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EMAIL contact@foster<strong>in</strong>frastructure.comWEB www.foster<strong>in</strong>frastructure.com<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of Public-Private Partnerships (<strong>PPPs</strong>) <strong>for</strong><strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong>, particularly <strong>in</strong> Health Care and EducationFoster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Pty Ltd ABN 72 148 166 536.


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Contents1 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 31.1 Purpose of this Report ............................................................................................................ 31.2 The importance of design <strong>in</strong> <strong>PPPs</strong> .......................................................................................... 31.3 Mechanisms to promote good design <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong> ....................................... 31.4 Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 32 Methodology .................................................................................................................................... 63 Background – <strong>Design</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>PPPs</strong> ........................................................................................................ 74 <strong>Design</strong>-related mechanisms through the PPP lifecycle .................................................................. 84.1 Project Development Phase .................................................................................................... 84.1.1 Functional Brief Development ......................................................................................... 94.1.2 User Group Input ........................................................................................................... 104.1.3 Concept <strong>Design</strong>s ........................................................................................................... 114.1.4 Market Sound<strong>in</strong>g ........................................................................................................... 124.1.5 Government architects .................................................................................................. 134.1.6 Community Advisory Groups dur<strong>in</strong>g project development ............................................ 144.2 Tender phase ........................................................................................................................ 154.2.1 Competitive dialogue ..................................................................................................... 154.2.2 <strong>Design</strong> standards and templates ................................................................................... 164.2.3 Mandated designs ......................................................................................................... 174.2.4 Interactive Tender Process ........................................................................................... 184.2.5 Qualitative design evaluation ........................................................................................ 194.2.6 Government Architects .................................................................................................. 204.3 Contract F<strong>in</strong>alisation Phase .................................................................................................. 204.3.1 <strong>Design</strong> development dur<strong>in</strong>g the contract f<strong>in</strong>alisation phase ......................................... 214.4 Construction Phase ............................................................................................................... 214.4.1 Government review dur<strong>in</strong>g construction phase design development ........................... 214.4.2 Variation Processes ...................................................................................................... 224.4.3 Community Advisory Groups ........................................................................................ 234.5 Operations Phase ................................................................................................................. 235 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................................ 25Appendix 1 – The European Commission’s Competitive Dialogue Process ........................................ 27Appendix 2 – RIBA Smart PFI Model .................................................................................................... 28Appendix 3 – Australia’s Interactive Tender Process ........................................................................... 30Appendix 4 – Examples of qualitative design evaluation criteria .......................................................... 32Appendix 5 – The <strong>Design</strong> Development Process ................................................................................. 34Note: This report has been prepared by Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Pty Ltd <strong>for</strong> the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess AdvisoryCouncil. Copyright <strong>in</strong> this report is held by the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Advisory Council.Page 2 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20121 Executive Summary1.1 Purpose of this ReportThis report has been prepared by Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> <strong>for</strong> the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess AdvisoryCouncil. It presents the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of a desktop research study of mechanisms used topromote good design outcomes <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure Public Private Partnerships (<strong>PPPs</strong>) <strong>in</strong>economies with well-developed social <strong>in</strong>frastructure PPP programs. These f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs are<strong>in</strong>tended to provide guidance <strong>for</strong> government officials from APEC economies on bestpractice <strong>in</strong> this field so as to deliver successful social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>, particularly <strong>in</strong> thehealthcare and education sectors.1.2 The importance of design <strong>in</strong> <strong>PPPs</strong>The design of social <strong>in</strong>frastructure, particularly <strong>in</strong> healthcare and education, is of greatimportance, regardless of whether the <strong>in</strong>frastructure is delivered through a PPP or by othermeans. In this context, design considerations can be divided <strong>in</strong>to two broad categories:Functional design, which enables the effective and efficient delivery of health andeducation services.Urban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>g considerations, which provide an appropriateenvironment, ensure the facility fits with<strong>in</strong> its surrounds, and allow <strong>for</strong> potentialexpansion <strong>in</strong> the future.A PPP provides opportunities and <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>for</strong> the private sector contractor to <strong>in</strong>novate <strong>in</strong>the design of the facility. The PPP also results <strong>in</strong> the private sector contractor tak<strong>in</strong>g much ofthe design related risk of the project, protect<strong>in</strong>g government aga<strong>in</strong>st the f<strong>in</strong>ancialconsequences of the design be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>capable of deliver<strong>in</strong>g the required outputs.1.3 Mechanisms to promote good design <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>Economies with well-developed PPP Frameworks have, through experience, developed arange of mechanisms to promote good design <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>. Thesemechanisms have been <strong>in</strong>fluenced by broader procurement regulations and policyconsiderations, such as the need <strong>for</strong> fairness and transparency <strong>in</strong> government procurement.Section 4 of this report exam<strong>in</strong>es a range of different mechanisms that are used at differentstages of the PPP process. The benefits and risks of these mechanisms vary <strong>in</strong> theirsignificance depend<strong>in</strong>g upon a range of factors, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the particular PPP model be<strong>in</strong>gused, the applicable legal system, and relative importance of design <strong>in</strong> comparison to theother outcomes that will be driven through delivery of the project as a PPP.1.4 RecommendationsBased on the analysis <strong>in</strong> this report of mechanisms used <strong>in</strong> PPP Frameworks to promotegood design outcomes, Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> has identified the follow<strong>in</strong>g recommendations<strong>for</strong> governments wish<strong>in</strong>g to promote best practice <strong>in</strong> design <strong>for</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>:1. Governments should identify an appropriate comb<strong>in</strong>ation of mechanisms topromote design outcomes through the stages of the PPP lifecycle, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toaccount relevant factors such as the particular PPP model be<strong>in</strong>g used, thePage 3 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012applicable legal system, and relative importance of design <strong>in</strong> comparison to theother outcomes that will be driven through delivery of the project as a PPP.2. Action taken <strong>in</strong> the earlier stages of the PPP process will have the greatest impactupon design outcomes. Governments should there<strong>for</strong>e devote sufficient time andallow sufficient resources <strong>for</strong> proper consideration of design issues dur<strong>in</strong>g theproject development phase of <strong>PPPs</strong>.3. Governments should develop functional briefs to provide a robust foundation <strong>for</strong>the broad range of other activities that drive good design outcomes <strong>in</strong> social<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>.4. Governments should <strong>in</strong>volve user groups <strong>in</strong> PPP project development due to theirunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of how design <strong>in</strong>fluences service delivery, but should also ensurethat project teams carefully manage these groups.5. For projects that <strong>in</strong>volve complex design issues, government should considerconduct<strong>in</strong>g market sound<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> relation to these issues prior to commencement ofthe <strong>for</strong>mal tender process. However the market sound<strong>in</strong>g process should becarefully managed.6. Government architects can provide expertise that enhances the effectiveness ofother design related activities throughout the PPP lifecycle.7. Governments should consider establish<strong>in</strong>g community advisory groups as ameans of two-way communication between the project team and the community,particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to urban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>g issues. Howevercommunity expectations must be appropriately and efficiently managed.8. Governments should establish mechanisms <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction between governmentand bidders dur<strong>in</strong>g the tender process to ensure that the design solutionsdeveloped by bidders meet government’s needs. This process should not bestructured as a negotiation of government’s design requirements, as theserequirements should have been fully developed prior to the tender process. Thefocus of the <strong>in</strong>teraction should be on ensur<strong>in</strong>g the bidders understand theserequirements.9. Governments should only require bidders to follow design templates andstandards if there is only one feasible or acceptable solution to the relevant aspectof design. To the extent possible, such templates and standards should beexpressed <strong>in</strong> output terms.10. Governments should only mandate the overall design where there is compell<strong>in</strong>greason to give design considerations priority over other aspects of the project. Incircumstances where this is the case, government should reconsider whether PPPdelivery is the best delivery model <strong>for</strong> the project, as the scope <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation andvalue <strong>for</strong> money may be compromised by the mandated design.11. Provid<strong>in</strong>g the risks can be managed by the project team and it is permissibleunder the relevant procurement rules, governments should use qualitativeevaluation of bidders’ designs <strong>in</strong> order to drive good design outcomes.12. Governments should ensure that designs are sufficiently developed by biddersdur<strong>in</strong>g the competitive tender process so that any subsequent design review needonly focus on compliance of the detailed design documentation with the PPPPage 4 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012contract. The design review process must be carefully managed to preventgovernment tak<strong>in</strong>g back risk.Page 5 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20122 MethodologyIn 2011, APEC m<strong>in</strong>isters and senior officials identified best practice <strong>in</strong> design of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong>social <strong>in</strong>frastructure as a key area of <strong>in</strong>terest.