Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

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doctrine (4:84). He cites the examples of Arid Uka (Frankfurt in March 2011) and Nidal Malik Hassan (FortHood in November 2009). 120 Chouka states "Allah demands that we follow his commands." According toChouka, divine command is further encapsulated in the doctrine: "It is enough to hold on to "the Qur'anthat guides us and to the sword that honors us" (Kitab yahdi wa saif yansur). 121 Originally attributed to the13 th century theologian Ibn Taymiyya, the doctrine flourishes among jihadis who passionately believe in thepower of doctrine and guidance via the Internet (facilitating the "book that guides" (guidance) and the"sword that conquers" (attacks)). Sunni Authorities (shuyukh) who do not call for deterrent terrorismshould be neglected, Yassin Chouka (the brother of Mounir) argues. 122 Even if western troops retreat fromMuslim countries, such as Germany from Afghanistan, "the bill is still open," jihadis have to revenge foreigndeeds and strive for world-dominion of Islam. 123 The perception of "an open bill;" the struggle for worlddominion; and likewise retaliation (al-'amal bi-l-mithl) stick out of Chouka’s speech. This makes it difficultfor adversaries to develop ratio-based counter-threat scenarios.Deterrence in Salafi-Jihadi PropagandaThe marketing of suicide attacks, assassinations and executions in videos and pictures on jihadi websites isoften used for deterrence purposes. In the logic of jihadi web-semiotics, signs of deterrence testify to theeffectiveness of terrorist tactics and are supposed to frighten enemies and recruit supporters. At the sametime, these signs aim at mobilizing followers. Followers are supposed to re-enact terrorist acts and violenceagainst enemies. This process starts in the head of the percipient. Propaganda-deterrence uses gruesomefootage from terrorist reality. This reality, however, transcends itself, when it is being re-branded andfurther marketed in online jihad. Emotions of victoriousness against an overwhelming enemy are created,very similar to the root myth of the "victorious sect" (al-tai'fa al-mansura), which refers to the companionsof Muhammad during the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, the paradigm of asymmetric warfare where a smallgroup of Muslims defeated an overwhelming enemy.Examples of these signs are manifold. One explicit example suffices to demonstrate the concept. Below, ascreenshot from a video of al-Qaeda in Iraq that was posted on jihadi websites shows the execution-stylemurder of government employees who worked in the interior ministry. The men were kidnapped, rowed upand shot in the back of their heads. The media company of "al-Qaeda in Iraq," al-Furqan (Divine Inspiration)stands with its logo (visible in the upper left side of the screenshot) for ruthless and brutal killings and hasstrongly influenced jihadi aesthetics of terror over the last years. Such pictures and videos exemplify the"we" versus "them" divide of jihadi group mobilization, using the theme of punitive "resistance." On a locallevel, the footage is supposed to deter anyone working with the government. But also on a global level,punitive deterrence is feasibly demonstrated with the help of such videos. The (jihadi) religious legalunderpinning derives from tractates and doctrines stipulating to not work with the idolaters (taghut), tonot govern by man-made laws (bi ghayr ma anzala Allah), to not befriend enemies and adapt their mores(al-wala' wa-l-bara'), and if they do so, to excommunicate them (takfir), which is punishable by death.120 Abu Ibraheem al-Almani, "Jundallah Studio: ‘Yes, We Are Terrorists’", 2012, (Accessed June 25, 2012) -http://archive.org/details/weRterro_Jundullah121 Abu Adam al-Almani Hafizullah "On to Success" (English translation), 2011 (Accessed June 24, 2012) -http://archive.org/details/on2Success_Jundullah122 Ibid.123 "Abu Adam – Evil Homeland," (Accessed June 26, 2012) - http://archive.org/details/mtn-shr-de36
Illustration 1: Execution of government employees by al-Qaeda in IraqThe Role of Martyrdom and Salvation in Salafi-Jihadi DeterrenceThe aesthetics and cult of salvation in jihadi martyrdom culture support deterrence concepts in a crucialway. This point is also essential for counter-deterrence approaches. Jihadi propaganda and martyrologyoverflow with death-glorification. The aesthetics serve to portray own fighters as determined, pious, andalmost saint-like, being ready to do anything for the cause.Deterrence strategies rely on elements of uncertainty. The enemy is left in the dark about the real arms, orpolitical capacity as well as the final conviction to realize a threat. Metaphorically speaking, deterrence canbe compared to a game of cards that is never supposed to end. One can have a good, or a bad hand –Deterrence aims at never ending the game. The psychological capacity of jihadis lies in their absolutewillingness, even doctrine of self-sacrifice. This is a certainty, which frightens the enemy, even more so, ifhe is not certain about the exact arms capacity.The question is how to break the certainty of salvation among fundamentalist Muslims who believe interrorist jihad. A sollution may be to address key signs of their mythology.Fundamentalists rely on interrelated myths to build up community; define enemies and justify goals. 124 Thisformula applies to the group-culture of almost any strict sect or cult and its collective identity. Similarly,jihadis construct a COMMUNITY MYTH for the sake of IDENTIFICATION and MOBILIZATION. Secondly, theyconstruct a CONSPIRACY MYTH in order to ACTIVATE followers. Thirdly, they construct a MYTH OFSALVATION to justify their end-goals.Until now jihadi ideology has been lacking any clear realizable concepts of statehood and government.Focus has been put on local and global struggles as well as on the rewards of martyrdom, i.e. paradise. The124 Monika Witsch, "Die Ästhetik fundamentalistischer Agitation im Internet", Stuttgart, Ibidem Verlag, 2003.37
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