From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AIDIn foreign aid, Planners announce good intentions but don’tmotivate anyone to carry them out; Searchers find things that workand get some reward. Planners raise expectations but take noresponsibility for meeting them; Searchers accept responsibility fortheir actions. Planners determine what to supply; Searchers findout what is in demand. Planners apply global blueprints; Searchersadapt to local conditions. Planners at the Top lack knowledge of theBottom; Searchers find out what the reality is at the Bottom.Planners never hear whether the Planned got what they needed;Searchers find out if the customer is satisfied. Will Gordon Brownbe held accountable if the new wave of aid still does not get 12-centmedicines to children with malaria? Indeed, the two key elementsthat make searches work, and the absence of which is fatal to plans,are feedback and accountability. 163Easterly is onto something: the absence of accountability lies at theheart of the problem; effective aid has to be tailored to local cultures,politics, and institutions and must avoid the curse of blueprintsdesigned in Washington, Brussels, or London. Many of the problemareas discussed above arise precisely from this mistaken top-downPlanners’ approach. But Easterly’s proposed cure – a naïve faith inmarkets – conveniently ignores the realities of powerlessness andmarginalisation in the lives of many poor women and men, and thevital importance of building an effective, accountable state.There is a fundamental inequality about the way that internationalaid works. Recipients are accountable to donors, and they must filehundreds of reports and host dozens of ‘donor missions’ to prove it.Accountability rarely operates in the opposite direction. Some poorcountries make the attempt – Afghanistan, for example, decided in2002 to set the ground rules for donor engagement in its reconstruction164 – but most have neither leverage nor recourse to sanctionsagainst donors if advice is poor or if projects are damaging. A newarchitecture is needed that makes donors accountable to recipients.Part of the answer ought to lie in a good-faith implementation ofthe Paris Declaration, but the Paris commitments are themselves weakin some areas, lacking specific targets on issues such as reducing tiedaid, counting debt relief as aid, or moving to long-term aid. Aiddonors should accept that developing-country governments must375
FROM POVERTY TO POWERremain in the driver’s seat, working with civil society, the private sector,political parties, and other domestic actors to devise policies that fitnational needs.Without a change in mindset on the part of donors, however, Parisstyleco-ordination between aid providers could actually increase theirability to speak to recipient governments with a single voice, undermining‘nationally owned’ strategies that donors do not like. Donors shouldalso welcome, rather than fight, assertive governments such as Ghana,Botswana, or Afghanistan which insist on aid on their own terms.For their part, INGOs regularly criticise companies and governmentsboth North and South for their lack of responsiveness to peopleliving in poverty, but many NGOs are less formally accountable totheir supporters than governments are to their electorates, or companiesto their shareholders.INGOs have responded by improving their transparency (forexample, publishing their financial statements and policies), agreeingcodes of good practice on issues such as humanitarian relief work, adoptingmembership structures, and instituting peer reviews and regularconsultation with a range of ‘stakeholders’, including partner organisationsin developing countries. 165 In most countries, INGOs areaccountable by law to the host government (which can lead to tensionswhen states resent NGO activities). They are also subject to rigorousreporting requirements to their official funders. In 2006, 11 of the majorINGOs from the human rights, development, environment, andconsumer sectors created the INGO Charter of Accountability to set astandard for their members and to give stakeholders greater confidence. 166While activists from developing countries appreciate the supportthat their organisations receive from INGOs, they often complain thatINGOs are domineering, using their resources and skills to hog thelimelight, impose their own agendas, and lure talented staff away withthe promise of higher salaries. In the long term, this dynamic couldwell undermine the effort to build active citizenship in developingcountries, and is particularly significant in light of the growth ofincreasingly sophisticated Southern NGOs, which are challenging thetraditional roles of their Northern counterparts as intermediariesbetween Northern funders and poor communities and as ‘builders ofcapacity’ of grassroots organisations.376
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FROM POVERTY TO POWERremain in the driver’s seat, working with civil society, the private sec<strong>to</strong>r,political parties, and other domestic ac<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> devise policies that fitnational needs.Without a change in mindset on the part of donors, however, Parisstyleco-ordination between aid providers could actually increase theirability <strong>to</strong> speak <strong>to</strong> recipient governments with a single voice, undermining‘nationally owned’ strategies that donors do not like. Donors shouldalso welcome, rather than fight, assertive governments such as Ghana,Botswana, or Afghanistan which insist on aid on their own terms.For their part, INGOs regularly criticise companies and governmentsboth North and South for their lack of responsiveness <strong>to</strong> peopleliving in <strong>poverty</strong>, but many NGOs are less formally accountable <strong>to</strong>their supporters than governments are <strong>to</strong> their elec<strong>to</strong>rates, or companies<strong>to</strong> their shareholders.INGOs have responded by improving their transparency (forexample, publishing their financial statements and policies), agreeingcodes of good practice on issues such as humanitarian relief work, adoptingmembership structures, and instituting peer reviews and regularconsultation with a range of ‘stakeholders’, including partner organisationsin developing countries. 165 In most countries, INGOs areaccountable by law <strong>to</strong> the host government (which can lead <strong>to</strong> tensionswhen states resent NGO activities). They are also subject <strong>to</strong> rigorousreporting requirements <strong>to</strong> their official funders. In 2006, 11 of the majorINGOs from the human rights, development, environment, andconsumer sec<strong>to</strong>rs created the INGO Charter of Accountability <strong>to</strong> set astandard for their members and <strong>to</strong> give stakeholders greater confidence. 166While activists from developing countries appreciate the supportthat their organisations receive from INGOs, they often complain thatINGOs are domineering, using their resources and skills <strong>to</strong> hog thelimelight, impose their own agendas, and lure talented staff away withthe promise of higher salaries. In the long term, this dynamic couldwell undermine the effort <strong>to</strong> build active citizenship in developingcountries, and is particularly significant in light of the growth ofincreasingly sophisticated Southern NGOs, which are challenging thetraditional roles of their Northern counterparts as intermediariesbetween Northern funders and poor communities and as ‘builders ofcapacity’ of grassroots organisations.376