Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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38717ground, by using a variable time fuse. 4212 The fragmentation of a 155-millimetreHowitzer projectile will kill everybody within a radius of 50 metres around the point ofexplosion, which is known as the absolute lethal distance, beyond which the fragmentsmay still cause damage and injuries, but will not necessarily be lethal. 4213 Theexplosion’s effect is maximized when the explosion takes place between 6 and 20metres above the ground, which can be achieved by using a time fuse. 4214 The variabletime fuse has a small radar system that triggers the explosion at the desired height,whereas the normal time fuse, which was available and in widespread use in 1995,works as a clock which counts down after the shot is fired and triggers the explosion ata set time. 4215 A point detonating fuse can be adjusted to explode at a certain heightabove the ground or following a short delay after impact. 4216 DPICM munitions arecarrier projectiles which contains a number of sub-munitions, also referred to as clustermunitions. 4217 Such munitions are activated by a time fuse at a height of 400 metres, thesub-munitions spread out over an area the size of a soccer field and explode upon hittinga target. 4218 122, 152, 155 and 203-millimetre Howitzers, rocket systems and somemortar types are capable of delivering cluster munitions. 42191169. Konings also testified about the various effects that can be achieved by means ofartillery fire, including the destruction, neutralising and suppression effects. 4220 Further,interdiction fire involves firing at a point target or target area with the aim of preventingthe enemy from using it. 4221 Harassing fire is intended to cause confusion among theenemy, to curtail his movement, and to lower enemy morale by threatening losses. 4222Artillery can also be used to fix the enemy, preventing him from moving his forces4212 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12;Harry Konings, T. 14316-14317, 14343, 14364, 14367-14369, 14472-14473.4213 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12;Harry Konings, T. 14316-14317.4214 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12.4215 Harry Konings, T. 14319-14320.4216 Harry Konings, T. 14319-14320, 14474.4217 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 13;Harry Konings, T. 14320-14321.4218 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 13;Harry Konings, T. 14367.4219 Harry Konings, T. 14331.4220 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), pp. 2, 9,11, Annex A, p. 4; P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 4; D1253 (United StatesDepartment of the Army, Fire Support in the Airland Battle), p. 24.4221 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 2,Annex A, p. 4; P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 4.4222 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 2,Annex A, p. 4; Harry Konings, T. 14538.598Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38716around. 4223 One method of fixing an enemy is neutralising or destroying his ability tocommunicate. 4224 Artillery attacks on in-depth targets can also cause dislocation anddisruption, for instance by attacking support facilities located well inside enemy lines,such as communications centres; command centres or headquarters; and logistics supplylocations. 4225 Under NATO doctrine, neutralisation and or destruction of the enemy’scentre of gravity can lead to the destruction of the enemy. 4226 While at a strategic levelthe centre of gravity may be something physical, it is more likely to be a moral entityrelated to a leader, ruling elite, or strong-willed population, which must be undermined,neutralized or defeated. 4227 According to Konings, the centre of gravity for the RSK wasKnin, so taking control of Knin was important for the HV to succeed. 4228 According toKonings, small amounts of shelling, such as firing eight rounds at a target, and ongoingshelling for a period of 19 hours, can have only a neutralising, suppressing, orinterdiction effect. 4229 Firing artillery at irregular intervals indicates that the shellingmay have been used as harassing fire. 4230 While rates of fire of four to five rounds perhour may have a suppressing effect on military units, they may have a harassing andfrightening effect on civilians, causing fear, panic and disorder. 42311170. Corn testified that harassment and interdiction can also be achieved by low ratesof artillery fire, and an early surge, followed by lower rates of fire during the afternoon,could be consistent with an attempt to keep the enemy fixed and disoriented, whileusing a limited supply of ammunition. 4232 Low-rate artillery fire could also be linked,according to Corn, to the operational objective of demonstrating a full-spectrum controlover the fight. 