Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY
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Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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38689D131. The Radio TV Knin building (marked A on P1095) housed, in addition to theRadio TV Knin staff, ten members of the RSK President’s staff. The Pensioner’s Hall(marked K on P1095) served as a hotel, with 10 to 15 of its 40 rooms occupied by SVKMain Staff officers.1215. The Post Office was located at marking N on P1095. In light of the apparentinconsistencies between the testimony of Witness 56 on the one hand and Mrkšić andNovaković on the other, the Trial Chamber is unable to determine the technical role, ifany, of the Post Office in SVK and/or RSK police communications. The railway stationwas at a location marked E8 on D131. The evidence indicates that no trains ran on therailway tracks through Knin in the months prior to or during Operation Storm, with thepossible exception of the SVK’s use of the railway in late July or early August 1995 totransport ammunition out of the Golubić depot to tunnels in Stara Straza. The TrialChamber finds that there was a railway communication centre near the railway station(marked W on P1095). A secondary railway yard (marked R on P1095) was a fuelstorage facility.1216. There is documentary evidence indicating that the SVK planned to produceweapons-related products at the TVIK factory (marked O on P1095). The evidence doesnot conclusively establish whether and if so to what extent the planned weapons-relatedproduction at the TVIK factory was in operation by early August 1995. Rinčić testifiedto finding large amounts of unfinished ammunition in the TVIK factory after OperationStorm. However, Rinčić’s testimony in this respect is unsupported by anycontemporaneous documentation. Moreover, Rinčić’s testimony also differs from thatof Mrkšić, Novaković, and a number of international observers who visited the factoryprior to Operation Storm, all of whom testified that there was no military production atthe factory.1217. The Trial Chamber has received evidence on the SVK presence in Kninimmediately prior to and at the start of 4 August 1995 from Rajčić, HV documentation,Novaković, Mrkšić, and several international observers who were stationed or otherwisepresent in Knin at the time.1218. In a report dated 30 July 1995, HV Rear admiral Davor Domazet stated that thesuccess rate of SVK mobilisation in Knin and its surroundings was said to be as low as17 percent. Domazet also stated that after a state of war and general mobilisation hadbeen declared, the RSK Supreme Military Council met in Knin and decided to engage626Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38688all human and material resources in the defence of the RSK; to impose a curfewbetween 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.; and to punish severely anyone whose actions wouldincrease fear and panic among people. Further, the SVK was setting up courts martial inthe occupied areas of Croatia, in order to improve response and reduce desertion. 44591219. Gotovina’s order for an offensive operation, dated 2 August 1995, noted that theSVK 75th Knin motorized brigade was mobilized along an axis in Drnišmunicipality. 4460 Combat Group Dinara (part of the forces of the 7th Knin Corps units,Knin MUP Battalion and part of the SVK Special Forces Corps) was mobilized alongan axis in Bosnia-Herzegovina-Dinara, Borova Glava and Strmica, in Kninmunicipality. In the order, Gotovina stated that in the area of Knin, the enemy hadreserve forces which included parts of the Special Forces Corp, the Minñušari (so-calledEarring Wearers) Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company and up to 800 conscripts. 44611220. Marko Rajčić testified that on 4 August 1995, based on the intelligenceinformation available to him at the time, in his analysis present in Knin were the troopsof the SVK Main Staff, the command of the 7th Corps, the command of the mixedartillery regiment, which was in the Senjak barracks, the support artillery regiment, thecommand of the aircraft regiment, and a small unit in the new school in Knin. 4462 Rajčićtestified that the operational reserve forces, for possible interventions along threatenedlines of defence, were in the Slavko Rodić barracks and the police of Milan Martić,including the unit referred to as earring wearers, 4463 were in the monastery of St Ante inKnin. 