4,090,000 E n/aBosnia and Herzegovina 11,865 3,907,000 807,000 N n/a3 9 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 5none 18 1 1 ! ! !19 18 ! 1 1 1 119 unclear ! r 1 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 ! ! !2018 (men)20 (women)1 r 1 1 !none 18 ! 1 1 1 1none 6 18 1 1 1 1 11818(16 as cadet)1 r 1 1 1none 17 1 1 1 1 11817 (trainingonly)1 1 1 1 118 17 (as cadet) 1 ! 1 ! !none 18 ! r 1 1 1none Unclear 1 r 1 1 1none 16 1 r 1 1 1none 18 (under-18*) ! 1 1 1 11818 (16 ascadet*)1 ! 1 1 117 (conscriptionsuspended)notspecified18 1 1 1 1 118 1 1 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 r ! ! ! !1915 (pre-militaryservice)1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9 1

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsBotswana 9,000 1,765,000 800,000 B n/aBrazil 287,870 186,405,000 62,229,000 L GBrunei Darussalam 7,000 374,000 130,000 L n/aBulgaria 51,000 7,726,000 1,366,000 N n/aBurkina Faso 10,800 13,228,000 7,176,000 N n/aBurundi 35,000 7,548,000 3,969,000 S ECambodia 124,300 14,071,000 6,242,000 N n/aCameroon 14,100 16,322,000 7,881,000 L n/aCanada 62,500 32,268,000 6,970,000 E n/aCape Verde 1,200 507,000 238,000 L n/aCentral African Republic 3,150 4,038,000 2,021,000 P/B EChad 25,350 9,749,000 5,257,000 E EChile 75,698 16,295,000 4,945,000 N n/aChina 2,255,000 1,315,844,000 352,718,000 L n/aColombia 208,600 45,600,000 16,755,000 S E 9Comoros unclear 798,000 387,000 N NCongo, DemocraticRepublic of the51,000 57,549,000 31,071,000 E E 10Congo, Republic of 10,000 3,999,000 2,153,000 N PCook Islands none 18,000 7,000 n/a n/aCosta Rica none 4,327,000 1,496,000 n/a n/aCôte d’Ivoire 17,050 18,154,000 8,908,000 N E 11Croatia 20,800 4,551,000 873,000 N n/aCuba 49,000 11,269,000 2,666,000 E n/a3 9 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 5none 18 1 1 1 1 118 17 (16*) 1 1 1 1 1none 17.5 ! ! ! 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1none 16 r 1 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 (under-18*) r r 1 1 1none 16 1 1 1 1 118 17 1 r 1 1 118 18 ! 1 1 1 120 18 (under-18*) 1 1 1 1 118 18 1 r 1 1 118 17 1 ! 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 ! 1 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 ! 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! ! ! 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 118 18 ! r 1 1 118 none 1 1 1 1 116 17 1 ! ! 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9 3

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsCyprus 12 10,000 835,000 205,000 L n/aCzech Republic 24,752 10,220,000 1,882,000 N n/aDenmark 21,620 5,431,000 1,211,000 N n/aDjibouti 10,950 793,000 383,000 N n/aDominica none 79,000 27,000 n/a n/aDominican Republic 24,500 8,895,000 3,481,000 L n/aEcuador 56,500 13,228,000 5,100,000 L N 69Egypt 468,500 74,033,000 29,691,000 L NEl Salvador 15,500 6,881,000 2,750,000 L n/aEquatorial Guinea 1,320 504,000 257,000 N n/aEritrea 201,750 4,401,000 2,266,000 P no dataEstonia 4,100 1,330,000 265,000 P n/aEthiopia 152,500 77,431,000 39,792,000 B NFiji 3,500 848,000 317,000 N n/aFinland 29,300 5,249,000 1,100,000 N n/aFrance 254,895 60,496,000 13,271,000 L n/aGabon 4,700 1,384,000 651,000 N n/aGambia 800 1,517,000 704,000 N n/aGeorgia 11,320 4,474,000 1,080,000 N n/aGermany 245,702 82,689,000 14,707,000 E n/aGhana 13,500 22,113,000 10,159,000 N n/aGreece 147,100 11,120,000 1,944,000 N n/aGrenada none 103,000 35,000 n/a n/aGuatemala 15,500 12,599,000 6,297,000 E n/a3 9 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 518 17 ! 1 1 1 118 (phased outby 2005)18 1 r 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 r 1 1 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1none 16 r 1 1 1 118 17 1 1 1 1 118 16 1 r 1 1 118 16 1 ! 1 1 1age not established 18 ! ! 1 1 118 18 1 r ! ! !18 18 r 1 1 1 118 18 ! ! 1 1 1none 18 r 1 1 ! !18 18 1 1 1 1 118 (conscriptionsuspended)17 1 1 1 1 1none 20 r 1 1 1 1none 18 r 1 1 1 118 18 ! 1 1 1 11817 (trainingonly)1 1 1 1 1none 18 r 1 1 1 119 18 1 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! ! 1 1 118 18 1 ! 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9 5