“<strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong>” can have a number of different mean<strong>in</strong>gs. For example, it may refer todesign<strong>in</strong>g the commercial structure of PPP projects, or to architectural and eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>gdesign of the facility. Follow<strong>in</strong>g discussions with the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Advisory Council,Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> agreed to develop this report with a focus on the architectural andeng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g design elements of <strong>PPPs</strong>.This report documents the outcomes of a desktop research study of processes used byeconomies with well-developed PPP programs to drive high quality design outcomes <strong>in</strong>social <strong>in</strong>frastructure. The body of the report is structured as an exam<strong>in</strong>ation of themechanisms by which design can be <strong>in</strong>fluenced at different stages of the PPP procurementprocess, draw<strong>in</strong>g on best practice from a range of countries. The key risks and benefits ofeach mechanism have been identified. This has enabled conclusions to be drawn as to therelative merits of the various mechanisms, and the extent to which they are complementaryor substitutes <strong>for</strong> one another.Page 6 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20123 Background – <strong>Design</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>PPPs</strong>The design of social <strong>in</strong>frastructure, particularly <strong>in</strong> healthcare and education, is of greatimportance, regardless of whether the <strong>in</strong>frastructure is delivered through a PPP or by othermeans. In this context, design considerations can be divided <strong>in</strong>to two broad categories:Functional design of the <strong>in</strong>frastructure is critical to enable the effective and efficientdelivery of health and education services.Urban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>g considerations are also important to provide anappropriate environment, ensure the facility fits with<strong>in</strong> its surrounds, and allow <strong>for</strong>potential expansion <strong>in</strong> the future.When healthcare or education <strong>in</strong>frastructure is delivered as a PPP, a private sectorcontractor is typically engaged to design, construct, f<strong>in</strong>ance and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> (and <strong>in</strong> somecases operate) the facility. The PPP contract is generally expressed <strong>in</strong> terms of the outputsthat the contractor must deliver, rather than the <strong>in</strong>puts or the design that must be delivered.The bundl<strong>in</strong>g together of responsibility <strong>for</strong> design, construction, f<strong>in</strong>ance and ma<strong>in</strong>tenanceand use of an output specification together provide opportunities and <strong>in</strong>centives <strong>for</strong> theprivate sector contractor to <strong>in</strong>novate <strong>in</strong> the design of the facility. The PPP also results <strong>in</strong> theprivate sector contractor tak<strong>in</strong>g much of the design related risk of the project, protect<strong>in</strong>ggovernment aga<strong>in</strong>st the f<strong>in</strong>ancial consequences of the design be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>capable of deliver<strong>in</strong>gthe required outputs.A question arises as to howgovernment can best drivedesirable design outcomes, whileensur<strong>in</strong>g that the private sectoraccepts an appropriate level ofdesign related risk and is givenscope to <strong>in</strong>novate <strong>in</strong> design<strong>in</strong>gthe <strong>in</strong>frastructure. If government<strong>in</strong>tervenes <strong>in</strong>appropriately <strong>in</strong>relation to design issues, it maytake back design risk from theprivate sector (see Box 1) orconstra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation. It isthere<strong>for</strong>e important <strong>for</strong>governments to understand andshare best practice PPPprocurement methodologies thathelp to drive high quality designoutcomes without compromis<strong>in</strong>grisk transfer or <strong>in</strong>novation.Section 4 of this paper sets outthe benefits and risks of thecommon mechanisms used byeconomies with well-developedPPP programs to drive highquality design outcomes <strong>in</strong> social<strong>in</strong>frastructure.Box 1: Tak<strong>in</strong>g back design riskWhen a private sector contractor designs <strong>in</strong>frastructureunder a PPP contract, it takes the risk that the designwill not be constructable or will not enable it to meet theper<strong>for</strong>mance requirements under the PPP contract.If government <strong>in</strong>appropriately <strong>in</strong>tervenes <strong>in</strong> relation todesign issues, the private sector contractor may claimthat any problems experienced <strong>in</strong> construction oroperation of the <strong>in</strong>frastructure are a result ofgovernment’s <strong>in</strong>tervention, not any failure on the part ofthe private party. The private sector contractor maythere<strong>for</strong>e seek compensation or relief from government<strong>in</strong> respect of these issues. In effect, government willhave “taken back” the design risk that it believed it hadtransferred to the private sector contractor.For example, if government engages a private sectorcontractor to design, build, f<strong>in</strong>ance and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a <strong>PPPs</strong>chool, the contractor would ord<strong>in</strong>arily take the risk thatadditional costs are <strong>in</strong>curred because w<strong>in</strong>dows areaccidentally broken more often than <strong>for</strong>ecast. However,if government directs the contractor to use a particularw<strong>in</strong>dow design that is more prone to accidentalbreakage than the design proposed by the contractor,the contractor may be able to argue that governmentshould bear the additional costs of repair<strong>in</strong>g thew<strong>in</strong>dows, as these costs are a result of the governmentdirection.Page 7 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20124 <strong>Design</strong>-related mechanisms through the PPP lifecycleGovernments with well-developed PPP programs have developed a range of mechanismsthat are used at various stages dur<strong>in</strong>g the PPP lifecycle to drive good design outcomes. Theprocesses exam<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> this report are set out <strong>in</strong> Figure 1.Figure 1: <strong>Design</strong>-related mechanisms through the PPP lifecycleProjectDevelopment• Functional Brief Development• User Group Input• Concept <strong>Design</strong>s• Market Sound<strong>in</strong>g• Government Architects• Community Advisory GroupsTenderProcess• Competitive Dialogue• <strong>Design</strong> Standards and Templates• Mandated <strong>Design</strong>s• Interactive Tender Process• Qualitative <strong>Design</strong> Evaluation• Government ArchitectsContractF<strong>in</strong>alisation• Government Review dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Design</strong>DevelopmentConstruction• Government Review dur<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Design</strong> Development• Variation Processes• Community Advisory GroupsOperations• VariationProcessesThe benefits and risks of each of these mechanisms are discussed below.The government project team <strong>for</strong> a PPP generally appo<strong>in</strong>ts and makes use of technicaladvisers (such as architects and eng<strong>in</strong>eers) at appropriate po<strong>in</strong>ts through the PPP lifecycle.Engagement of these advisers is not discussed below, as it is common practice and shouldbe a standard part of the process <strong>for</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>.4.1 Project Development PhaseDur<strong>in</strong>g the project development phase of a PPP, government assembles the necessaryresources <strong>for</strong> the project and develops of the project structure, scope and commercialpr<strong>in</strong>ciples, <strong>in</strong> read<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>for</strong> the <strong>for</strong>mal tender process 1 . Significant work should beundertaken at this time to develop and document government’s design-related requirements.1 <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Australia, “National PPP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es: Volume 2: Practitioners’ Guide” (March 2011),page 6. (Available at:http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_private/files/Vol_2_Practioners_Guide_Mar_2011.pdf).Page 8 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20124.1.1 Functional Brief Development<strong>Design</strong> activities <strong>in</strong> the project development phase of a social <strong>in</strong>frastructure PPP generallycommence with the development of a functional brief 2 , which typically sets out:The services that will be provided with<strong>in</strong> the facility (<strong>for</strong> example emergencytreatment and surgery are two of the services with<strong>in</strong> a hospital)The functional areas required to deliver those services (<strong>for</strong> example, an emergencydepartment <strong>for</strong> the delivery of emergency treatment; operat<strong>in</strong>g theatres <strong>for</strong> thedelivery of surgery)The functional relationships between the different elements of the design (<strong>for</strong>example, the need <strong>for</strong> connectivity between the emergency department andoperat<strong>in</strong>g theatres).The functional brief is an important <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong>to the subsequent development of the technicaldesign requirements and output specification <strong>for</strong> the project, and then the per<strong>for</strong>mancerequirements and payment mechanism that are <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the PPP contract.Figure 2: The Relationship between the Functional Brief, the Specification and the ContractSpecification• Technical <strong>Design</strong>Requirements• Output SpecificationContract• Pe<strong>for</strong>manceRequirements• PaymentMechanismFunctional Brief• Services to beprovided• Functional Areas• FunctionalRelationshipsThe technical design requirements set out the m<strong>in</strong>imum architectural and eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>gper<strong>for</strong>mance specifications that must be <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to the design of the facility 3 . The2 For an example of a functional brief <strong>for</strong> a complex hospital project, see South <strong>Australian</strong> Departmentof Health, “New Royal Adelaide Hospital Project: Schedule 18 – <strong>Design</strong> Specifications: FunctionalBrief”. (Available at:http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/e1466e00479780d68eb9fe2e504170d4/new+RAH+Functional+Brief+1.0.