Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...
Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ... Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...
theory of legal deterrence advocates methods such as incapacitation, which aims at ending the life of aperpetrator and setting an example for others. As Michel Foucault and Émile Durkheim argued, the settingup of draconic punishment and institutions is a necessary prerequisite to project scare and crime on others– the "inmates," "criminals" and so on, in short, to define ourselves. 49 In Islamic culture, the hisba-doctrine"to enjoin what is right (known) and forbid what is wrong (unknown)" (al-'amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy 'an almunkar)is used by fundamentalists such as the Wahhabi-cult to set up a draconic system of prohibitionsand punishments that is self-defining and threatening at the same time. The Saudi-Arabian mutawwa(Islamic religious police), for example, derives its legitimacy from the doctrine and the correspondinginstitution of hisba. "Strangers in this World" (ghuraba), a Sunni-Salafi sub-sect, interprets the behavior ofUmar, the second rightly-guided caliph, as hisba. Tradition tells that he "sought to humiliate himself whenhe was preaching and his soul felt above everyone else’s. It is said that his ring was inscribed with thewords, ‘Death suffices as an admonition oh ‘Umar.’" 50 Understanding different applications of hisba couldbe crucial for developing reward and punishment laws for and against psychological-religious deterrence.Chapter Two:The Construction of Fear in Islam for the Sake of DeterrenceDeterrence is a social construction that can be learned, and socialization affects its practices. 51 Theconstruction of a successful deterrence strategy relies on two sorts of fear. Firstly, a successful mobilizationof the fears of the own group secures financing and political support for a deterrence strategy (creatingfears among "friends"). Secondly, a successful intimidation by denial or punishment prevents an enemyfrom attacking or achieving his goals (creating fears among "foes").Figure 1. Four states of fearFriend abstract (internal)concrete (external)MergersthroughFoeabstract (internal)concrete (external)projection andconditioningInternally, the abstract fear of the own population (in-group) needs to be projected on concrete andfeasible examples of the enemies malevolence. The process can be described as projection of abstract fear(angor) on an out-group, which as a result becomes a concrete and rational fright feeling (timor).Propaganda helps to exaggerate the natural phenomenon of in-group-out-group bias, turning it intocontrolled aggression, which is fed by fright/fear. 52 In-group-out-group bias describes a natural preference49 See, for example, Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: McMillan and Co., 1933).50"Ĥisba and the Mutawwa – Ethical Institutions in Islam," (Accessed May 21, 2012) -http://strangerinthisdunya.wordpress.com/2008/02/29/hisba-and-the-mutawwa-ethical-institutions-in-islam/51 Amir Lupovici, "The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda," International Studies Quarterly 54,2010.52 Intensity of in-group cohesion correlates with heightened out-group aggression.16
for members of the own group or nation, and an instinctive sense of anger and suspicion against outsiders.The mixture between abstract threat and concrete fear is often manipulated by creating a collective alteredstate of consciousness within the population that may be described as "security-phobia." A phobia ischaracterized by abstract fear (lack of security) projected on concrete matters (terrorist attacks), which inturn allows avoidance-behavior (security policies, for example deterrence) and increases the feeling ofsecurity among the population. However, this technique still does not offer any solution for a workingdefense mechanism against inner fears, and is therefore rejected by many psychiatrists in individualtreatment therapy. 53 Populations in general suffer from cultural biases that can be turned into collectivestates of fear that are phobia-like. Their senses of fear are characterized, among Westerners, for example,by the perception of Muslims as backward, fanatic, irrational terrorists. Among Muslims a perception ofdegradation, cultural and military imperialism and Jewish-Christian conspiracy against Islam prevails.Westerners are often seen as technocratic people without spiritual ideals. With its foreign policy, the U.S.further aggravates other deep seated inner fears of Muslims. Muslims fear their own cultural demise,incapability to self-organize and are searching for reasons. The U.S. presents itself as a welcome projectionsurface for the quasi-phobic fear of Muslim fundamentalists from Western cultural and military dominance.On the other hand, the enemy image of Islamism can be seen as a compensatory reaction to the lack ofideological adversaries by the West. Enemy pictures are always a welcome escape from self-reflection.Furthermore, self-victimization plays an important role in the dynamics of politico-religious conflicts anddeterrence policies. Only heroes can protect the own victimized group; yet the archetypical "hero" needs todie for the sake of the community. The hero carries the collective victimization on his shoulders. His selfsacrificialact, propagated through mythical narratives of bravery, is also supposed to have a deterringeffect on the enemy (evidence: epigraphic and medial deterrence by punishment). Martyrdom thenbecomes legitimate, if it preserves the own group. Thus, myths of victimization, heroism and self-sacrificeare inextricably connected to deterrence strategies and the build-up of fears and aggressions, finally thecohesion of groups.Common rituals, such as prayer, and talk on shared cultural values can further aggression and in-group outgroupbias, as much as they diminish in-group frictions. 54 Ritual group behavior strengthens collectiveidentity. Among jihadis, ceremonial rituals such as oaths of allegiance, eulogizing God in dialogues andsinging and war-dance rituals play essential roles for deterrence perceptions and collective identity.Empirical proves exist in jihadi reality, for example testimonies of drop-outs and captives, as well as in jihadipropaganda and discourse, which serve as social glue. An essential goal of propaganda is to address bothinternal and external fears of friend and foe. The enemy needs to be intimidated and the memberstrengthened in his conviction to fight out of fear from harm, but also out of excessive hubris. The closergroup members get, the more aggressive they become against the outside world. 