Power-Sharing - Goftaman.com

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Afghans. Meanwhile, ISAF first deployed to Kabul, and then elsewhere, to providesecurity from the commanders allied with the Coalition, as well as from Taliban and al-Qaeda. The militias allied with the Coalition were supposed to withdraw from areasoccupied by ISAF; they did not, and the United States declined to press them to do so.Although ISAF has helped prevent factional clashes in Kabul, the militias’ continuedpresence in Kabul, regional cities, and border posts provided them with political leverageand the ability to engage in predation and trafficking.By mid-2002, U.S. commanders on the ground understood the need to provideAfghans with reconstruction and governance to consolidate military gains, despite theadministration’s original opposition to “nation-building” and “peacekeeping.” Althoughthe Pentagon continued to oppose ISAF expansion until late 2003 (and other countrieswere not exactly lining up to volunteer), ground commanders won approval for CoalitionledProvincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs are small, joint civilian-militaryorganizations. These deployments of dozens of people—predominantly from the military,with a few embedded civilian aid providers—are intended to create an “ISAF effectwithout ISAF.” In the summer and fall of 2003, when the Pentagon relaxed itsopposition, NATO took command of ISAF and started extending it outside of Kabul.Germany, Spain, Canada, and other NATO members, who wanted to find a way to affirmtheir alliance with the United States, despite opposition to the invasion of Iraq, nowstepped forward to contribute, although sometimes with restrictive national caveats ontheir operations. NATO took on PRTs as the template for expansion. NATO and theCoalition have since worked out a plan for nationwide coverage by PRTs in four stages.The United States, whose forces are overextended due to the war in Iraq, would like towithdraw forces as ISAF expansion continues, leading to the unification of commandwith a common mission. Because the U.S. Coalition has presided over a strengtheningrather than defeat of the insurgency, however, NATO troops would have to engage inactive combat, which most alliance members are not prepared to do.The compact calls on both the Coalition and ISAF to continue support of theAfghan government’s efforts to establish security and stability, including commitments tocarry out “counterterrorism” operations in close coordination with the government,6
expand coverage by PRTs, help disband illegal armed groups, and build fiscallysustainable military and police forces bound by the rule of law.INSURGENCYAfter years of claiming that greater American and Afghan casualties are either signs of“desperation” by foundering terrorists or the result of more aggressive U.S. tactics thatare pushing opposition fighters out of their safe havens, the U.S. government has nowadmitted that the insurgency is growing and becoming more effective. U.S. and Afghangovernment casualties caused by the insurgency are higher in 2005 than in any previousyear (see figure 1). Insurgent activities have increased in lethality, with increased use oftactics seen in Iraq, including suicide bombings, which the Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) estimates have quadrupled in the past year, and improvised explosive devises,whose use has doubled. According to Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist based inLahore, “In the past few months, at least thirty attacks have killed nearly one hundredpeople in Afghanistan, including NATO peacekeepers and a Canadian diplomat.” 6Afghanistan and the Arab world have now switched places: whereas before 9/11 Arabjihadists created a base for terrorism in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq now provides atraining and testing ground for new jihadi tactics, which have spread to Afghanistan.The Coalition and the Afghan government have disagreed over the diagnosis ofthe insurgency and the strategy against it. The United States is largely relying oncooperation with Pakistan for action against al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctuaries in thatcountry, although President Bush has noted that more needs to be done. 7 The Coalition isalso waging aggressive campaigns against insurgency sanctuaries in Afghanistan andtrying to increase development and governance efforts in areas of Taliban activitythrough PRTs and civil affairs projects. Although during his March 2006 visit PresidentBush praised both President Karzai and President Pervez Musharraf as staunch allies inthe war on terror, the two presidents were waging an active war of words against each6 Ahmed Rashid, “He’s Welcome in Pakistan,” Washington Post, February 26, 2006.7 “Bush Praises Pakistan Terror Role,” BBC News, March 4, 2006.7
Page 1 and 2: THE CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIONAfg
Page 3: CONTENTSForewordvAcknowledgmentsvii
Page 7 and 8: ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to than
Page 9: Source: Map graphic provided by map
Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION:THE AFGHANISTAN COMPAC
Page 15 and 16: • An exchange rate inflated by ai
Page 17: SECURITYThere are two international
Page 21 and 22: Yet more than four years after the
Page 23 and 24: presidential visit to the region, w
Page 25 and 26: without active engagement and assis
Page 27 and 28: enforcement services. The inhabitan
Page 29 and 30: manage its water resources, connect
Page 31 and 32: efforts.” 18 In response to Afgha
Page 33 and 34: Using pressure to hold such leaders
Page 35 and 36: • The central police force also m
Page 37 and 38: Afghans also have shown that they w
Page 39 and 40: presence, as it has done through re
Page 41 and 42: development budgets. Currently, the
Page 43 and 44: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTBasi
Page 45 and 46: • Counternarcotics development st
Page 47 and 48: military operations of the Coalitio
Page 49 and 50: Figure 3: U.S. Assistance to Afghan
Page 51 and 52: This will require both national bud
Page 53 and 54: ABOUT THE AUTHORBarnett R. Rubin is
Page 55 and 56: CENTER FOR PREVENTIVE ACTION ADVISO

Power-Sharing - Goftaman.com

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?