Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

38716around. 4223 One method of fixing an enemy is neutralising or destroying his ability tocommunicate. 4224 Artillery attacks on in-depth targets can also cause dislocation anddisruption, for instance by attacking support facilities located well inside enemy lines,such as communications centres; command centres or headquarters; and logistics supplylocations. 4225 Under NATO doctrine, neutralisation and or destruction of the enemy’scentre of gravity can lead to the destruction of the enemy. 4226 While at a strategic levelthe centre of gravity may be something physical, it is more likely to be a moral entityrelated to a leader, ruling elite, or strong-willed population, which must be undermined,neutralized or defeated. 4227 According to Konings, the centre of gravity for the RSK wasKnin, so taking control of Knin was important for the HV to succeed. 4228 According toKonings, small amounts of shelling, such as firing eight rounds at a target, and ongoingshelling for a period of 19 hours, can have only a neutralising, suppressing, orinterdiction effect. 4229 Firing artillery at irregular intervals indicates that the shellingmay have been used as harassing fire. 4230 While rates of fire of four to five rounds perhour may have a suppressing effect on military units, they may have a harassing andfrightening effect on civilians, causing fear, panic and disorder. 42311170. Corn testified that harassment and interdiction can also be achieved by low ratesof artillery fire, and an early surge, followed by lower rates of fire during the afternoon,could be consistent with an attempt to keep the enemy fixed and disoriented, whileusing a limited supply of ammunition. 4232 Low-rate artillery fire could also be linked,according to Corn, to the operational objective of demonstrating a full-spectrum controlover the fight. 4233 Corn added that, if an observer at a vantage point or driving aroundKnin perceived that there were rounds exploding all over the city, this perception mayhave been caused by the fact that the military targets in Knin were dispersed all over the4223 Harry Konings, T. 14568-14570; D1254 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, AJP-3.2),pp. 3, 12, 14-15.4224 Harry Konings, T. 14570.4225 Harry Konings, T. 14567, 14572-14573, 14586, 14735; D1253 (United States Department of theArmy, Fire Support in the Airland Battle), pp. 55-56; D1254 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for LandOperations, AJP-3.2), pp. 8-9.4226 Harry Konings, T. 14576-14578; D1247 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (C) 2006), pp. 47, 49.4227 D1247 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (C) 2006), pp. 47, 49.4228 Harry Konings, T. 14578-14580, 14584, 14596, 14743.4229 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5; Harry Konings, T. 14421-14422.4230 Harry Konings, T. 14427-14428.4231 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), pp. 5-6; Harry Konings, T. 14348, 14365,14374, 14379.4232 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21542-21543, 21577.4233 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21542.599Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `