Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

North-Western Pakistan. The life of the Germans in IBU training camps was characterized by a rigid dailyschedule. This schedule included common praying, Qur'an-reading, sports and meals as well as steadyindoctrination on the values of martyrdom. Some participants became ever more radical, their awarenessrose from an individual to a collective group level. It seems that the culmination of the German jihadis’socialization was their self-awareness as deterring Muslim warriors. According to the self-perception ofone jihadi, American soldiers were afraid on sight of them. The reason, in jihadi self-perception, was theMuslim warriors’ love for martyrdom.Chapter Six:Ideas for Counter-DeterrenceContemporary Cases of State Deterrence against Salafi-JadisAs recent history shows, state suppression and deterrence against Salafi jihadis does not really work. Thelatest U.S. killings of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’s most prominent media operators (Anwar al-Awlaqi, Samir Khan and Ibrahim al-Banna who represented al-Malahim Media Company of AQAP), inaddition to the U.S. assassination of one of al-Awlaqi’s sons, Abdulrahman Anwar Al Awlaki, can withoutthe blink of an eye be seen as useless in terms of deterrence, maybe useful in terms of disrupting chains ofcommand and propaganda. A further effect is the ever growing alienation among Muslim populations fromU.S. foreign policies. The same conclusion may be drawn on the targeted killings of Bin Laden, MustaphaAbu al-Yazid and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, if regarded from a deterrence viewpoint. Instead of separating thekilled leaders from their followers, their deaths cemented their personae into a mythology of trustfulnessand sacrifice, which leads to even greater admiration of them in the salafi-jihadi scene. When SyrianPresident Hafez al-Assad wiped out Sunni Islamic opposition together with thousands of civilians in the cityof Hama in 1982, the result was the emigration of the remaining groups, among them the "FightingVanguard" (al-Tali'ah al-Muqatilah) to neighboring Iraq and to Egypt, where they received specializedweapons and explosives training. When Egyptian authorities, following the assassination of President Sadatin October 1981, crushed the "Islamic Jihad" (Tanzim al-Gihad) and the "Islamic Group" (al-Gama'ah al-Islamiyyah) plus their followers, the result was the emigration of militants via Saudi Arabia to the AfghanJihad against the Soviets, where the roots of al-Qaeda were laid. In short, the leverage of brute power andkilling of symbolic targets will not deter and stop salafi-jihadism.One counter-argument brought forward by supporters of the assassinations is that the targeted killing ofPalestinian leaders by Israel has led to a decrease of attacks inside Israel. Yet, Palestinian goals are clearlydefined in a national framework and underlie rationales that are easier to manipulate by the occupyingpower Israel than those of a globally oriented network of extremists as it is represented by al-Qaeda andaffiliates. Furthermore, the Israeli policy of deterrence, which struggles hard for justifications, takes place ina geographically limited environment. The targeted killing of tribal and al-Qaeda leaders by the U.S. in theAfghani-Pakistani border region of Waziristan, for example, has witnessed results that are unwanted:Queues of volunteers for "martyrdom-operations" gather after each attack. Instead of breaking theideological resolve to fight, young men from the local populace line up in front of militant leaders’ housesApril or early June 2009). Based on the indictment of the Federal Prosecutor General against Ahmad Wali S., which contains testimonies byS. and fellow jihadis who participated in their training at IBU and al-Qaeda.40