Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY Gotovina et al Judgement Volume I - ICTY

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39273further 4,254 troops in combat security, logistical support and anti-armoured support. 185On 16 September 1995, in his Analysis of Conducted Operation Storm, Gotovina wroteto Červenko that during Operation Storm the Split MD had 30,000 men, 10,000 ofwhom had been newly mobilized. 186 The Split MD included the following operationalunits: the 4th Guards Brigade; the 7th Guards Brigade; the 2nd battalion of the 9thGuards Brigade; the 81st Guards battalion; the 112th, 113th, 141st and 144th brigades;and the 6th, 7th, 15th, 126th, 134th, 142nd Home Guard Regiments. 187 The 4th GuardsBrigade had 1,969 troops as ready forces, and the 7th Guards Brigade had 1,880troops. 18878. On 2 August 1995, in his order for an offensive operation, Gotovina establishedthe OG North and ordered that it be comprised of, as main forces, the 4th and the 7thGuards Brigades; as auxiliary forces, the 2nd and the 3rd HVO Guards Brigades and theTomislavgrad MD forces; and as other forces, the 81st Guards battalion and the 1stCroatian Guards Brigade. 189 Gotovina further ordered that the OG Sinj be comprised ofthe 126th Home Guard Regiment, the 144th Brigade and the 6th Home GuardRegiment. 190 The OG Šibenik was to be comprised of the 15th and 142nd Home GuardRegiments and the 113th Infantry Brigade. 191 The OG Zadar was to consist of the 2ndbattalion of the 9th Guards Brigade, the 112th Brigade, and the 7th and 134th HomeGuard Regiments. 192 The Split MD command was placed in charge of commanding andcontrolling all forces in the area of the attack operation. The Zadar forward commandpost was to directly control the forces of the OG Zadar and the OG Šibenik, while theSajković forward command post would directly control the forces of the OG Sinj andthe OG North. 193 Gotovina appointed Rahim Ademi, the Split MD Chief of Staff, tocommand all units of the OG North, Bruno Vukić to command the units of the OGŠibenik, and Mladen Fuzul to command the units of the OG Zadar. 194 Gotovina further185 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1. Further details of the units can be found inthis exhibit.186 P2585 (Analysis of conducted Operation Storm, Ante Gotovina, 16 September 1995), pp. 1-2, 6.187 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1; P2585 (Analysis of conducted OperationStorm, Ante Gotovina, 16 September 1995), pp. 6-7.188 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1.189 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), pp. 6-7.190 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 9.191 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 10.192 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 12. See also P1192(Gotovina report regarding analysis of Kozjak 95, 20 August 1995), p. 2.193 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 6.194 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), pp. 7, 11-12. See also D793(Order by Ante Gotovina appointing Brigadier Rahim Ademi as OG North Commander, 3 August 1995).42Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

39272ordered that regular daily reports were to be sent every six hours depicting the situationfrom 6 a.m. onwards. Interim reports were ordered to be sent when needed. 19579. In orders dated 2 August 1995, Gotovina and Rajčić ordered the formation ofTRS-1, TRS-2, TS-3 within OG North, TS-4 in OG Šibenik and TS-5 in OG Zadar. 196To provide artillery support, Gotovina further ordered the formation of artillery groupswithin the units carrying out the combat operations, using the units’ own artilleryresources. These artillery groups were to engage in the focal tasks of their respectiveunits. 197 Gotovina ordered that ammunition be provided to artillery at their initialpositions and further supplies to be provided based on consumption, within the amountsauthorized. 198 Rajčić provided further details on the organization of the Split MD, inparticular with regard to its artillery units. Rajčić testified that the primary level ofcommand was the MD and the OGs were the second level, as they were directlysubordinated to the command of the MD. 199 The artillery was split into five groups,because the Split MD lacked sufficient artillery to cover all the needs of OperationStorm. 200 The artillery groups were tasked with providing artillery support for infantrybrigades and Home Guard regiments by firing at targets within the composition ofenemy brigades and combat groups, as well as with firing at military objectives, such astargets in Knin and in the operative depth of the enemy’s defence. 201 The artillery andartillery-rocket groups were deployed within the disposition of the OGs, but notattached to the OGs, in a centralized/decentralized model of command. 202 When firingat strategic targets and targets in the operational depth, such as those in Knin, theartillery groups were under the command of the Split MD Commander Gotovina, who195 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 19.196 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 14; D970 (Order to attackattachment for the artillery, by Marko Rajčić, 2 August 1995), p. 1. See also Marko Rajčić, T. 16425;D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), para. 33; P1192 (Gotovina report regardinganalysis of Kozjak 95, 20 August 1995), p. 3; P2323 (Military Police official note of Rajčić interview, 11July 2008), p. 2; P2336 (Analysis of Split MD actions from 4 to 9 August 1995, by Marko Rajčić, 17October 2008), pp. 6-7; P2340 (Reconstruction of the Split MD artillery from 4 to 9 August 1995, byMarko Rajčić, 28 November 2008), p. 7; P2350 (First version of the order for an attack operation, signedCommander Ante Gotovina, 1 August 1995), pp. 15-16.197 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 14.198 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante Gotovina, 2 August 1995), p. 17.199 Marko Rajčić, T. 16402-16403.200 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), paras 34-35.201 D1425 (Marko Rajčić, witness statement, 13 February 2009), paras 35-40, 42, 62; Marko Rajčić, T.16341; P2336 (Analysis of Split MD actions from 4 to 9 August 1995, by Marko Rajčić, 17 October2008), p. 7.202 Marko Rajčić, T. 16339-16341, 16344, 16346, 16577.43Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

