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told Kabul that the ceiling for the ANA would be 45,000 men, compared to the 70,000that the Afghan Ministry of Defense thinks it needs.Although the belated concern for fiscal sustainability is welcome, this unilateraldecision has placed the Afghans in a difficult position. The United States, notAfghanistan, determined the salary levels of the ANA, and now the United States isinsisting that this impoverished, insecure country, just embarking on a majordevelopment strategy, take on this fiscal burden. Secretary Rumsfeld has reportedlyassured the Afghans that the United States will ensure Afghanistan’s external security,but the failure of the United States to neutralize the Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries inPakistan has made the Afghans skeptical of such guarantees.Because Afghanistan cannot have a foreign-supported army for long, someadjustment of the quantity or quality of the force is inevitable. Besides simply making theANA smaller, the Afghan government could move away from the U.S.-inspired structuretoward a more cost-effective, if less professional, army, such as one based onconscription and compensation in kind (housing and other facilities) rather than cash.Similar adjustments must be made for the Afghan National Police (ANP). Current plansto raise police salaries to a level comparable to that of the ANA will further inflate thebudget beyond the country’s means. Because of the insufficiency of both internationaland national security forces, the Afghan government continues to raise informal militias,mostly in Pashtun areas, where the Taliban are active. This has created some anxietyamong non-Pashtuns, who have seen their much larger militias disbanded. The need forregional and ethnic equity must be taken into account in the structure of the securityforces.Recommendations:• The Afghan government and its partners in SSR should reexamine the structureand mission of the army and police as the Afghan security sector must be fiscallysustainable. To enable the ANA to become more self-sufficient, the force mayneed to be smaller than initially planned and more cost-effective. This mayrequire a change from the U.S.-inspired model of a highly paid, all-volunteerarmy.22
• The central police force also must be relatively small to be effective andaffordable. Rather than trying to deploy a centralized security force throughoutthe country, the government should police the cities, main roads, border points,and national installations, while organizing, disciplining, and lightly subsidizinglocally based forces in much of the country.• Coalition forces should reduce intrusive foreign presence in the security forces.The Coalition must begin planning a reduction of the pervasive role the UnitedStates plays in the ANA. Embedded advisers planned for the ANP should notpatrol.23
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19 and 20: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27 and 28: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 29 and 30: manage its water resources, connect
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

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