From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE CHANGEaccrue in a relatively far-off future, and often in different countriesaltogether. The political reality is that floods in New Orleans orCentral Europe are much more likely to prompt action in Washingtonor Brussels than cyclones in Bangladesh or droughts in Niger.New institutions of the kind required by climate change have comeabout in the past as the result of a shock that galvanises allies andconvinces waverers, such as war or depression. Such shocks haveenormous costs, especially for poor people. In this case, waiting for amajor systemic shock will probably entail irreversible tipping points.In that, it resembles nuclear warfare, where global agreements must bereached before a major shock occurs.Convincing the public of the need for short-term sacrifice in theinterest of long-term solutions is always difficult: witness the glacialpace of pension reform in many countries. Achieving all this withequity is even harder – as in the Doha trade talks, where rich countrieshave resisted granting additional flexibility to any poor country thatmight become a competitor. Politicians may hope that a less costlypath comes along in the shape of technological fixes that can obviatethe need for difficult trade-offs. However, technological solutionscould well end up increasing inequality, while the wilder visions ofgeo-engineering – such as sprinkling the oceans with iron filings toencourage algal growth or launching giant reflectors into space – arelikely to have serious unintended consequences.The political obstacles are great, but the scale of the threat is almostunimaginable: climate change could make large parts of the globeuninhabitable, triggering a species loss comparable to the end of thedinosaurs. One of those species might be our own. Perhaps moreplausible is a disintegration of civilisation, catapulting society backcenturies, if not millennia. The global governance of the internationalsystem faces no sterner test in the decades to come.423
FROM POVERTY TO POWERGLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THETWENTY-FIRST CENTURYThe twenty-first century will be characterised by growing economicintegration and shifting power balances among nations: the slow declineof the post- Second World War powers; the inexorable rise of new powerssuch as China and India; the increased role of regional and sub-regionalblocs such as the African Union, Comesa (East and Southern Africa),Caricom (Caribbean),or ASEAN (East Asia); and the sometimes precipitatecollapse of poor countries on the margins of these tectonic shifts.The institutions of global governance were built on an order that israpidly eroding,and will have to evolve to keep pace with new challenges.With all its limitations, global governance holds out the promise ofbuilding some fairness and predictability into international relationsby reining in the powerful, ensuring that poor nations have sufficientpolicy space and resources to work their way out of poverty, and helpingthe most vulnerable. The challenge is to make sure that globalgovernance resembles a safety net more than it does a trap.The current institutions of global governance fall far short offulfilling that hope: the UN struggles to reform itself into the kind ofeffective organisation that can implement its newly agreed ‘responsibilityto protect’; the World Bank and the IMF remain in the grip of a largelyoutdated and ideological economic doctrine that does great harm inmany countries, and the same goes for the WTO; aid agencies moveslowly to overcome their inefficiencies and to spend new aid money inways that strengthen, and do not undermine, fledgling democracies.424
- Page 390 and 391: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDThe g
- Page 392 and 393: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDIn fo
- Page 394 and 395: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDIn th
- Page 396 and 397: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDcount
- Page 398 and 399: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDHOW C
- Page 400 and 401: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDIn su
- Page 402 and 403: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 404 and 405: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 406 and 407: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 408 and 409: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 410 and 411: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 412 and 413: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 414 and 415: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 416 and 417: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 418 and 419: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 420 and 421: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 422 and 423: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HUMANITA
- Page 424 and 425: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 426 and 427: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 428 and 429: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 430 and 431: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 432 and 433: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 434 and 435: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 436 and 437: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 438 and 439: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE
- Page 442 and 443: 5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM GLOBAL G
- Page 444 and 445: PART SIX
- Page 446 and 447: 6 CONCLUSION A NEW DEAL FOR A NEW C
- Page 448 and 449: ANNEX
- Page 450 and 451: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSmeetings, s
- Page 452 and 453: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSTHE COMPONE
- Page 454 and 455: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSinstitution
- Page 456 and 457: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSOrganisatio
- Page 458 and 459: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSthe planned
- Page 460 and 461: ANNEX HOW CHANGE HAPPENSTechnologic
- Page 462 and 463: NOTESPART 1: INTRODUCTION1 The infa
- Page 464 and 465: NOTESPART 2: POWER AND POLITICS1 J.
- Page 466 and 467: NOTES82 J. Beall and S. Fox (2006)
- Page 468 and 469: NOTES5 There has, however, been inc
- Page 470 and 471: NOTES73 See also DFID (2005) ‘Gro
- Page 472 and 473: NOTES139 Author interview, December
- Page 474 and 475: NOTES10 Sources for Figure 4.2: Chi
- Page 476 and 477: NOTES63 WHO (2006) ‘Cumulative Nu
- Page 478 and 479: NOTES124 K. Annan (2005) ‘In Larg
- Page 480 and 481: NOTESFramework Paper drawn up betwe
- Page 482 and 483: NOTES66 H.-J. Chang (2001) ‘Insti
- Page 484 and 485: NOTES138 Information gathered from
- Page 486 and 487: NOTES192 United Nations (2005) ‘W
- Page 488 and 489: NOTES234 In the UK, for example, th
5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CLIMATE CHANGEaccrue in a relatively far-off future, and often in different countriesal<strong>to</strong>gether. The political reality is that floods in New Orleans orCentral Europe are much more likely <strong>to</strong> prompt action in Washing<strong>to</strong>nor Brussels than cyclones in Bangladesh or droughts in Niger.New institutions of the kind required by climate change have comeabout in the past as the result of a shock that galvanises allies andconvinces waverers, such as war or depression. Such shocks haveenormous costs, especially for poor people. In this case, waiting for amajor systemic shock will probably entail irreversible tipping points.In that, it resembles nuclear warfare, where global agreements must bereached before a major shock occurs.Convincing the public of the need for short-term sacrifice in theinterest of long-term solutions is always difficult: witness the glacialpace of pension reform in many countries. Achieving all this withequity is even harder – as in the Doha trade talks, where rich countrieshave resisted granting additional flexibility <strong>to</strong> any poor country thatmight become a competi<strong>to</strong>r. Politicians may hope that a less costlypath comes along in the shape of technological fixes that can obviatethe need for difficult trade-offs. However, technological solutionscould well end up increasing inequality, while the wilder visions ofgeo-engineering – such as sprinkling the oceans with iron filings <strong>to</strong>encourage algal growth or launching giant reflec<strong>to</strong>rs in<strong>to</strong> space – arelikely <strong>to</strong> have serious unintended consequences.The political obstacles are great, but the scale of the threat is almostunimaginable: climate change could make large parts of the globeuninhabitable, triggering a species loss comparable <strong>to</strong> the end of thedinosaurs. One of those species might be our own. Perhaps moreplausible is a disintegration of civilisation, catapulting society backcenturies, if not millennia. The global governance of the internationalsystem faces no sterner test in the decades <strong>to</strong> come.423