55 This behavior is bornout of prehistoric instinctive patterns of socialization. 56 Fear, fright and distancing from an enemy werelearned as survival mechanisms by early hominids. The best way to keep a distance from enemies is byintimidation. Show of intimidation is best created by real preparedness to fight. The altered state ofconsciousness, which is called "battle trance," may have been first induced through ritualistic group53 Karl Peter Kisker, "Psychiatrie in der Gegenwart: Forschung und Praxis", Band 2, Teil 1, Hamburg, Springer Verlag, 1972, p. 408.54 Eugene G. D'Aquili, "Human Ceremonial Ritual and the Modulation of Aggression," Zygon-Journal of Religion and Science 20, 1985, pp.21-30.55 See for a more detailed discussion Philipp Holtmannn, "Leadership in Cyberspace: An Organizational Network Analysis and Socio-Anthropological Study of Communicative Leadership Patterns among Online-Jihadi Groups," dissertation-thesis University of Vienna,handed in August 2012.56 Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, "Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence", New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996,pp. 194-199.17
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theory <strong>of</strong> legal deterrence advocates methods such as <strong>in</strong>capacitation, which aims at end<strong>in</strong>g the life <strong>of</strong> aperpetrator <strong>and</strong> sett<strong>in</strong>g an example for others. As Michel Foucault <strong>and</strong> Émile Durkheim argued, the sett<strong>in</strong>gup <strong>of</strong> draconic punishment <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions is a necessary prerequisite to project scare <strong>and</strong> crime on others– the "<strong>in</strong>mates," "crim<strong>in</strong>als" <strong>and</strong> so on, <strong>in</strong> short, to def<strong>in</strong>e ourselves. 49 In <strong>Islamic</strong> culture, the hisba-doctr<strong>in</strong>e"to enjo<strong>in</strong> what is right (known) <strong>and</strong> forbid what is wrong (unknown)" (al-'amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy 'an almunkar)is used by fundamentalists such as the Wahhabi-cult to set up a draconic system <strong>of</strong> prohibitions<strong>and</strong> punishments that is self-def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> threaten<strong>in</strong>g at the same time. The Saudi-Arabian mutawwa(<strong>Islamic</strong> religious police), for example, derives its legitimacy from the doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> the correspond<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>stitution <strong>of</strong> hisba. "Strangers <strong>in</strong> this World" (ghuraba), a Sunni-Salafi sub-sect, <strong>in</strong>terprets the behavior <strong>of</strong>Umar, the second rightly-guided caliph, as hisba. Tradition tells that he "sought to humiliate himself whenhe was preach<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> his soul felt above everyone else’s. It is said that his r<strong>in</strong>g was <strong>in</strong>scribed with thewords, ‘Death suffices as an admonition oh ‘Umar.’" 50 Underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g different applications <strong>of</strong> hisba couldbe crucial for develop<strong>in</strong>g reward <strong>and</strong> punishment laws for <strong>and</strong> aga<strong>in</strong>st psychological-religious deterrence.Chapter Two:The Construction <strong>of</strong> Fear <strong>in</strong> Islam for the Sake <strong>of</strong> <strong>Deterrence</strong><strong>Deterrence</strong> is a social construction that can be learned, <strong>and</strong> socialization affects its practices. 51 Theconstruction <strong>of</strong> a successful deterrence strategy relies on two sorts <strong>of</strong> fear. Firstly, a successful mobilization<strong>of</strong> the fears <strong>of</strong> the own group secures f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> political support for a deterrence strategy (creat<strong>in</strong>gfears among "friends"). Secondly, a successful <strong>in</strong>timidation by denial or punishment prevents an enemyfrom attack<strong>in</strong>g or achiev<strong>in</strong>g his goals (creat<strong>in</strong>g fears among "foes").Figure 1. Four states <strong>of</strong> fearFriend abstract (<strong>in</strong>ternal)concrete (external)MergersthroughFoeabstract (<strong>in</strong>ternal)concrete (external)projection <strong>and</strong>condition<strong>in</strong>gInternally, the abstract fear <strong>of</strong> the own population (<strong>in</strong>-group) needs to be projected on concrete <strong>and</strong>feasible examples <strong>of</strong> the enemies malevolence. The process can be described as projection <strong>of</strong> abstract fear(angor) on an out-group, which as a result becomes a concrete <strong>and</strong> rational fright feel<strong>in</strong>g (timor).Propag<strong>and</strong>a helps to exaggerate the natural phenomenon <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>-group-out-group bias, turn<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>tocontrolled aggression, which is fed by fright/fear. 52 In-group-out-group bias describes a natural preference49 See, for example, Émile Durkheim, The Division <strong>of</strong> Labor <strong>in</strong> Society (New York: McMillan <strong>and</strong> Co., 1933).50"Ĥisba <strong>and</strong> the Mutawwa – Ethical Institutions <strong>in</strong> Islam," (Accessed May 21, 2012) -http://stranger<strong>in</strong>thisdunya.wordpress.com/2008/02/29/hisba-<strong>and</strong>-the-mutawwa-ethical-<strong>in</strong>stitutions-<strong>in</strong>-islam/51 Amir Lupovici, "The Emerg<strong>in</strong>g Fourth Wave <strong>of</strong> <strong>Deterrence</strong> Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda," International Studies Quarterly 54,2010.52 Intensity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>-group cohesion correlates with heightened out-group aggression.16
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