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other in the media both before and after his visit. Relations deteriorated rapidly, with littleapparent action by the United States to address this conflict.Figure 1: Growth in Insurgency: Attacks on and Fatalities of Coalitionand Government Forces in Afghanistan, 2002–2005350300250200Attacks150Fatalities100500Fatalities2002200320042005AttacksSource: Data from RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, courtesy of Seth Jones.The Afghan government wants Washington to reduce unpopular actions insideAfghanistan, reduce its unilateral actions, and instead focus pressure on Pakistan. Karzaihas stated that, “No coalition forces should go to Afghan homes without the authorizationof the Afghan government….The use of air power is something that may not be veryeffective now.” 88 Daniel Cooney, “Karzai Wants End to U.S.-Led Operations,” Associated Press Online (Kabul),September 20, 2005.8
Yet more than four years after the initial offensive and the establishment of whatis supposed to be a fully sovereign Afghan government, U.S. forces and their contractorsstill enjoy full “freedom of action” without any status of forces agreement. The Bushadministration’s insistence on independence for U.S. forces and impunity for contractorsis undermining support for Coalition presence, damaging its sustainability.The government of Afghanistan also has discreetly joined the global chorus ofprotest over the mistreatment of detainees by the Bush administration. During hisWashington visit in May 2005, President Karzai asked for the transfer of Afghandetainees to his government’s custody and for more control by Afghanistan overCoalition operations. The United States has since signed an agreement for the gradualtransfer of Afghan detainees, although the Afghan government protested the failure toadequately punish U.S. soldiers for the torture and murder of two detainees in Bagram airbase and the sacrilegious burning of the bodies of Taliban who had died in battle. 9The Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership of May 17, 2005, providing for“freedom of action” by U.S. forces must give way to a status of forces agreementbetween Afghanistan and the United States that affirms Afghan sovereignty, commitsboth sides to respect international humanitarian law, and limits threats to neighboringstates from U.S. bases. 10 Such an agreement should regulate the legal status of detaineesand U.S. contractors on the basis of international law. It also should make clear that theU.S. presence in Afghanistan is directed solely at combating terrorism and insurgencyand that Afghanistan will not become a permanent U.S. base.Such an agreement alone, however, would not constitute a counterinsurgencystrategy. The strategy also has to emphasize an end to foreign sanctuaries and thestrengthening of the Afghan government and economy in affected areas. More aggressivemilitary action by the Coalition in the past year has led to successful adaptation by theinsurgents. The Pentagon’s plan to reduce U.S. coalition forces from 20,000 to 16,000represents only a return to the levels of 2004 and is supposed to be compensated for bydeployment of British, Canadian, and Dutch forces to southern Afghanistan, but it iscausing anxiety in Kabul as a sign of decreasing U.S. commitment. This anxiety may not9 Tim Golden, “Years After Two Afghans Died, Case Falters,” New York Times, February 13, 2006.10 The White House, Press Release: Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership,May 23, 2005. See http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/pr/2005/46628.htm.9
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17 and 18: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 19: expand coverage by PRTs, help disba
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27 and 28: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 29 and 30: manage its water resources, connect
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

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