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e1466e00479780d68eb9fe2e504170d4.)Page 9 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 2: Benefits and Risks of User Group InputBenefitsRisksUser group <strong>in</strong>put enables future users ofthe facility (or users of similar facilities)to provide <strong>in</strong>put to the designrequirements, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation tofunctional designUser group <strong>in</strong>put can provide futureusers of the facility with anunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of the design processand design issues, which contributes togood outcomes <strong>in</strong> the changemanagement process that occurs whenstaff transfer <strong>in</strong>to the newly completedPPP facilityGiv<strong>in</strong>g users access to detail of aconcept design at the projectdevelopment phase may lead them toexpect that this design is what will bedelivered, lead<strong>in</strong>g to dissatisfaction if thew<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g bidder proposes a significantlydifferent designUnless carefully managed, the usergroup process may be time consum<strong>in</strong>g<strong>for</strong> the project team, without mak<strong>in</strong>g asignificant contribution to good designoutcomesUser groups generally provide significant value <strong>in</strong> PPP project development due to theirunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of how design <strong>in</strong>fluences service delivery. However user groups should becarefully managed by the project team to mitigate the risks identified <strong>in</strong> Table 2.4.1.3 Concept <strong>Design</strong>sFollow<strong>in</strong>g development of the functional brief, <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g user groups as required,government’s project team can create a concept design that represents one possible designsolution that delivers the functional requirements.The concept design is <strong>in</strong>tended to further develop the project team’s understand<strong>in</strong>g of thedesign issues associated with the project, but it is not a design that the successful PPPbidder will be required to follow.The level of detail developed <strong>in</strong> a concept design can depend upon the needs of the project.The more complex the design issues associated with the project, the more value there is <strong>in</strong>develop<strong>in</strong>g a detailed concept design to understand those issues. For example, a primaryschool with relatively simple functional requirements to be located on a relatively large sitemay only require a high level concept design, whereas a major hospital with complexfunctional relationships and a constra<strong>in</strong>ed site may benefit from more detailed conceptdesign work.Table 3 sets out the key benefits and risks of preparation by government of concept designs.The benefits are significant, and <strong>in</strong>dicate that preparation by government of a conceptdesign can play a key role <strong>in</strong> validat<strong>in</strong>g that government understands what design outcomesare required of the project, ensur<strong>in</strong>g that the project delivers its expected outcomes.However care is needed to ensure that the right level of detail is developed <strong>in</strong> the conceptdesign, so that the benefits are delivered without unnecessary costs and without rais<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>appropriate stakeholder expectations of the project by promot<strong>in</strong>g a design that will not bebuilt.Page 11 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 3: Benefits and Risks of Concept <strong>Design</strong>sBenefitsRisksConcept designs enable government tobetter understand potential designoutcomes that will deliver the functionalrequirementsStakeholders may assume the conceptdesign is what will be built, and may bedisappo<strong>in</strong>ted if the w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g bidderproposes a significantly different designConcept designs provide governmentwith a better understand<strong>in</strong>g of anyspecific design challenges associatedwith the projectThe cost of prepar<strong>in</strong>g a concept designmay be viewed as a waste of funds,given the concept design will not be builtConcept designs provide a more<strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>med basis on which governmentcan develop the specificationConcept designs can assist governmentto ref<strong>in</strong>e the scope of the PPP andassist government to identify elementsthat should be procured separately fromthe PPP 5Concept designs can assist government<strong>in</strong> engagement with user groups and thecommunity4.1.4 Market Sound<strong>in</strong>gSome PPP Frameworks and audit authorities recommend that government should conductdialogue with potential bidders about the design of assets be<strong>for</strong>e conduct<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>for</strong>mal tenderprocess 6 . This dialogue commonly <strong>for</strong>ms part of a market sound<strong>in</strong>g process, which mightalso be used to gauge and develop market <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the project.Market sound<strong>in</strong>g must always be carefully conducted to ensure that governmentprocurement rules are not breached and no participant is given (or perceived by others tohave been given) a competitive benefit <strong>in</strong> the subsequent tender process.Table 4 sets out the key benefits and risks of us<strong>in</strong>g market sound<strong>in</strong>g to conduct dialoguewith potential bidders <strong>in</strong> relation to design issues. For market sound<strong>in</strong>g to be effective, itmust be carefully planned. Issues <strong>for</strong> discussion should be identified prior to the processcommenc<strong>in</strong>g, and market sound<strong>in</strong>g meet<strong>in</strong>gs should be scripted so as to draw out usefulcomment from participants without rais<strong>in</strong>g concerns from participants that they are be<strong>in</strong>gasked to disclose confidential or commercially sensitive perspectives. If the process is notcarefully managed <strong>in</strong> this way, the market sound<strong>in</strong>g may only result <strong>in</strong> general positiveresponses from potential bidders, as they will not want to appear un<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> a potentialproject opportunity.5 See, <strong>for</strong> example (<strong>in</strong> a transport context) Queensland Government, “Gold Coast Rapid TransitLessons Learned” (2012). (Available at: http://gcrtlessonslearned.com.au/about/.)6 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), page 7. (Available athttp://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.); See also <strong>Infrastructure</strong>Australia, “National PPP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es: Volume 2: Practitioners’ Guide” (March 2011), page 72.(Available at:http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_private/files/Vol_2_Practioners_Guide_Mar_2011.pdf).Page 12 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 4: Benefits and Risks of Market Sound<strong>in</strong>gBenefitsRisksMarket sound<strong>in</strong>g can developgovernment’s understand<strong>in</strong>g of theprivate sector’s design capacity andcapability, appetite <strong>for</strong> tak<strong>in</strong>g designrisk, and expectation of opportunities to<strong>in</strong>novate <strong>in</strong> designMarket sound<strong>in</strong>g can <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m potentialbidders at an early stage of designissues and opportunities <strong>in</strong> the project,which will assist the potential bidders <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g consortia with appropriatedesign expertiseUnless government carefully focusesthe market sound<strong>in</strong>g and asks relevantquestions, potential bidders may notprovide useful <strong>in</strong>putUnless carefully managed, a marketsound<strong>in</strong>g process may be perceived asgiv<strong>in</strong>g an advantage to some potentialbidders over othersMarket sound<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> relation to design issues can provide significant value <strong>in</strong> PPP projectdevelopment, particularly if the project <strong>in</strong>volves design issues that government does not fullyunderstand but private sector organisations may have previously resolved <strong>in</strong> other contexts.However the market sound<strong>in</strong>g process should be carefully managed by the project team tomitigate the risks identified <strong>in</strong> Table 4.4.1.5 Government architectsA number of governments have appo<strong>in</strong>ted government architects to provide strategic adviceto government about architecture and urban design. This role can <strong>in</strong>clude the provision ofadvice on how to achieve good design outcomes <strong>for</strong> <strong>PPPs</strong>. For example:In the State of Victoria, Australia, project teams are required to consider theassistance available from the Victorian Government Architect <strong>in</strong> relation to designmatters <strong>in</strong> the project development phase of PPP projects 7 .In Flanders, Belgium, a government architect employed by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of theFlemish Community ensures the architectural quality of PPP projects <strong>in</strong> the schoolssector 8 .Dur<strong>in</strong>g the project development phase of a PPP, a government architect can assist theproject team to improve the quality of design-related project documentation, such as thefunctional brief. The government architect can also share lessons from other projects.The key benefits and risks of us<strong>in</strong>g government architects dur<strong>in</strong>g the project developmentphase of a PPP are set out <strong>in</strong> Table 5.7 <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Australia, “National PPP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es: Volume 6: Jurisdictional Requirements” (March2011), page 27. (Available at:http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_private/files/Vol_6_Jurisdictional_Requirements_Apr_2011.pdf.)8 Organisation <strong>for</strong> Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Public-Private Partnerships <strong>in</strong>Flanders” PEB Exchange 2006/6. (Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/17/37697444.pdf.)Page 13 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 5: Benefits and Risks of <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Government Architects <strong>in</strong> Project DevelopmentBenefitsRisksInvolvement of a government architectan assist <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g good designpractice <strong>in</strong>to the projectA government architect may br<strong>in</strong>g a“whole of government” approach todesignInvolvement of a government architectmay conflict with the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple thatbidders take design risk and areresponsible <strong>for</strong> development of theirown designsInvolvement of government architects dur<strong>in</strong>g the project development phase of a PPP isbest seen as a means of enhanc<strong>in</strong>g the effectiveness of the other design related activitiesthat occur