From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec From poverty to power - Oxfam-Québec
2 POWER AND POLITICS I RULE, THEREFORE I AMto achieve legitimacy, either at home or in the eyes of the internationalcommunity. Widespread awareness of rights means thateconomic growth alone, while necessary, will not guaranteelegitimacy, much less bring about the deep transformations thatconstitute real development.THE POLITICS OF EFFECTIVE STATESStates reflect the history and nature of the society in question. One ofthe hallmarks of effective states is that they possess economic andpolitical elites willing to participate in building the nation by investingin people, infrastructure, and production. Such elites are sometimescorrupt but confine themselves to skimming off a percentage, awarethat to be sustainable, even corruption requires a flourishing economy.135 By contrast, building effective states becomes extraordinarilydifficult when elites are dominated by get-rich-quick politicians andbusiness leaders, or by those unwilling to risk investing at home andwho instead park their wealth abroad. This so-called ‘national bourgeoisiequestion’ bedevils much of Latin America and Africa.The glue that binds powerful elites into a national project can stemfrom history, fear, culture, ideology, leadership, or national pride.In East Asia, war, occupation, and defeat gave rise to nationalism inJapan and communism in China, while the uprooting of existingelites and the persistence of an external threat were important in SouthKorea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Cultural traditions of paternalismand commitment to education undoubtedly helped, although theirimportance is often exaggerated. Culture is an endlessly malleableconcept: prior to South Korea’s take-off, Confucianism’s respect forauthority and hierarchy was held up as one explanation for its failureto develop. And effective states have arisen in many cultures: ‘African’or ‘Latin American’ values cannot explain why Botswana or Uruguaywere able to build effective states while others around them did not.Successful states manage a difficult balancing act. They must keepat arm’s length groups seeking to ‘capture’ the state for their ownshort-term gain, yet must remain deeply integrated into society inorder to understand the needs and possibilities of the economy. This95
FROM POVERTY TO POWER‘embedded autonomy’ 136 requires a skilled civil service, based onmeritocratic appointments and able to experiment and learn from itsmistakes as it seeks to build the institutions – economic, social, orpolitical – needed for development.Where would-be developmental states have failed, it is oftenbecause such autonomy could not be maintained. In Latin America,many of the businesses that initially flourished behind tariff barriersfailed to invest and increase productivity, but proved adept at lobbyinggovernments for subsidies and continued protection. Latin Americangovernments turned out to be ineffectual at picking winners, but thelosers proved masters at picking governments.States need legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens, who accept thestate’s right to rule in exchange for their ability to seek protection andclaim rights. In this, states often resemble banks, which cocoon themselvesin pompous buildings and rituals to create an illusion of solidityand to win public confidence, since without that they are remarkablyfragile. In the political equivalent of a run on a bank, the astonishingcollapse of communist states in Eastern Europe in the early 1990sshows what happens when such legitimacy is lost. In order to manageconflicts within society peacefully, states also need the active supportof the most powerful citizens, such as business, ethnic, and religiousleaders, or of regional power brokers.Legitimacy is based on an underlying ‘social contract’ betweenstate and citizen – a deal, whether explicit or not, that buildsconfidence and trust between citizens, businesses, and the state byestablishing the rights and responsibilities of each. The state’s responsibilityto protect gives it the right to conscript or to impose martial law.Its responsibility for public welfare gives it the right to raise taxes. Itsresponsibility for justice bestows the right to arrest and imprison.Even non-democratic regimes need to achieve a degree oflegitimacy to survive over time. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime(1967–98) achieved significant legitimacy for many years, despite itsmilitary origins and authoritarian character, by ensuring the basicdelivery of education and health services and paying attention to ruraldevelopment.96
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FROM POVERTY TO POWER‘embedded au<strong>to</strong>nomy’ 136 requires a skilled civil service, based onmeri<strong>to</strong>cratic appointments and able <strong>to</strong> experiment and learn from itsmistakes as it seeks <strong>to</strong> build the institutions – economic, social, orpolitical – needed for development.Where would-be developmental states have failed, it is oftenbecause such au<strong>to</strong>nomy could not be maintained. In Latin America,many of the businesses that initially flourished behind tariff barriersfailed <strong>to</strong> invest and increase productivity, but proved adept at lobbyinggovernments for subsidies and continued protection. Latin Americangovernments turned out <strong>to</strong> be ineffectual at picking winners, but thelosers proved masters at picking governments.States need legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens, who accept thestate’s right <strong>to</strong> rule in exchange for their ability <strong>to</strong> seek protection andclaim rights. In this, states often resemble banks, which cocoon themselvesin pompous buildings and rituals <strong>to</strong> create an illusion of solidityand <strong>to</strong> win public confidence, since without that they are remarkablyfragile. In the political equivalent of a run on a bank, the as<strong>to</strong>nishingcollapse of communist states in Eastern Europe in the early 1990sshows what happens when such legitimacy is lost. In order <strong>to</strong> manageconflicts within society peacefully, states also need the active suppor<strong>to</strong>f the most <strong>power</strong>ful citizens, such as business, ethnic, and religiousleaders, or of regional <strong>power</strong> brokers.Legitimacy is based on an underlying ‘social contract’ betweenstate and citizen – a deal, whether explicit or not, that buildsconfidence and trust between citizens, businesses, and the state byestablishing the rights and responsibilities of each. The state’s responsibility<strong>to</strong> protect gives it the right <strong>to</strong> conscript or <strong>to</strong> impose martial law.Its responsibility for public welfare gives it the right <strong>to</strong> raise taxes. Itsresponsibility for justice bes<strong>to</strong>ws the right <strong>to</strong> arrest and imprison.Even non-democratic regimes need <strong>to</strong> achieve a degree oflegitimacy <strong>to</strong> survive over time. In Indonesia, the Suhar<strong>to</strong> regime(1967–98) achieved significant legitimacy for many years, despite itsmilitary origins and authoritarian character, by ensuring the basicdelivery of education and health services and paying attention <strong>to</strong> ruraldevelopment.96
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