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsGuinea 12,300 9,402,000 4,723,000 B P 11Guinea-Bissau 9,250 1,586,000 856,000 L n/aGuyana 1,100 751,000 261,000 L n/aHaiti none 8,528,000 3,846,000 n/a GHoly See 100 13 1,000 no data N n/aHonduras 12,000 7,205,000 3,317,000 N n/aHungary 32,300 10,098,000 1,965,000 L n/aIceland none 295,000 78,000 n/a n/aIndia 1,316,000 1,103,371,000 420,678,000 L/S 15 EIndonesia 302,000 222,781,000 75,641,000 S EIran (IslamicRepublic of)545,000 69,515,000 25,243,000 L 15 PIraq 227,000 28,807,000 13,759,000 N EIreland 10,470 4,148,000 1,007,000 E n/aIsrael 168,000 6,725,000 2,200,000 L/S EItaly 191,152 58,093,000 9,837,000 P n/aJamaica 2,830 2,651,000 992,000 P GJapan 240,400 128,085,000 21,770,000 N n/aJordan 100,500 5,703,000 2,477,000 E NKazakhstan 65,800 14,825,000 4,394,000 P NKenya 24,120 34,256,000 17,214,000 L GKiribati none 99,000 39,000 n/a n/aKorea, DemocraticPeople’s Republic of1,106,000 22,488,000 6,756,000 L n/a3 9 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 518 18 ! 1 1 1 118 16 (under 16*) r r ! 1 118 16 (14–16*) ! 1 1 1 1n/a n/a r r 1 1 1none 19 1 ! ! 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 118 18 (17*) r 1 1 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1none 17.5 1 ! ! ! !18 18 r ! 1 ! !18 16 ! r 1 ! !none 18 ! ! 1 ! !none17 (16 forapprentices)1 1 1 1 118 17 1 r 1 ! !conscriptionsuspendednone18 1 1 1 1 118 (17.5 trainingonly)1 r 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 11819 (16 (militaryacademy)1 ! 1 1 1none 18 (under 18*) 1 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !18 unclear16 or 17unclear! ! ! 1 !C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9 7

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsKorea, Republic of 687,000 47,817,000 10,795,000 N n/aKuwait 15,500 2,687,000 764,000 N n/aKyrgyzstan 12,500 5,264,000 2,016,000 L n/aLao People’s DemocraticRepublic29,100 5,924,000 2,830,000 N PLatvia 5,339 2,307,000 448,000 N n/aLebanon 72,100 3,577,000 1,225,000 L ELesotho 2,000 1,795,000 840,000 B n/aLiberia 2,400 3,283,000 1,769,000 N E 11Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 76,000 5,853,000 2,119,000 P 15 n/aLiechtenstein none 35,000 7,000 n/a n/aLithuania 12,010 3,431,000 745,000 N n/aLuxembourg 900 465,000 104,000 E n/aMacedonia (the formerYugoslav Republic of)10,890 2,000,000 494,000 N n/aMadagascar 13,500 18,606,000 9,412,000 N n/aMalawi 5,300 12,884,000 6,945,000 B n/aMalaysia 109,000 25,347,000 9,603,000 L n/aMaldives not known 329,000 158,000 N n/aMali 7,350 13,518,000 7,439,000 N n/aMalta 1,609 402,000 88,000 L n/aMarshall Islands none 62,000 24,000 n/a n/aMauritania 15,870 3,069,000 1,513,000 L n/a3 9 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 519 18 1 1 1 1 118 18 1 r 1 1 118 18 (16 as cadets) 1 r 1 1 118 18 1 ! 1 1 119 (ended in 2006) 18 1 1 1 1 118 (ended in 2007) 17 r ! 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1nonenot establishedin lawr 1 1 1 117 17 1 ! 1 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 ! 1 119 18 1 1 1 1 1None 17 1 1 1 1 119 (conscriptionabolished)18 1 1 1 1 1None 18 1 r 1 1 1None 18 r 1 1 1 1None17.5 (under17.5*! ! 1 ! !none 18 1 ! ! 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 117.5 (under17.5*)1 1 1 1 1nonen/a n/a ! 1 ! ! !1818 or 16(unclear)! ! 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 3 9 9

