Classical Islamic Paradigms of Deterrence and their Expression in ...

START) and the Hot Line. 21 Similar reassurance mechanisms should be taken into consideration whendefining the limits of discursive denial approaches within Muslim culture.A fourth element of deterrence strategy is conciliation. Some strategists strongly reject the idea thatconciliation is a valid element of deterrence strategy, since it puts the actor who applies it into a weakerposition. However, when developing religious-psychological deterrence against sub-state actors, oneshould keep in mind reconciliation as a parallel information strategy towards them and their meta-culture.The key point is to reward an enemy "for abstaining from undesirable actions." 22 In the meta-conflictbetween Western and Muslim cultures, pragmatic modes of conciliation should be formulated to buildpopular support for religious-psychological deterrence strategies against sectarian sub-state actors(jihadiya istishhadiyya). A successful reformation of deterrence also means to develop forms of deterrencethat do not look like deterrence. The "reformation calls for the paradoxical developments of both seekingto deter more reliably, while simultaneously placing less reliance on deterrence." 23Furthermore, a distinction between conventional and non-conventional deterrence is crucial whenspeaking about deterrence-force. The reason is that "[c]hemical or biological weapons are other potentialways for weaker states to deter stronger enemies by threatening to inflict ‘unacceptable’ damage […] Theseweapon’s are sometimes called the ‘poor man’s’ atomic bomb." 24 One such example is the NorwegianChristian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, who allegedly tried to recruit a jihadi terrorist cell [sic] for achemical weapons attack in Europe. 25 When dealing with fundamentalist extremists, the stakes of losingone’s grip on them once they have acquired non-conventional weapons are very high. One must have asufficient amount of religious psychological deterrence force and credibility to address the opponent.However, it "is extremely difficult to identify or deny a potential gain if there is neither an actor nor acommon currency (Münkler, 2002) against which threats and claims can be evaluated." 26 In this respect, aconventional deterrence strategy cannot work against doctrinaire salafi-jihadi actors who lack a clear line ofcommand and control; and against organizations, such as al-Qaeda, that foster both traditionalorganizational behavior and self-reliable individual terrorism (irhab fardi), which is guided bycommunicative guidance through incitement (tahrid). The further this strategy develops, the less acommon actor or currency, specific territory or enemy can be addressed. What remains to be deterred is anoverarching religious-doctrinal ideology and neo-tribal behavioral pattern of socialization.Bernard Brodie, one of the key-thinkers of early U.S. deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union, hasargued in his seminal essay The Anatomy of Deterrence: "Deterrence as an element of national strategy ordiplomacy is certainly nothing new under the sun […] The threat of war, open or implied, has always beenan instrument of diplomacy by which one state deterred another from doing something or a military or21 David Garnham, "Deterrence Essentials: Keys to Controlling an Adversary’s Behavior", The Emirates Occasional Papers No.3, London: SaqiBooks, 1995, p. 8.22 Ibid., 8. "Kuwait practiced conciliation with some success during previous disputes with Iraq. For example, when Iraq’s Ba‘ath Partyassumed power in 1963, Kuwait extended an interest-free $85 million 25-year loan to Iraq, and in the so-called ‘Agreed minutes’ (October1963), Iraq renounced its claims to Warba and Bubiyan islands." A further "unwritten-agreement" allowed Iraq to station troops in Kuwaitin 1969 to protect the Iraqi port Umm Qasr from Iran. However, this approach did not work in the summer of 1990s, when Iraq invadedKuwait.23 Colin Gray, "The Reformation of Deterrence: Moving On," Comparative Strategy 22, 2003, p. 454.24 Ibid.25 See "Norway Shooter Considered WMD, Jihadi Alliance," (Accessed May 27, 2012) - http://www.wnd.com/2011/07/325769/ . RüdigerLohlker observes that an "interesting new aspect of this question may be seen in news that the Norwegian anti-Muslim terrorist AndersBreivik considered the use of CBRN, esp. anthrax, recruiting Muslim suicide attackers and helping them to pass controls; So the discussionson jihadi WMD gave birth to an unexpected offshoot." See Rüdiger Lohlker (ed. Rüdiger Lohlker,) "Religion, Weapons, and Jihadism:Emblematic Discourses," New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism: Online and Offline, Vol. 2, Göttingen, Vienna University Press, 2012.26 Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, "Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction ofDanger," p. 421.10