LSEG Response to IOSCO Consultation - London Stock Exchange

21 In practical terms, it is unlikely that in extreme market conditions marketmakers would continue to provide prices, regardless of the regulatoryrequirements upon them. The risk of a censure or a fine from an RM, MTF oreven a Competent Authority could seem less significant when set against thepotential risk of significant financial loss or insolvency from meeting mandatoryobligations to continue to quote prices in fast-moving and volatile markets whennot in their interests. The fine is likely to be a small price to pay for stepping outof the path of the oncoming train.22 Finally, we do not support the use of stub quotes. If market makers are able tobe absent from the market for a period of time in periods of high volatility, andthose markets themselves use volatility controls, then stub quotes will be notbe necessary.Question 6 – Do you have suggestions for improvements to regulators’surveillance capabilities with respect to the markets and modern tradingtechniques? Please elaborate.Who should bear the cost of investing in such capabilities and the cost ofoperating and supervising the markets in order to ensure fairness amongmarket participants? Please elaborate.23 Trading venues have a role to play, as the front line regulators, in ensuring thattheir markets remain fair and orderly with real-time monitoring and surveillance.We are aware that competent authorities may be considering enhancing theirsurveillance systems to have a real-time view of the markets. This is likely to becomplex and expensive to implement and may not necessarily be effective –especially across the larger fragmented equity markets in Europe, and acrossEU member states.24 A distinction should be drawn between market abuse, which is a criminal act,and market disruption or an activity having an impact on market integrity, whichcan be the result of erroneous orders and so called “fat finger” errors. MarketAbuse is difficult to detect and respond to in real-time; it often requiresextensive investigation after the event, using transaction data that can takeseveral weeks or even months to analyse. Market disruption can be detectedmore easily in real-time, and dealt with rapidly by trading venues in theircapacity of ensuring orderly and fair markets.25 Therefore, although real-time capabilities are required for trading venues toensure orderly trading, we do not see that they would be required by regulatorsto monitor for market abuse – certainly not for the cost that would be requiredto achieve such real-time surveillance in larger and fragmented equity marketssuch as the UK. In Europe, competent authorities already receive transactiondata at the end of the day, and may request further data from investment firmsand trading venues if they believe that a case of market abuse exists.Page 7 of 11

Question 7 – What do you perceive as the major causes of settlementindiscipline and settlement failures? What steps, if any, do you believeregulators should take to address these causes?26 We are uncertain as to the premise of this question, and note that there is nodiscussion in the Consultation paper regarding settlement failure or discipline.Notwithstanding this, if the point of the question is whether HFT and automatedtrading gives rise to settlement failure or indiscipline, we do not accept such apremise. There is a popular misconception that intra-day trading, whether HFTor not, has an impact on the shareholding position in the issuers’records/registers; in many cases it does not. In our experience, intra-daytraders rarely hold a large inventory of stock, and therefore their trades rarelygo through to the settlement process.27 We estimate that approximately 98.4 per cent of all trades settle within fourdays of the Intended Settlement Date (ISD) 8 for all securities that trade on theLondon Stock Exchange, and over 99 per cent of trades settle by the ISD inItaly. 9Question 8 – Have the appropriate steps been taken to limit or manageconflicts of interest that arise where an investment firm simultaneouslyconducts client-serving activities and proprietary trading or a tradingparticipant is also a shareholder in a venue on which it trades? If you believeconflicts management is inadequate, please explain how this manifests itselfand any recommendation you have for how conflicts management could beimproved.28 We are unaware of any problems that have arisen as a result of a conflict ofinterest. This does not present any particular new problem not already coveredby the existing Conduct of Business rules. We would also make the generalpoint that all firms and platforms should have adequate policies in place tomanage such conflicts effectively, and that the regulatory compliancedepartment within such firms should be sufficiently independent.Question 9 – Do you think existing laws and rules on market abuse anddisorderly trading cover computer generated orders and are relevant in today’smarket environment?29 In general, we believe that existing laws and rules on market abuse anddisorderly trading in Europe are still relevant and applicable in today’s marketenvironment. Computer generated trading has not, in our view, given rise toany new types of abuse, namely the means by which it may be undertaken orthe speed. However, it may be useful to have more illustrative guidance andexamples of what may constitute market abuse and disorderly behaviour inmarkets.8 Source: CREST9 Source: Monte TitoliPage 8 of 11

traded in more than one venue, or which have active stock options or stockfutures, also typically have higher order-to-trade ratios.35 IOSCO will be aware of the work done by the Canadian authorities regarding aregulatory fee structure that imposes a cost in proportion to a marketparticipant’s order activity, rather than executed trades; it would be interestingto see whether this had any measurable impact on trading strategies.Question 12 – Should market operators be required to make their co-locationservices available on a fair and non-discriminatory basis?36 We agree that access to co-location facilities should be provided on a nondiscriminatorybasis. The same market access offering and related incentivesshould be offered to all participants. This should not mean that co-locationspace has to be limitless – provided it is open to all market participants then itshould be a commercial service based on supply and demand and should beable to be priced accordingly.37 In assessing co-location from the point of view of fair market access, we wouldalso highlight that the information provided on the costs and speeds of colocationmust be correct, clear and not misleading, so that market participantsare unambiguously and transparently informed about costs and technicalspecifications.Question 13 – Should market operators be required to provide testingenvironments to enable participants in stress test their algorithms? If so, whatkind of minimum requirements are reasonable?38 We do not believe that market operators should be required to provide testingenvironments for stress testing algorithms. To do so would be incredibly difficultto achieve in practice and expensive to implement, as it would requiresimulating a trading environment with parameters that may change in responseto different externalities (and are therefore difficult to model).39 However, the London Stock Exchange Group does provide range of customertesting services that allow our members to test their systems, and ensure thatthey are fully operational and effective. 10 It is our belief that all trading venuesmust offer this service as part of its arrangements for effective systems andcontrols.40 LSEG also stress tests its systems to ensure that their capacity can meetdemand and handle potentially high message volumes during times of highmarket volatility. Further, as discussed in question 4, volatility controls andcircuit breakers are deployed to ensure that trading in particular financialinstruments remains orderly. We consider that this is a more effective way ofmaintaining orderly markets.10 For more information, please visit http://www.londonstockexchange.com/products-andservices/technical-library/customer/customer-testing-services.htmPage 10 of 11

Question 14 – To what extent do you have other comments related to the risksto market integrity and efficiency raised by the issues in this report?41 We have no further views to add at this timePage 11 of 11