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsMauritius none 1,245,000 364,000 n/a n/aMexico 237,800 107,029,000 39,654,000 P NMicronesia (FederatedStates of)none 110,000 51,000 n/a n/aMoldova, Republic of 6,750 4,206,000 1,009,000 P no dataMonaco none 35,000 7,000 n/a n/aMongolia 8,600 2,646,000 998,000 P n/aMontenegro 7,300 601,000 14 145,000 14 N n/aMorocco 200,800 31,478,000 11,743,000 N NMozambique 11,200 19,792,000 10,049,000 N n/aMyanmar 375,000 50,519,000 17,962,000 E ENamibia 9,200 2,031,000 993,000 N NNauru none 14,000 5,000 n/a n/aNepal 69,000 27,133,000 12,395,000 S E 8Netherlands 53,130 16,299,000 3,559,000 E n/aNew Zealand 8,951 4,028,000 1,048,000 E n/aNicaragua 14,000 5,487,000 2,526,000 N n/aNiger 5,300 13,957,000 7,765,000 L no dataNigeria 85,000 131,530,000 67,371,000 N E/GNiue none 1,000 no data n/a n/aNorway 23,400 4,620,000 1,083,000 N n/aOccupied PalestinianTerritorynone 3,702,000 1,938,000 N EOman 41,700 2,567,000 1,054,000 N n/a4 0 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 5n/a1818 (for securityforces)r 1 1 1 116* (trainingonly)1 1 1 1 !n/a n/a r ! ! 1 118n/a17 (trainingonly)1 r 1 1 121(securityforces)1 r ! 1 118 18 (unclear) 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 r 1 ! !19 18 1 r 1 1 1none 18 ! ! ! ! !none 18 1 1 1 1 1n/a n/a r 1 ! 1 1none 18 1 ! 1 ! !conscriptionsuspended17 r 1 1 1 1none 17 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 ! 1 1 1not specified not specified ! 1 1 1 1none 18 r 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !18 18 1 1 1 1 1none18 (securityforces)n/a n/a n/a n/a n/anone15 or 18(unclear)1 r 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 0 1

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsPakistan 619,000 157,935,000 71,800,000 L EPalau none 20,000 8,000 n/a n/aPanama none 3,232,000 1,163,000 n/a n/aPapua New Guinea 3,100 5,887,000 2,751,000 L n/aParaguay 10,100 6,158,000 2,722,000 E n/aPeru 80,000 27,968,000 10,722,000 L 15 NPhilippines 106,000 83,054,000 34,622,000 N 15 EPoland 141,500 38,530,000 7,984,000 L n/aPortugal 43,960 10,495,000 2,007,000 N n/aQatar 12,400 813,000 204,000 N n/aRomania 69,600 21,711,000 4,366,000 N n/aRussian Federation 1,027,000 143,202,000 28,830,000 E PRwanda 33,000 9,038,000 4,658,000 N N 10Saint Kitts and Nevis no data 43,000 14,000 N n/aSaint Lucia none 161,000 56,000 n/a n/aSaint Vincent and theGrenadinesnone 119,000 43,000 n/a n/aSamoa none 185,000 88,000 n/a n/aSan Marino no data 28,000 5,000 N n/aSao Tome and Principe unknown 157,000 73,000 L n/aSaudi Arabia 224,500 24,573,000 10,690,000 N NSenegal 13,620 11,658,000 5,804,000 N no data4 0 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 5none 17 r ! 1 ! !n/a n/a ! ! ! 1 1n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 1none 16 ! ! 1 ! !17no legalminimum1 1 1 1 1none 18 (16 as cadets) 1 1 1 1 1none18 (17 fortraining)1 r 1 ! 118 17 1 1 1 1 118 (conscriptionsuspended)18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 ! 1 1 120 (conscriptionsuspended)1818 1 1 1 1 118 (16 at militaryeducationinstitutes)r r 1 1 1none 18 1 ! 1 1 1none18 (securityforces)! 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! r 1 1 1n/a19 (securityforces)! 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! 1 ! 1 1none 18 r 1 1 1 118 17 ! r 1 1 1none 18 ! ! 1 1 120 18 1 1 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 0 3

