Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

38715city, creating the impression of an indiscriminate attack. 4234 The timing of the attack,during early morning twilight, could also have added to the perception that the entirecity was under attack, because the lack of natural light exacerbates the flash impacts ofartillery. 42351171. With regard to artillery or forward observers, Konings testified that forwardobservers are important intelligence assets, as they may initiate fire missions, controland correct fire, assess the results and advise the unit commander. 4236 According toKonings, firing artillery at a moving target requires a forward observer that canconstantly see the target moving. 4237 Further, the use of artillery and mortars againststationary targets in civilian-populated areas without having these targets underobservation by a forward observer is inadvisable, unless the target is beyond thecollateral damage distance and the exact location is known. 4238 Air-basedreconnaissance can be used as an alternative to forward observers. 4239 Observation ofthe civilian-populated area containing military targets during artillery fire allows acommander to know whether the artillery is having the intended effects and not causingunintended damage to infrastructure or people. 4240 Corn testified that artillery observerscan be used to correct fire and better control the effects of the attack and mitigate therisk of collateral damage or incidental injury to civilians. 4241 However, observed indirectfire is not always an option: when firing artillery at long range, commanders might notbe willing or able to place observers in close proximity to long range targets, especiallyin areas under significant enemy control. 4242 Unobserved indirect fire is based onintelligence indicating the location of proposed targets and indirect fire directioncalculations. 4243 Thus commanders should engage in a proportionality analysis,4234 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21238-21241, 21247-21250, 21254-21255.4235 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21255.4236 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8,Annex A, pp. 3, 7; P1262 (Harry Konings, Corrigendum to the expert report), p. 1.4237 Harry Konings, T. 14344.4238 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5; Harry Konings, T. 14360-14361.4239 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 8;P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5.4240 Harry Konings, T. 14360-14361.4241 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 17; Geoffrey Corn, T. 21178-21179,21185.4242 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), pp. 17-18.4243 D1642 (Expert Report of Geoffrey Corn, 28 June 2009), p. 17.600Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `