From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec

From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec

12.07.2015 Views

5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FINANCEcrises almost always increase inequality. In the words of Thai economistPasuk Phongpaichit, ‘For the poor, growth may trickle down – butdisaster sweeps down like an avalanche.’ 39There are numerous sensible ways to avoid such disasters.Countries that have maintained capital controls and have beencautious in opening up to capital flows, such as China, Chile, andIndia, have avoided crises of this kind. Governments raising money oninternational capital markets could link repayments to growth orcommodity prices, so that they can pay more back in good times, lessin bad times. The IMF attempted to devise an orderly process for bailingout governments, similar to a company bankruptcy procedure, toreplace the chaotic and damaging confusion that usually surrounds afinancial crash, only to have its proposals for a ‘Sovereign DebtRestructuring Mechanism’ blocked by a combination of powerfulgovernments and financial interests, as well as some developingcountrygovernments. 40The last point illustrates a serious obstacle to change.Whatever theobvious long-term benefits of managing capital flows to avoid crises,there are profits to be made from volatility. In the middle of themarket mayhem of the late 1990s, NatWest bank happily reported that‘currency and interest rate volatility provided significant tradingopportunities’. 41 Only firm political leadership can overcome suchopposition. Within developing countries, financial sectors wieldincreasing economic and political clout, and constitute a domesticlobby for liberalisation and against the kind of controls that can bringstability but would cut into their profits.While the IMF has backed off from its mid 1990s call for capitalaccount liberalisation to become part of its core business, the push forderegulation continues by means of regional trade agreements. In itsbilateral trade agreements with Chile and Singapore, the USA insistedon the elimination of widely applauded controls aimed at deterringshort-term speculative capital flows and encouraging longer-terminvestment. 42At the time of writing (early 2008), storm clouds are gathering inglobal capital markets, triggered by the sub-prime mortgage collapsein the USA and the bursting of other ‘bubbles’ in rich economies. Thelong, debt-driven boom in the rich world looks increasingly fragile:313

FROM POVERTY TO POWERthe USA is currently racking up huge debts due to large fiscal andtrade deficits and is covering them by borrowing some $2bn a day,largely from developing countries running surpluses, notablyChina. 43 In a highly risky ‘mutual hostage arrangement’, any majorshock or loss of confidence in the US economy or in the dollar coulddevastate both the USA and China and other Asian economies (whichwould see their dollar reserves fall in value).So far, in a warped mirror image of events after the Asian financialcrisis of the late 1990s, wealthy companies are snapping up assets in‘fire sales’ of distressed companies. But whereas in 1998 it was NorthernTNCs buying out companies in Indonesia, South Korea, and othercrisis-hit economies, in 2008 it was the ‘sovereign wealth funds’ ofdeveloping-country governments (mainly oil producers and Asiantigers), using their estimated $2.9 trillion in assets to bail out strugglingNorthern companies on Wall Street and beyond, and in theprocess gaining significant degrees of ownership and control. 44However, beyond this interesting exercise in role reversal, shouldthe feared recession finally break in the North, developing countriesare likely to be hurt too. Although in some ways they are less vulnerable– growth in the larger developing countries is primarily in the domesticeconomy rather than being export-driven, which means that commodityprices are likely to stay high even if the US and Europeaneconomies slow – many smaller developing countries still depend onexports to (and capital flows from) the USA and Europe. Financial‘contagion’ could infect developing-country banks and financecompanies. Historically, each new crisis is unpredictable and exposesa new source of instability – and the most vulnerable countries, andthe poorest communities within them, are unlikely to escapeunscathed.TAXATIONA major component of capital flows that cries out for effective regulationis tax evasion and avoidance. Put simply, the developing world is missingout on an estimated $385bn a year (five times the volume of globalaid) due to the evasion and avoidance of existing taxes. This happensthrough a number of mechanisms: 45314

5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FINANCEcrises almost always increase inequality. In the words of Thai economistPasuk Phongpaichit, ‘For the poor, growth may trickle down – butdisaster sweeps down like an avalanche.’ 39There are numerous sensible ways <strong>to</strong> avoid such disasters.Countries that have maintained capital controls and have beencautious in opening up <strong>to</strong> capital flows, such as China, Chile, andIndia, have avoided crises of this kind. Governments raising money oninternational capital markets could link repayments <strong>to</strong> growth orcommodity prices, so that they can pay more back in good times, lessin bad times. The IMF attempted <strong>to</strong> devise an orderly process for bailingout governments, similar <strong>to</strong> a company bankruptcy procedure, <strong>to</strong>replace the chaotic and damaging confusion that usually surrounds afinancial crash, only <strong>to</strong> have its proposals for a ‘Sovereign DebtRestructuring Mechanism’ blocked by a combination of <strong>power</strong>fulgovernments and financial interests, as well as some developingcountrygovernments. 40The last point illustrates a serious obstacle <strong>to</strong> change.Whatever theobvious long-term benefits of managing capital flows <strong>to</strong> avoid crises,there are profits <strong>to</strong> be made from volatility. In the middle of themarket mayhem of the late 1990s, NatWest bank happily reported that‘currency and interest rate volatility provided significant tradingopportunities’. 41 Only firm political leadership can overcome suchopposition. Within developing countries, financial sec<strong>to</strong>rs wieldincreasing economic and political clout, and constitute a domesticlobby for liberalisation and against the kind of controls that can bringstability but would cut in<strong>to</strong> their profits.While the IMF has backed off from its mid 1990s call for capitalaccount liberalisation <strong>to</strong> become part of its core business, the push forderegulation continues by means of regional trade agreements. In itsbilateral trade agreements with Chile and Singapore, the USA insistedon the elimination of widely applauded controls aimed at deterringshort-term speculative capital flows and encouraging longer-terminvestment. 42At the time of writing (early 2008), s<strong>to</strong>rm clouds are gathering inglobal capital markets, triggered by the sub-prime mortgage collapsein the USA and the bursting of other ‘bubbles’ in rich economies. Thelong, debt-driven boom in the rich world looks increasingly fragile:313

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