Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...
Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ... Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...
pieces of theological evidence from the Qur’an and Islamic tradition. A well known hadith states that ajihadi elite "will continue fighting for the cause of Allah … until Judgment Day." 114 The second piece ofevidence is the above mentioned Surat al-Anfal 8:60, which commands to "prepare" means of war tofrighten the enemy. It becomes once again clear that al-Qaeda and affiliates go back to classical sources inorder to develop new paradigms and regard themselves as chosen elite, which acts on behalf of, defendsand represents the whole Muslim ummah. To bolster this claim, salafi-jihadis present themselves asauthoritative actors with formal institutions, ministries and administrations such as the virtual "IslamicState of Iraq," the "Council-Committee of Fighters," and the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan."Another major deterrence paradigm of modern jihadis is exemplary punishment (tankil). It can also bedescribed as "individual deterrence" because Muslim individuals are supposed to strike against non-Muslimindividuals, who have allegedly done harm to Islam. The Islamic legal justification for individual deterrenceand individual terrorism derives from Surat al- al-Nisa' 4:84 "Then fight in Allah.s cause - Thou art heldresponsible only for thyself - and rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restrain the fury of theUnbelievers; for Allah is the strongest in might and in punishment [tankilan]." Individual deterrence is thusbased on "exemplary punishment" (tankil), the modus operandi being assassinations (ightiyalat).Muslim outrage in the wake of the publication of the Muhammad caricatures in 2006, for example, wasanswered by bin Laden with a call upon individuals to revenge the hostile ridicule of Muhammad. Bin Ladencited the classical example of the Prophet’s companion Muhammad bin al-Maslamah, who killed the Jewishtribal leader Ka'ab bin al-Ashraf. Al-Ashraf had ridiculed Muhammad in his poetry (see above, 1.a). TheDutch extremist Muhammad al-Bouyeri, who assassinated filmmaker and Islam critique Theo van Gogh in2004, oriented himself at the same Islamic legal precedence. In both cases, punitive assassinations weremeant to deter critiques or ridiculers of Islam.The same strategy can from a Muslim viewpoint be applied to politicians, military personnel and economicfigure-heads that cause harm to Islam. For example, the ridicule of Muhammad by Neo-Nazis (Pro-NRWmovement) in Solingen in Germany was followed by violent clashes between local salafis and the police,including a knife-attack against a police officer. Short time later, the German jihadi Yassin Chouka aka AbuIbrahim, one of the figure-heads of German jihad propaganda from Waziristan under the patronage of theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan, published a video titled "Death to Pro-NRW." Yassin Chouka calls for selfresponsiblesingle deterrence attacks and quotes the classical scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal „whoever insultsthe Prophet must be killed." Chouka eplicitely summons German salafis to revenge the ridicule ofMuhammad. Volunteers shall to go underground, keep a low profile and assassinate key figures of Pro-NRW, which will be painful punishment ('adhab muhin; Qur'an 33:57 and adhab 'alim; Qur'an 9:61). Thecommand comes out of Waziristan. Fellow jihadis from Khorasan "told me to tell you [the German Muslims]that you shall kill them all [the right-wing Pro-NRW followers]. 115 German police found the video on the cellphones of several salafis, who had downloaded it and were distributing it in their social milieu.Global jihad relies on two strategic pillars with a communicational link in between. The first pillar compriseseverything that is connected to the realm of established terrorist organizations and networks. The secondpillar of global jihadi strategy is based on "individualized terrorism" (irhab fardi), i.e. individuals or small،"http://www.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=1163&hid=37&pid=0115 The command comes out of Waziristan. Fellow jihadis from Khorasan "told me to tell you [the German Muslims] that you shall kill themall [the right-wing Pro-NRW followers]. German police found the video on the cell phones of several salafis, who had downloaded it andwere distributing it in their social milieu. Interview by the author with German source (anonymous), May 2012; and "Jundullah Studiopraesentiert: Tod der Pro-NRW", May 17, 2012," (Accessed June 25, 2012) - http://archive.org/details/mwt-nrw34لا تَزَا ُل طَائِفَةٌ مِنْ أُم َّتِي یُقَاتِلُو َن عَلَى الْحَ ِّق ظَاهِرِی َن إِلَى یَوْ ِم الْقِيَامَ ِةوَأَوْمَأَ بِيَدِ ِهإِلَى الش َّا ِم"-114
