Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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387111177. The Trial Chamber first turns to the evidence regarding training and earlyplanning for HV artillery operations. Marko Rajčić, the chief of artillery of the SplitMD from April 1993 to June 1996, 4266 testified that he was in charge of planning,coordinating, and controlling the use of artillery during Operation Storm. 4267 Accordingto Rajčić, the planning and training for the liberation of the areas of OGs Zadar,Šibenik, and Sinj started years before Operation Storm. 4268 In 1993, the HV started touse unmanned aerial drones for reconnaissance of artillery targets, including those inKnin. 4269 Following the Serb shelling of Biograd on 13 June 1993, General Bobetkoordered Rajčić to start preparations for a possible retaliation against Knin, althoughKnin was not within range of HV artillery at that time. 4270 In mid-June 1993, based oninformation from the intelligence services, Rajčić selected the type of weapon and thetargets and drafted an artillery target list for Knin (which is in evidence as P1271). 4271 In1993, when Rajčić came under the command of General Gotovina, he also developedplans for the use of artillery in the towns of Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gračac, bydefining the military facilities in those towns and determining their coordinates. 42721178. In the spring of 1994, following the Zagreb Agreement, the initial planning foran HV military operation re-taking the Krajina began, by training staff in coursesdirected at the actual situation. 4273 During 1994, 750 artillery personnel and theindividual units of the Split MD were trained under the code name Promina-94, and atactical live-fire exercise was conducted, codenamed Bandira-94. 4274 During this time,Rajčić continued to plan possible artillery targets and their coordinates, on the basis ofavailable intelligence. 4275 On 6 February 1995, General Janko Bobetko ordered thecommanders of several MDs, including Gospić and Split, to send their chiefs of staff, ofartillery and of the intelligence department to the HV Main Staff for coordination.Bobetko further ordered that they bring along working maps containing data received4266 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 1; Marko Rajčić, T. 16236, 16275;P2323 (Military Police official note of Rajčić interview, 11 July 2008), p. 1.4267 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 1.4268 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 50; Marko Rajčić, T. 16522.4269 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 23; Marko Rajčić, T. 16268.4270 Marko Rajčić, T. 16261, 16267, 16452.4271 Marko Rajčić, T. 16254, 16261, 16267-16268; P1271 (HV table of identified targets, drafted byMarko Rajčić, June 1993).4272 Marko Rajčić, T. 16452-16453.4273 Marko Rajčić, T. 16262, 16522-16524.4274 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), paras 50, 52-53; Marko Rajčić, T.16523.4275 Marko Rajčić, T. 16524.604Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38710through aerial photography and that the chief of artillery bring a plan of artillery actionsagainst targets in their zone of responsibility. The coordination related to the use ofsatellite shoots and data collected by unmanned aircraft aerial photography and aimed toidentify the need for and possibility of additional aerial photography of areas andfacilities. 4276 In February 1995, Rajčić and the Commanders and Deputy Commandersof the Home Guards units’ artillery battalions were trained, and a large number ofofficers and NCOs received specialist training at the Croatian Military College. 4277 Twoor three months before Operation Storm, Rajčić prepared another target list, (which is inevidence as P1272), for the staff training of the Split area headquarters. 42781179. The Trial Chamber now turns to the evidence regarding artillery-relatedplanning, meetings, and orders from June to early August 1995. Marko Rajčić testifiedthat in June 1995, the Chief of the HV Main Staff issued a directive on OperationStorm, which set out the tasks of the Split HV, and the Command of the Split MDreceived training at the Lora barracks. 4279 In the directive on Operation Storm of 26June 1995, the HV Main Staff Chief Janko Bobetko decided that artillery and rocketsupport should focus on neutralising the SVK Main Staff and 7th Corps Command Postin Knin and the brigades’ command posts, concentrations of enemy manpower, armour,and artillery in the area of Knin and Benkovac, including ammunition and fueldepots. 4280 The artillery and rocket support should also support the main forces in attackand prevent an enemy counter-attack from the direction of Knin, Kaštel Žegarski andBenkovac. 