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsSerbia 39,686 9,900,000 14 2,200,000 14 L n/aSeychelles 200 81,000 41,000 L n/aSierra Leone 10,500 5,525,000 2,722,000 N N 11Singapore 72,500 4,326,000 1,023,000 L n/aSlovakia 15,223 5,401,000 1,142,000 N n/aSlovenia 6,550 1,967,000 345,000 N n/aSolomon Islands none 478,000 227,000 n/a n/aSomalia no data 8,228,000 4,152,000 E ESouth Africa 62,334 47,432,000 18,417,000 N GSpain 147,255 43,064,000 7,457,000 N NSri Lanka 150,900 20,743,000 6,054,000 N ESudan 104,800 36,233,000 16,547,000 E ESuriname 1,840 449,000 161,000 no data NSwaziland no data 1,032,000 514,000 B n/aSweden 27,600 9,041,000 1,943,000 N n/aSwitzerland 4,200 7,252,000 1,458,000 N n/aSyrian ArabRepublic307,600 19,043,000 8,375,000 B NTaiwan 290,000 22,800,000 16 5,250,000 16 N n/aTajikistan 7,600 6,507,000 3,055,000 P PTanzania, UnitedRepublic of27,000 38,329,000 19,070,000 L NThailand 306,600 64,233,000 18,522,000 N ETimor-Leste 1,250 947,000 463,000 N n/a4 0 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 517 18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 (under-18*) r r 1 1 1none 18 1 1 ! 1 118 16.5 r ! 1 ! !18 (conscriptionabolished in 2006)18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 1 1 1 1n/a n/a ! r ! 1 1no datano data r ! ! ! !none 18 r 1 1 1 1conscriptionsuspended18 1 1 1 1 1none 18 1 ! 1 ! !18 18 1 r 1 1 1none no data r ! 1 1 118 18 ! ! 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 119 18 1 1 1 1 118 18 1 r 1 1 !18 18 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a18 18 1 1 1 1 1none18(under 18*)1 1 1 1 120 18 1 r 1 ! !18 18 1 1 ! 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 0 5

Countries and territoriesTotal activegovernment forcesTotal population(2005)Under 18 population(2005)Child soldiers ingovernment forcesChild soldiers inarmed politicalgroupsTogo 8,550 6,145,000 3,095,000 N n/aTonga not known 102,000 43,000 L n/aTrinidad and Tobago 2,700 1,305,000 355,000 L n/aTunisia 35,300 10,102,000 3,259,000 N NTurkey 514,850 73,193,000 25,348,000 N PTurkmenistan 26,000 4,833,000 1,882,000 L n/aTuvalu none 10,000 4,000 n/a n/aUganda 45,000 28,816,000 16,539,000 E EUkraine 187,600 46,481,000 9,084,000 N n/aUnited Arab Emirates 50,500 4,496,000 1,192,000 N n/aUnited Kingdom 191,030 59,668,000 13,117,000 E n/aUnited States ofAmerica1,506,757 298,213,000 74,926,000 E n/aUruguay 25,100 3,463,000 1,001,000 N n/aUzbekistan ± 55,000 26,593,000 10,742,000 P NVanuatu none 211,000 99,000 n/a n/aVenezuela 82,300 26,749,000 9,988,000 N P 9Viet Nam 455,000 84,238,000 30,496,000 L n/aYemen 66,700 20,975,000 11,252,000 E PZambia 15,100 11,668,000 6,215,000 L / B NZimbabwe 29,000 13,010,000 6,256,000 P 15 n/aFootnotes to the Data Summary Chart appear on page 406.4 0 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Legal minimumconscription age 1Legal min. voluntaryrecruitment age 1Ratification of theOptional Protocol 2Ratification ofthe Rome Statute 3Ratification ofILO C182 4Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol I 5Ratification ofAdditionalProtocol II 518 18 1 ! 1 1 1none 16 ! ! ! 1 1none 16* ! 1 1 1 120 18 1 ! 1 1 119 18 1 ! 1 ! !18 17 1 ! ! 1 1n/a n/a ! ! ! ! !none 18 1 1 1 1 118 19 1 r 1 1 1none 18 17 ! r 1 1 1none 16 1 1 1 1 118 (not in force) 17 1 r 1 ! !none 18 1 1 1 1 118 18 ! r ! 1 1n/a n/a 1 ! 1 1 118 18 1 1 1 1 11818 (17 atmilitary serviceinstitute)1 ! 1 1 !none 18 1 r 1 1 1none 18 (16*) ! 1 1 1 11818 or 16(unclear)! r 1 1 1C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 0 7

