Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY
Share Embed Flag
Download ePaper

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

cpi.hr
12.07.2015 Views

38715city, creating the impression of an indiscriminate attack. 4234 The timing of the attack,during early morning twilight, could also have added to the perception that the entirecity was under attack, because the lack of natural light exacerbates the flash impacts ofartillery. 42351171. With regard to artillery or forward observers, Konings testified that forwardobservers are important intelligence assets, as they may initiate fire missions, controland correct fire, assess the results and advise the unit commander. 4236 According toKonings, firing artillery at a moving target requires a forward observer that canconstantly see the target moving. 4237 Further, the use of artillery and mortars againststationary targets in civilian-populated areas without having these targets underobservation by a forward observer is inadvisable, unless the target is beyond thecollateral damage distance and the exact location is known. 4238 Air-basedreconnaissance can be used as an alternative to forward observers. 4239 Observation ofthe civilian-populated area containing military targets during artillery fire allows acommander to know whether the artillery is having the intended effects and not causingunintended damage to infrastructure or people. 4240 Corn testified that artillery observerscan be used to correct fire and better control the effects of the attack and mitigate therisk of collateral damage or incidental injury to civilians. 4241 However, observed indirectfire is not always an option: when firing artillery at long range, commanders might notbe willing or able to place observers in close proximity to long range targets, especiallyin areas under significant enemy control. 4242 Unobserved indirect fire is based onintelligence indicating the location of proposed targets and indirect fire directioncalculations. 4243 Thus commanders should engage in a proportionality analysis,4234 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21238-21241, 21247-21250, 21254-21255.4235 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21255.4236 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8,Annex A, pp. 3, 7; P1262 (Harry Konings, Corrigendum to the expert report), p. 1.4237 Harry Konings, T. 14344.4238 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5; Harry Konings, T. 14360-14361.4239 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5.4240 Harry Konings, T. 14360-14361.4241 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 17; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21178-21179,21185.4242 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), pp. 17-18.4243 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 17.600Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38714considering the location of the target and possible collateral damage, to decide whetherusing artillery observers is the best operational decision. 42441172. The Trial Chamber has reviewed evidence regarding orders to the HV artilleryby Gotovina and Rajčić in chapter 4.4.3. The Trial Chamber has received evidence fromexpert witnesses Konings and Corn on interpreting the formulations used in these HVartillery orders. Konings noted that Gotovina’s order of 2 August 1995 to put Drvar,Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gračac under artillery fire did not provide clearguidelines for artillery units regarding the specification and details of military targets, orthe effects to be achieved. 4245 Konings stated that when giving the order to shell a citythe detailed specification of military targets is an absolute precondition, otherwise thevague nature of the order may be interpreted as ordering, or at least permitting,commanders to fire randomly into the named cities. 4246 Firing rounds at a city withoutspecifying a target involves willingly and deliberately taking the risk that those roundswill fall in an area where only civilians live, and can have only the psychological effectof harassing fire on civilians. 4247 Konings further stated that the 4 August 1995 report ofTS-4, which referred to firing artillery at a general, civilian populated area, requiredfurther detailed explanation with a clear reference to implied rules of engagement andobjectives. 42481173. With regard to Gotovina and Rajčić’s orders to put the town of Knin underartillery fire, Corn opined that the language was open to several interpretations, one ofwhich was reading it as an order to shell the entire town of Knin. 4249 Alternatively, theorder could be read as a high-level order in a broader context to strike previouslyidentified targets within Knin as tactical support. 4250 Corn added that, as in most casescommanders do not write orders themselves, poor phrasing could be the result ofsubordinate officers preparing orders under time pressure. 4251 Further, according toCorn, a commander is permitted to anticipate the effect of an exodus of the civilian4244 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 18; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21179-21180,21182, 21184.4245 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;Harry Konings, T. 14346-14347, 14350, 14427, 14539, 14579, 14640, 14654, 14761-14764, 14772.4246 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;Harry Konings, T. 14346, 14356-14357, 14418-14419, 14760, 14764-14766, 14768-14769.4247 Harry Konings, T. 14422.4248 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 6.4249 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21257-21259, 21263-21264, 21270, 21274, 21277-21278, 21472, 21474-21475.4250 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21257-21258, 21263-21265, 21270, 21274-21275, 21277, 21279, 21474-21475.601Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38714considering the location of the targ<strong>et</strong> and possible collater<strong>al</strong> damage, to decide wh<strong>et</strong>herusing artillery observers is the best operation<strong>al</strong> decision. 42441172. The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber has reviewed evidence regarding orders to the HV artilleryby <strong>Gotovina</strong> and Rajčić in chapter 4.4.3. The Tri<strong>al</strong> Chamber has received evidence fromexpert witnesses Konings and Corn on interpr<strong>et</strong>ing the formulations used in these HVartillery orders. Konings noted that <strong>Gotovina</strong>’s order of 2 August 1995 to put Drvar,Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, and Gračac under artillery fire did not provide clearguidelines for artillery units regarding the specification and d<strong>et</strong>ails of military targ<strong>et</strong>s, orthe effects to be achieved. 4245 Konings stated that when giving the order to shell a citythe d<strong>et</strong>ailed specification of military targ<strong>et</strong>s is an absolute precondition, otherwise thevague nature of the order may be interpr<strong>et</strong>ed as ordering, or at least permitting,commanders to fire randomly into the named cities. 4246 Firing rounds at a city withoutspecifying a targ<strong>et</strong> involves willingly and deliberately taking the risk that those roundswill f<strong>al</strong>l in an area where only civilians live, and can have only the psychologic<strong>al</strong> effectof harassing fire on civilians. 4247 Konings further stated that the 4 August 1995 report ofTS-4, which referred to firing artillery at a gener<strong>al</strong>, civilian populated area, requiredfurther d<strong>et</strong>ailed explanation with a clear reference to implied rules of engagement andobjectives. 42481173. With regard to <strong>Gotovina</strong> and Rajčić’s orders to put the town of Knin underartillery fire, Corn opined that the language was open to sever<strong>al</strong> interpr<strong>et</strong>ations, one ofwhich was reading it as an order to shell the entire town of Knin. 4249 Alternatively, theorder could be read as a high-level order in a broader context to strike previouslyidentified targ<strong>et</strong>s within Knin as tactic<strong>al</strong> support. 4250 Corn added that, as in most casescommanders do not write orders themselves, poor phrasing could be the result ofsubordinate officers preparing orders under time pressure. 4251 Further, according toCorn, a commander is permitted to anticipate the effect of an exodus of the civilian4244 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 18; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21179-21180,21182, 21184.4245 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;Harry Konings, T. 14346-14347, 14350, 14427, 14539, 14579, 14640, 14654, 14761-14764, 14772.4246 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;Harry Konings, T. 14346, 14356-14357, 14418-14419, 14760, 14764-14766, 14768-14769.4247 Harry Konings, T. 14422.4248 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 14;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 6.4249 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21257-21259, 21263-21264, 21270, 21274, 21277-21278, 21472, 21474-21475.4250 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21257-21258, 21263-21265, 21270, 21274-21275, 21277, 21279, 21474-21475.601Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

logo

products

Resources

Company

Terms of service
Privacy policy
Cookie policy
Cookie settings
Imprint
Change language
Made with love in Switzerland
© 2024 Yumpu.com all rights reserved

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!