42811180. On 31 July 1995, Rajčić attended the presidential meeting at Brioni. 4282 At theoutset of the meeting, the President stated in his initial remarks that there wasinformation that after the Croatian forces broke out at Dinara, civilians started leavingKnin. 4283 Rajčić testified that he did not add any new potential targets to the existing4276 D967 (HV Main Staff Order, Janko Bobetko, 6 February 1995).4277 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 55.4278 Marko Rajčić, T. 16253; P1272 (HV artillery preparation table of identified targets, drafted by MarkoRajčić, May or June 1995).4279 Marko Rajčić, T. 16424-16425; P2336 (Analysis of Split MD actions from 4 to 9 August 1995, byMarko Rajčić, 17 October 2008), p. 2; P2340 (Reconstruction of the Split MD artillery from 4 to 9August 1995, by Marko Rajčić, 28 November 2008), pp. 2, 11.4280 D956 (HV Main Staff directive on Operation Storm, Staff General Janko Bobetko, 26 June 1995), pp.1, 6, 11. See also Marko Rajčić, T. 16527, 16618.4281 D956 (HV Main Staff directive on Operation Storm, Staff General Janko Bobetko, 26 June 1995), p.6.4282 Marko Rajčić, T. 16594, 16600.4283 Marko Rajčić, T. 16601-16602.605Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38710through aeri<strong>al</strong> photography and that the chief of artillery bring a plan of artillery actionsagainst targ<strong>et</strong>s in their zone of responsibility. The coordination related to the use ofsatellite shoots and data collected by unmanned aircraft aeri<strong>al</strong> photography and aimed toidentify the need for and possibility of addition<strong>al</strong> aeri<strong>al</strong> photography of areas andfacilities. 4276 In February 1995, Rajčić and the Commanders and Deputy Commandersof the Home Guards units’ artillery batt<strong>al</strong>ions were trained, and a large number ofofficers and NCOs received speci<strong>al</strong>ist training at the Croatian Military College. 4277 Twoor three months before Operation Storm, Rajčić prepared another targ<strong>et</strong> list, (which is inevidence as P1272), for the staff training of the Split area headquarters. 42781179. The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber now turns to the evidence regarding artillery-relatedplanning, me<strong>et</strong>ings, and orders from June to early August 1995. Marko Rajčić testifiedthat in June 1995, the Chief of the HV Main Staff issued a directive on OperationStorm, which s<strong>et</strong> out the tasks of the Split HV, and the Command of the Split MDreceived training at the Lora barracks. 4279 In the directive on Operation Storm of 26June 1995, the HV Main Staff Chief Janko Bob<strong>et</strong>ko decided that artillery and rock<strong>et</strong>support should focus on neutr<strong>al</strong>ising the SVK Main Staff and 7th Corps Command Postin Knin and the brigades’ command posts, concentrations of enemy manpower, armour,and artillery in the area of Knin and Benkovac, including ammunition and fueldepots. 4280 The artillery and rock<strong>et</strong> support should <strong>al</strong>so support the main forces in attackand prevent an enemy counter-attack from the direction of Knin, Kaštel Žegarski andBenkovac. 42811180. On 31 July 1995, Rajčić attended the presidenti<strong>al</strong> me<strong>et</strong>ing at Brioni. 4282 At theouts<strong>et</strong> of the me<strong>et</strong>ing, the President stated in his initi<strong>al</strong> remarks that there wasinformation that after the Croatian forces broke out at Dinara, civilians started leavingKnin. 4283 Rajčić testified that he did not add any new potenti<strong>al</strong> targ<strong>et</strong>s to the existing4276 D967 (HV Main Staff Order, Janko Bob<strong>et</strong>ko, 6 February 1995).4277 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 55.4278 Marko Rajčić, T. 16253; P1272 (HV artillery preparation table of identified targ<strong>et</strong>s, drafted by MarkoRajčić, May or June 1995).4279 Marko Rajčić, T. 16424-16425; P2336 (An<strong>al</strong>ysis of Split MD actions from 4 to 9 August 1995, byMarko Rajčić, 17 October 2008), p. 2; P2340 (Reconstruction of the Split MD artillery from 4 to 9August 1995, by Marko Rajčić, 28 November 2008), pp. 2, 11.4280 D956 (HV Main Staff directive on Operation Storm, Staff Gener<strong>al</strong> Janko Bob<strong>et</strong>ko, 26 June 1995), pp.1, 6, 11. See <strong>al</strong>so Marko Rajčić, T. 16527, 16618.4281 D956 (HV Main Staff directive on Operation Storm, Staff Gener<strong>al</strong> Janko Bob<strong>et</strong>ko, 26 June 1995), p.6.4282 Marko Rajčić, T. 16594, 16600.4283 Marko Rajčić, T. 16601-16602.605Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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