Footnotes1 Refers to minimum conscription age and minimum voluntary recruitment age inpeacetime and recruitment ages may therefore be lower in cases of public emergency.2 Adapted from Status of Ratifications of Principle International Human Rights Treaties,Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,www.unhchr.ch; Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, UnitedNations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org (subscription required).3 Adapted from States Parties to the International Criminal Court,www.icc.cpi.int/statesparties.html.4 Adapted from Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), InternationalLabour Organization, www.ilo.org.5 Adapted from State Parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols,International Committee of the Red Cross, www.icrc.org.6 Authorities could authorize conscription if the number of volunteers failed to meet theannual quota.7 “Militia should start in 2008”, Kuensel Online, 16 June 2007, www.kuenselonline.com.8 Bhutanese armed groups were reportedly recruiting children from refugee camps ineastern Nepal.9 Recruitment by Colombian armed groups reportedly extended across the borders intoEcuador and Venezuela.10 Armed group units loyal to Laurent Nkunda in the eastern Democratic Republic of theCongo recruited children from refugee camps in Rwanda.11 In 2004 and 2005 former child soldiers from Liberia were recruited and used inhostilities in Côte d’Ivoire. Liberian ex-combatants were reportedly recruiting for proandanti-government groups in Guinea in 2004, although it was not possible to confirmwhether children were involved. Children were reportedly recruited in Sierra Leone byLiberian armed groups in 2005.12 Additional information: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Child soldiers inarmed forces: P (no data); child soldiers in armed political groups: not applicable;legal minimum conscription age: 19; legal minimum voluntary recruitment age: 17.Signatures and ratifications: not applicable.13 “Pope’s guards celebrate 500 years”, BBC News, 22 January 2006.14 UNICEF, The State of the World’s Children, 2008, www.unicef.org.15 Children were reportedly recruited or used by paramilitary or civilian defence forces.16 Government Information Office, Taiwan Yearbook 2006 (figures from 2006),www.gio.gov.tw.17 18 years for officers and women, unknown for others.4 0 8 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

© Coalition 2007Mural in a youth centre in Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem, the West BankC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 0 9