4233 Corn added that, if an observer at a vantage point or driving aroundKnin perceived that there were rounds exploding all over the city, this perception mayhave been caused by the fact that the military targets in Knin were dispersed all over the4223 Harry Konings, T. 14568-14570; D1254 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, AJP-3.2),pp. 3, 12, 14-15.4224 Harry Konings, T. 14570.4225 Harry Konings, T. 14567, 14572-14573, 14586, 14735; D1253 (United States Department of theArmy, Fire Support in the Airland Battle), pp. 55-56; D1254 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for LandOperations, AJP-3.2), pp. 8-9.4226 Harry Konings, T. 14576-14578; D1247 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (C) 2006), pp. 47, 49.4227 D1247 (NATO Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01 (C) 2006), pp. 47, 49.4228 Harry Konings, T. 14578-14580, 14584, 14596, 14743.4229 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 5; Harry Konings, T. 14421-14422.4230 Harry Konings, T. 14427-14428.4231 P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), pp. 5-6; Harry Konings, T. 14348, 14365,14374, 14379.4232 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21542-21543, 21577.4233 Geoffrey Corn, T. 21542.599Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

38717ground, by using a variable time fuse. 4212 The fragmentation of a 155-millim<strong>et</strong>reHowitzer projectile will kill everybody within a radius of 50 m<strong>et</strong>res around the point ofexplosion, which is known as the absolute l<strong>et</strong>h<strong>al</strong> distance, beyond which the fragmentsmay still cause damage and injuries, but will not necessarily be l<strong>et</strong>h<strong>al</strong>. 4213 Theexplosion’s effect is maximized when the explosion takes place b<strong>et</strong>ween 6 and 20m<strong>et</strong>res above the ground, which can be achieved by using a time fuse. 4214 The variabl<strong>et</strong>ime fuse has a sm<strong>al</strong>l radar system that triggers the explosion at the desired height,whereas the norm<strong>al</strong> time fuse, which was available and in widespread use in 1995,works as a clock which counts down after the shot is fired and triggers the explosion ata s<strong>et</strong> time. 4215 A point d<strong>et</strong>onating fuse can be adjusted to explode at a certain heightabove the ground or following a short delay after impact. 4216 DPICM munitions arecarrier projectiles which contains a number of sub-munitions, <strong>al</strong>so referred to as clustermunitions. 4217 Such munitions are activated by a time fuse at a height of 400 m<strong>et</strong>res, thesub-munitions spread out over an area the size of a soccer field and explode upon hittinga targ<strong>et</strong>. 4218 122, 152, 155 and 203-millim<strong>et</strong>re Howitzers, rock<strong>et</strong> systems and somemortar types are capable of delivering cluster munitions. 42191169. Konings <strong>al</strong>so testified about the various effects that can be achieved by means ofartillery fire, including the destruction, neutr<strong>al</strong>ising and suppression effects. 4220 Further,interdiction fire involves firing at a point targ<strong>et</strong> or targ<strong>et</strong> area with the aim of preventingthe enemy from using it. 4221 Harassing fire is intended to cause confusion among theenemy, to curtail his movement, and to lower enemy mor<strong>al</strong>e by threatening losses. 4222Artillery can <strong>al</strong>so be used to fix the enemy, preventing him from moving his forces4212 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12;Harry Konings, T. 14316-14317, 14343, 14364, 14367-14369, 14472-14473.4213 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12;Harry Konings, T. 14316-14317.4214 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 12.4215 Harry Konings, T. 14319-14320.4216 Harry Konings, T. 14319-14320, 14474.4217 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 13;Harry Konings, T. 14320-14321.4218 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 13;Harry Konings, T. 14367.4219 Harry Konings, T. 14331.4220 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), pp. 2, 9,11, Annex A, p. 4; P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 4; D1253 (United StatesDepartment of the Army, Fire Support in the Airland Battle), p. 24.4221 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 2,Annex A, p. 4; P1260 (Harry Konings, Addendum to expert report), p. 4.4222 P1259 (Harry Konings, expert report, “Fire support during Operation Storm, August 1995”), p. 2,Annex A, p. 4; Harry Konings, T. 14538.598Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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