Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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39223noon and by 7 p.m., indicating, respectively, the status as of 11 a.m. and as of 6 p.m. 603These reports had to indicate, inter alia, the development of the situation, emergingproblems, lines reached and requests. 604 This was binding on all the commandersdirectly subordinated to the Chief of the HV Main Staff, including Markač, who wasamongst the order’s recipients. 605 With regard to reporting, the Trial Chamber has alsoconsidered relevant evidence from Sačić, reviewed in chapter 4.2.4.177. With regard to the artillery assets available to the Special Police duringOperation Storm, Turkalj testified that Special Police units that possessed their ownartillery were Zagreb, Karlovac, Zadar, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Požega, and Osijek. 606 Intheory, each of these units should have at least one artillery unit, which would meanfour to six 120-millimetre mortars, and one or two 128-millimetre multi-barrel rocketlaunchers, or so-called RAK-12. 607 The Lučko Anti-Terrorist Unit occasionally carriedanti-tank weapons during their searches. 608 According to Janić, the Special Police hadits own artillery which could cover up to twelve kilometres, and during Operation Stormwas supported by 128-millimetre rockets and 130-millimetre cannons from the HV. 609He added that he could directly command the lighter artillery of the Special Police,though if he wanted the heavier HV artillery to act on certain targets, he had to gothrough Turkalj at the Collective Forces Staff. 610 Sačić testified that a reserve unit wasin charge of escorting the artillery unit. 611 There were six 128-millimetre mortarbatteries, multiple rocket launchers, and 75-millimetre mortars and the artillery unit603 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 142; P2521 (Order prescribing newreporting obligations, HV Main Staff, 6 August 1995), p. 1.604 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 142; P2521 (Order prescribing newreporting obligations, HV Main Staff, 6 August 1995), p. 2.605 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 143; P2521 (Order prescribing newreporting obligations, HV Main Staff, 6 August 1995), pp. 2-3.606 P1150 (Josip Turkalj, witness interview of 11 March 2005), pp. 97-100; see also P1233 (Report ofused material during Operation Storm from Požega Special Police unit, 18 August 1995), p. 2; D1206(Report on the participation of the artillery battery of the Brod-Posavina police administration inOperation Storm, 18 August 1995), p. 1.607 P1150 (Josip Turkalj, witness interview of 11 March 2005), pp. 97, 101; Josip Turkalj, T. 13697; seee.g. P1236 (War path of Brod-Posavina Special Police unit, 1 April 1999), pp. 2-3; D1206 (Report on theparticipation of the artillery battery of the Brod-Posavina police administration in Operation Storm, 18August 1995), p. 1.608 P1152 (Josip Turkalj, third witness interview of 11 March 2005), pp. 110-111.609 P553 (Zdravko Janić, Prosecution interview, 15 March 2005), part I, p. 59; Zdravko Janić, T. 6299-6304, 6309; D539 (Order to Brod-Posavina Police Administration, 22 July 1995); D540 (Order toVaraždin Police Administration signed by Markač, 22 July 1995); D542 (Special Police order to theOsijek-Baranja and Sisak units signed by Željko Sačić, 23 July 1995).610 P553 (Zdravko Janić, Prosecution interview, 15 March 2005), part I, p. 74; Zdravko Janić, T. 6323-6324.611 Željko Sačić, T. 27759.92Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

39222operated on call from axis commanders or from Sačić in order to clear the passage. 612According to Cetina, the Special Police also had APCs. 613 With regard to the SpecialPolice’s use of artillery the Trial Chamber has also considered the testimony of MarkoRajčić, reviewed in chapter 3.1, as well as exhibits P1125 and D970, reviewed inchapter 4.4.3.178. With regard to the geographical boundaries of the Special Police, Janić testifiedthat on the right of the Special Police’s designated area of responsibility for the attackwas the Split MD and to the left the Gospić MD. 614 The witness explained that theSpecial Police coordinated its operations with these two MDs. 615 The Trial Chamber hasconsidered the evidence of Repinć on the topic, reviewed in chapter 3.1.1. The lack of aprecise zone of responsibility assigned to the Special Police during Operation Stormimplied, according to Repinć, that Markač neither had territorial responsibility nor thetask, the forces or the mechanisms to control, prohibit, or allow entry or departure ofany forces, except for his own, along the axes of attack or in areas of deployment of theCollective Special Police Forces. 616 More specifically, the Special Police wereresponsible for the area where they were at a specific moment and the axis along whichthey carried out an attack, but upon leaving an area they had no obligation to keepmonitoring it by establishing check-points or by leaving forces behind. 