Methodology, terms anddefinitionsMethodologyThis report covers the period from April 2004 to October 2007 and the country entriesrefer to events occurring within this period. Some important developments relating to therecruitment and use of child soldiers between the end of October 2007 and the end ofMarch 2008 are referred to in the report’s introduction. Country ratifications of relevantinternational treaties are up to date as of February 2008 and are included in the countrydata at the top of each entry, and in the global data summary chart.Information for this report was sought from a wide range of sources. These includedgovernments, UN agencies and peacekeeping missions, other intergovernmentalorganizations, news media, academic sources, and human rights and humanitarianorganizations. Information was also provided by Coalition members and partners and bylocal non-governmental organizations, journalists, lawyers, activists and others in manycountries. Sources for the information contained in the country entries and the datasummary chart are provided in endnotes. In some cases the identity of the source has beenwithheld and this is indicated in the relevant endnote. The names of child soldiers havebeen changed throughout this report.Terms and definitionsAccession: Accession means formal consent by a state to be legally bound by a treaty– essentially a one-step process combining signature and ratification (see below) of atreaty. In most instances it requires action by the national parliament. States accedingto the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its optional protocols must deposit theirinstruments of accession with the UN Secretary-General.Armed conflict: The term armed conflict is used to refer to both international and noninternationalconflicts of high and low intensity.Armed forces: These generally refer to official government armed forces, including the army,navy and air force.Armed groups and armed political groups: These terms are used to refer to non-state orirregular armed groups which use arms for political reasons. They include opposition forces,factional or tribal groups, armed groups belonging to ethnic or religious minorities and arange of other militia groups. These terms are also sometimes used to refer to armed groups(often paramilitaries or militias) which are backed by or allied to government forces but arenot officially part of them.4 1 0 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Child: A child is any person under 18 years of age. This is consistent with the Convention onthe Rights of the Child (Article 1), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child(Article 2), and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Worst Formsof Child Labour (Article 2). The Coalition also refers to “under-18s” in this report, generallywhen referring to children between the ages of 15 and 18.Child soldier: While there is no precise definition, the Coalition considers a child soldier anyperson below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forcesor any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not anarmed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation incombat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards;training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking anddomestic labour. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms ofsexual abuse. 1DDR: A commonly-used abbreviation for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration(see below).Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of soldiers from the army or froman armed group. In demobilizing children the objectives should be to verify the child’sparticipation in armed conflict, to collect basic information to establish the child’s identityfor family tracing, to assess priority needs, and to provide the child with information aboutwhat is likely to happen next.Disarmament: The collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within a conflictzone. It frequently entails weapons collection, assembly of combatants and development ofarms management programs, including their safe storage and sometimes their destruction.Because many child soldiers do not carry their own weapons, disarmament should not be aprerequisite for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.Internally displaced persons: People who have been forced to flee their homes for reasonssuch as armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights abuses or other disasters, andwho have sought safety elsewhere in the same country.Ratification: Ratification is the means by which governments consent to be legally boundby an international treaty. In most cases, ratification follows signature of the treaty andrequires action by the national parliament. States ratifying the Convention on the Rights ofthe Child or its optional protocols must deposit their instruments of ratification with the UNSecretary-General.Recruitment: The term recruitment refers to three different means by which peoplebecome members of armed forces or armed groups: compulsory, voluntary, and forcible (orforced). Compulsory recruitment is defined in national legislation and typically applies toconscripted members of official armed forces. Voluntary recruitment is usually regulatedby law or policy and occurs without conscription or force. Forcible (or forced) recruitmententails the illegal use of force, for instance in the form of abduction or other duress. It isimportant to note that the lines between compulsory, voluntary and forced recruitmentare often blurred. Children may be subjected to various political and economic pressuresC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 1 1

which mean they have little alternative to enlisting in an armed force or group. The Coalitionopposes all forms of military recruitment or use of children under the age of eighteen.Reintegration: A long-term process which aims to give children a viable alternative totheir involvement in armed conflict and help them resume life in the community. Elementsof reintegration include family reunification (or finding alternative care if reunification isimpossible), providing education and training, devising appropriate strategies for economicand livelihood support and in some cases providing psycho-social support.Signature: A state may sign an international treaty to indicate its preliminary and generalendorsement of its aims, but a signature is not a legally binding step or a firm commitmentto proceed to the next, and final, step of ratification. Nevertheless, signing a treaty createsan obligation of good faith not to undermine the treaty’s objectives.“Straight-18”: The Coalition campaigns for governments to adopt and implement the OptionalProtocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armedconflict, in a manner which prohibits the military recruitment or use of all children below theage of 18 years without exception or reservation. This is called the “straight-18” position.1 A similar definition is provided in the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with ArmedForces or Armed Groups. It states “A child associated with an armed force or armed group” refers to anyperson below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed groupin any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters,messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken adirect part in hostilities.4 1 2 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