4464 Statements of the RSK and SVK leadership lead the HV to believe that theSVK intended to resist and defend Knin to the last man. 44651221. Mile Mrkšić testified that on 2 August 1995, he issued a decision to carry out apersistent defence, being an extreme, decisive, last-ditch defence, to slow down andprevent a possible attack by the HV, while also carrying out an operation to liberate theKnin-Grahovo-Drvar communication and take control of the Dinara ridge, so as toimprove the RSK’s negotiating position. 4466 By this decision, Mrkšić hoped to slow4459 P2619 (Intelligence administration report, Rear admiral Davor Domazet, 30 July 1995), p. 2.4460 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 3.4461 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 4.4462 Marko Rajčić, T. 16481-16483.4463 The Trial Chamber understands this to refer to the unit also known as the Minñušari.4464 Marko Rajčić, T. 16481-16482.4465 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 31.4466 Mile Mrkšić, T. 18868; D1515 (SVK General Staff decision on further combat operations, MileMrkšić, 2 August 1995), p. 2.627Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38688<strong>al</strong>l human and materi<strong>al</strong> resources in the defence of the RSK; to impose a curfewb<strong>et</strong>ween 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.; and to punish severely anyone whose actions wouldincrease fear and panic among people. Further, the SVK was s<strong>et</strong>ting up courts marti<strong>al</strong> inthe occupied areas of Croatia, in order to improve response and reduce desertion. 44591219. <strong>Gotovina</strong>’s order for an offensive operation, dated 2 August 1995, noted that theSVK 75th Knin motorized brigade was mobilized <strong>al</strong>ong an axis in Drnišmunicip<strong>al</strong>ity. 4460 Combat Group Dinara (part of the forces of the 7th Knin Corps units,Knin MUP Batt<strong>al</strong>ion and part of the SVK Speci<strong>al</strong> Forces Corps) was mobilized <strong>al</strong>ongan axis in Bosnia-Herzegovina-Dinara, Borova Glava and Strmica, in Kninmunicip<strong>al</strong>ity. In the order, <strong>Gotovina</strong> stated that in the area of Knin, the enemy hadreserve forces which included parts of the Speci<strong>al</strong> Forces Corp, the Minñušari (so-c<strong>al</strong>ledEarring Wearers) Reconnaissance-Sabotage Company and up to 800 conscripts. 44611220. Marko Rajčić testified that on 4 August 1995, based on the intelligenceinformation available to him at the time, in his an<strong>al</strong>ysis present in Knin were the troopsof the SVK Main Staff, the command of the 7th Corps, the command of the mixedartillery regiment, which was in the Senjak barracks, the support artillery regiment, thecommand of the aircraft regiment, and a sm<strong>al</strong>l unit in the new school in Knin. 4462 Rajčićtestified that the operation<strong>al</strong> reserve forces, for possible interventions <strong>al</strong>ong threatenedlines of defence, were in the Slavko Rodić barracks and the police of Milan Martić,including the unit referred to as earring wearers, 4463 were in the monastery of St Ante inKnin. 4464 Statements of the RSK and SVK leadership lead the HV to believe that theSVK intended to resist and defend Knin to the last man. 44651221. Mile Mrkšić testified that on 2 August 1995, he issued a decision to carry out apersistent defence, being an extreme, decisive, last-ditch defence, to slow down andprevent a possible attack by the HV, while <strong>al</strong>so carrying out an operation to liberate theKnin-Grahovo-Drvar communication and take control of the Dinara ridge, so as toimprove the RSK’s negotiating position. 4466 By this decision, Mrkšić hoped to slow4459 P2619 (Intelligence administration report, Rear admir<strong>al</strong> Davor Domaz<strong>et</strong>, 30 July 1995), p. 2.4460 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 3.4461 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 4.4462 Marko Rajčić, T. 16481-16483.4463 The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber understands this to refer to the unit <strong>al</strong>so known as the Minñušari.4464 Marko Rajčić, T. 16481-16482.4465 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 31.4466 Mile Mrkšić, T. 18868; D1515 (SVK Gener<strong>al</strong> Staff decision on further combat operations, MileMrkšić, 2 August 1995), p. 2.627Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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