Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

demonstrated by the U.S. reaction to the attacks of 9/11, which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan andIraq. However, bitter experience shows that trying to dry out one hotbed of extremism creates many othersat the same time (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, and Libya). Moreover, such apolicy has the effect that the popularity of and the support for jihadi concepts among Muslim populations isdangerously rising.The West has to refrain from collectively punishing Muslims (which is indirectly done by catastrophicallyfailed military policies and the resulting massive "collateral damages" in the Muslim world). Jihadi sub-stateactors, in contrast, do not suffer from any moral predicament. The "strength" of jihadi deterrenceparadigms relies on an unscrupulous construction of enemy categories that include civilians.Classical Islamic deterrence concepts "exemplary punishment" (tankil) and "equal retaliation" (qisas) aresupported by modern theological justifications that allow third-party, individual and collective (mass-)attacks. According to jihadi non-state actors, civilians of hostile western states (soft targets) can betargeted directly to communicate a message. Such attacks are –in salafi-jihadi thinking- defensiveretaliatory attacks (9/11, Madrid 2004, London 2005), not offensive terrorist attacks.One could argue that Western concepts of deterrence should work diametrically opposed. This would meanan approximate, but modified continuation of the presently U.S.-dominated international security strategyagainst hardcore terrorists: Muslims will not be punished collectively by interfering in their right of freedomand self-determination, but jihadis who plan attacks in the West will be taken out very pointedly, whichcuts the leadership away from the base. Other deterrence strategists point to the removal of those leadersof global jihad who are influential enough to convince followers of the validity of their ideology, forexample Ibrahim al-Banna, Anwar al-Awlaqi and Samir Khan, the ideological-figure heads of AQAP, whowere assassinated by the U.S. in late 2011. However, deterrence against jihadi actors is a double-edgedsword as long as the West will not end military policies in Muslim regions. Allowing regime changes to takeplace means that Islamists will to come to power. This will create political bargaining chips, possibilities forstate-to-state deterrence and non-aggression pacts. Islamist regimes can actually be hold accountable foractions by jihadis who operate from their territory.It is therefore very difficult to develop a functional approach of deterrence against jihadis non-state actors.A main point of this study is that religious ideology and a similar sub-culture are the lowest commondenominators among jihadi non-state actors. A psychological deterrence strategy must attack this AchillesHeel. Every deterrence strategy is per definition psychological. However, the emphasis lies here on theprevalence of psychological means of information warfare and methods of conviction as opposed tomilitary measures or threat scenarios.Therefore, the transcendental element of fear is more important than the worldly element if one wants todeter a religious enemy. It is in the beginning not advisable to confront him with a Realangst (realistic fear).Rather, it requires a stratagem, namely to take a psychological detour to condition transcendental fears onconcrete worldly matters.Without a doubt, such an approach should be based on multifaceted combinations of soft and hard securitymeasures as well as revised foreign policy strategies in the Middle East, without impeding on the freedomand rights of citizens of democratic states, and by drastically curbing Western military engagement in theMiddle East.In the introduction of this study, we will shed light on how the multiplicity of terrorist sub-state actors, theglobal rise of fundamentalism and drastically changed ways of perception in the information age alter3