dur<strong>in</strong>g this stage.4.1.6 Community Advisory Groups dur<strong>in</strong>g project developmentPublic participation is important <strong>for</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure projects, and hence governmentshave devised mechanisms <strong>for</strong> public participation at the plann<strong>in</strong>g and design stage of PPPprojects 9 . This participation often occurs through a community advisory group or communityreference group established by government.The Sunsh<strong>in</strong>e Coast University Hospital Project, undertaken by the State of Queensland <strong>in</strong>Australia, illustrates the two-way communication that can occur between a project team andthe community, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to design issues 10 :In July 2010, Queensland Health held four community <strong>for</strong>ums across the coast seek<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>put about the hospital design from the community. The feedback was veryconstructive and will be used <strong>in</strong> the design brief <strong>for</strong> the hospital where applicable.A Community Reference Group was also established by Queensland Health <strong>in</strong> 2010compris<strong>in</strong>g 15 local residents, health users and health providers.The Community Reference Group will assist Queensland Health <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m<strong>in</strong>g thebroader community of progress on the project as well as provide advice and <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong>tothe design of the hospital.The key benefits and risks of community advisory groups dur<strong>in</strong>g the project developmentphase of a PPP are set out <strong>in</strong> Table 6.9 United Nations Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Commission <strong>for</strong> Asia and the Pacific, “A Guidebook on Public-Private Partnership <strong>in</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong>”, page 28. (Available athttp://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/TPT/PPP/text/ppp_guidebook.pdf.)10 Queensland Government, “Sunsh<strong>in</strong>e Coast University Hospital FAQs”. (Available at:http://www.health.qld.gov.au/scuhospital/faqs.asp.)Page 14 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 6: Benefits and Risks of Community Advisory Groups dur<strong>in</strong>g Project DevelopmentBenefitsRisksCommunity advisory groups enable thecommunity to provide <strong>in</strong>put to the designrequirements, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation tourban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>gissuesCommunity advisory groups provide thecommunity with an understand<strong>in</strong>g of thedesign process and design issues,reduc<strong>in</strong>g the likelihood of communityopposition to design outcomes whenconstruction takes placeGiv<strong>in</strong>g the community access to detail ofpossible designs may lead them toexpect that these designs arerepresentative of what will be delivered,lead<strong>in</strong>g to opposition if the w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gbidder proposes a significantly differentdesignManagement of a community advisorygroup may be time consum<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> theproject team, without mak<strong>in</strong>g asignificant contribution to good designoutcomesCommunity advisory groups are a valuable means of two-way communication between theproject team and the community, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to urban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>gissues. However community expectations must be appropriately and efficiently managed.4.2 Tender phaseThe tender process <strong>in</strong>volves <strong>for</strong>mal engagement with the PPP market, seek<strong>in</strong>g bids fromconsortia capable of deliver<strong>in</strong>g the project. To ensure fair and transparent competition, thetender process is conducted under strict procurement rules. A range of mechanisms havebeen developed to promote good design outcomes with<strong>in</strong> the framework of these rules.4.2.1 Competitive dialogueA competitive dialogue procurement process was <strong>in</strong>troduced by the European Commission<strong>in</strong> March 2004. The key stages <strong>in</strong> the process <strong>in</strong>clude the follow<strong>in</strong>g 11 :A pre-qualification process is used to select a number of bidders who are <strong>in</strong>vited toparticipate <strong>in</strong> the dialogue processSuccessive stages of dialogue are conducted with the <strong>in</strong>vited biddersFollow<strong>in</strong>g completion of the dialogue, government issues its f<strong>in</strong>alised request <strong>for</strong>tenders and the bidders submit their f<strong>in</strong>al tenders.Further <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on this process is provided <strong>in</strong> Appendix 1. The key benefits and risks ofcompetitive dialogue are set out <strong>in</strong> Table 7.While competitive dialogue can help government to secure good design outcomes, it alsoentails significant risks. It is an option available under the European Commission’s generalprocurement rules, not a process specifically <strong>in</strong>tended to improve design outcomes <strong>for</strong><strong>PPPs</strong>. As a result, it appears to have somewhat greater risks and weaker benefits than anumber of the other mechanisms discussed <strong>in</strong> this report.11 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 11. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)Page 15 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 7: Benefits and Risks of Competitive DialogueBenefitsRisksCompetitive dialogue may enable Competitive dialogue could result <strong>in</strong>beyond what can be undertaken through<strong>in</strong>itial market test<strong>in</strong>g 13 Care is needed to protect bidders’<strong>in</strong>tellectual property dur<strong>in</strong>g thegovernment to identify potential issueswith bidders’ designs at an early stagewhile bidders are still <strong>in</strong> a competitiveprocess 12government and bidders <strong>in</strong>curr<strong>in</strong>gsignificant additional costs withoutcorrespond<strong>in</strong>g improvements <strong>in</strong>outcomes 14Competitive dialogue enables Competitive dialogue can requiregovernment to ref<strong>in</strong>e its requirementsgreater government resources thanthrough dialogue with engaged biddersother procurement processes 15competitive dialogue process 16Competitive dialogue may result <strong>in</strong>government’s design requirementsbe<strong>in</strong>g partially determ<strong>in</strong>ed by bidders’preferences rather than functionality,master-plann<strong>in</strong>g and urban designneeds4.2.2 <strong>Design</strong> standards and templatesIn some social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>, government may <strong>for</strong>m the view that a particular aspectof design should con<strong>for</strong>m to requirements that have been pre-determ<strong>in</strong>ed by government.For example, <strong>in</strong> a schools PPP project, government may require the classrooms to bedesigned so that they are consistent with classrooms <strong>in</strong> other schools <strong>for</strong> students of thesame age. This consistency would provide an equivalent environment <strong>for</strong> all teachers andstudents across the school system, regardless of how the schools are delivered.If there really is only one design solution that is feasible or acceptable to government <strong>for</strong> aparticular element of the project, then government should require bidders to follow thissolution by prescrib<strong>in</strong>g a design standard or template <strong>in</strong> the tender documents. However,12 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), page 21. (Availableat http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.); Office of GovernmentCommerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>t guidance on us<strong>in</strong>g theprocedure”, page 4. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)13 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 4. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)14 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, pages 4-5. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)15 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 4. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)16 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 5. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)Page 16 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012government should only do this where it is necessary, as the design standard or templatewill prevent bidders <strong>in</strong>novat<strong>in</strong>g to offer alternative solutions and it may be difficult <strong>for</strong>government to transfer the risk that the standard or template compromises the functionalityof the facility.If there is a good reason <strong>for</strong> government to be prescribe detailed design requirements <strong>in</strong> adesign standard or template, it should express those detailed requirements <strong>in</strong> output termsas far as possible. Government should avoid express<strong>in</strong>g requirements <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>put terms ormention<strong>in</strong>g any particular choice of technology as far as possible, as this may <strong>in</strong>hibit theprivate party choos<strong>in</strong>g the most efficient technology and <strong>in</strong>novation <strong>in</strong> design 17 . For example,a post-implementation review of a schools PPP <strong>in</strong> the State of New South Wales, Australia,found that government’s m<strong>in</strong>imum facility standards (which appear to have been expressed<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>put terms and were specified <strong>in</strong> the tender documents) constra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>novation 18 . In asubsequent schools PPP project, the New South Wales Government sought to express itsm<strong>in</strong>imum facility standards <strong>in</strong> output terms 19 .The key benefits and risks of prescrib<strong>in</strong>g design standards and templates are set out <strong>in</strong>Table 8.Table 8: Benefits and Risks of <strong>Design</strong> Standards and TemplatesBenefitsRisksRequir<strong>in</strong>g bidders to follow designstandards and templates can helpensure that government’s expectationsare met if the standard or template is theonly value <strong>for</strong> money solutionUse of design standards and templateswhere other solutions may meetgovernment’s requirements canconstra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation by bidders andcompromise value <strong>for</strong> moneyRequir<strong>in</strong>g bidders to follow designstandards and templates can reducecosts that would otherwise be <strong>in</strong>curredby bidders explor<strong>in</strong>g other solutionsGovernment may be unable to transferthe risk that a specified design standardor template compromises functionalityIn summary, bidders should only be required to follow design templates and standards ifthere is only one feasible or acceptable solution to the relevant aspect of design. To theextent possible, such templates and standards should be expressed <strong>in</strong> output terms.4.2.3 Mandated designsThe idea of requir<strong>in</strong>g bidders to follow design templates and standards can be taken onestep further by government mandat<strong>in</strong>g an overall design (pre-prepared by or on behalf ofgovernment) that bidders must adopt. A proposal from the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom <strong>for</strong> this approachis summarised <strong>in</strong> Appendix 2.17 United Nations Economic and <strong>Social</strong> Commission <strong>for</strong> Asia and the Pacific, “A Guidebook on Public-Private Partnership <strong>in</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong>”, page 53. (Available