Glossary and explanatory notesFrequently used abbreviationsACRWCAFPAIAPAUBBCBONUCACEDAWCEMACCPTCRCDCIDDRECOWASEUEUFORFIDHGC AP IAfrican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the ChildAgence France-PresseAmnesty InternationalAssociated PressAfrican Union (formerly Organization of African Unity)British Broadcasting CorporationUN Peace-building Office in the Central African RepublicUN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen (1979)Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (Economicand Monetary Community of Central Africa)European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or PunishmentConvention on the Rights of the Child. Also, UN Committee on the Rightsof the ChildDefence for Children Internationaldisarmament, demobilization and reintegration (see Methodology, termsand definitions)Economic Community of West African StatesEuropean UnionEuropean Union military operation in Bosnia and HerzegovinaFédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme (InternationalFederation for Human Rights)Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andrelating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts(Protocol I), 8 June 1977C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 1 3

GC AP IIHRWICCICGICRCIDPIISSILOProtocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andrelating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts(Protocol II), 8 June 1977Human Rights WatchInternational Criminal CourtInternational Crisis GroupInternational Committee of the Red Crossinternally displaced persons (see Methodology, terms and definitions)International Institute for Strategic StudiesInternational Labour OrganizationILO 138 C138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973ILO 182 C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999IMFIPSIRINKFORMINURCATMINURSOMINUSTAHMONUCNATONGOOCHAOHCHROptionalProtocolOSCEPANAUKUNInternational Monetary FundInter Press ServiceUN Integrated Regional Information NetworksKosovo Force (NATO)UN Mission in the Central African Republic and ChadUN Mission for the Referendum in Western SaharaUN Stabilization Mission in HaitiUN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisationnon-governmental organizationUN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian AffairsOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human RightsOptional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on theinvolvement of children in armed conflictOrganization for Security and Co-operation in EuropePanapress (Africa)United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandUnited Nations4 1 4 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8

UNAMIDUNAMSILUNDOFUNDPUNESCOUNFICYPUNHCRUNICEFUNIFILUNMEEUNMIKUNMILUNMINUNMISUNMITUNOCIUNOMBUNOMIGUNRWAUNTSOUS, USAAfrican Union/UN hybrid operation in DarfurUN Mission in Sierra LeoneUN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights)UN Development ProgrammeUN Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUN Peacekeeping Force in CyprusOffice of the UN High Commissioner for RefugeesUN Children’s FundUN Interim Force in LebanonUN Mission in Ethiopia and EritreaUN Interim Administration Mission in KosovoUN Mission in LiberiaUN Mission in NepalUN Mission in the SudanUN Integrated Mission in Timor LesteUN Operation in Côte d’IvoireUN Observer Mission on BougainvilleUN Observer Mission in GeorgiaUN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near EastUN Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East)United States of AmericaInternet sourcesWebsites for a particular document or source are given at first reference in the endnotes.In most cases the link to the home page is provided (rather than a link to the specificdocument), so the reader can locate the specific document using the site’s own searchengine or from its home page. Where additional guidance may be helpful for locating aspecific document or web page, it is given in brackets.Frequently cited sources in this report include:Amnesty International (AI): www.amnesty.org; documents under Library tab at http://web.amnesty.org/library/engindexBBC: http://news.bbc.co.ukC H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8 4 1 5

Human Rights Watch (HRW): www.hrw.orgInternational Crisis Group (ICG): www.crisisweb.orgOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): www.osce.orgUN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): www.irinnews.orgUN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): http://ochaonline.un.org;Reliefweb: www.reliefweb.intUS State Department: www.state.gov; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices since1993: www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htmLocating UN documents on the internetUN human rights documents, such as those issued by the Office of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN Doc. CRC/…) and otherTreaty Bodies, or the Commission on Human Rights and its mechanisms (UN Doc. E/CN.4/…), can be found on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights, www.ohchr.org.Reports of the UN Secretary-General to other UN bodies and other documents issued inconnection with the UN Security Council (UN Doc. S/…) and General Assembly (UN Doc.A/…) can be found on the main UN website (www.un.org) under the Documents link or atwww.un.org/documents. The main UN website also provides links to other bodies in the UNsystem, such as UNHCR (www.unhcr.ch) and UNICEF (www.unicef.org).Material relating to UN peacekeeping missions can be found at the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO): www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.The UN Treaty Collection on-line service offers (subscription only) access to over 40,000treaties and international agreements: http://untreaty.un.org.4 1 6 C H I L D S O L D I E R S G L O B A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 8