Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

doctrine (4:84). He cites the examples of Arid Uka (Frankfurt in March 2011) and Nidal Malik Hassan (FortHood in November 2009). 120 Chouka states "Allah demands that we follow his commands." According toChouka, divine command is further encapsulated in the doctrine: "It is enough to hold on to "the Qur'anthat guides us and to the sword that honors us" (Kitab yahdi wa saif yansur). 121 Originally attributed to the13 th century theologian Ibn Taymiyya, the doctrine flourishes among jihadis who passionately believe in thepower of doctrine and guidance via the Internet (facilitating the "book that guides" (guidance) and the"sword that conquers" (attacks)). Sunni Authorities (shuyukh) who do not call for deterrent terrorismshould be neglected, Yassin Chouka (the brother of Mounir) argues. 122 Even if western troops retreat fromMuslim countries, such as Germany from Afghanistan, "the bill is still open," jihadis have to revenge foreigndeeds and strive for world-dominion of Islam. 123 The perception of "an open bill;" the struggle for worlddominion; and likewise retaliation (al-'amal bi-l-mithl) stick out of Chouka’s speech. This makes it difficultfor adversaries to develop ratio-based counter-threat scenarios.Deterrence in Salafi-Jihadi PropagandaThe marketing of suicide attacks, assassinations and executions in videos and pictures on jihadi websites isoften used for deterrence purposes. In the logic of jihadi web-semiotics, signs of deterrence testify to theeffectiveness of terrorist tactics and are supposed to frighten enemies and recruit supporters. At the sametime, these signs aim at mobilizing followers. Followers are supposed to re-enact terrorist acts and violenceagainst enemies. This process starts in the head of the percipient. Propaganda-deterrence uses gruesomefootage from terrorist reality. This reality, however, transcends itself, when it is being re-branded andfurther marketed in online jihad. Emotions of victoriousness against an overwhelming enemy are created,very similar to the root myth of the "victorious sect" (al-tai'fa al-mansura), which refers to the companionsof Muhammad during the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, the paradigm of asymmetric warfare where a smallgroup of Muslims defeated an overwhelming enemy.Examples of these signs are manifold. One explicit example suffices to demonstrate the concept. Below, ascreenshot from a video of al-Qaeda in Iraq that was posted on jihadi websites shows the execution-stylemurder of government employees who worked in the interior ministry. The men were kidnapped, rowed upand shot in the back of their heads. The media company of "al-Qaeda in Iraq," al-Furqan (Divine Inspiration)stands with its logo (visible in the upper left side of the screenshot) for ruthless and brutal killings and hasstrongly influenced jihadi aesthetics of terror over the last years. Such pictures and videos exemplify the"we" versus "them" divide of jihadi group mobilization, using the theme of punitive "resistance." On a locallevel, the footage is supposed to deter anyone working with the government. But also on a global level,punitive deterrence is feasibly demonstrated with the help of such videos. The (jihadi) religious legalunderpinning derives from tractates and doctrines stipulating to not work with the idolaters (taghut), tonot govern by man-made laws (bi ghayr ma anzala Allah), to not befriend enemies and adapt their mores(al-wala' wa-l-bara'), and if they do so, to excommunicate them (takfir), which is punishable by death.120 Abu Ibraheem al-Almani, "Jundallah Studio: ‘Yes, We Are Terrorists’", 2012, (Accessed June 25, 2012) -http://archive.org/details/weRterro_Jundullah121 Abu Adam al-Almani Hafizullah "On to Success" (English translation), 2011 (Accessed June 24, 2012) -http://archive.org/details/on2Success_Jundullah122 Ibid.123 "Abu Adam – Evil Homeland," (Accessed June 26, 2012) - http://archive.org/details/mtn-shr-de36