Power-Sharing - Goftaman.com

More documents

Recommendations

Info

CONCLUSIONThe sketch of Afghanistan’s problems in this report is meant to be realistic; these are thechallenges facing Afghanistan. We already know that the cost of failing is virtuallyincalculable. The Afghanistan Compact provides many elements of a plan for sustainablesecurity, governance, and development. This report has tried to supplement that bysuggesting additional measures for implementation. If the international <strong>com</strong>munity isunable or unwilling to meet the cost of success, or if Afghan authorities are unable orunwilling to make the decisions needed to use assistance effectively, they must answerthe question: What risks are they willing to accept? Afghans are determined not to revertto a past they abhor; will their leaders and international actors enable them to succeed?40
ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is director of studies and senior fellow at the Center on InternationalCooperation at New York University. From November to December 2001, he served asadviser to the UN special representative of the secretary-general for Afghanistan,Lakhdar Brahimi, during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement. From 1994to 2000, he was director of the Center for Preventive Action and director of peace andconflict studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.Previously, Dr. Rubin was associate professor of political science and director ofthe Center for the Study of Central Asia at Columbia University, Jennings Randolphpeace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, and assistant professor of politicalscience at Yale University. He is considered one of the world’s foremost experts onAfghanistan, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding, and is the author of several books,including Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventing Violent Conflict (2002);Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia(1999); and The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State(1995).41
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19 and 20: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27 and 28: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 29 and 30: manage its water resources, connect
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51: This will require both national bud
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

Power-Sharing - Goftaman.com

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?