39273further 4,254 troops in combat security, logistic<strong>al</strong> support and anti-armoured support. 185On 16 September 1995, in his An<strong>al</strong>ysis of Conducted Operation Storm, <strong>Gotovina</strong> wrot<strong>et</strong>o Červenko that during Operation Storm the Split MD had 30,000 men, 10,000 ofwhom had been newly mobilized. 186 The Split MD included the following operation<strong>al</strong>units: the 4th Guards Brigade; the 7th Guards Brigade; the 2nd batt<strong>al</strong>ion of the 9thGuards Brigade; the 81st Guards batt<strong>al</strong>ion; the 112th, 113th, 141st and 144th brigades;and the 6th, 7th, 15th, 126th, 134th, 142nd Home Guard Regiments. 187 The 4th GuardsBrigade had 1,969 troops as ready forces, and the 7th Guards Brigade had 1,880troops. 18878. On 2 August 1995, in his order for an offensive operation, <strong>Gotovina</strong> establishedthe OG North and ordered that it be comprised of, as main forces, the 4th and the 7thGuards Brigades; as auxiliary forces, the 2nd and the 3rd HVO Guards Brigades and theTomislavgrad MD forces; and as other forces, the 81st Guards batt<strong>al</strong>ion and the 1stCroatian Guards Brigade. 189 <strong>Gotovina</strong> further ordered that the OG Sinj be comprised ofthe 126th Home Guard Regiment, the 144th Brigade and the 6th Home GuardRegiment. 190 The OG Šibenik was to be comprised of the 15th and 142nd Home GuardRegiments and the 113th Infantry Brigade. 191 The OG Zadar was to consist of the 2ndbatt<strong>al</strong>ion of the 9th Guards Brigade, the 112th Brigade, and the 7th and 134th HomeGuard Regiments. 192 The Split MD command was placed in charge of commanding andcontrolling <strong>al</strong>l forces in the area of the attack operation. The Zadar forward commandpost was to directly control the forces of the OG Zadar and the OG Šibenik, while theSajković forward command post would directly control the forces of the OG Sinj andthe OG North. 193 <strong>Gotovina</strong> appointed Rahim Ademi, the Split MD Chief of Staff, tocommand <strong>al</strong>l units of the OG North, Bruno Vukić to command the units of the OGŠibenik, and Mladen Fuzul to command the units of the OG Zadar. 194 <strong>Gotovina</strong> further185 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1. Further d<strong>et</strong>ails of the units can be found inthis exhibit.186 P2585 (An<strong>al</strong>ysis of conducted Operation Storm, Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 16 September 1995), pp. 1-2, 6.187 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1; P2585 (An<strong>al</strong>ysis of conducted OperationStorm, Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 16 September 1995), pp. 6-7.188 P1266 (List of Split MD troops for Operation Storm), p. 1.189 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), pp. 6-7.190 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 9.191 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 10.192 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 12. See <strong>al</strong>so P1192(<strong>Gotovina</strong> report regarding an<strong>al</strong>ysis of Kozjak 95, 20 August 1995), p. 2.193 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), p. 6.194 P1125 (Offensive Operation Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong>, 2 August 1995), pp. 7, 11-12. See <strong>al</strong>so D793(Order by Ante <strong>Gotovina</strong> appointing Brigadier Rahim Ademi as OG North Commander, 3 August 1995).42Case No.: IT-06-90-T 15 April 2011 `

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