From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec

From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec

12.07.2015 Views

5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FINANCEActive citizens played a large role in obliging governments in bothrich and poor countries to move on the debt issue. The Freedom fromDebt Coalition in the Philippines and Koalisi Anti Utang in Indonesiaboth campaigned against ‘illegitimate debt’. In May 1998, 70,000Jubilee 2000 supporters formed a human chain around the G8 summitin Birmingham, UK and – as politicians inside the meeting laterconfirmed – forced debt onto the summit agenda, which culminatedin the Enhanced HIPC programme a year later. Global campaigningby Make Poverty History and the Global Call to Action against Povertyachieved a similar breakthrough at the G8 summit in Scotland in2005. Each time, governments swore that the latest debt relief initiativewould be the last. Luckily, citizens refused to believe them and, whenthe plight of debtor nations failed to improve, continued to campaignfor more.Naturally, creditors continued to try to set the terms of thenegotiations, but effective states proved themselves able to negotiatebetter terms. Argentina played hardball with the IMF and other creditorsafter its 2002 crisis, and was thus able to rebuild its economy atrecord speed.With HIPC, the creditors began to break new ground by actuallywriting off debts, rather than simply rescheduling them; by includingmultilateral, rather than just bilateral, debt; by dividing relief equitablyamong creditors; and, in the Enhanced HIPC initiative, by basing debtrelief on a ‘poverty reduction strategy’ drawn up by the government inconsultation with civil society (see page 301). The most recent incarnation,the MDRI, has gone still further by offering full cancellation ofcountries’ debts to the IFIs incurred up to certain dates, a limitedapplication of the ‘100 per cent cancellation’ that campaigners hadlong called for and which creditors had long claimed was impossible.Serious concerns remain about both the HIPC and the MDRI, notleast the extent to which they have entrenched the force of, in particular,IMF conditions. Countries must comply with these to get debt relief,which forces them to spend years implementing painful structuraladjustment policies in order to access the debt cancellation that waspromised to them as a solution to an urgent crisis. This is connected tothe fact that the HIPC and the MDRI are designed, implemented, andmonitored by the IFIs, with creditors treated as generous benefactors307

FROM POVERTY TO POWER– rather than those responsible for often irresponsible or self-interestedlending that contributed to the crisis in the first place – and debtors aserrant children who need to behave.Nonetheless, debt relief has translated into big money. The totaldebt relief for the 22 countries that had completed HIPC by mid-2007is estimated to be worth $70.7bn in today’s money, combining agreementswith multilateral institutions and bilateral and commercialcreditors. Because it directly frees up funds for governments to spendover many years, debt relief is a very efficient form of aid: the additionaldebt relief agreed in 2005 provided these countries with an estimated$1.3bn of extra funds in 2007 alone. 27It should be remembered, however, that debt relief is oftendwarfed by the amount that poor countries have already paid on theseloans. In 2004, the Nigerian government reported that the countryhad had original loans of $17bn, had repaid $18bn, and still owed$34bn. Its much-trumpeted 2005 debt-relief deal finally led to significantdebt cancellation, but the deal required the country to make adown payment of a further $12bn. 28Indebted countries face new threats in the shape of so-called‘vulture funds’. In 1999, as Zambia was trying to negotiate clearance ofthe debt it owed to Romania, a company called Donegal International,registered in the tax haven of the British Virgin Islands, swooped inand bought up the debt – then valued at around $30m with accruedinterest – for a knockdown price of $3.3m. The company then suedZambia in the UK courts for the full amount of the debt,plus compoundinterest, demanding a staggering $55m in total. In the end the judgeordered the Zambian government to hand over $15.5m.So far at least 40 such lawsuits have been launched by vulture fundsagainst highly indebted poor countries, and many of them are stilloutstanding. The debts known to be subject to litigation amount to$1.9bn. The bad news is that, in many cases, the law is on the side of thevulture funds: $991m has been awarded so far.A few major corporations have attempted similar legal arm-twisting.In 2003 the Big Food Group, at that time owner of the UK-basedIceland supermarket chain and other companies, sued Guyana forover £12m, only to drop the case after an outcry by UK NGOs.308

5 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FINANCEActive citizens played a large role in obliging governments in bothrich and poor countries <strong>to</strong> move on the debt issue. The Freedom fromDebt Coalition in the Philippines and Koalisi Anti Utang in Indonesiaboth campaigned against ‘illegitimate debt’. In May 1998, 70,000Jubilee 2000 supporters formed a human chain around the G8 summitin Birmingham, UK and – as politicians inside the meeting laterconfirmed – forced debt on<strong>to</strong> the summit agenda, which culminatedin the Enhanced HIPC programme a year later. Global campaigningby Make Poverty His<strong>to</strong>ry and the Global Call <strong>to</strong> Action against Povertyachieved a similar breakthrough at the G8 summit in Scotland in2005. Each time, governments swore that the latest debt relief initiativewould be the last. Luckily, citizens refused <strong>to</strong> believe them and, whenthe plight of deb<strong>to</strong>r nations failed <strong>to</strong> improve, continued <strong>to</strong> campaignfor more.Naturally, credi<strong>to</strong>rs continued <strong>to</strong> try <strong>to</strong> set the terms of thenegotiations, but effective states proved themselves able <strong>to</strong> negotiatebetter terms. Argentina played hardball with the IMF and other credi<strong>to</strong>rsafter its 2002 crisis, and was thus able <strong>to</strong> rebuild its economy atrecord speed.With HIPC, the credi<strong>to</strong>rs began <strong>to</strong> break new ground by actuallywriting off debts, rather than simply rescheduling them; by includingmultilateral, rather than just bilateral, debt; by dividing relief equitablyamong credi<strong>to</strong>rs; and, in the Enhanced HIPC initiative, by basing debtrelief on a ‘<strong>poverty</strong> reduction strategy’ drawn up by the government inconsultation with civil society (see page 301). The most recent incarnation,the MDRI, has gone still further by offering full cancellation ofcountries’ debts <strong>to</strong> the IFIs incurred up <strong>to</strong> certain dates, a limitedapplication of the ‘100 per cent cancellation’ that campaigners hadlong called for and which credi<strong>to</strong>rs had long claimed was impossible.Serious concerns remain about both the HIPC and the MDRI, notleast the extent <strong>to</strong> which they have entrenched the force of, in particular,IMF conditions. Countries must comply with these <strong>to</strong> get debt relief,which forces them <strong>to</strong> spend years implementing painful structuraladjustment policies in order <strong>to</strong> access the debt cancellation that waspromised <strong>to</strong> them as a solution <strong>to</strong> an urgent crisis. This is connected <strong>to</strong>the fact that the HIPC and the MDRI are designed, implemented, andmoni<strong>to</strong>red by the IFIs, with credi<strong>to</strong>rs treated as generous benefac<strong>to</strong>rs307

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