From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TRADINGThese kinds of attitudes, and the developing countries’ refusal tocave in, have paralysed the Doha Round. On one level, this is betterthan accepting a ‘bad deal’ and the multilateral trading system continuesto function, however unfairly. But storm clouds are gathering over theglobal economy, fuelling protectionist sentiments in the North, andthat system is more fragile than it would be were the round to befunctioning smoothly and fairly. All it takes is for one major power toopenly defy a ruling by the WTO to precipitate a crisis of authorityand legitimacy in the institution, with serious consequences for themultilateral system. Rich countries have both a moral duty and along-term self-interest in ensuring that this does not happen.Shifting governments to the long-term vision that underpinned,for example, the USA’s willingness to give unilateral market access toits defeated opponents after the Second World War will not be easy.The strong economies need to offer more and demand less, ratherthan push the weak into further disadvantage. Developed countriesought to cut subsidies and open up their markets, while allowingdeveloping countries more ‘policy space’, not less, so that they mayfind the right trade and investment policies among the wide rangethat have led to economic take-off in different countries. 64Official trade rules are often less important in determining theeffectiveness of trade for development than the trade ‘realities’ of thesystem: access to finance; technology; or the nature of the chain ofbuyers and sellers for a particular product. These are discussed in Part3. More equitable global institutions and fairer rules for trade will notdeliver development on their own, but they hold out hope of at leastreining in the rapacious behaviour of the most powerful corporationsand countries, allowing poor countries and citizens to harness tradefor their long-term development.INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYThe global governance of ‘intellectual property’ (IP) such as patents,copyrights,and trademarks constitutes one of the most glaring examplesof the rigged rules and double standards that bedevil the internationaltrade system. While powerful governments seek ever greater liberalisationof trade and capital markets, they are using their negotiatingclout to force the global system towards increasing levels of ‘knowledge325
FROM POVERTY TO POWERprotectionism’ in the shape of IP rules that close down the flow ofknowledge and technology. IP negotiations lure the corporate lobbyistsout of the shadows, revealing their extraordinary access and influenceover the US and EU governments, among others (see page 328).The underlying principles of IP protection are simple. New inventionsare often costly to develop, and if rival firms were allowed immediatelyto copy and market new inventions, the incentives for companies toinvest in R&D would be few. IP laws provide companies with atemporary monopoly during which they can charge high prices torecoup their investment.The task of maintaining a balance between society’s interest increating incentives for innovation on the one hand, and promotingthe widespread dispersion of inventions on the other has been fraughtever since the Venetians first introduced patents at the end of thefifteenth century. Corporations find it far easier to make a profit frommonopoly than from innovation, and so have invariably argued forstrengthened IP rules, often to the detriment of wider society. At aninternational level, rich countries have consistently used IP topreserve their technological edge and ‘kick away the ladder’ frompotential competitors.Ironically, even in the rich countries the proliferation of patentsthreatens to undermine their purported aim. In many fields, firmsseeking to innovate must navigate through a ‘patent thicket’ protectingexisting technologies that they want to incorporate into a new design.In stampedes such as the patent applications on hundreds ofthousands of gene sequences for fragments of human DNA, the hardslog of innovation has given way to a Klondike-style gold rush of‘patent mining’ as an easy source of profits.The role of technology in development follows a fairly standardpath, described by one UN report as ‘a developed, innovating “North”and a developing, imitating “South”’. 65 All countries initially grow byimitating and adapting existing technologies. As they approach theglobal ‘technological frontier’, they move into innovation. One of thereasons why countries such as China or India, which are in ‘catch-up’mode, grow so much faster than the industrialised countries is thatadapting existing technologies is much easier than creating new ones.326
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FROM POVERTY TO POWERprotectionism’ in the shape of IP rules that close down the flow ofknowledge and technology. IP negotiations lure the corporate lobbyistsout of the shadows, revealing their extraordinary access and influenceover the US and EU governments, among others (see page 328).The underlying principles of IP protection are simple. New inventionsare often costly <strong>to</strong> develop, and if rival firms were allowed immediately<strong>to</strong> copy and market new inventions, the incentives for companies <strong>to</strong>invest in R&D would be few. IP laws provide companies with atemporary monopoly during which they can charge high prices <strong>to</strong>recoup their investment.The task of maintaining a balance between society’s interest increating incentives for innovation on the one hand, and promotingthe widespread dispersion of inventions on the other has been fraughtever since the Venetians first introduced patents at the end of thefifteenth century. Corporations find it far easier <strong>to</strong> make a profit frommonopoly than from innovation, and so have invariably argued forstrengthened IP rules, often <strong>to</strong> the detriment of wider society. At aninternational level, rich countries have consistently used IP <strong>to</strong>preserve their technological edge and ‘kick away the ladder’ frompotential competi<strong>to</strong>rs.Ironically, even in the rich countries the proliferation of patentsthreatens <strong>to</strong> undermine their purported aim. In many fields, firmsseeking <strong>to</strong> innovate must navigate through a ‘patent thicket’ protectingexisting technologies that they want <strong>to</strong> incorporate in<strong>to</strong> a new design.In stampedes such as the patent applications on hundreds ofthousands of gene sequences for fragments of human DNA, the hardslog of innovation has given way <strong>to</strong> a Klondike-style gold rush of‘patent mining’ as an easy source of profits.The role of technology in development follows a fairly standardpath, described by one UN report as ‘a developed, innovating “North”and a developing, imitating “South”’. 65 All countries initially grow byimitating and adapting existing technologies. As they approach theglobal ‘technological frontier’, they move in<strong>to</strong> innovation. One of thereasons why countries such as China or India, which are in ‘catch-up’mode, grow so much faster than the industrialised countries is thatadapting existing technologies is much easier than creating new ones.326