athttp://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/TPT/PPP/text/ppp_guidebook.pdf.)18 New South Wales Treasury, “New Schools Privately F<strong>in</strong>ance Project Post-Implementation Review”(December 2005), pages 7, 13 and 51. (Available at:http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/5403/trp05-3.pdf.)19 New South Wales Treasury, “New Schools Privately F<strong>in</strong>ance Project Post-Implementation Review”(December 2005), page 7. (Available at:http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/5403/trp05-3.pdf.)Page 17 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012<strong>Australian</strong> experience of standard PPP processes <strong>in</strong> hospital projects <strong>in</strong>dicates that becauseeach bidder submits its own fully developed and costed design, prepared <strong>in</strong> an extremelycompetitive environment <strong>in</strong> response to an output based brief (which encourages design<strong>in</strong>novation), government can achieve enhanced design outcomes 20 . The mandated designapproach would remove the identified drivers of these enhanced outcomes.The key benefits and risks of mandated designs are set out <strong>in</strong> Table 9.Table 9: Benefits and Risks of Mandated <strong>Design</strong>sBenefitsRisksA mandated design gives governmentgreater certa<strong>in</strong>ty of, and control over,design outcomesA mandated design constra<strong>in</strong>sopportunities <strong>for</strong> design <strong>in</strong>novation bybiddersA mandated design avoids the expenseof each bidder develop<strong>in</strong>g their owndesignA mandated design may compromisethe transfer of design risk, or result <strong>in</strong>bidders charg<strong>in</strong>g a risk premium tocompensate <strong>for</strong> adopt<strong>in</strong>g risk on adesign that they have not themselvesprepared and verifiedThe risks created by mandated designs reflect the fact that mandat<strong>in</strong>g a design conflicts witha core feature and value driver of the PPP model, which is the bundl<strong>in</strong>g together of design,construction, f<strong>in</strong>ance and ma<strong>in</strong>tenance under the responsibility of one party. In view of theserisks, mandated designs should only be used where there is compell<strong>in</strong>g reason to givedesign considerations priority over other aspects of the project. In circumstances where thisis the case, government should reconsider whether PPP delivery is the best delivery model<strong>for</strong> the project, as the scope <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation and value <strong>for</strong> money may be compromised by themandated design.4.2.4 Interactive Tender Process<strong>Australian</strong> governments have developed an <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process to improve the qualityof bid submissions and ultimately deliver better outcomes <strong>for</strong> the public, through clearcommunication of the government’s requirements. This process and its risks are described<strong>in</strong> detail <strong>in</strong> Appendix 3, and it is now part of standard PPP processes <strong>in</strong> Australia 21 .The <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process consists of a series of workshops conducted with each shortlistedbidder after government has issued its request <strong>for</strong> proposals. The workshops providean opportunity <strong>for</strong> bidders to seek feedback on their proposals as they are developed, and toclarify the application of government’s requirements to their solution. This enables bidders to20 Tony Lubofsky, “Maximis<strong>in</strong>g the Benefits of PPP Procurement”, presentation at <strong>Design</strong> and HealthAustralasia 2011 (2-4 May 2011). (Available at:http://www.designandhealth.com/uploaded/documents/International-Symposium/Australasia-2010/Australasia-2011/Speaker-Presentations/TonyLubofsky_DHV.pdf)21 New South Wales Treasury, “New Schools Privately F<strong>in</strong>ance Project Post-Implementation Review”(December 2005), page 7. (Available at:http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/5403/trp05-3.pdf.)Page 18 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012better understand government requirements without compromis<strong>in</strong>g probity (that is,transparency and fairness) 22 .Table 10 sets out the key benefits and risks of the <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process.Table 10: Benefits and Risks of Interactive Tender ProcessesBenefitsRisksThe <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process enablesbidders to seek feedback of whethertheir solution meets government’srequirements, and to clarify thoserequirements – this <strong>in</strong>creases thelikelihood that the bids submitted will allbe acceptable to governmentUnless the <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process iscarefully managed, transparency andfairness of the tender process may becompromisedThere is a risk that a bidder’s <strong>in</strong>tellectualproperty may be communicated to otherbidders or to the publicThe <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process has some similarities to the competitive dialogue processreferred to <strong>in</strong> Section 4.2.1 above. However there are two key differences:Competitive dialogue occurs prior to government f<strong>in</strong>alis<strong>in</strong>g its request <strong>for</strong> tenders andissu<strong>in</strong>g it to bidders, whereas the <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process occurs after the request<strong>for</strong> tenders is issued.Competitive dialogue potentially leads to changes <strong>in</strong> government’s requirements,whereas the <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process rests on an assumption that government hasdone sufficient work dur<strong>in</strong>g the project development phase to have f<strong>in</strong>alised itsrequirements, with the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g challenge be<strong>in</strong>g to ensure that bidders understandthose requirements.Given the importance of design <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>, and the wide scope <strong>for</strong> biddersto propose alternative design solutions <strong>in</strong> response to an output specification, the <strong>in</strong>teractivetender process provides an important means to ensure the design solutions developed bybidders meet government’s needs.4.2.5 Qualitative design evaluationIn some PPP processes, government’s technical evaluation of the private sector’s bids goesbeyond an evaluation of whether the bid complies with the specified technical requirementsto <strong>in</strong>clude an evaluation of aspects of the quality of the design, such as its functionality andarchitectural merit. Appendix 4 <strong>in</strong>cludes samples of such design-related evaluation criteriafrom an Australia hospital PPP and schools PPP.Government’s ability to undertake broad qualitative evaluation can depend upon whetherthis is allowable under the relevant procurement rules.Table 11 sets out the key benefits and risks of the qualitative design evaluation. The benefitsare significant. Provid<strong>in</strong>g the risks can be managed by the project team and it is permissible22 New South Wales Treasury, “New Schools Privately F<strong>in</strong>ance Project Post-Implementation Review”(December 2005), page 7. (Available at:http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/5403/trp05-3.pdf.)Page 19 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012under the relevant procurement rules, qualitative design evaluation is generally desirable <strong>in</strong>social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>in</strong> order to drive good design outcomes.Table 11: Benefits and Risks of Qualitative <strong>Design</strong> EvaluationBenefitsRisksA qualitative evaluation of design<strong>in</strong>centivises bidders to <strong>in</strong>novate anddeliver high quality design outcomes,rather than merely comply<strong>in</strong>g withgovernment’s technical requirementsA qualitative evaluation of designenables government to dist<strong>in</strong>guish bidson the basis of the quality of theirfunctional, urban design and masterplann<strong>in</strong>goutcomes, not merely ontechnical compliance and f<strong>in</strong>ancialcriteriaA qualitative evaluation of design mayresult <strong>in</strong> government’s tender decisionbe<strong>in</strong>g more open to challenge byunsuccessful biddersA qualitative evaluation of design maymake it more difficult <strong>for</strong> bidders toidentify their best design solution andput this <strong>for</strong>wardA qualitative evaluation of design mayresult <strong>in</strong> it be<strong>in</strong>g more difficult <strong>for</strong>government decision makers to reach aconclusion4.2.6 Government ArchitectsIn addition to their role discussed <strong>in</strong> section 4.1.5 above, government architects can alsoassist PPP project teams dur<strong>in</strong>g the tender phase of the project. Their expertise can beparticularly valuable <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g circumstances:When government is <strong>in</strong>teract<strong>in</strong>g with bidders <strong>in</strong> relation to design issues, such an <strong>in</strong>competitive dialogue (see section 4.2.1 above) or an <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process (seesection 4.2.4 above) When government is conduct<strong>in</strong>g qualitative design evaluation (see section 4.2.5above).Table 12 sets out the key benefits and risks of <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g government architects <strong>in</strong> theseprocesses.Table 12: Benefits and Risks of us<strong>in</strong>g Government Architects <strong>in</strong> the Tender PhaseBenefitsRisksA government architect can br<strong>in</strong>g a highlevel of design expertise and a “whole ofgovernment” perspective to the<strong>in</strong>teraction with bidders and evaluationof bidsInteraction with bidders and the bidevaluation process may be too timeconsum<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> a government architect tobe fully <strong>in</strong>volvedIf a government architect is available to participate <strong>in</strong> relevant activities dur<strong>in</strong>g the tenderphase, they can make a valuable contribution.4.3 Contract F<strong>in</strong>alisation PhaseOnce PPP bids have been evaluated and a preferred bidder has been selected bygovernment, there may be a time period <strong>in</strong> which the contractual documentation andf<strong>in</strong>ancial arrangements are f<strong>in</strong>alised be<strong>for</strong>e the contract is executed and f<strong>in</strong>ancial closePage 20 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012occurs. Ideally, design issues have been resolved prior to the appo<strong>in</strong>tment of the preferredbidder. However, that is not always the case.4.3.1 <strong>Design</strong> development dur<strong>in</strong>g the contract f<strong>in</strong>alisation phasePrior to the <strong>in</strong>troduction of the competitive dialogue process (see section 4.2.1 above),government project teams <strong>in</strong> the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom would often request high level designsdur<strong>in</strong>g the competitive bidd<strong>in</strong>g process, and then request detailed designs follow<strong>in</strong>gappo<strong>in</strong>tment of a preferred bidder but prior to enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a contract 23 . Table 13 sets out thekey benefits and risks of further development of the design dur<strong>in</strong>g this phase.Table 13: Benefits and Risks of Government Review dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Design</strong> Development (ContractF<strong>in</strong>alisation Phase)BenefitsRisks<strong>Design</strong> development dur<strong>in</strong>g the contractf<strong>in</strong>alisation phase avoids the need <strong>for</strong>unsuccessful bidders to <strong>in</strong>cur theexpense of prepar<strong>in</strong>g detailed