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level that it wants to see the withdrawal of military control from Pakistan’scivilian institutions and genuine freedom for political parties. It should supportPakistan’s development by lifting restrictions on Pakistani textile imports into theUnited States, as Pakistani business has a strong economic interest in thestabilization of Afghanistan. This measure should not be held out as a reward forgood behavior but should be enacted immediately to show commitment tocooperation with Pakistan on new terms.• In response, Afghanistan will have to respect legitimate Pakistani concerns aboutthe border and an Indian presence. Currently Afghanistan is following thehistorical pattern of turning to India to balance the threat from Pakistan,particularly in the context of the drawdown of U.S. forces and doubts about futureU.S. commitment. The United States should strengthen its presence on the Afghanside of the border, and encourage India and Afghanistan not to engage in anyprovocative activity there. India has legitimate consular interests in Jalalabad andQandahar involving Indian businesses and Afghan Sikhs and Hindus with familyties in India, but Afghanistan should encourage confidence-building measureswith Pakistan in the area. Afghanistan also should refrain from relations withPashtun leaders in Pakistan that give the impression that the governmentrepresents Pashtuns, which aggravates both relations with Pakistan and ethnicrelations in Afghanistan.• The United States should help Afghans realize that Islamabad will not respect aborder that Kabul does not recognize. This is a very sensitive ethnic and politicalissue domestically, and it will be necessary to show that the border issue is not azero-sum conflict and that recognizing the border need not isolate Pashtuns fromeach other, though they live in different states. Current efforts to promotedevelopment along the Durand line, bringing benefits to those on both sides,should be expanded, and both transit rights and access to Pakistani ports inKarachi and Gwadar should be guaranteed.• Settling the border issue will require transforming the status of the tribal areas inPakistan. Currently, these areas have lost their autonomy: they have experiencedoffensives by the Pakistani Army but have not enjoyed social and law14
enforcement services. The inhabitants of these areas must have the opportunity toparticipate in decisions about their future through genuine elections, which theyhave never had. Stabilizing the border also will require coordinated investments inthe underdeveloped areas on both sides, although such coordination can be scaledup only as agreement on the political status of the border develops, and securitythreats no longer override other considerations.• In order to launch a long-term program to stabilize and develop the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the United States and the UK should sponsor both officialand second-track discussions involving all stakeholders in the border region.These discussions should ultimately aim to create a context in which Afghanistancan recognize an open border, the tribal territories of Pakistan can be integratedinto and receive a full range of services from the Pakistani state, and the borderarea can become a region for cooperative development rather than insecurity,extremism, and antagonism.OTHER REGIONAL DILEMMASAfghanistan’s regional dilemmas go beyond Pakistan. Afghanistan’s weakness hasalways posed a strategic dilemma for its rulers. Because the country has never producedenough wealth to pay the cost of governing or defending itself, Afghanistan has beenstable only when its neighbors or imperial powers agreed to strengthen it as a buffer ornonaligned state to serve external security interests. The resulting lack of domesticlegitimacy, however, has created opportunities for other foreign powers to interfere.Afghanistan’s experience of interference after the Soviet withdrawal has intensified thecountry’s mistrust of its neighbors and made many skeptical that nonalignment withouteffective deterrence of interference would suffice to guarantee the country’sindependence. Hence, Afghans tolerate international presence, including that of the U.S.military, as the needed deterrence to its neighbors’ interference. Concerns that the UnitedStates might reduce its presence led President Karzai to seek long-term guarantees in the15
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19 and 20: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25: without active engagement and assis
Page 29 and 30: manage its water resources, connect
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

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