From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
4 RISK AND VULNERABILITY HEALTH RISKSTAC was astute in building broad alliances both within and outsidegovernment, and at local, national, and international levels.The campaign showed a remarkable tolerance for difference,even working with the Catholic Church despite disagreementover the use of condoms. By not denouncing the ANC government(unlike many other social movements), TAC managed tofind and cultivate allies within the party who eventually becameinstrumental in changing government policy.Since its campaign did not threaten major political or economicinterests (other than the foreign drug companies), it was probablymore suited to an insider–outsider-type strategy than issuessuch as land reform or the fall of apartheid itself. As an organisationof HIV-positive people, TAC also empowered its members tobecome their own most effective advocates, running ‘treatmentliteracy’ campaigns that provided the basis for both self-help andsocial mobilisation.Despite TAC’s enormous success in influencing public opinion,President Mbeki remained defiant, giving full support to HealthMinister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who had earned thenickname ‘Dr. Beetroot’ for her repeated assertions thatgarlic, beetroot, and better nutrition offered better prospects fortreating AIDS than ARVs.Only in 2006, when the battle over who would succeed Mbekibegan in earnest, did the façade of party unity begin to crack.Mbeki’s position on HIV and AIDS became a lightning rod in theleadership contest. TAC’s protests at the 16 th International AIDSConference in Toronto in August that year helped escalate theinternational public humiliation of the ANC at the hands of UNofficials and the media.By late 2006, a change of policy on ARVs was essential for theANC leadership to regain its authority. As it looked for a facesavingexit, the Health Minister’s (non HIV-related) sickness andtemporary departure from office allowed the government to backdown with good grace, finally acknowledging the scale of theproblem and agreeing to do more, working with civil society andrestructuring the South African National Aids Council.Deputy Health Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, a sharpcritic of the government’s policies, acknowledged the role thatTAC played. ‘Activism’, she said, ‘did change policy and forceCASE STUDY243
FROM POVERTY TO POWERgovernment to alter course – partly by strengthening differentvoices in government.’ And one study concluded: ‘The AIDScampaign, which has been far more concerned to use theinstruments offered by constitutional democracy than any otherattempt to win change in post-apartheid South Africa, has alsobeen far more successful than its counterparts in winningchange.’Sources: Steven Friedman (undated), ‘The Extraordinary “Ordinary”: The Campaign forComprehensive AIDS treatment in South Africa’; author interview with Mark Heywood,TAC, July 2007.CASE STUDY244
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4 RISK AND VULNERABILITY HEALTH RISKSTAC was astute in building broad alliances both within and outsidegovernment, and at local, national, and international levels.The campaign showed a remarkable <strong>to</strong>lerance for difference,even working with the Catholic Church despite disagreemen<strong>to</strong>ver the use of condoms. By not denouncing the ANC government(unlike many other social movements), TAC managed <strong>to</strong>find and cultivate allies within the party who eventually becameinstrumental in changing government policy.Since its campaign did not threaten major political or economicinterests (other than the foreign drug companies), it was probablymore suited <strong>to</strong> an insider–outsider-type strategy than issuessuch as land reform or the fall of apartheid itself. As an organisationof HIV-positive people, TAC also em<strong>power</strong>ed its members <strong>to</strong>become their own most effective advocates, running ‘treatmentliteracy’ campaigns that provided the basis for both self-help andsocial mobilisation.Despite TAC’s enormous success in influencing public opinion,President Mbeki remained defiant, giving full support <strong>to</strong> HealthMinister Man<strong>to</strong> Tshabalala-Msimang, who had earned thenickname ‘Dr. Beetroot’ for her repeated assertions thatgarlic, beetroot, and better nutrition offered better prospects fortreating AIDS than ARVs.Only in 2006, when the battle over who would succeed Mbekibegan in earnest, did the façade of party unity begin <strong>to</strong> crack.Mbeki’s position on HIV and AIDS became a lightning rod in theleadership contest. TAC’s protests at the 16 th International AIDSConference in Toron<strong>to</strong> in August that year helped escalate theinternational public humiliation of the ANC at the hands of UNofficials and the media.By late 2006, a change of policy on ARVs was essential for theANC leadership <strong>to</strong> regain its authority. As it looked for a facesavingexit, the Health Minister’s (non HIV-related) sickness andtemporary departure from office allowed the government <strong>to</strong> backdown with good grace, finally acknowledging the scale of theproblem and agreeing <strong>to</strong> do more, working with civil society andrestructuring the South African National Aids Council.Deputy Health Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, a sharpcritic of the government’s policies, acknowledged the role thatTAC played. ‘Activism’, she said, ‘did change policy and forceCASE STUDY243