designs 24 <strong>Design</strong> development dur<strong>in</strong>g the contractf<strong>in</strong>alisation phase may result <strong>in</strong> changesto designs, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g additions andreductions to project scope, at a timewhen there is no competitive pressure toprotect government’s value <strong>for</strong> moneyposition 25Request<strong>in</strong>g detailed designs follow<strong>in</strong>g appo<strong>in</strong>tment of a preferred bidder but prior to enter<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>to a contract was found to have adverse outcomes <strong>in</strong> the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom. With the<strong>in</strong>troduction of the competitive dialogue process (see section 4.2.1 above), the UnitedK<strong>in</strong>gdom has moved to a system <strong>in</strong> which any major design issues should be resolved whilebidders rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> a competitive environment. This mitigates the risks and offers betteroutcomes <strong>for</strong> government. Australia’s <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process (see section 4.2.4 above)achieves a similar result through a slightly different process.4.4 Construction PhaseOnce the PPP contract has been signed, the private party should proceed to construct thefacility <strong>in</strong> accordance with the design requirements that were <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the contract. Theopportunities <strong>for</strong> government to <strong>in</strong>fluence design outcomes are limited at this stage.However some design related mechanisms are available.4.4.1 Government review dur<strong>in</strong>g construction phase design developmentGenerally, PPP bidders are not required to submit fully detailed “<strong>for</strong> construction” designdraw<strong>in</strong>gs dur<strong>in</strong>g the PPP tender process, as this would impose an unreasonable burden onunsuccessful bidders. It is there<strong>for</strong>e common <strong>for</strong> the private party to undertake further designwork <strong>in</strong> order to develop “<strong>for</strong> construction” draw<strong>in</strong>gs after the contract is executed, work<strong>in</strong>gfrom the design documentation that was <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> the bid. The PPP contract should give23 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), page 18. (Availableat http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.).24 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), page 18. (Availableat http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.).25 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), pages 18 and 21.(Available at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.).Page 21 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012government the right to review whether these further design documents meet the contractualrequirements. An example of such a design review process is set out <strong>in</strong> Appendix 5.Table 14 sets out the key benefits and risks of further development of the design dur<strong>in</strong>g thisphase.Table 14: Benefits and Risks of Government Review dur<strong>in</strong>g Construction Phase <strong>Design</strong> DevelopmentBenefitsRisksGovernment review dur<strong>in</strong>g designdevelopment enables government toensure compliance of the detaileddesign documentation with the PPPcontractGovernment review dur<strong>in</strong>g designdevelopment provides government withimproved understand<strong>in</strong>g of designaspects of the facility be<strong>for</strong>e it has beenbuiltGovernment may take back design riskif it provides <strong>in</strong>appropriate feedback tothe private party as to how to meet thedesign requirements and, as a result ofthe private party rely<strong>in</strong>g on thatfeedback, the facility does not meet theper<strong>for</strong>mance requirementsUnless the design is fully documented at the time bids are submitted, a design reviewprocess is desirable after the contract is executed to ensure compliance of the detaileddesign documentation with the PPP contract. However, the process must to carefullymanaged to prevent government tak<strong>in</strong>g back risk.4.4.2 Variation ProcessesPPP contracts typically <strong>in</strong>clude variation clauses that allow government to request changesto the facility design dur<strong>in</strong>g the life of the PPP. Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> has prepared a separatepaper 26 <strong>for</strong> the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Advisory Council, compar<strong>in</strong>g these clauses across a rangeof jurisdictions and PPP sectors. Table 15 sets out the key benefits and risks of us<strong>in</strong>gvariation processesTable 15: Benefits and Risks of Variation Processes dur<strong>in</strong>g the Construction PhaseBenefitsRisksVariation processes enable governmentto request changes to the design of thefacility <strong>in</strong> response to chang<strong>in</strong>g needs,or to <strong>in</strong>corporate new technologies and<strong>in</strong>novationsIt may be difficult to subject a variationrequested dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phaseto a competitive process or an accuratebenchmark<strong>in</strong>g of the price, andthere<strong>for</strong>e it may be difficult to securevalue <strong>for</strong> money <strong>for</strong> the variationThe variation process may becumbersome and disrupt the overallprogress of the project26 See Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>, “Comparative Study of Contractual Clauses to Provide <strong>for</strong> the SmoothAdjustment of Physical <strong>Infrastructure</strong> and Services through the Lifecycle of a Public-PrivatePartnership (PPP) Project” (May 2012), paper prepared <strong>for</strong> the APEC Bus<strong>in</strong>ess Advisory Council.Page 22 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Be<strong>for</strong>e embark<strong>in</strong>g on the tender process <strong>for</strong> a PPP, government should be confident that itwill not need to change the design significantly over the term of the PPP contract. Dur<strong>in</strong>g thetender process, government should use the mechanisms described <strong>in</strong> section 4.2 above toensure that the design will be suitable <strong>for</strong> the long-term. Nevertheless, circumstances canarise dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phase <strong>in</strong> which it is appropriate to request a variation to thedesign.4.4.3 Community Advisory GroupsThe role of community advisory groups dur<strong>in</strong>g the project development phase wasdiscussed <strong>in</strong> Section 4.1.6 above. Interaction with these groups may also be importantdur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phase to <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>m them of the urban design and master-plann<strong>in</strong>goutcomes of the project. A community advisory group may also have some limited <strong>in</strong>put <strong>in</strong>togovernment’s design review process.The key benefits and risks of community advisory groups dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phase of aPPP are set out <strong>in</strong> Table 16.Table 16: Benefits and Risks of Community Advisory Groups dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phaseBenefitsRisksCommunity advisory groups enable thecommunity to provide <strong>in</strong>put togovernment’s design developmentreview process, particularly <strong>in</strong> relation tourban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>gissuesManagement of a community advisorygroup may be time consum<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> theproject team without mak<strong>in</strong>g asignificant contribution to good designoutcomes, particularly given theconstra<strong>in</strong>ts of the design review processCommunity advisory groups provide thecommunity with an understand<strong>in</strong>g of thedesign process and design issues,reduc<strong>in</strong>g the likelihood of communityopposition to design outcomes4.5 Operations PhaseThe variation processes referred to <strong>in</strong> section 4.4.2 above are usually also available togovernment dur<strong>in</strong>g the operations phase of the PPP. The risks of request<strong>in</strong>g variationsdur<strong>in</strong>g the operations phase are slightly different to those dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phase, andare set out <strong>in</strong> Table 17 on page 24.As is the case dur<strong>in</strong>g the construction phase, circumstances can arise dur<strong>in</strong>g the operationsphase <strong>in</strong> which it is appropriate to request a variation to the design.Page 23 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Table 17: Benefits and Risks of Variation Processes dur<strong>in</strong>g the Construction PhaseBenefitsRisksVariation processes enable governmentto request changes to the design of thefacility <strong>in</strong> response to chang<strong>in</strong>g needs,or to <strong>in</strong>corporate new technologies and<strong>in</strong>novationsIt may be difficult to subject a variationrequested dur<strong>in</strong>g the operations phaseto a competitive process or an accuratebenchmark<strong>in</strong>g of the price, andthere<strong>for</strong>e it may be difficult to securevalue <strong>for</strong> money <strong>for</strong> the variation –however the difficulty is less acute thandur<strong>in</strong>g constructionThe variation process may becumbersome and time consum<strong>in</strong>gThe private party may require arelaxation of the contractualper<strong>for</strong>mance requirements dur<strong>in</strong>g thetime the variation is be<strong>in</strong>g implementedPage 24 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 20125 Conclusions and RecommendationsEconomies with well-developed PPP Frameworks have, through experience, developed arange of mechanisms to promote good design <strong>in</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>. Thesemechanisms have been <strong>in</strong>fluenced by broader procurement regulations and policyconsiderations, such as the need <strong>for</strong> fairness and transparency <strong>in</strong> government procurement.The benefits and risks of the various mechanisms identified <strong>in</strong> this report will vary <strong>in</strong> theirsignificance depend<strong>in</strong>g upon a range of factors <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the particular PPP model be<strong>in</strong>gused, the applicable legal system, and relative importance of design <strong>in</strong> comparison to theother outcomes that will be driven through delivery of the project as a PPP.Some of the mechanisms identified <strong>in</strong> this report are substitutes <strong>for</strong> one another – <strong>for</strong>example, Australia’s <strong>for</strong>m of <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process (discussed <strong>in</strong> section 4.2.4) andcompetitive dialogue (discussed <strong>in</strong> section 4.2.1) serve similar purposes, and it wouldusually be unnecessary to use both of these mechanisms. Other mechanisms identified <strong>in</strong>this report are complementary and can be used together – <strong>for</strong> example, user groups(discussed <strong>in</strong> section 4.1.2) complement functional brief development (discussed <strong>in</strong>section 4.1.1).Based on the analysis <strong>in</strong> this report of mechanisms used <strong>in</strong> PPP Frameworks to promotegood design outcomes, Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong> has identified the follow<strong>in</strong>g recommendations<strong>for</strong> governments wish<strong>in</strong>g to best practice <strong>in</strong> design <strong>for</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>:1. Governments should identify an appropriate comb<strong>in</strong>ation of mechanisms topromote design outcomes through the stages of the PPP