Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

Arabian Peninsula since the 18 th century (Wahhabism), in Sudan (The Mahdi-Movement between 1885-99),as well as in Libya (Senusite resistance-forces against colonial occupation in the 1930s).At present the term "doctrinaire jihadis" describes adherents of the idea of global jihad, who either fightout of purely ideological reasons, or have been socialized through the experience of occupation andrepression. The majority of them would not drop their goal to establish a worldwide caliphate after thewithdrawal of western troops from Muslim countries, or the establishment of Islamist governments. As afringe group with considerable interpretational authority, doctrinaire jihadis stick to their goal of globalIslamic dominion and formulate their own Islamic military jurisprudence in order to justify their cause. Inevery respect, doctrinaire jihadis display characteristics of highly modern fundamentalists, neo-tribalwarriors and cult adherents of the 21 st century information age.Sunni "jihadism" as a distinct ideology is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its development started in themid-1960s, when radical groups broke away from the broader Islamist opposition in Arab countries. 3Repressed and frustrated in their political aspirations, these groups started fighting their localgovernments, paraphrasing Marxist-Leninist revolutionary slogans and ideas in Islamist parlance andutilizing analogies to the Islamic law of War to justify terrorist tactics. 4 They were inspired by the MedievalDamascene Hanbali school, led by Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350), who wrote extensively on jihad when the Abbasside caliphate was under different attacks by theMongols. 5 Moreover, the ultra-literal Sunni fundamentalist school of Wahhabism, which originated in SaudiArabia in the 18 th century, strongly influences jihadi thinking. Since the Afghanistan jihad 1979-1989,Wahabbi fighters and ideologues from Saudi Arabia have been exerting a strong doctrinaire influence onthe international jihad scene. Moreover, since 2006, internal doctrinaire feuds have led to a split betweenclassical al-Qaeda followers and so-called Neo-Zarqawists, who follow a more extremist line oriented at thelate leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Protest by internal critics against ever more brutal terrorist tactics and themassive killing of civilians have been refuted by the latter strand with pseudo-legal arguments. 6The paradigm-expansion in the perception of jihadis from the local "near enemy" represented by Muslimgovernments (al-'adu al-qarib) to the international "far enemy" (al-'adu al-ba'id), and finally into an allcomprisingdichotomy that divides into jihadis and non-jihadis passed through two stages. The first one wasdecisively influenced by the main ideologue of the Afghanistan jihad and his school of thought. AbdullahAzzam (k. 1989) and his followers Tamim al-Adnani and Abu al-Walid al-Masri described the Soviet troopsas "the biggest satan" (al-shaytan al-akbar), which represented the paradigm change from the near to thefar enemy and internationally oriented jihad concepts. The ideology of global jihad thus started to develop3 Political conflicts and state repression have led to the break-away of revolutionary splinter groups from broader Islamist movements sincethe 1940s. For example, militant splinter groups have broken away both from the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami and the Egyptian/Syrian MuslimBrothers. During the 1990s, key ideologues of global jihad sat in London while discussing the plight of Muslims and developing terroriststrategies against the West. Yet, the 1990s also witnessed brutal civil wars in which Muslims were involved (Bosnia, Chechny, Algeria,Somalia), and which influenced the praetorian ideological formation of global jihad. With the rise of direct Western interventionism, globaljihadis have been co-adapting insurgent struggles such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and oppositional struggles such as in Central Asia, China(Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; Uighur Islamic movement).4 The Islamic Law of War on the ethics of war, declaration of warfare, conduct of warfare, legitimacy of warfare etc. may be comparable inmany points to the Western jus in bello. See Rudolph Peter, "The Doctrine of Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam," in Jihad in Classical andModern Islam, edited by Rudolph Peters (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), 103-148. On a sidenote: The local jihad conceptsoriginated in the 1970s in the jihadist scenes of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine. By then, they were interpreted in the contexts of localoppositional and liberation struggles. The jihadist theological doctrines are heavily inspired by the medieval jurisprudential Hanbali school,led by Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), which formulated war doctrines when the Abbasside caliphate was under attack by the Mongols.5 However, the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya is extremely selective and does neither represent their lifeworks,nor the historical reality. See Michot 2006.6 Neo-Zarqawists call themselves after the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in 2006. They mainlyuse the Medad al-Suyuf Forum, which was closed in late 2010 and not relaunched by the time of writing. See the excellent analysis byMusawi 2010.6