Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

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Secondly, as we have argued before, deterrence is one of the most ancient patterns of social organization;it is a policy to influence group behavior (in-groups and out-groups); and part of an instinctive reaction thatresults out of the correlation between in-group cohesion and out-group aggression. 74 Islamic traditions onmartial incidents during the Sahaba period (the first three generations of Muhammad’s followers) stressnumerous cases in which the battle spirit and resolve of Muslim fighters was so overwhelming that itdeterred the enemy during battle. One such instance is the battle of Constantinople under the caliphate ofMu'awiyya in 674 AD. Even though the Theodosian Walls of Constantinople proved impregnable during thesiege, the single attack of a Muslim fighter who threw himself into the rows of the enemy (inghimas;iqtiham) is said to have had a destructive effect on the Byzantines’ fighting moral:On the strength of Abu 'Umran, who told: We were at Constantinople. 'Aqba Bin 'Amir was in charge of thepeople from Egypt, and a man was in charge of the people of Syria. A powerful division of the Byzantines leftthe city. We lined up towards them. Then, a man from the Muslims launched an attack against theByzantines, until he entered into them. Then he returned towards us. The people shouted at him: Praise theLord! He threw himself with his own hands into [his] destruction (tahluka). Then Abu Ayub al-Ansari, thecompanion of the prophet of Allah, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, raised and said: Oh, all of youpeople! You interpret this verse with this interpretation (Inna-kum tata'awwalun hadhihi-al-aya 'ala hadha alta'awil).However, this verse was revealed to the community of the al-Ansar (ma'shar al-Ansar). When thereligion of Allah prospered, and its followers grew, some of us spoke in a small circle in secrecy from theprophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him: Our wealth perished, let’s rebuild it. And we rebuilt whathad perished. Then Allah, the exalted, revealed in his book the answer to what we planned. He said: Spendyour money in the way of The Lord, and don’t contribute with your (own) hands to (your) destruction. [(Suratal-Baqara, 2:195) Wa unfuqu fi sabil Allahi wa la talqu bi-ayadikum ila al-tahluka]. And the destruction (altahluka)meant the upheaval (al-qiyama), when we wanted to raise our wealth, and rebuild it. He ordered usto raid (fa-'amarana bi-l-rhazu). And Abu Ayub kept on raiding in the way of Allah until Allah, the exalted,seized him. 75According to the hadith, K 2:195 does not refer to self-destruction, but to a divine revelation for the al-Ansar, 76 which commanded them to continue jihad. Thus, "tahluka" implies that "(self) destruction is theomission of jihad". Some Muslim interpreters argue that K 2:195 must not be interpreted in a narrowtactical sense, but has a wider strategic and ideological implication. And it does not contradict suicidemartyrdomoperations.In the quoted example two deterrence paradigms are again stalemating each other. The Theodosian Wallsof Constantinople posed an impenetrable obstacle (deterrence by denial). According to Muslim traditionthe single attack was successful tactic of deterrence by punishment, which demoralized the enemy. 77 Thus,the single attack example becomes a corner-stone of medieval theological deterrence concepts, and thencontinues to be important in contemporary Islamic legal justifications of suicide attacks, which arefrequently used by sub-state actors as a form of extended deterrence by punishment. Excursus: One might74 The goal is to build-up a coherent in-group, at the same time to deter and reduce the harmony of out-group(s). The correlation betweenin-group harmony and out-group aggression is probably one of the most basic social behavioral patterns. (trans-species: amongchimpanzees as well as humans) (Demonic Males; Revilla; Jordania).75 Translation by the author. There are different versions of this hadith with reference numbers to their transmitters, among them: AbuDaw'd (1512), Abu 'Umran with a supposedly sound hadith by the fourth century a.H. Hanafi scholar al-Jasas, al-Tirmidhi (2972), al-Nis'i’sinterpretation (48), and Ibn 'Atiya in "Al-Muharrir al-wajiz", "interpretation of the Koran 2/146."76 One of two groups of Muslims around the Prophet Muhammad after his Hijra (emigration) to Mecca in the year 622. The First Groupwere members of the Quraysh who emigrated with Muhammad to Mecca, the so-called al-Muhajirun. The second group were people fromMedina who granted Muhammad refuge after the Hijra and converted to Islam. Therefore, they gained the name "al-Ansar", "the Helpersor Supporters."77 The principle underlying this deterrence/preterrence battle tactic is that constant dropping wears the stone; but Constantinople only fellin 1453.24