lifecycle, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toaccount relevant factors such as the particular PPP model be<strong>in</strong>g used, theapplicable legal system, and relative importance of design <strong>in</strong> comparison to theother outcomes that will be driven through delivery of the project as a PPP.2. Action taken <strong>in</strong> the earlier stages of the PPP process will have the greatest impactupon design outcomes. Governments should there<strong>for</strong>e devote sufficient time andallow sufficient resources <strong>for</strong> proper consideration of design issues dur<strong>in</strong>g theproject development phase of <strong>PPPs</strong>.3. Governments should develop functional briefs to provide a robust foundation <strong>for</strong>the broad range of other activities that drive good design outcomes <strong>in</strong> social<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>.4. Governments should <strong>in</strong>volve user groups <strong>in</strong> PPP project development due to theirunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of how design <strong>in</strong>fluences service delivery, but should also ensurethat project teams carefully manage these groups.5. For projects that <strong>in</strong>volve complex design issues, government should considerconduct<strong>in</strong>g market sound<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> relation to these issues prior to commencement ofthe <strong>for</strong>mal tender process. However the market sound<strong>in</strong>g process should becarefully managed.6. Government architects can provide expertise that enhances the effectiveness ofother design related activities throughout the PPP lifecycle.7. Governments should consider establish<strong>in</strong>g community advisory groups as ameans of two-way communication between the project team and the community,Page 25 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012particularly <strong>in</strong> relation to urban design and master plann<strong>in</strong>g issues. Howevercommunity expectations must be appropriately and efficiently managed.8. Governments should establish mechanisms <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>teraction between governmentand bidders dur<strong>in</strong>g the tender process to ensure that the design solutionsdeveloped by bidders meet government’s needs. This process should not bestructured as a negotiation of government’s design requirements, as theserequirements should have been fully developed prior to the tender process. Thefocus of the <strong>in</strong>teraction should be on ensur<strong>in</strong>g the bidders understand theserequirements.9. Governments should only require bidders to follow design templates andstandards if there is only one feasible or acceptable solution to the relevant aspectof design. To the extent possible, such templates and standards should beexpressed <strong>in</strong> output terms.10. Governments should only mandate the overall design where there is compell<strong>in</strong>greason to give design considerations priority over other aspects of the project. Incircumstances where this is the case, government should reconsider whether PPPdelivery is the best delivery model <strong>for</strong> the project, as the scope <strong>for</strong> <strong>in</strong>novation andvalue <strong>for</strong> money may be compromised by the mandated design.11. Provid<strong>in</strong>g the risks can be managed by the project team and it is permissibleunder the relevant procurement rules, governments should use qualitativeevaluation of bidders’ designs <strong>in</strong> order to drive good design outcomes.12. Governments should ensure that designs are sufficiently developed by biddersdur<strong>in</strong>g the competitive tender process so that any subsequent design review needonly focus on compliance of the detailed design documentation with the PPPcontract. The design review process must be carefully managed to preventgovernment tak<strong>in</strong>g back risk.Page 26 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Appendix 1 – The European Commission’s Competitive DialogueProcessIn March 2004 the European Commission published Directive 2004/18/EC, which <strong>in</strong>troduceda new Competitive Dialogue procurement process. The key stages <strong>in</strong> the process <strong>in</strong>cludethe follow<strong>in</strong>g 27 :A pre-qualification process is used to select a number of bidders who are <strong>in</strong>vited toparticipate <strong>in</strong> the dialogue processSuccessive stages of dialogue are conducted with the <strong>in</strong>vited biddersFollow<strong>in</strong>g completion of the dialogue, government f<strong>in</strong>alises its request <strong>for</strong> tendersand the bidders submit their f<strong>in</strong>al tenders.The earliest phase of dialogue typically focuses on the bidders’ proposed technicalsolutions 28 , which would <strong>in</strong>clude design issues.Government can structure the process so that the number of bidders can be reducedthrough the dialogue stages by “down select<strong>in</strong>g” bidders whose solutions are not expectedto meet government’s needs 29 .Dur<strong>in</strong>g the dialogue process, bidders ref<strong>in</strong>e their proposed solutions and government ref<strong>in</strong>esits contractual position <strong>in</strong> respect of each proposed solution. As a result, when governmentasks the bidders to submit their f<strong>in</strong>al tenders, it may ask each bidder to bid on the basis of adifferent contract 30 . Government then needs to consider how to evaluate the bids on aconsistent basis 31 .As the European Commission rules give government only limited ability to negotiate withbidders after the dialogue is completed, government needs to substantially agree all aspectsof the project, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g design matters, dur<strong>in</strong>g the dialogue stages 32 .27 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 11. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)28 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 20. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)29 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 20. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)30 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 21. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)31 Office of Government Commerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>tguidance on us<strong>in</strong>g the procedure”, page 21. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)32 National Audit Office, “Improv<strong>in</strong>g the PFI Tender<strong>in</strong>g Process” (8 March 2007), page 7. (Available athttp://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improv<strong>in</strong>g_pfi_tender<strong>in</strong>g.aspx.); Office of GovernmentCommerce and HM Treasury, “Competitive Dialogue <strong>in</strong> 2008: OGC/HMT jo<strong>in</strong>t guidance on us<strong>in</strong>g theprocedure”, page 24. (Available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/competitive_dialogue_procedure.pdf.)Page 27 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Appendix 2 – RIBA Smart PFI Model 33In 2005, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) proposed changes to the UnitedK<strong>in</strong>gdom’s PPP procurement processes. RIBA believed that these changes would rectifyproblems it claimed existed affect<strong>in</strong>g design quality, and deliver broader benefits <strong>in</strong> terms ofreduc<strong>in</strong>g the time and cost of bidd<strong>in</strong>g <strong>for</strong> social <strong>in</strong>frastructure PPP projects. Follow<strong>in</strong>g aconsultation process, RIBA released details of its preferred “Smart PFI” model <strong>in</strong> 2006.Prior to the tender phaseUnder the Smart PFI model, prior to the tender phase the public sector client appo<strong>in</strong>ts amanagement and design team, chosen through a competitive process <strong>for</strong> their creative skillsand understand<strong>in</strong>g of the client’s area of expertise.The successful team then works <strong>in</strong> close collaboration with client representatives and otherstakeholders to develop an <strong>in</strong>timate knowledge of the client’s strategic and operationalneeds and set an appropriate vision <strong>for</strong> the project supported by research and visits to classlead<strong>in</strong>gfacilities.The design team is required to produce:a well-researched and comprehensive design briefsite analyses and selectionan outl<strong>in</strong>e design <strong>for</strong> the project, achiev<strong>in</strong>g full user-client sign-off on content, layoutand quality benchmarksan output specificationan analysis of buildability and construction logisticsa robust budget <strong>for</strong> the project based on the outl<strong>in</strong>e design solution and tak<strong>in</strong>gaccount of all site specific costsa further client sign-off to confirm the af<strong>for</strong>dability of the projectplann<strong>in</strong>g approval (if appropriate).Dur<strong>in</strong>g the tender phaseInstead of develop<strong>in</strong>g an entirely new design, bidders are asked to develop the publicsector’s design sufficiently to build up a tender.The consortia are challenged to use their <strong>in</strong>novation, compet<strong>in</strong>g to demonstrate how theycould most efficiently deliver the required design solution <strong>in</strong> terms of build<strong>in</strong>g methodologies,value eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g, lean construction, facilities management, f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g and the provision ofpartner<strong>in</strong>g services where appropriate.33 Source: Royal Institute of British Architects, “Smart PFI Position Paper” (2006). (Available at:http://www.architecture.com/Files/RIBAHold<strong>in</strong>gs/PolicyAndInternationalRelations/Policy/SmartPFI/SmartPFIPositionPaper.pdf.)Page 28 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012They are also <strong>in</strong>vited to identify any areas of the design where they feel improvements couldbe made or any opportunities <strong>for</strong> additional <strong>in</strong>come generation offered by the site. Eachbidder works with its own design team.The design team that prepared the outl<strong>in</strong>e design <strong>for</strong> the public sector client may be reta<strong>in</strong>edto judge consortium proposals.Page 29 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Appendix 3 – Australia’s Interactive Tender Process 34Governments <strong>in</strong> Australia usually conduct an <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process <strong>for</strong> social<strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong>. This process <strong>in</strong>volves hold<strong>in</strong>g a series of <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>teractiveworkshops with shortlisted bidders after government’s request <strong>for</strong> proposals has beenissued.The <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process provides shortlisted bidders with an opportunity to discuss thedevelopment of their concepts and designs and to seek clarification and feedback <strong>in</strong> thecontext of the government’s output requirements, be<strong>for</strong>e lodg<strong>in</strong>g proposals. The workshopsalso m<strong>in</strong>imise the risk of any misunderstand<strong>in</strong>g of the government’s requirements.Objective of the processThe objective of the <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process is to improve the quality of bid submissionsand ultimately deliver better outcomes <strong>for</strong> the public, through clear communication of thegovernment’s requirements to ultimately <strong>in</strong>fluence the overall quality of proposals receivedfrom shortlisted bidders.Structure of the processThe <strong>in</strong>teractive tender process typically <strong>in</strong>volves a series of presentations and workshops,usually number<strong>in</strong>g between three and 