cells that perpetrate attacks. 116 These are linked to and guided by authoritative organizations and individualmedia activists through the salafi-jihadi propaganda machinery.Shmuel Bar observes in his analysis of Israeli deterrence that leaders of organizations such as Fatah (Arafat)and Hezbollah (Nasrallah) sometimes rely on their intuition and own sources of intelligence, which makes itdifficult to spread "deterrent messages through sophisticated disinformation campaigns […] when leadersare using such paradigms." 117Bar’s analysis is right in regards to charismatic leadership. Yet, jihadis confront us with multiple modes ofleadership which are coupled with different deterrence strategies. Organizational networks and hierarchicalgroups apply "collective responsibility" deterrence paradigms according to their reading of deterrenceforce, propaganda benefits and local interests. For example, hierarchical jihadi groups that are affiliatedwith al-Qaeda, such as the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, apply extended deterrence bypunishment on behalf of the central organization or its affiliates. In the Shabaab’s case, strategic andideological subordination to al-Qaeda central and its affiliates was already clear in 2010. A suicide-attackvideo by the group featured a bombing in Somalia against Ethiopian peace-keeping forces.118 The videojustified the bombing as retaliation (tha'r) for the death of two al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq (al-i'tidad bi-lmithl).119A complex doctrine of subordination, retaliation and deterrence emerges from this piece of evidence. Froman organizational network theory point of view, major jihadi groups seem to share a collective sense ofdeterrence as well as an obligation and solidarity to revenge killings of leaders of their own networks.Although they are sub-state actors, they behave on retaliation and deterrence level as a collective, or alsoas quasi-institutionalized players (whose institutions are based on informal organizational (often tribal) andclandestine networks).Our description of early, classical and Qur'an-based Islamic deterrence concepts allows us to detect furtherdeterrence patterns, namely individualized deterrence. Information based organizational networks (i.e."online jihad") foster communicative command structures and order individuals to perpetrate deterrenceattacks. Organizational networks apply a mix of theological command-doctrines such as "inghimas" (singleattack), "unnat al-ightiyal" (tradition of assassinations), tankil (exemplary punishment) and tahrid(incitement). A major problem from a counter-deterrence point of view is the lack of control over themembers of such networks which are led by indoctrination and targeted information sharing(communicative leadership). How do different actors read the situations and what are their perceptions ofcollective retaliation? For example, a whole series of videos by the German jihadi propaganda figure-headsYassin and Mounir Chouka calls for individual deterrence operations on the basis of "divine command."For example, in one video Mounir Chouka confirms the "value" of being a terrorist and issues commandsvia the Internet. "Do anything, no matter what. Every operation is beneficial"- arson, derailing trains,destroying buildings, stabbing or shooting people. Chouka applies here the Qur'an based command116 "Individualized terrorism" is another one of al-Suri’s key concepts, but promoted by numerous other jihadi thinkers as well.117 Bar, Israeli Deterrence, p. 17.118 "'Amaliyat dawlat al-Islam baqiya" (Operation ‘The State of Islam continues to exist’), Kataeb Media Office, Shabab al-MujahidinMovement, summer 2010, archive of JihadismOnline Project.119 Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Shabab Movement, justifies the attack with a short speech. The driver of the bomb-truck prays. Thechirping of green paradise-birds in which the souls of martyrs are said to live on is added as background acoustic. Afterwards the driverswears to revenge the slain al-Qaeda in Iraq leaders Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. This is followed by an audio speechof Abu Yahya al-Libi, the chief theologician of al-Qaeda central. The video itself was produced by al-Kataeb, the media wing of the Shabaabal-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia.35
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pieces <strong>of</strong> theological evidence from the Qur’an <strong>and</strong> <strong>Islamic</strong> tradition. A well known hadith states that ajihadi elite "will cont<strong>in</strong>ue fight<strong>in</strong>g for the cause <strong>of</strong> Allah … until Judgment Day." 114 The second piece <strong>of</strong>evidence is the above mentioned Surat al-Anfal 8:60, which comm<strong>and</strong>s to "prepare" means <strong>of</strong> war t<strong>of</strong>righten the enemy. It becomes once aga<strong>in</strong> clear that al-Qaeda <strong>and</strong> affiliates go back to classical sources <strong>in</strong>order to develop new paradigms <strong>and</strong> regard themselves as chosen elite, which acts on behalf <strong>of</strong>, defends<strong>and</strong> represents the whole Muslim ummah. To bolster this claim, salafi-jihadis present themselves asauthoritative actors with formal <strong>in</strong>stitutions, m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>and</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrations such as the virtual "<strong>Islamic</strong>State <strong>of</strong> Iraq," the "Council-Committee <strong>of</strong> Fighters," <strong>and</strong> the "<strong>Islamic</strong> Emirate <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan."Another major deterrence paradigm <strong>of</strong> modern jihadis is exemplary punishment (tankil). It can also bedescribed as "<strong>in</strong>dividual deterrence" because Muslim <strong>in</strong>dividuals are supposed to strike aga<strong>in</strong>st non-Muslim<strong>in</strong>dividuals, who have allegedly done harm to Islam. The <strong>Islamic</strong> legal justification for <strong>in</strong>dividual deterrence<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual terrorism derives from Surat al- al-Nisa' 4:84 "Then fight <strong>in</strong> Allah.s cause - Thou art heldresponsible only for thyself - <strong>and</strong> rouse the believers. It may be that Allah will restra<strong>in</strong> the fury <strong>of</strong> theUnbelievers; for Allah is the strongest <strong>in</strong> might <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> punishment [tankilan]." Individual deterrence is thusbased on "exemplary punishment" (tankil), the modus oper<strong>and</strong>i be<strong>in</strong>g assass<strong>in</strong>ations (ightiyalat).Muslim outrage <strong>in</strong> the wake <strong>of</strong> the publication <strong>of</strong> the Muhammad caricatures <strong>in</strong> 2006, for example, wasanswered by b<strong>in</strong> Laden with a call upon <strong>in</strong>dividuals to revenge the hostile ridicule <strong>of</strong> Muhammad. B<strong>in</strong> Ladencited the classical example <strong>of</strong> the Prophet’s companion Muhammad b<strong>in</strong> al-Maslamah, who killed the Jewishtribal leader Ka'ab b<strong>in</strong> al-Ashraf. Al-Ashraf had ridiculed Muhammad <strong>in</strong> his poetry (see above, 1.a). TheDutch extremist Muhammad al-Bouyeri, who assass<strong>in</strong>ated filmmaker <strong>and</strong> Islam critique Theo van Gogh <strong>in</strong>2004, oriented himself at the same <strong>Islamic</strong> legal precedence. In both cases, punitive assass<strong>in</strong>ations weremeant to deter critiques or ridiculers <strong>of</strong> Islam.The same strategy can from a Muslim viewpo<strong>in</strong>t be applied to politicians, military personnel <strong>and</strong> economicfigure-heads that cause harm to Islam. For example, the ridicule <strong>of</strong> Muhammad by Neo-Nazis (Pro-NRWmovement) <strong>in</strong> Sol<strong>in</strong>gen <strong>in</strong> Germany was followed by violent clashes between local salafis <strong>and</strong> the police,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a knife-attack aga<strong>in</strong>st a police <strong>of</strong>ficer. Short time later, the German jihadi Yass<strong>in</strong> Chouka aka AbuIbrahim, one <strong>of</strong> the figure-heads <strong>of</strong> German jihad propag<strong>and</strong>a from Waziristan under the patronage <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Islamic</strong> Movement <strong>of</strong> Uzbekistan, published a video titled "Death to Pro-NRW." Yass<strong>in</strong> Chouka calls for selfresponsibles<strong>in</strong>gle deterrence attacks <strong>and</strong> quotes the classical scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal „whoever <strong>in</strong>sultsthe Prophet must be killed." Chouka eplicitely summons German salafis to revenge the ridicule <strong>of</strong>Muhammad. Volunteers shall to go underground, keep a low pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>and</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>ate key figures <strong>of</strong> Pro-NRW, which will be pa<strong>in</strong>ful punishment ('adhab muh<strong>in</strong>; Qur'an 33:57 <strong>and</strong> adhab 'alim; Qur'an 9:61). Thecomm<strong>and</strong> comes out <strong>of</strong> Waziristan. Fellow jihadis from Khorasan "told me to tell you [the German Muslims]that you shall kill them all [the right-w<strong>in</strong>g Pro-NRW followers]. 115 German police found the video on the cellphones <strong>of</strong> several salafis, who had downloaded it <strong>and</strong> were distribut<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> <strong>their</strong> social milieu.Global jihad relies on two strategic pillars with a communicational l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> between. The first pillar compriseseveryth<strong>in</strong>g that is connected to the realm <strong>of</strong> established terrorist organizations <strong>and</strong> networks. The secondpillar <strong>of</strong> global jihadi strategy is based on "<strong>in</strong>dividualized terrorism" (irhab fardi), i.e. <strong>in</strong>dividuals or small،"http://www.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=1163&hid=37&pid=0115 The comm<strong>and</strong> comes out <strong>of</strong> Waziristan. Fellow jihadis from Khorasan "told me to tell you [the German Muslims] that you shall kill themall [the right-w<strong>in</strong>g Pro-NRW followers]. German police found the video on the cell phones <strong>of</strong> several salafis, who had downloaded it <strong>and</strong>were distribut<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong> <strong>their</strong> social milieu. Interview by the author with German source (anonymous), May 2012; <strong>and</strong> "Jundullah Studiopraesentiert: Tod der Pro-NRW", May 17, 2012," (Accessed June 25, 2012) - http://archive.org/details/mwt-nrw34لا تَزَا ُل طَائِفَةٌ مِنْ أُم َّتِي یُقَاتِلُو َن عَلَى الْحَ ِّق ظَاهِرِی َن إِلَى یَوْ ِم الْقِيَامَ ِةوَأَوْمَأَ بِيَدِ ِهإِلَى الش َّا ِم"-114
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