Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

cells that perpetrate attacks. 116 These are linked to and guided by authoritative organizations and individualmedia activists through the salafi-jihadi propaganda machinery.Shmuel Bar observes in his analysis of Israeli deterrence that leaders of organizations such as Fatah (Arafat)and Hezbollah (Nasrallah) sometimes rely on their intuition and own sources of intelligence, which makes itdifficult to spread "deterrent messages through sophisticated disinformation campaigns […] when leadersare using such paradigms." 117Bar’s analysis is right in regards to charismatic leadership. Yet, jihadis confront us with multiple modes ofleadership which are coupled with different deterrence strategies. Organizational networks and hierarchicalgroups apply "collective responsibility" deterrence paradigms according to their reading of deterrenceforce, propaganda benefits and local interests. For example, hierarchical jihadi groups that are affiliatedwith al-Qaeda, such as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, apply extended deterrence bypunishment on behalf of the central organization or its affiliates. In the Shabaab’s case, strategic andideological subordination to al-Qaeda central and its affiliates was already clear in 2010. A suicide-attackvideo by the group featured a bombing in Somalia against Ethiopian peace-keeping forces.118 The videojustified the bombing as retaliation (tha'r) for the death of two al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq (al-i'tidad bi-lmithl).119A complex doctrine of subordination, retaliation and deterrence emerges from this piece of evidence. Froman organizational network theory point of view, major jihadi groups seem to share a collective sense ofdeterrence as well as an obligation and solidarity to revenge killings of leaders of their own networks.Although they are sub-state actors, they behave on retaliation and deterrence level as a collective, or alsoas quasi-institutionalized players (whose institutions are based on informal organizational (often tribal) andclandestine networks).Our description of early, classical and Qur'an-based Islamic deterrence concepts allows us to detect furtherdeterrence patterns, namely individualized deterrence. Information based organizational networks (i.e."online jihad") foster communicative command structures and order individuals to perpetrate deterrenceattacks. Organizational networks apply a mix of theological command-doctrines such as "inghimas" (singleattack), "unnat al-ightiyal" (tradition of assassinations), tankil (exemplary punishment) and tahrid(incitement). A major problem from a counter-deterrence point of view is the lack of control over themembers of such networks which are led by indoctrination and targeted information sharing(communicative leadership). How do different actors read the situations and what are their perceptions ofcollective retaliation? For example, a whole series of videos by the German jihadi propaganda figure-headsYassin and Mounir Chouka calls for individual deterrence operations on the basis of "divine command."For example, in one video Mounir Chouka confirms the "value" of being a terrorist and issues commandsvia the Internet. "Do anything, no matter what. Every operation is beneficial"- arson, derailing trains,destroying buildings, stabbing or shooting people. Chouka applies here the Qur'an based command116 "Individualized terrorism" is another one of al-Suri’s key concepts, but promoted by numerous other jihadi thinkers as well.117 Bar, Israeli Deterrence, p. 17.118 "'Amaliyat dawlat al-Islam baqiya" (Operation ‘The State of Islam continues to exist’), Kataeb Media Office, Shabab al-MujahidinMovement, summer 2010, archive of JihadismOnline Project.119 Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Shabab Movement, justifies the attack with a short speech. The driver of the bomb-truck prays. Thechirping of green paradise-birds in which the souls of martyrs are said to live on is added as background acoustic. Afterwards the driverswears to revenge the slain al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. This is followed by an audio speechof Abu Yahya al-Libi, the chief theologician of al-Qaeda central. The video itself was produced by al-Kataeb, the media wing of the Shabaabal-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia.35