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form of the Declaration of Strategic Partnership, which gave the United States the rightsto military bases in Afghanistan and “freedom of action” for its forces.Although Afghans largely accept the need for the U.S. presence, neither they northe country’s neighbors have accepted the overt nullification of the country’snonalignment that many saw in the Strategic Partnership. Soon after President Karzaiannounced his intention to seek such an agreement with the United States,demonstrations broke out around the country, in part against granting permanent bases tothe United States. An underground leaflet (“Night Letter”) circulating in Kabul during therioting called Karzai a “U.S.A. servant” who put the interests of his “evil master” aheadof Afghanistan. 15Iran then drafted a proposed treaty with Afghanistan, including a provision thatneither party would permit intelligence operations by third countries against the other.The United States opposed this treaty, which Afghanistan could not have enforced. WhenPresident Karzai wanted to visit Tehran for the inauguration of President MahmoudAhmadinejad on August 3, 2005, Iran told him he was not welcome if he would not signthe agreement. A call from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice forced PresidentKarzai to cancel a trip to Iran aimed at reaching economic agreements in January 2006.Afghanistan was caught between Tehran, which tried to use Afghanistan’s need fortransit to break out of its isolation over its nuclear program, and Washington, whichdeprived Kabul of the opportunity to exploit Tehran’s discomfiture for its own benefit.China and Russia issued veiled protests of the Strategic Partnership in public andsharp rebukes in private. On July 5, 2005, the heads of state of the members of theShanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, theKyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, asked the United States to set a date forclosing its military bases in Central Asia. These countries believe that the United States isexploiting their cooperation on counterterrorism to pursue long-term strategic objectivesinimical to their interest. Subsequently, China and Russia conducted joint militaryoperations on each other’s territory for the first time, in part over these concerns.Yet having good regional relations is extremely important to Afghanistan.Landlocked and arid, it can develop economically only through regional cooperation to15 John Lee Anderson, “The Man in the Palace,” New Yorker, June 6, 2005.16
manage its water resources, connect to the international market, and obtain energy.Because none of Afghanistan’s neighbors welcomes a long-term U.S. military presence,they may resist such cooperation. Although the potential economic cooperation describedin this report may help build confidence, regional cooperation will be limited in theabsence of a common understanding of Afghanistan’s geopolitical and regional identity.Recommendation:• The United States and its Coalition partners, especially its principal NATO allies,should seek to promote a regional consensus on the geostrategic role ofAfghanistan as a state not aligned against any neighbor. This requires developingunderstandings of how to insulate Afghanistan from conflicts in and oversurrounding areas, including Iran, as was done for the first three decades of theCold War and in the early part of the twentieth century, despite sharp politicalantagonisms in the region. Longer term stability in the region will be able todevelop only as the Afghan state becomes stronger and able to articulate andimplement relations with its neighbors. The United States should not underminethis eventual process by insisting that Afghanistan’s foreign and security policyconform to U.S. strategic objectives. For instance, the United States has means toconfront the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program without forcing landlockedAfghanistan to forgo economic agreements with one of its most importantpartners for trade and transit, where over a million Afghans live.STABILIZATION OPERATIONSThe Bonn Agreement defined the international stabilization mission in Afghanistan ashelping Afghans to provide security until they were able to do so themselves. ISAF wasconfined to Kabul for nearly two years, and the Coalition did not initially define thedomestic security of Afghanistan as part of its mission. Hence, militias and drugtraffickers easily consolidated control of much of the country in 2002. Since late 2002,the Coalition has been devoting more resources to stabilization by means of the PRTs.17
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19 and 20: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

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