argue that using the term "deterrence" is wrong, but rather "preterrence" 78 should be used for this modusoperandi. However, this would be a double-standard. The actual use and not only threat of force is also anintegral element of Western deterrence (targeted assassinations, house demolitions). Moreover, the actualuse of force in deterrence accords with endemic perceptions of tribal warfare. These perceptions aredeeply rooted underneath the cultural and civilization layer of every society. The predominant focus onWMD-deterrence during the Cold War has led to the neglecting of other forms of deterrence for the betterpart of half a century. If state actors and sub-state actors like salafi-jihadis battle each other, the latteroften refer to asymmetric warfare tactics such as suicide attacks, which they integrate into extendeddeterrence concepts ("Do not attack us or other Muslims, otherwise we will perpetrate [irrationally looking]martyrdom operations" – [which when used as a war tactic underlie clear rationales]) – while the formerrespond in kind with targeted assassinations. This is neo-endemic warfare at the high ends of technologicaland doctrinaire conflict. In psychological terms, the modus operandi "suicide attack" can be compared toan unconventional weapon in the hands of a weaker actor facing a stronger actor: Suddenly the weakeractor gains deterrence force. Analogies between medieval "catapults" and weapons of mass destructionare another possible use of Muslim sub-state actors to legitimize extended deterrence paradigms (seebelow, 1.c). Also in this case extended analogical reasoning (qiyas) is applied. One should focus again ondifferent perceptions of deterrence and applicability in Muslim culture and jihadi subculture; as well as instate culture versus sub-state culture. Do religiously motivated sub-state actors tend to realize threats;would they always follow a strategy of preterrence (pre-emptive deterrence), also with WMD? The bigquestion is how they would behave if they possessed non-conventional weapons.The "pledge of the tree" (bay'at al-shajara) is another example of a deterrence-standoff between Muslimsand non-Muslims. 79 As for the background, in March 628 CE, Muhammad went with more than 1000Muslims to Mecca in order to perform the annual pilgrimage. 80 However, the Quraysh of Mecca denied theMuslims entry to the city. Therefore, Muhammad sent an envoy, 'Uthman bin 'Affan, to negotiateunhindered entry into the city. When the envoy Uthman did not return, the Muslims assumed that he hadbeen killed or taken prisoner. Muhammad assembled his followers under a tree and took a pledge ofallegiance to fight for Uthman ("kanat bay'atun fi 'Uthman"), who was later released by the Quraysh.Muhammad’s followers pledged "not to run away" (baya'nahu ann la nafirra). Some traditions stress that"we did not pledge loyalty until death." Other traditions, which are more in line with jihadi doctrine,narrate that Muhammad demanded a pledge of loyalty "until death" ('ala al-maut). 81Both sides used threat display. The Quraysh levered deterrence by denial (blocking entrance to their city)against the Muslims, who responded with threatening deterrence by punishment to influence theiradversaries’ behavior (pledging, singing, show of force and determination). Such standoffs were frequentand integral elements of endemic warfare of 7 th century tribal society on the Arabian Peninsula. At leastonce a year, a truce was concluded to end the constant state of low scale conflict and allow pilgrims toenter Mecca. It is utterly important to understanding the deeper social dynamics connected to the pledge78 This concept stems from Shmuel Bar.79 Also called "pledge of the pleasure [of Allah] (bay'at al-ridwan). The Qur'an quote reads like a description of a rite of personal devotionthat was performed for the sake of the community. Certainly Allah was well pleased with the believers when they swore allegiance to you[idh yubayi'unaka] under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts, so He sent down tranquillity on them and rewarded them with anear victory." See Qur'an Surat al-Fath 48:18, translation by Muhammad Habib Shakir, (Accessed Mai 4, 2012) -http://www.muslimaccess.com/quraan/translations/shakir/048.htm.80 Some traditions speak about 1400, others about 1300 followers who accompanied Muhammad to Mecca in 628 CE.81 "Tarikh Dimashq li ibn Asakir,"No. 15194, (Accessed May 5, 201) -http://www.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=798&hid=15194&pid=609094Another tradition states that the second sub-pledge was to loyalty until death. Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, No. 16206, (Accessed May 5,2012) - http://www.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=121&hid=16206&pid=67265025
Page 1 and 2: The Concept of Deterrence in Arab a
Page 3 and 4: demonstrated by the U.S. reaction t
Page 5 and 6: The third part of the research focu
Page 7 and 8: in Afghanistan and became mixed wit
Page 9 and 10: younger groups always must subordin
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Page 13 and 14: policy fails, since states cannot m
Page 15 and 16: cultural epochs, from Roman Antiqui
Page 17 and 18: for members of the own group or nat
Page 19 and 20: deterrence strategy must address we
Page 21 and 22: Chapter Three:The Deterrence of Rel
Page 23: Dauntless bombers on four Japanese
Page 27 and 28: have impressed the Quraysh tribe. T
Page 29 and 30: they thought That their fortresses
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Page 37 and 38: Illustration 1: Execution of govern
Page 39 and 40: The Sense of Non-Deterrability in S
Page 41 and 42: to be recruited into tribal and jih
Page 43 and 44: In the mind of radicalized perceive
Page 45 and 46: As third and fourth conceptual elem
Page 47 and 48: Eugene G. D'Aquili, "Human Ceremoni

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