From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSthe planned results and at the end evaluate the project for accountability,impact and sometimes even for learning.’ 6Such an approach may work for specific tasks such as building aschool or sinking a well, but it is ill-suited to describing or influencingthe kind of chaotic and complex changes that often characterisedevelopment.More broadly, NGOs abhor violence and suffering: indeed, reducingthe prevalence of these is one of the main reasons for their existence.But recognising the role of, say, conflict in change need not requireendorsing it. If the only change that NGOs can even think aboutis economic growth without Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ –innovation without risk and change without conflict – then they riskignoring some of the most important drivers of change. A pale changemodel that considers only slow and painless progress can end uplooking very much like support for the status quo.Roman Krznaric points to several flaws in development thinkingon change: 7Excessive reformism without politics or history: Most developmentthinking is essentially reformist, attempting to work within existinginstitutions and systems. It therefore ignores the possibility of suddenshifts, and struggles to understand the link between social and politicalupheaval and change. Development organisations limited to areformist agenda would have found it difficult to support the AfricanNational Congress during apartheid because of its policy of armedstruggle; liberation movements in 1980s Central America; or the morethan two decades of illegal land occupations by Brazil’s Landless RuralWorkers Movement.This raises difficult questions for our understanding of change. Ifwe eschew violence in all but the most extreme situations, as mostNGOs do, we remove from the equation one of the most omnipresentforces of change. Heraclitus believed that ‘war is the father of allthings’. Modern observers might not be so militaristic, but war isundoubtedly a major source of political and social upheaval, not all ofwhich is negative, as the creation of the European welfare statesfollowing the Second World War demonstrates.441
FROM POVERTY TO POWERWithin many development organisations there is often somethingof a divide, with staff on the ground in different developing countrieshaving a sophisticated grasp of local politics and history (albeit oftenin their heads rather than on paper). However, this knowledge rarelymakes it into the overall thinking of the organisation. One seasonedNGO observer noticed that, almost invariably, serious politicaldiscussions with staff around the world took place only in the restaurantor bar after the formal business of the day had ended. 8Ignoring the impact of sudden change and ‘shocks’: Shocks such aswars or natural disasters are perhaps the most powerful forces forchange, and yet development organisations largely respond to themsolely in terms of humanitarian aid, such as food, water, or shelter.These undoubtedly save lives, but ignore the opportunities for positivechange created by such shocks. Major changes (both good and bad)that would normally take decades to happen may occur in the weeksand months after a war, disaster, or political upheaval. How coulddevelopment practitioners respond more effectively to these ‘silverlinings’ to promote wider systemic change (for example new laws andconstitutions, political actors, movements for change)?Lack of multi-disciplinary agility: Development practitioners tendto look at change through the lens of a single discipline. In 2006, whenthe World Bank commissioned an external evaluation of its researchdepartment, it appointed a group of 20 eminent economists, to thechagrin of the non-economists in its research team. Such disciplinaryblinkers also afflict NGOs.This may explain why development advocateshave a weakness for magic bullets – whether on the neoliberal wing,(de Soto’s work on property rights, discussed on page 71) or on the left(popular participation, social movements).Underestimating contextual limitations: There are an enormousnumber of contextual factors that affect change or are an obstacle to it.Development strategies tend to underestimate the importance of suchcontexts, and hence overestimate the possibilities for successfulchange. Sometimes advocates of change default to ‘If I ruled the world’visions of Utopias, with little analysis of how such visions could beachieved given the existing distribution of power and influence. Suchapolitical thinking can be self-defeating, swinging between feelings ofomnipotence, frustration, and powerlessness.442
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- Page 462 and 463: NOTESPART 1: INTRODUCTION1 The infa
- Page 464 and 465: NOTESPART 2: POWER AND POLITICS1 J.
- Page 466 and 467: NOTES82 J. Beall and S. Fox (2006)
- Page 468 and 469: NOTES5 There has, however, been inc
- Page 470 and 471: NOTES73 See also DFID (2005) ‘Gro
- Page 472 and 473: NOTES139 Author interview, December
- Page 474 and 475: NOTES10 Sources for Figure 4.2: Chi
- Page 476 and 477: NOTES63 WHO (2006) ‘Cumulative Nu
- Page 478 and 479: NOTES124 K. Annan (2005) ‘In Larg
- Page 480 and 481: NOTESFramework Paper drawn up betwe
- Page 482 and 483: NOTES66 H.-J. Chang (2001) ‘Insti
- Page 484 and 485: NOTES138 Information gathered from
- Page 486 and 487: NOTES192 United Nations (2005) ‘W
- Page 488 and 489: NOTES234 In the UK, for example, th
- Page 490 and 491: BIBLIOGRAPHYArcand, J.L. (2004) in
- Page 492 and 493: BIBLIOGRAPHYCastillo, G. and M. Bro
- Page 494 and 495: BIBLIOGRAPHYCozijnsen, J., D. Dudek
- Page 496 and 497: BIBLIOGRAPHYFerreira, F.H.G., P.G.
- Page 498 and 499: BIBLIOGRAPHYGreen, D. (2003) Silent
- Page 500 and 501: BIBLIOGRAPHYInternational Food Poli
- Page 502 and 503: BIBLIOGRAPHYLiu, J. and J. Diamond
- Page 504 and 505: BIBLIOGRAPHYODI (undated) ‘Inequa
- Page 506 and 507: BIBLIOGRAPHYOxfam International (20
ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSthe planned results and at the end evaluate the project for accountability,impact and sometimes even for learning.’ 6Such an approach may work for specific tasks such as building aschool or sinking a well, but it is ill-suited <strong>to</strong> describing or influencingthe kind of chaotic and complex changes that often characterisedevelopment.More broadly, NGOs abhor violence and suffering: indeed, reducingthe prevalence of these is one of the main reasons for their existence.But recognising the role of, say, conflict in change need not requireendorsing it. If the only change that NGOs can even think aboutis economic growth without Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ –innovation without risk and change without conflict – then they riskignoring some of the most important drivers of change. A pale changemodel that considers only slow and painless progress can end uplooking very much like support for the status quo.Roman Krznaric points <strong>to</strong> several flaws in development thinkingon change: 7Excessive reformism without politics or his<strong>to</strong>ry: Most developmentthinking is essentially reformist, attempting <strong>to</strong> work within existinginstitutions and systems. It therefore ignores the possibility of suddenshifts, and struggles <strong>to</strong> understand the link between social and politicalupheaval and change. Development organisations limited <strong>to</strong> areformist agenda would have found it difficult <strong>to</strong> support the AfricanNational Congress during apartheid because of its policy of armedstruggle; liberation movements in 1980s Central America; or the morethan two decades of illegal land occupations by Brazil’s Landless RuralWorkers Movement.This raises difficult questions for our understanding of change. Ifwe eschew violence in all but the most extreme situations, as mostNGOs do, we remove from the equation one of the most omnipresentforces of change. Heraclitus believed that ‘war is the father of allthings’. Modern observers might not be so militaristic, but war isundoubtedly a major source of political and social upheaval, not all ofwhich is negative, as the creation of the European welfare statesfollowing the Second World War demonstrates.441