Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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387031190. The target lists Rajčić compiled in mid-June 1993 and two or three months priorto Operation Storm contained the following targets in Knin, with x, y and z coordinates:church in Knin (KV-110); Kosovo warehouse (KV-150); army barracks located at theentrance (KV-210); Slavko Rodić barracks (KV-250); bridge at the entrance (KV-310);Senjak barracks (KV-350); railway station (KV-410); western warehouse (KV-450);cross-roads (KV-510); old garage (KV550); block of flats/apartment building complex(KV-610); Padane warehouse (KV-650, which the Trial Chamber understands to referto Pañene, in Knin municipality); Hospital (KV-710); screw and bolt factory (KV-750);and the western bridge (KV-810). 43371191. According to Rajčić, the Main SVK headquarters, the adjacent communicationscentre, and the SVK 7th Krajina Corps headquarters in the Northern barracks (alsoreferred to as the Slavko Rodić barracks) were the main and highest pay-off targets inKnin. 4338 These targets needed to be hit with all available assets, as they were critical tothe success of the entire operation. 4339 The HV also selected Milan Martić as a target inKnin and information regarding his location and residence was constantly updated,based on surveillance and intelligence efforts. 4340 Although there was no clear line ofsight from the HV’s positions to the settlement of Knin before Operation Storm, HVintelligence officers determined the coordinates of Martić’s apartment (KV-610) basedon sources which Rajčić believed may have included aerial photography by pilotlessdrones, cadastral plans, and information spread by word of mouth. 4341 According toRajčić, the HV took the rules of distinction and of proportionality into account whendeciding whether to target the apartment block, where other civilians may have beenpresent. 4342 In this context, Rajčić considered the information that the SVK had anevacuation plan and a plan on how to take care of civilians, that the buildings in the areawere of good quality, and that the residents would try to take care of the population inthe area. 4343 Rajčić opined that it would have been unacceptable to fire at the residential4337 P1271 (HV table of identified targets, drafted by Marko Rajčić, June 1993); P1272 (HV artillerypreparation table of identified targets, drafted by Marko Rajčić, May or June 1995). The Trial Chambernotes that in the third entry of P1272, p. 1, the target is listed as “KV-410 (railway station)”, with thecorresponding z coordinate, while the x and y coordinates entered are those of “KV-610 (block of flats)”.4338 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 15.4339 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 16.4340 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 48; Marko Rajčić, T. 16613.4341 Marko Rajčić, T. 16443, 16445-16446.4342 Marko Rajčić, T. 16451, 16613.4343 Marko Rajčić, T. 16613.612Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38702complex with 122-millimetre MBRLs, because they would damage the buildings aroundthe target, due to their higher density of projectiles covering a broader area. 43441192. According to Rajčić, the HV anticipated that the SVK may use a field near thecross-roads outside the Northern barracks and identified it as a military objective on thesource lists, named Hospital (KV-710), after the first dominant facility near thelocation. 4345 Rajčić had information that a small SVK artillery mortar unit was locatedin a secondary school close to the barracks and could use the targeted field, which wasin front of the school, as a firing position from which to fire on the Dinara Mountain. 4346The HV never targeted the actual hospital in Knin. 43471193. Based on the above evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that from 1993 up to themonths preceding Operation Storm, Rajčić identified artillery targets in Knin with x, y,and z coordinates. Rajčić did so on the basis of information from sources whichincluded at least aerial photography by unmanned drones. Rajčić listed these targets ontarget lists, such as P1271 and P1272, which were compiled for training purposes.Rajčić assigned the targets KV-numbers on these lists. Based on lists P1271, P1272,Rajčić’s testimony, and map D1261, 4348 the Trial Chamber finds that the followingtargets were entered on one or both of these lists: a church in Knin (referred to as KV-110, which the Trial Chamber understands to refer to the St Ante monastery); theSouthern barracks (listed as army barracks located at the entrance, KV-210); the SlavkoRodić or Northern barracks (KV-250); the bridge at the entrance (KV-310); the