From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDHOW CHANGE HAPPENS:THE 2005 GLENEAGLES AGREEMENTSAt their annual summit in 2005, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8)countries promised a dramatic turnaround in the rich world’s willingnessto fund development. They agreed to increase global aid levels by around$50bn per year by 2010 and to write off the debts of up to 50 of theworld’s poorest countries. Though critics derided the commitments asinadequate, and collective backsliding subsequently removed much oftheir lustre, the promises at Gleneagles constituted a marked departurefrom past practice. If nothing else, leaders would pay a political price forreneging on their pledges. How did such a commitment come about?The months leading up to the Gleneagles Summit in Scotland saw anunprecedented combination of government and civil society activism.The British host government, keen to ensure that the event would beperceived as a success, championed development funding from the start,setting up a high level ‘Commission for Africa’ in 2004 which includedseveral African heads of government and musician/activist Bob Geldof,and which produced a well-argued and costed plan for how the extra aidshould be spent.Civil society groups, meanwhile, campaigned in 70 countries acrossthe globe, including all the G8 nations, as part of the Global Call to ActionAgainst Poverty, a campaign known in the UK and a number of othercountries as ‘Make Poverty History’.Nelson Mandela added his considerablemoral weight when G8 finance ministers met in February. Then celebritiesGeldof, Bono, and others organised a series of ‘Live 8’ concerts in most G8countries the week before the summit, which were watched by two billionpeople. The campaign culminated in a march of 225,000 people inEdinburgh to deliver a petition that carried an astonishing 38 millionsignatures.The combination of public pressure and the UK government’s astutemanoeuvering of the summit agenda strengthened the hand of pro-aidministers in G8 governments, weakened the resolve of blockers (USA,Japan, and Italy), and convinced those who could have swung either way(Canada and Germany). The first sign of movement came as early asCASE STUDY381
FROM POVERTY TO POWERCASE STUDYFebruary, when G8 finance ministers outlined a debt cancellation plan.Then in May, EU leaders committed to aid increases that went a long waytoward meeting the $50bn target.Activists both inside government and out benefited from a broaderrevival of commitment to development, evidenced in the reversal offalling aid levels since 2000 and the endorsement that same year of theUN’s Millennium Development Goals. The efforts of African governmentsto promote a sense of progress – through the New EconomicPartnership for African Development, the spread of elections, and therestoration of promising levels of growth – also helped make aid politicallypalatable. Leaders may also have wanted to rebuild international cooperationafter deep divisions over the 2003 invasion of Iraq.Strong growth in the global economy was a factor, allowing the G8leaders to concentrate on long-term issues, breaking free of the crisismanagement mindset of previous summits. And unexpected events tooplayed a critical role. The Asian tsunami six months earlier had promptedan unprecedented display of public generosity, which in several cases hadshamed politicians into increasing government humanitarian relief, anddemonstrated the level of public interest in development issues. Then onthe first full day of the summit, terrorist bombings in London killed morethan 50 people, evoking a sentiment of solidarity in which G8 leaderswere keen to support the British government.The upbeat message on aid and debt contrasted sharply with theleaders’ inability to achieve significant progress on climate change or thestalled trade talks at the WTO. Generally speaking, leaders find it easier topromise money than to change their own policies: reductions in carbonemissions or righting the rigged rules of global trade cannot be achievedby writing a cheque.The lesson of 30 years of G8 summits is also that progress is oftenachieved only through reiteration – the same issue returning year afteryear to the summit agenda. The 2005 summit marked the fifth successivediscussion on Africa, whereas climate change had not figured on the G8agenda since 1997. The reappearance of climate change on the agenda inthe years following Gleneagles may therefore hold out some hope forfuture progress in the talks on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.382
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5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDHOW CHANGE HAPPENS:THE 2005 GLENEAGLES AGREEMENTSAt their annual summit in 2005, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8)countries promised a dramatic turnaround in the rich world’s willingness<strong>to</strong> fund development. They agreed <strong>to</strong> increase global aid levels by around$50bn per year by 2010 and <strong>to</strong> write off the debts of up <strong>to</strong> 50 of theworld’s poorest countries. Though critics derided the commitments asinadequate, and collective backsliding subsequently removed much oftheir lustre, the promises at Gleneagles constituted a marked departurefrom past practice. If nothing else, leaders would pay a political price forreneging on their pledges. How did such a commitment come about?The months leading up <strong>to</strong> the Gleneagles Summit in Scotland saw anunprecedented combination of government and civil society activism.The British host government, keen <strong>to</strong> ensure that the event would beperceived as a success, championed development funding from the start,setting up a high level ‘Commission for Africa’ in 2004 which includedseveral African heads of government and musician/activist Bob Geldof,and which produced a well-argued and costed plan for how the extra aidshould be spent.Civil society groups, meanwhile, campaigned in 70 countries acrossthe globe, including all the G8 nations, as part of the Global Call <strong>to</strong> ActionAgainst Poverty, a campaign known in the UK and a number of othercountries as ‘Make Poverty His<strong>to</strong>ry’.Nelson Mandela added his considerablemoral weight when G8 finance ministers met in February. Then celebritiesGeldof, Bono, and others organised a series of ‘Live 8’ concerts in most G8countries the week before the summit, which were watched by two billionpeople. The campaign culminated in a march of 225,000 people inEdinburgh <strong>to</strong> deliver a petition that carried an as<strong>to</strong>nishing 38 millionsignatures.The combination of public pressure and the UK government’s astutemanoeuvering of the summit agenda strengthened the hand of pro-aidministers in G8 governments, weakened the resolve of blockers (USA,Japan, and Italy), and convinced those who could have swung either way(Canada and Germany). The first sign of movement came as early asCASE STUDY381