617 Theestablishment of such check-points, together with the prevention and repression ofcrime, was the responsibility of the VP and of the civilian police. 618 In addition, becauseof the high tempo of the attack, the large area that the Special Police units had to coveron foot, and the available manpower, Markač was in no position to establish checkpointsor roadblocks behind the reached lines. 619 Repinć further testified that, after thefirst two days of fierce fighting, during which the enemy’s frontline was severed andGračac was taken, Markač moved to pursue enemy forces to prevent their consolidationand took Bruvno. Thereafter, the Collective Special Police Forces in the territories of612 Željko Sačić, T. 27759-27760.613 D1745 (Ivica Cetina, witness statement, 26 February 2002), p. 5.614 Zdravko Janić, T. 6325; D280 (Map depicting the areas of responsibility of the Split MD and theGospić MD).615 Zdravko Janić, T. 6325; D543 (Special Police orders for Operation Storm sent to Markač fromZvonimir Červenko, 29 July 1995), p. 2.616 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97; Dragutin Repinć, T. 26716.617 Dragutin Repinć, T. 26716-26717.618 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97.619 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97; Dragutin Repinć, T. 26717-26718.93Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

39222operated on c<strong>al</strong>l from axis commanders or from Sačić in order to clear the passage. 612According to C<strong>et</strong>ina, the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police <strong>al</strong>so had APCs. 613 With regard to the Speci<strong>al</strong>Police’s use of artillery the Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber has <strong>al</strong>so considered the testimony of MarkoRajčić, reviewed in chapter 3.1, as well as exhibits P1125 and D970, reviewed inchapter 4.4.3.178. With regard to the geographic<strong>al</strong> boundaries of the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police, Janić testifiedthat on the right of the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police’s designated area of responsibility for the attackwas the Split MD and to the left the Gospić MD. 614 The witness explained that theSpeci<strong>al</strong> Police coordinated its operations with these two MDs. 615 The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber hasconsidered the evidence of Repinć on the topic, reviewed in chapter 3.1.1. The lack of aprecise zone of responsibility assigned to the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police during Operation Stormimplied, according to Repinć, that Markač neither had territori<strong>al</strong> responsibility nor th<strong>et</strong>ask, the forces or the mechanisms to control, prohibit, or <strong>al</strong>low entry or departure ofany forces, except for his own, <strong>al</strong>ong the axes of attack or in areas of deployment of theCollective Speci<strong>al</strong> Police Forces. 616 More specific<strong>al</strong>ly, the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police wereresponsible for the area where they were at a specific moment and the axis <strong>al</strong>ong whichthey carried out an attack, but upon leaving an area they had no obligation to keepmonitoring it by establishing check-points or by leaving forces behind. 617 Theestablishment of such check-points, tog<strong>et</strong>her with the prevention and repression ofcrime, was the responsibility of the VP and of the civilian police. 618 In addition, becauseof the high tempo of the attack, the large area that the Speci<strong>al</strong> Police units had to coveron foot, and the available manpower, Markač was in no position to establish checkpointsor roadblocks behind the reached lines. 619 Repinć further testified that, after thefirst two days of fierce fighting, during which the enemy’s frontline was severed andGračac was taken, Markač moved to pursue enemy forces to prevent their consolidationand took Bruvno. Thereafter, the Collective Speci<strong>al</strong> Police Forces in the territories of612 Željko Sačić, T. 27759-27760.613 D1745 (Ivica C<strong>et</strong>ina, witness statement, 26 February 2002), p. 5.614 Zdravko Janić, T. 6325; D280 (Map depicting the areas of responsibility of the Split MD and theGospić MD).615 Zdravko Janić, T. 6325; D543 (Speci<strong>al</strong> Police orders for Operation Storm sent to Markač fromZvonimir Červenko, 29 July 1995), p. 2.616 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97; Dragutin Repinć, T. 26716.617 Dragutin Repinć, T. 26716-26717.618 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97.619 D1932 (Dragutin Repinć, Expert Report, December 2009), para. 97; Dragutin Repinć, T. 26717-26718.93Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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