Senjakbarracks (KV-350); the railway station (KV-410); a cross-roads (KV-510); Martić’sresidence (listed as block of flats/apartment building complex, KV-610); a field nearfrom the Northern barracks listed as Hospital (KV-710); the TVIK factory (listed asscrew and bolts factory, KV-750); and the western bridge (KV-810).1194. On 31 July 1995, Gotovina ordered Rajčić to prepare plans for the use of artilleryand Rajčić finalized the target lists for Operation Storm. The Trial Chamber has notreceived in evidence any finalized target lists containing targets in Knin which postdate4344 Marko Rajčić, T. 16592.4345 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), paras 22-23, p. 18; Marko Rajčić, T.16614-16615.4346 Marko Rajčić, T. 16615.4347 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 22.4348 D1261 (Gotovina Defence map plotting table of identified military targets of P1271 and P1272 onmap of Knin); For the parties submissions on the locations of these targets within Knin, see DefendantAnte Gotovina’s Submission on Grid References, 4 March 2009 and Prosecution Response to DefendantAnte Gotovina’s Submission on Grid References, 10 March 2009.613Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

387031190. The targ<strong>et</strong> lists Rajčić compiled in mid-June 1993 and two or three months priorto Operation Storm contained the following targ<strong>et</strong>s in Knin, with x, y and z coordinates:church in Knin (KV-110); Kosovo warehouse (KV-150); army barracks located at theentrance (KV-210); Slavko Rodić barracks (KV-250); bridge at the entrance (KV-310);Senjak barracks (KV-350); railway station (KV-410); western warehouse (KV-450);cross-roads (KV-510); old garage (KV550); block of flats/apartment building complex(KV-610); Padane warehouse (KV-650, which the Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber understands to referto Pañene, in Knin municip<strong>al</strong>ity); Hospit<strong>al</strong> (KV-710); screw and bolt factory (KV-750);and the western bridge (KV-810). 43371191. According to Rajčić, the Main SVK headquarters, the adjacent communicationscentre, and the SVK 7th Krajina Corps headquarters in the Northern barracks (<strong>al</strong>soreferred to as the Slavko Rodić barracks) were the main and highest pay-off targ<strong>et</strong>s inKnin. 4338 These targ<strong>et</strong>s needed to be hit with <strong>al</strong>l available ass<strong>et</strong>s, as they were critic<strong>al</strong> tothe success of the entire operation. 4339 The HV <strong>al</strong>so selected Milan Martić as a targ<strong>et</strong> inKnin and information regarding his location and residence was constantly updated,based on surveillance and intelligence efforts. 4340 Although there was no clear line ofsight from the HV’s positions to the s<strong>et</strong>tlement of Knin before Operation Storm, HVintelligence officers d<strong>et</strong>ermined the coordinates of Martić’s apartment (KV-610) basedon sources which Rajčić believed may have included aeri<strong>al</strong> photography by pilotlessdrones, cadastr<strong>al</strong> plans, and information spread by word of mouth. 4341 According toRajčić, the HV took the rules of distinction and of proportion<strong>al</strong>ity into account whendeciding wh<strong>et</strong>her to targ<strong>et</strong> the apartment block, where other civilians may have beenpresent. 4342 In this context, Rajčić considered the information that the SVK had anevacuation plan and a plan on how to take care of civilians, that the buildings in the areawere of good qu<strong>al</strong>ity, and that the residents would try to take care of the population inthe area. 4343 Rajčić opined that it would have been unacceptable to fire at the residenti<strong>al</strong>4337 P1271 (HV table of identified targ<strong>et</strong>s, drafted by Marko Rajčić, June 1993); P1272 (HV artillerypreparation table of identified targ<strong>et</strong>s, drafted by Marko Rajčić, May or June 1995). The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chambernotes that in the third entry of P1272, p. 1, the targ<strong>et</strong> is listed as “KV-410 (railway station)”, with thecorresponding z coordinate, while the x and y coordinates entered are those of “KV-610 (block of flats)”.4338 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 15.4339 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 16.4340 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 48; Marko Rajčić, T. 16613.4341 Marko Rajčić, T. 16443, 16445-16446.4342 Marko Rajčić, T. 16451, 16613.4343 Marko Rajčić, T. 16613.612Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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