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Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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38713population on the enemy’s mor<strong>al</strong>e, so as long as he does not use his combat capabilityto spread terror among the civilian population on purpose. 42521174. Experts Konings and Corn <strong>al</strong>so testified on the basis of assumed facts put tothem by the parties about the effects of using artillery against specific objects in Knin,including with regard to the anticipated military advantage and risk of collater<strong>al</strong> damageand incident<strong>al</strong> injury. Specific<strong>al</strong>ly, Konings testified that firing 120- or 155-millim<strong>et</strong>reshells at a tarmac or concr<strong>et</strong>e road will damage it, but not in a way that renders itunusable, unless a lot of rounds are fired. 4253 Moreover, most military vehicles wouldstill be able to pass around it off-road or find another road. 4254 Further, the SVK mortarsection, which was located in close proximity to a school, could be moved quickly andformed a sm<strong>al</strong>l, point targ<strong>et</strong>, so that firing artillery at it could only achieve a suppressingeffect. 4255 Although the presence of the RSK commander in chief could make hisresidence a military targ<strong>et</strong>, the likelihood of killing the commander by artillery was verylow, considering the degree of protection in a strong building and that the commanderwas unlikely to be on the top floor. 4256 Non<strong>et</strong>heless, assuming that the commander wasin Knin, the HV artillery attack will have excluded most of his movements, having asuppressing effect. 42571175. Corn testified that Knin was a critic<strong>al</strong> command, control, and communicationcentre serving enemy forces, as well as a logistic<strong>al</strong> centre. 4258 Corn considered the useof MBRLs against the SVK Main Staff headquarters and the Northern barracks to beunderstandable, as they presented critic<strong>al</strong> command, control, communications, andintelligence targ<strong>et</strong>s. 4259 Multiple barrel rock<strong>et</strong> launchers could degrade these targ<strong>et</strong>s bydestroying communications antennas, cables, and equipment, while enemy forcesrequired to move in and around the area would be disrupted. 4260 As commander in chiefMilan Martić was a lawful military objective, and <strong>al</strong>though the probability of killing or4251 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21266, 21276-21279.4252 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21478, 21538-21539.4253 Harry Konings, T. 14393.4254 Harry Konings, T. 14393.4255 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 2; Harry Konings, T. 14397-14398, 14646-14647.4256 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), pp. 2, 6; Harry Konings, T. 14403-14404.4257 Harry Konings, T. 14599, 14604-14605.4258 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), pp. 23, 25.4259 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), pp. 31-32; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21192, 21245,21309, 21579-21580.4260 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), pp. 31-32; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21500-21501,21505-21506, 21570-21573, 21576.602Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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