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Since ISAF expansion in 2003, NATO has been trying to field more troops andequipment, but it took NATO more than a year, from 2003 to 2004, to deploy a fewtransport helicopters. 16Some European NATO members are resisting unification of command with theCoalition that might lead to their troops’ participation in counterinsurgency operationsand lead them to turn over detainees to the U.S. government, in whose custody they risktreatment in violation of international humanitarian law. 17 They have now decided to turnprisoners over to the Afghan government on the condition that prisoners will neither beexecuted nor turned over to U.S. custody. Several troop contributors also have adoptednational caveats for other reasons, even against proactive patrolling and measures to pressfor demobilization of militias. Success in Afghanistan, however, requires NATOcontributors to find a way to carry out the mission while respecting international law,despite obstacles posed by the U.S. administration.Recommendation:• Troop contributors should adopt a common mission and rules of engagement,rather than insist on national caveats, even if this requires bilateral agreement withthe Afghan government on treatment of prisoners or constructing separatedetention facilities, to assure respect of Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions.Provincial Reconstruction TeamsThe PRT terms of reference now state that they will “assist the Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan to extend its authority, to facilitate the development of a stable and secureenvironment in the identified area of operations, and enable SSR and reconstruction16 During his October 2005 trip to Kabul, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced thatNATO would increase its force in Afghanistan to as many as 15,000 soldiers and will take oncounterinsurgency operations as it expands its mission into southern Afghanistan in the coming months.See Carlotta Gall, “NATO to Expand Force and Task In Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 7, 2005.17 Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “United States May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next Spring,”New York Times, September 14, 2005; James Travers, “Smart Move to Sidestep Afghanistan PrisonControversy,” The Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada), March 4, 2006.18
efforts.” 18 In response to Afghan concerns that PRTs were building projects that thegovernment had no budget to operate, the Coalition now reviews projects to align themwith Afghan government priorities. But the Coalition’s development activities are stillnot integrated into the coordination procedures of the civilian aid donors, nor are militaryofficers the best development partners for local administration.Recommendation:• PRTs should be reconfigured to support governance and development moreeffectively, by including more political officers and development specialists fromNATO member countries, a possible role for the European Union. Thedevelopment funds disbursed by PRTs should be subject to the same criteria foreffectiveness as other assistance; those funds would be more effective ifdisbursements were accountable to provincial administration and elected councils,as through a trust fund.Power-holder ImpunityStabilization of the country will eventually require an end to the impunity of powerholders. Despite several homicides by U.S. officials and contractors, and crimes byAfghan power holders including land grabbing, forced marriages, human trafficking,drug trafficking and other abuses, none of the guilty have received significant sanctions.Recommendations:• The United States must impose meaningful punishment on its personnel andcontractors for homicides and torture of detainees.• The Afghan government, with the support as needed of the Coalition and NATO,should begin a process to arrest powerful Afghan criminals (not just apolitical orpro-Taliban drug traffickers, as in the past year) and either punish or extraditethem.18 Islamic Government of Afghanistan, “Terms of Reference for the Combined Force Command and ISAFPRTs in Afghanistan,” January 27, 2005.19
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19 and 20: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27 and 28: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 29: manage its water resources, connect
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

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