10 per shortlisted bidder. The workshops are resource<strong>in</strong>tensive. Each will normally <strong>in</strong>volve representatives of both the project team and ashortlisted bidder. The workshops are held with <strong>in</strong>dividual bidders to enable opencommunication of <strong>in</strong>tellectual property.Protect<strong>in</strong>g government from the risks associated with the processThe request <strong>for</strong> proposals specifies the procedures, timetable and protocols <strong>for</strong> the<strong>in</strong>teractive tender process. Ground rules <strong>for</strong> the workshops are established and provided toshortlisted bidders be<strong>for</strong>e the workshops. Shortlisted bidders notify government <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g oftheir acceptance of the procedures, protocols and ground rules.The terms and conditions of tender<strong>in</strong>g require bidders to acknowledge that they will not relyon the representations made by government dur<strong>in</strong>g the procurement process, nor will theyattribute any loss to comments provided. However, a residual risk to government rema<strong>in</strong>s, ismanaged by:provid<strong>in</strong>g the project team with a clear understand<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>in</strong>teractive tenderprocess and its boundaries at the outset of the request <strong>for</strong> proposals period(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g session if required);provid<strong>in</strong>g a clear set of objectives and ground rules <strong>for</strong> bidders at the start of theprocess. These <strong>in</strong>clude an explanation that government’s feedback must necessarilybe qualified by its <strong>in</strong>ability to <strong>for</strong>m a full <strong>in</strong>terpretation of a bidder’s proposal prior tobid submission. Government can address particular parts of a proposal separately,but may not be <strong>in</strong> a position to provide feedback on the ‘sum of the parts’. Ultimately,34 Source: <strong>Infrastructure</strong> Australia, “National PPP Guidel<strong>in</strong>es: Volume 2: Practitioners’ Guide” (March2011), page 24-5 and Appendix E. (Available at:http://www.<strong>in</strong>frastructureaustralia.gov.au/public_private/files/Vol_2_Practioners_Guide_Mar_2011.pdf).Page 30 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012the bidders must take the risk that their proposals as a whole respond adequately tothe request <strong>for</strong> proposals.Protect<strong>in</strong>g bidders’ <strong>in</strong>tellectual propertyParticular care is taken by government’s project team to protect each bidder’s commercial<strong>in</strong>-confidencematerial and <strong>in</strong>tellectual property, as these elements can provide a competitiveadvantage and often have a commercial value. Ideas from one bidder are not communicatedto other bidders.To the extent that bidders choose to provide <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation on their proposals to government toseek feedback, the project team is careful about the circulation of this material among teammembers. Circulation is on an ‘as needs’ basis only.Page 31 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Appendix 4 – Examples of qualitative design evaluation criteriaSet out below are examples of the design evaluation criteria <strong>for</strong> a PPP hospital project and aPPP schools project from Australia. The evaluation criteria <strong>for</strong> these projects also <strong>in</strong>cludedexam<strong>in</strong>ation of matters such as cost, risk, commercial opportunities, service requirementsand project management.Royal Children’s Hospital Project – <strong>Design</strong>-related evaluation criteria 35Criterion E - Master PlanThe State will evaluate the:proposed vision and <strong>in</strong>tegration of the master plan;Site circulation and provision of appropriate traffic management;urban architectural <strong>for</strong>m and fit and relationship to the built and natural environment;andthe quality and layout of the Site.Criterion F - <strong>Design</strong>The State will evaluate the:extent to which the Proposal reflects the <strong>Design</strong> Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples;functionality and operational efficiency of the proposed design;contribution of the proposed design towards an efficient whole life cost <strong>for</strong> theFacility;architectural quality of the proposed design;process <strong>for</strong> Equipment selection and appropriateness and quality of the selectedEquipment;flexibility and expansion capability of the Facility;appropriateness and quality of the eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g and build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure services;ecological susta<strong>in</strong>ability of the design;extent to which the Proposals demonstrate <strong>in</strong>novation;design of any Commercial Opportunities;35 Department of Human Services and Department of Treasury and F<strong>in</strong>ance (Victoria, Australia),“Partnerships Victoria <strong>in</strong> Schools Project Summary” (February 2008), page 25. (Available at:www.partnerships.vic.gov.au.)Page 32 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012extent to which Proposals consider and respond to the plann<strong>in</strong>g framework; andextent of Departures from the requirements of the <strong>Design</strong> Brief.Partnerships Victoria <strong>in</strong> Schools Project – <strong>Design</strong> evaluation criteria 36The State will evaluate the designs <strong>for</strong> each of the Schools. In do<strong>in</strong>g so, the key issues thatwill be considered <strong>in</strong>clude:<strong>Design</strong> solution – the State will evaluate the extent to which the proposal reflects thefunctionality and operational efficiency of the proposed design and otherwise reflectsthe design pr<strong>in</strong>ciples;Master Plann<strong>in</strong>g – the State will evaluate amongst other th<strong>in</strong>gs:ooo<strong>Design</strong> documentation – the State will evaluate the extent to which the designdocumentation and associated <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation illustrates the proposals <strong>in</strong>accordance with the requirements of the Output Specification;Flexibility and future expansion capacity – the State will evaluate the flexibilityand expansion capability of the Facilities <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the extent to which thedesign facilitates the use of Relocatables;Site access and traffic provisions – the State will evaluate the access andtraffic arrangements on and around the sites <strong>for</strong> pedestrian, bicycle andvehicular <strong>in</strong>teraction;Facility architecture – the State will evaluate the architectural quality of the proposeddesign and will consider as part of this criteria:oWhole-of-life design – the State will evaluate the contribution of the proposeddesign towards an efficient whole life cost <strong>for</strong> the schools;Equipment – the State will evaluate the process <strong>for</strong> equipment selection andappropriateness and quality of the selected equipment;Eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g services – the State will evaluate the appropriateness and quality of theeng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g and build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>frastructure services;Ecological susta<strong>in</strong>ability – the State will evaluate the ecological susta<strong>in</strong>ability of thedesign;Innovation – the State will evaluate the extent to which the proposals demonstrate<strong>in</strong>novation <strong>in</strong> each of the above areas; andPlann<strong>in</strong>g framework – the State will evaluate the extent to which proposals considerand respond to the plann<strong>in</strong>g framework.36 Department of Education and Early Childhood Development and Department of Treasury andF<strong>in</strong>ance (Victoria, Australia), “Partnerships Victoria <strong>in</strong> Schools Project Summary” (March 2009),page 26. (Available at: www.partnerships.vic.gov.au.)Page 33 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>


<strong>Best</strong> <strong>Practice</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Design</strong> of <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Social</strong> <strong>Infrastructure</strong> June 2012Appendix 5 – The <strong>Design</strong> Development ProcessIn social <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>PPPs</strong> <strong>in</strong> Australia, the PPP contract provides <strong>for</strong> a designdevelopment process to occur follow<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>ancial close. The key features of this process areas follows 37 :The PPP contractor must give government’s project director drafts of its detaileddesign documentation.The project director may, but need not, review these drafts and provide commentsand recommendations to the PPP contractor. Those comments must only relate tocompliance of the draft designs with the PPP contract, and must be provided with<strong>in</strong>20 days of receiv<strong>in</strong>g the drafts.The PPP contractor must amend the draft designs to reflect the project director’scomments and recommendations, and resubmit the designs.The contract protects government aga<strong>in</strong>st the possibility that, by comment<strong>in</strong>g on thedesigns, it takes back risk – the PPP contractor rema<strong>in</strong>s solely liable <strong>for</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g thatits designs comply with the PPP contract.The design documentation is not reviewed by the project director alone – typically the projectdirector seeks <strong>in</strong>put from a range of experienced “client representatives” with<strong>in</strong> government.For large and complex projects, particularly where the <strong>in</strong>frastructure will be operated bygovernment, this design review process is, <strong>in</strong> itself, a major undertak<strong>in</strong>g. For example, <strong>in</strong> amajor hospital PPP <strong>in</strong> Australia, the process required 38 :Up to 80 <strong>in</strong>dividual groupsPlann<strong>in</strong>g group members committ<strong>in</strong>g to attend design review meet<strong>in</strong>gs, as difficultieswere identified with hav<strong>in</strong>g proxies attendInvestigation of web based communication to facilitate the flow of design <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mation.Similarly, another major hospital PPP <strong>in</strong> Australia <strong>in</strong>volved 39 :… <strong>in</strong>put from staff <strong>in</strong> the design process through the 74 user groups and 15 referencegroups… [The builder] met with these groups <strong>in</strong> excess of 1,500 times to ensure thecl<strong>in</strong>ical objectives were met.37 See, <strong>for</strong> example, New South Wales Department of Education and Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, “New Schools 2 PublicPrivate Partnership Project –Summary of Contracts” (6 July 2006), page 19. (Available at:https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/detresources/ppp2summary_diWKmKHbAQ.pdf.)38 Government of South Australia, “The new Royal Adelaide Hospital Project – Next Steps – <strong>Design</strong>and Development” (May 2011). (Available at:http://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/491f380047541cd38724ff2e504170d4/NRAHOverviewPresentation-SSS-MPO-1105v2.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=491f380047541cd38724ff2e504170d4.)39 Lend Lease, “Deliver<strong>in</strong>g a World Class Facility to Meet Australia’s Future Healthcare Needs” (30April 2012). (Available at:http://www.hospitalhealth.com.au/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=817:deliver<strong>in</strong>g-a-worldclass-facility-to-meet-australias-future-healthcare-needs&Itemid=238&tmpl=component&pr<strong>in</strong>t=1.)Page 34 of 34Foster <strong>Infrastructure</strong>

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