From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
2 POWER AND POLITICS I VOTE, THEREFORE I AMbe the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressedin periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal andequal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent freevoting procedures.’More than any other political system, democracy has a trackrecord of promoting and protecting individual political rights andcivil liberties, such as freedom of speech and association, and thesein turn help to entrench democratic values and foster democraticpolitics, paving the way for the enjoyment of economic, social, andcultural rights. Democracy is not necessarily benign: emerging democraciesin the USA, Argentina, and Australia committed somethingclose to genocide against indigenous groups.Without a wider range ofstate institutions being in place (see Part 4), elections (which canseriously challenge existing power structures) can trigger violence, asin recent attempts at democratic transitions in Lebanon, Afghanistan,Kenya, and the Palestinian Authority, while elections in Algeria,Burundi, and Yugoslavia in the 1990s led directly to major civil wars. 104More than periodic elections, democracy is best understood as acluster of devices and institutions, some of which point in contradictorydirections, and all of which are continuing to evolve. It is thechecks and balances that these different institutions –legislature,judiciary, executive, media, and civil society – exert on each other thatdetermine the degree to which democratic regimes respect the rightsof all their citizens. 105 When competitive elections are introduced in asituation of weak or non-existent institutions, as in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, it can trigger an outbreak of ‘spoils politics’and political meltdown, undermining efforts to build the state.Democracy is made possible by greater equality, and in turnpromotes equality and seems to encourage governments to focus onthe prosaic needs of their citizens, rather than on glory or plunder.Studies find a clear link between democracy and the greater provisionof primary education. Once income effects are excluded, democraciesspend 25–50 per cent more than autocracies on public goods andservices. 106 Democracy also has an equalising effect on power relationsbetween men and women. Conversely, where democracies fail toaddress inequalities, civic involvement and voter turnout fall. 10781
FROM POVERTY TO POWERWhere flawed democracies allow a majority to dominate and excludea minority, they can also aggravate inequality.Amartya Sen famously established that no famine has ever occurredin a functioning democracy, but any deeper link between democracyand economic well-being is much more disputed. The decades ofdemocratisation have not produced a growth rebound – quite thecontrary. In many regions, new democracies proved unexpectedlywilling to introduce harsh structural adjustment measures that hurtboth growth and equity. 108 The economies of democracies in LatinAmerica and Africa have stagnated, while China,Viet Nam, Indonesia,and South Korea have taken off economically under authoritariangovernments.Because democracies require an element of consent – defeatedcandidates must accept their defeat – it can be more difficultfor democratic governments to pursue radical change, such as redistributionthrough land reform, even where it is required to triggereconomic take-off (as in Taiwan and South Korea). By the same token, ademocratic regime is less likely to get away with the sort of radicallyanti-poor reforms that were implemented by the Pinochet dictatorshipin Chile, when opponents such as trade unionists were killed,jailed, or exiled as part of its free market overhaul of the economy.That very inertia can be a blessing: one study found that althoughdemocracies have grown more slowly in economic terms than somenon-democratic countries, they have grown more steadily over longperiods, avoiding the booms and busts that invariably hit the poorhardest and ratchet up inequality. 109Economist Ha-Joon Chang believes that ‘market and democracyclash at a fundamental level. Democracy runs on the principle of“one man (one person), one vote”. The market runs on the principle of“one dollar, one vote”’. Chang points out that ‘most nineteenth centuryliberals opposed democracy because they thought it was not compatiblewith a free market. 110 They argued that democracy would allow thepoor majority to introduce policies that would exploit the rich minority(e.g. a progressive income tax, nationalisation of private property),thus destroying the incentive for wealth creation’. 111Perhaps he exaggerates (many liberals believe that the independenceand security given by a market and property are needed to make82
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FROM POVERTY TO POWERWhere flawed democracies allow a majority <strong>to</strong> dominate and excludea minority, they can also aggravate inequality.Amartya Sen famously established that no famine has ever occurredin a functioning democracy, but any deeper link between democracyand economic well-being is much more disputed. The decades ofdemocratisation have not produced a growth rebound – quite thecontrary. In many regions, new democracies proved unexpectedlywilling <strong>to</strong> introduce harsh structural adjustment measures that hurtboth growth and equity. 108 The economies of democracies in LatinAmerica and Africa have stagnated, while China,Viet Nam, Indonesia,and South Korea have taken off economically under authoritariangovernments.Because democracies require an element of consent – defeatedcandidates must accept their defeat – it can be more difficultfor democratic governments <strong>to</strong> pursue radical change, such as redistributionthrough land reform, even where it is required <strong>to</strong> triggereconomic take-off (as in Taiwan and South Korea). By the same <strong>to</strong>ken, ademocratic regime is less likely <strong>to</strong> get away with the sort of radicallyanti-poor reforms that were implemented by the Pinochet dicta<strong>to</strong>rshipin Chile, when opponents such as trade unionists were killed,jailed, or exiled as part of its free market overhaul of the economy.That very inertia can be a blessing: one study found that althoughdemocracies have grown more slowly in economic terms than somenon-democratic countries, they have grown more steadily over longperiods, avoiding the booms and busts that invariably hit the poorhardest and ratchet up inequality. 109Economist Ha-Joon Chang believes that ‘market and democracyclash at a fundamental level. Democracy runs on the principle of“one man (one person), one vote”. The market runs on the principle of“one dollar, one vote”’. Chang points out that ‘most nineteenth centuryliberals opposed democracy because they thought it was not compatiblewith a free market. 110 They argued that democracy would allow thepoor majority <strong>to</strong> introduce policies that would exploit the rich minority(e.g. a progressive income tax, nationalisation of private property),thus destroying the incentive for wealth creation’. 111Perhaps he exaggerates (many liberals believe that the independenceand security given by a market and property are needed <strong>to</strong> make82